Wednesday, December 17, 2025

The Thanjavur District Co Op Milk ... vs Acit, Circle2(1), Trichy on 21 November, 2022

 

The Thanjavur District Co Op Milk ... vs Acit, Circle2(1), Trichy on 21 November, 2022

     आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण चे ई "सी" ायपीठ म।
IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, CHENNAI
            BENCHES "C" : CHENNAI

 BEFORE SHRI MAHAVIR SINGH, VICE-PRESIDENT AND
    DR. DIPAK P. RIPOTE, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER

            आयकरअपीलसं. / ITA No.404/CHNY/2022
             िनधारणवष / Assessment Year : 2017-18
 The Thanjavur District Co Op      The Principal
 Milk Producers Union Limited, Vs Commissioner of Income
 No.1, Nanjikottai Road,           Tax-1, Madurai.
 Thanjavur - 613006.
 PAN: AAAAT 0224 E
      Appellant/ Assessee             Respondent /Revenue

 Assessee by              K.Meenakshisundaram - ITP
 Revenue by               Shri M.Rajan - CIT(DR)
 Date of hearing          23/08/2022
 Date of pronouncement    21/11/2022

                          आदेश/ ORDER

PER DR. DIPAK P. RIPOTE, AM:

This is an appeal filed by the Appellant Assessee against the order u/s 263 of the Income Tax Act (Act) of the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax Madurai-1, dated 26/03/2022 for A.Y. 2017-18. The Assessee has raised following grounds of appeal:

"The order under section 263 of the income tax Act dated 26/3/2022 received by the appellant on 1/4/2022 is objected to on the following grounds of appeal.
1. The learned Principal Commissioner Madurai erred in setting aside the valid order passed by the Assisstant Commissioner of Income tax Circle-2(1) Trichy dated 5/11/2019 for the assessment year 2017- 2018 under section 263 on mere assumptions and presumptions that the order had been erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue.
2. The learned Principal Commissioner misdirected himself that the valid order passed by the Assisstant Commissioner was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue simply for the reason that the The Thanjavur District Co. Op Milk Producers Union Ltd.,[A] order was cryptic and parsimonious in description of the reliefs claimed by the assessee and allowed by the Assessing Officer with the Assisstant Commissioner's views on each and every claim of the assessee under chapter VIA and more especially with respect to the relief under section 80(P)(2)(d).
3. The learned Principal Commissioner is believed to have set aside the valid order mainly on account of the objections raised by Revenue Audit party or the Internal Audit party and such action on the part of the Principal Commissioner is erroneous as the Audit parties are not the persons vested with powers to express opinions on legal aspects of an assessment.
4. The learned Principal Commissioner ought to have appreciated the fact that the assessee's file was never called for by the Principal Commissioner for review and inspection at any point of time and it is a mystery as to how the Principal commissioner came to know about the erroneous nature of assessment on his own."

2. Brief Facts of the case :

It is mentioned in the assessment order that the assessee is a Co-
Operative Society engaged in promoting dairy activities like procuring milk, processing milk, producing by- products, marketing milk and its products. The Assessee filed return of Income for AY 2017-18 on 09/10/2017. Assessee also filed revised return on 11/03/2019. The case of the assessee was selected for scrutiny for following reasons:
- Claim of any other amount as deduction
- Deduction under chapter VIA
- Deduction and deposits of TDS
- Cash deposits during demonetisation period.
2.1 It is mentioned in the Assessment Order that the assessee being Co-Operative Society have claimed deduction u/s.80P(2)(d) on following amounts:
-Interest on fixed deposit with Co-Op Central bank Thanjavur Rs. 79,17,751/-
The Thanjavur District Co. Op Milk Producers Union Ltd.,[A]
-Interest on Saving Account with Co-Op Central bank Thanjavur Rs.72990/-
2.2 In addition to these the assessee had also claimed deduction u/s.80P(2)(e), 80P(c) for various amounts mentioned in the order.
2.3 It has also been mentioned by the Assessing Officer(AO) in the assessment order that Assessee has submitted Ledger copies of the respective bank accounts in supports of the interest accrued on the fixed deposits and saving account. The Assessing Officer allowed the assessee's claim for deduction u/s.80P(2)(d), u/s.80P(2)(e), u/s.80P(c) and assessed the income of the assessee at NIL.
2.4 However, the Pr.Commissioner of Income Tax, Madurai-

1(PCIT), issued notice u/s 263 of the Act to the assessee and after giving opportunity to the assessee, passed the order u/s 263 of the Act on 26/03/2022. Assessee has filed appeal before this Tribunal against the said order u/s 263.

2.5 ThePr.CIT has observed in the order u/s 263 as under :

3. OBSERVATIONS IN THE ORDER u/s 263 :

"5. I have considered the written submissions of the assessee, in the light of the facts of the case, the provisions of the law and the material information available on records. The assessee had admitted a gross total income of Rs.79,37,939/- and claimed the entire income as deduction u/s 80P(2).Further verification of the records shows that assessee has invested the society's funds in Cooperative Banks and the interest received from such investments has been claimed as deduction u/s 80P(2)(d) of the IT Act, 1961 The Thanjavur District Co. Op Milk Producers Union Ltd.,[A] under Chapter VIA. The assessee in the reply filed before me stated that they derived interest income on fixed deposit with Central Co- operative Bank or Rs.79,17,751/-, interest on SB account with Central Co-op Bank of Rs.72,990/- and interest on SB account with other commercial Bank of Rs.5,88,226/- totaling to Rs.85,78,967/- and claimed deduction of Rs.79,90,741/- u/s 80(p)(2)(d) and restricted the same to gross total income of Rs.79,37,939/-. I have perused the written submission made by the assessee quoting various judgments. Whereas the Income Tax Act is very clear that the deduction u/s 80P(2)(d) is applicable "in respect of any income by way of interest or dividends derived by the cooperative society from its investments with any other co-operative society, the whole of such income". In the case on hand, the assessee has derived interest and dividend income on the investments made in the Cooperative Banks. Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act reads as under;
(d) in respect of any income by way of interest or dividends derived by the co-operative society from its investments with any other cooperative society, the whole of such income;

Accordingly, any Co-operative Society can claim deduction of the whole of the interest and dividend income derived from its investment with any other Cooperative Society, whereas the assessee invested in Cooperative Banks which could not be considered as a cooperative society since their activities are on par with commercial banks and therefore, the income on investments made in the Banks is not an allowable deduction as per the provisions of section 80P(2)(d) of the Act, and the same has to be disallowed and assessed separately under the head income from other sources. The assessing officer has failed to take congnizance of the above facts and wrongly allowed the deduction claimed u/s 80P(2)(d) of the Act with regard to the interest receipt of Rs.79,90,741/- on the investment made with Thanjavur District Central Cooperative Bank and kumbakonam Central Cooperative Bank and completed the assessment accepting the income returned.

6. It is seen from the above that the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer is not only erroneous but also prejudicial to the interest of revenue since the same has been passed without proper enquiry and verification of deduction claimed u/s 80P(2)(d) of the Act."

4. We have heard both the parties and perused the records. The Pr.CIT has invoked his powers of revision u/s.263. There are conditions which ought to be satisfied before invoking Section 263. Those are that the Assessment Order should be Erroneous and it The Thanjavur District Co. Op Milk Producers Union Ltd.,[A] should be prejudicial to the interest of revenue. For ready reference Section 263 of the Act is reproduced here under:

263. (1) The Principal Commissioner or Commissioner may call for and examine the record of any proceeding under this Act, and if he considers that any order passed therein by the Assessing Officer is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue, he may, after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard and after making or causing to be made such inquiry as he deems necessary, pass such order thereon as the circumstances of the case justify, including an order enhancing or modifying the assessment, or cancelling the assessment and directing a fresh assessment.
"Explanation 1.--..........
(b) "record" shall include and shall be deemed always to have included all records relating to any proceeding under this Act available at the time of examination by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner;
(c)............

Explanation 2.--For the purposes of this section, it is hereby declared that an order passed by the Assessing Officer shall be deemed to be erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue, if, in the opinion of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner,--

(a) the order is passed without making inquiries or verification which should have been made;
(b) the order is passed allowing any relief without inquiring into the claim;
(c) the order has not been made in accordance with any order, direction or instruction issued by the Board under section 119; or
(d) the order has not been passed in accordance with any decision which is prejudicial to the assessee, rendered by the jurisdictional High Court or Supreme Court in the case of the assessee or any other person."

4.1 The Pr.CIT was of the opinion that the Assessment Order has been passed without making inquiries or verification and relief allowed without inquiring.

4.2 However, on perusal of the assessment order it is observed that the AO had got the ledger copies of the accounts showing interest The Thanjavur District Co. Op Milk Producers Union Ltd.,[A] income. The AO has reproduced the amounts of interest income earned and the same figures have been mentioned by the Pr.CIT. Thus, there is no error in the amounts mentioned. The AO has studied the Ledger Copies of the accounts showing interest income. After analysing the same the AO arrived at a conclusion that the Assessee was entitled for deduction u/s.80P(2)(d) of the Act for the amount of Rs.79,37,939/-. It is important to mention here that the AO has excluded interest income of Rs.5,88,226/- earned from Commercial Bank from the deduction u/s 80P(2)(d) of the Act. This explains that the AO had applied his mind to the documents submitted by the assessee.

5. Before we discuss the case further, we will like to mentions the relevant case laws on this issue.

5.1 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT Vs. Amitabh Bachchan, 384 ITR 200(SC) observed as under :

"21. There can be no doubt that so long as the view taken by the Assessing Officer is a possible view the same ought not to be interfered with by the Commissioner under Section 263 of the Act merely on the ground that there is another possible view of the matter. Permitting exercise of revisional power in a situation where two views are possible would really amount to conferring some kind of an appellate power in the revisional authority. This is a course of action that must be desisted from."

5.2 The Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT v/s Mepco Industries Ltd. 294 ITR 121 (Madras) held as under :

The Thanjavur District Co. Op Milk Producers Union Ltd.,[A] Quote, "8. Therefore, on the facts of the case, when two views are possible and it is not the case of the Revenue that the view taken by the Assessing Officer is not permissible in law, the CIT is not justified in invoking the jurisdiction under section 263 of the Act. "
Unquote.
5.3 The Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Future Corporate Resources Ltd in IT Appeal No.1275 of 2017 vide order dated September 29, 2021 held as under :
Quote ," 7. In the order of PCIT it is stated "in paragraph 4.3 of the assessment order, the Assessing Officer has recorded that from the details submitted by the assessee and the explanation given by him, it was observed that assessee had regular business connection with the company in which investment had been made and also there was business income to the assessee from the same. Therefore, interest expense debited by the assessee has not been considered for the calculation of disallowance under section 14A because the same has been incurred for the purpose of business."

The PCIT therefore agrees that the Assessing Officer has recorded from the details submitted by respondent and the explanation given by respondent that the assessee had regular business connection with the company in which investment has been made and also there was a business income to the assessee from the same. He notes that the Assessing Officer, therefore did not consider the calculation of disallowance under section 14A the interest expense debited by the assessee because the same has been incurred for the purpose of business. The PCIT though was unhappy with the view of the Assessing Officer, the PCIT himself does not say why it should have been considered for the calculation of disallowance under section 14A. Even if one assumes that he has, after reading of the order expressed his views, but still the position is two views therefore were possible. Therefore, if one of the two possible views was taken by the Assessing Officer, the PCIT could not have exercised his powers under section 263 of the Act. 8. " Unquote . 5.4 Thus, the principal of the law emanating from the above decision of the Hon'ble SC, Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court, Hon'ble Bombay High Court is that when two views are legally possible and AO adopts one view the Assessment Order cannot be said to be erroneous for the CIT to invoke jurisdiction u/s 263.

The Thanjavur District Co. Op Milk Producers Union Ltd.,[A] 5.5 We will analyze the facts of the present case on the touch stone of law mentioned above.

5.6 Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Pr.CIT Vs. Totagars Co-operative Sale Society in IT Appeal No.100069 of 2016 vide Order dated 05/01/2017 has held as under :

Quote, "8. The issue whether a Co-operative Bank is considered to be a Co-operative Society is no longer res integra. For the said issue has been decided by the ITAT itself in different cases. Moreover the word "Co-operative Society" are the words of a large extent, and denotes a genus, whereas the word "Co-operative Bank" is a word of limited extent, which merely demarcates and identifies a particular species of the genus Co-operative Societies. Co-Operative Society can be of different nature, and can be involved in different activities; the Co-operative Society Bank is merely a variety of the Co-operative Societies. Thus the Co- operative Bank which is a species of the genus would necessarily be covered by the word "Co-operative Society".
9. Furthermore, even according to Section 56(i)(ccv) of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949, defines a primary Co-Operative Society bank as the meaning of Co-Operative Society. Therefore, a Co-

operative Society Bank would be included in the words 'Co- operative Society'.

10. Admittedly, the interest which the assessee respondent had earned was from a Co-operative Society Bank. Therefore, according to Sec. 80P(2)(d) of the I.T. Act, the said amount of interest earned from a Co-operative Society Bank would be deductible from the gross income of the Co-operative Society in order to assess its total income. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was not justified in denying the said deduction to the assessee respondent.

11. The learned counsel has relied on the case of Totgars Co- operative Sale Society Ltd. v. ITO [2010] 322 ITR 283/188 Taxman 282 (SC). However, the said case dealt with the interpretation, and the deduction, which would be applicable under Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the I.T. Act. For, in the present case the interpretation that is required is of Section 80P(2)(d) of the I.T. Act and not Section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the I.T. Act. Thereforethe said judgment is inapplicable to the present case. Thus, neither of the The Thanjavur District Co. Op Milk Producers Union Ltd.,[A] two substantial questions of law canvassed by the learned counsel for the Revenue even arise in the present case." Unquote. 5.7 The ITAT Chennai in the case of ITO Vs. Irula Snake Catchers Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd [2022] 140 taxmann.com 494 (Chennai - Trib.) has held on identical facts as under :

Quote, "We heard the rival submissions and considered the documents available on records. Here, we are adjudicatingtwo issues; one relating to deduction u/s.80P(2) of the Act and the applicability of the video / still photography- charges within the ambit of the income of the co-operative society. The Assessee received the interest from theco-operative bank "TAICO". The co- operative banks are first cooperative society and thereafter they areconverted into banks. The Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court is also in favour of the Assessee. Hon'ble SupremeCourt in the case of Mavilayi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. CIT [2021] 123 taxmann.com 161/279 Taxman75 (SC) observed that whether the Assessee is registered as a primary agricultural credit society, it is entitled forthe benefit of deduction u/s.80P(2) of the Act, notwithstanding that it was also giving loans to its members whichis not related to agriculture. Respectfully considering the judicial observations, it is clear that, in the case of theinterest earned from the co-operative bank, it does not come under the consideration of the income from othersources. The said interest is eligible for deduction u/s.80P(2) of the Act." Unquote.
5.8 The ITAT Surat Bench on identical facts in the case of BardoliVibhag Gram Vikas Co.Op. Credit Society Vs. Pr.CIT [2021] 127 taxmann.com 334 (Surat-Trib.) has held as under :
Quote "12. The ld. PCIT before passing under section 263 of the Act, identified the issue regarding the claim of deduction under section 80P(2)(d) in its show cause notice dated 6-3-2019. The assessee in its reply dated 7-3-2019 clearly explained that the issue was examined by Assessing Officer and that the assessment order is not erroneous. The assessee also explained that similar disallowances/issues was subject matter in the appeal filed by the revenue before Tribunal in A.Y. 2009-10, 2010-11 and 2012-13 and the assessee was allowed similar deductions.
13. The Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in Aryan Arcade Ltd. v. Pr. CIT [2019] 412 ITR 277 (Gujarat) held that merely because Commissioner held a different belief that would not permit The Thanjavur District Co. Op Milk Producers Union Ltd.,[A] him to take the order in revision, it if further held that when Assessing Officer made full enquiry, he made up his mind, the notice of revision is not valid. (emphasis added by us). Further, Hon'ble Madras High Court in CIT v. Mepco Industries Ltd. [2007] 163 Taxman 648/294 ITR 121 (Madras) held that when two views are possible on an issue and it is not the case of the Commissioner that the view taken by AssessingOfficer is not permissible in law, Commissioner cannot invoke his jurisdiction under section 263 of the Act. (emphasis added by us)
14. As we have noted above the assessing officer has made enquiries on the allowability of deduction under section 80(P)(2)(d) and passed the assessment order, thus, the Assessing Officer has taken a reasonable and possible view which cannot be held as erroneous.
15. The Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in Totagars Cooperative Sales Society (supra) held that for the purpose of section 80P(2)(d) a Co-operative Bank should be considered by a Co-operative Society and interest earned by Co-operative Society from Cooperative Bank would necessarily be deductible under section 80P(1) of the Act. Further, the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in Surat VankarSahakari Sangh Ltd. (supra) held that assessee co-

operative society is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) in respect of gross interest received from co-operative bank without adjusting interest paid to said bank.

16. The Co-ordinate Bench of Rajkot Tribunal in Surendarnagar District Co-operative Milk Producer Union Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2019] 111 taxmann.com 69/179 ITD 690 (Rajkot Tribunal) also held the assessee co-operative society could not claim benefit under section 80P(2)(d) in respect of interest earned by it from deposits made with nationalized/private banks, however, the said benefit was available in respect of interest earned and on deposits made with co-operative bank. Thus, in view of the aforesaid legal discussion we are of the considered view that order passed by Assessing Officer is not erroneous, though it may be prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. Therefore, the twin conditions that orders is erroneous and so far as prejudicial to the interest of revenue, as prescribed under section 263 is not fulfilled in the present case." Unquote.

6. Thus, in this case we have to first decide whether the Assessment Order is erroneous or not! The Thanjavur District Co. Op Milk Producers Union Ltd.,[A] 6.1 In the case under consideration, it is observed that the AO has taken a possible view on the issue of allowability of deduction u/s 80P(2)(d) of the Act after studying the respective ledger accounts. The AO had called for the respective ledger accounts which are categorically mentioned in the assessment order. To arrive at the figure of the Interest earned one just needs to study the ledger accounts. Before the AO, the fact that the assessee has earned Interest Income from Co-operative bank was on record and easy to understand from the ledger accounts. The Pr.CIT has also relied on the same ledger accounts to arrive at a different conclusion. It is a fact that the issue of deductibility of Interest earned by Co-Operative society from Co-Operative Bank has been held in favour of assessee by Hon'ble Karnataka High Court (supra), ITAT Chennai, ITAT Surat (supra). Therefore, the AO has adopted a view which was one legally possible view. Therefore, in these facts and circumstances of the case as held by Hon'ble SC in the case of Amitabh Bachchan (supra) and Hon'ble High Court (Supra), when two views are possible and AO adopts one view, the Assessment cannot be said to be erroneous. Therefore, the Pr.CIT has no power to invoke jurisdiction u/s.263 in such circumstances where the Assessment Order is not erroneous. Therefore, on all facts and circumstances of the case, respectfully following the judicial precedence discussed in The Thanjavur District Co. Op Milk Producers Union Ltd.,[A] earlier paragraphs, the order of the Pr.CIT is set aside. Accordingly, the appeal of the Appellant Assessee is allowed.

7. In the result, appeal of the Assessee is Allowed.

Order pronounced in the open Court on 21st November, 2022.

       Sd/-                                           Sd/-
(MAHAVIR SINGH)                             (DR. DIPAK P. RIPOTE)
 VICE-PRESIDENT                            ACCOUNTANT MEMBER

पुणे / Pune; दनांक / Dated : 21st Nov, 2022/ SGR*

आदेशक ितिलिपअ ेिषत / Copy of the Order forwarded to :

1. अपीलाथ / The Appellant.
2. यथ / The Respondent.
3. The CIT(A), concerned.
4. The Pr. CIT, concerned.
5. िवभागीय ितिनिध, आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण, चे ई बच, चे ई / DR, ITAT, "C" Bench, Chennai.
6. गाडफ़ाइल / Guard File.

आदेशानुसार / BY ORDER, // TRUE COPY // Senior Private Secretary आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण, पुण/े ITAT, Pune.

Subha Dey & Anr vs The State Of West Bengal on 29 July, 2022

 

Subha Dey & Anr vs The State Of West Bengal on 29 July, 2022

Author: Debangsu Basak

Bench: Debangsu Basak

                                    1


                IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
                Criminal Miscellaneous Jurisdiction
                            Appellate Side
Present:

The Hon'ble Justice Debangsu Basak

            And

The Hon'ble Justice Bibhas Ranjan De


                           CRA 169 of 2020
                                With
                           CRAN 5 of 2022

                           Subha Dey & Anr.
                                   Vs.
                        The State of West Bengal


For the Appellant            : Mr. Rajdeep Mazumder, Adv.
                               Ms. Arushi Rathore, Adv.
                               Ms. Radhika Agarwal, Adv.

For the State                : Mr. P.K. Datta, Ld. APP
                               Mr. Santanu Deb Roy, Adv.

Heard on                     : July 20, 2022
Judgement on                 : July 29, 2022

DEBANGSU BASAK, J.:-


   1.

The appellants have assailed the judgement of conviction dated January 21, 2020 passed by the learned additional District and Sessions Judge, First Court and Special Court Bongaon, North 24 Parganas in Special (POCSO) 88/2018 (75/18) and the order of sentence dated January 20, 2020 passed therein.

2. By the impugned judgement of conviction dated January 21, 2020, the appellants have been held guilty of the offences under section 376 (2) (j)/376 D/506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 6 of the Protection of Children against Sexual Offences Act, 2012. By the impugned order of sentence dated January 28, 2020, the appellants have been sentenced various terms with a maximum period of 10 years and directed to pay various amounts of fine and in default to undergo various periods of imprisonment.

3. The police received a complaint from the victim which was registered as a first information report being Gaighata police station case No. 1288/18 dated December 12, 2018 under section 376 (2) (j)/376D/506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 6 of the Protection of Children against Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The police had investigated into the complaint and on completion of investigations, police submitted charge sheet against the appellants under section 376 (2) (j)/376D/506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 6 of the Protection of Children against Sexual Offences Act, 2012.

4. The Trial Court had framed charges against the appellants under section 376 (2) (j)/376D/506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 6 of the Protection of Children against Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The appellants had pleaded not guilty to the offence and on claiming to be tried were tried.

5. At the trial, the prosecution had examined 12 witnesses. The prosecution had tendered various documents as evidence which were marked as exhibits. The prosecution had also tendered material evidences which were marked as exhibits.

6. The prosecution had approached the Trial Court with the case that, the appellants had met the victim on December 11, 2018 when she had been to Bokchara Market for photography purpose. The appellants on the pretext of meeting her with her friend Furi took her to an open field near Digha, Bokchara in the night at about 10.30 P.M where the appellants had forcibly committed rape upon the victim. The appellant had threatened the victim not to disclose the incident to anybody. Consequently, the appellant had committed offences under Section 376 (2)

(j)/376D/506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of Children against Sexual Offences Act, 2012.

7. Learned advocate appearing for the appellants has submitted that, the prosecution could not establish the case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. He has contended that, out of the 12 prosecution witnesses which were examined, three were declared hostile by the prosecution. The victim herself had been declared hostile by the prosecution.

8. Referring to the oral testimony of the victim, being the prosecution witness No. 7, learned advocate appearing for the appellants has submitted that, the victim stated that she was asked to establish a relationship with the appellants by making an ugly proposal and that, after hearing the same, she fled away from the place and returned home. He has contended that, the statement of the victim being prosecution witness No. 7 clearly indicated that no offence as alleged by the prosecution was committed. According to him, prosecution witness No. 7 is the only eyewitness and therefore, her evidence carries the utmost of weightage.

9. Learned advocate appearing for the appellants has submitted that, prosecution witness No. 1 and 2 being the mother and sister-in-law of the victim were also declared hostile by the prosecution. They did not support the case of the prosecution. They had stated that the prosecution witness No. 7 was detained by her friends for settling some disputes and thereafter prosecution witness No. 7 returned home on the date of the incident at about 7:45 PM.

10. Learned advocate appearing for the appellants has referred to the evidence of the other prosecution witnesses. He has submitted that, none of the prosecution witnesses have established commission of any offence by any of the appellants. He has referred to the evidence of the prosecution witness No. 8 and prosecution witness No. 11 who are doctors. He has referred to such testimony and submitted that, the doctors could not find any injury on the prosecution witness No. 7. He has submitted that the prosecution witness No. 11 stated in evidence that there was no mark of external injury over the private parts of the prosecution witness No. 7.

11. Learned advocate appearing for the appellants has submitted that, the learned judge had erred in relying upon the statement of the prosecution witness No. 7 recorded under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the Learned Magistrate for convicting the appellants. He has contended that, statements recorded under section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code are not substantive evidence in itself and can only be used for corroboration. According to him, a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be solely relied upon to convict an accused in the absence of any corroborative evidence. He has contended that, the prosecution witness No. 7 in evidence in Court, stated contrary to the statements recorded under section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In court, prosecution witness No. 7 has claimed that she was tutored by the police at the time of recording her statement. He has pointed out that, the magistrate who recorded the statement of the prosecution witness No. 7 under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code was not examined by the prosecution.

12. Learned advocate appearing for the appellants has relied upon 1972 (3) Supreme Court Cases 280 (Ram Kishan Singh vs. Harmit Kaur and Another) for the proposition that, a statement recorded under section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not substantive evidence. He has relied upon 2005 Supreme Court Cases (Criminal) 1050 (Raja Ram vs. State of Rajasthan) and 2005 Supreme Court Cases (Criminal) 1037 (Muktihar Ahmed Ansari vs. State) for the proposition that, the defence can rely upon the evidence of a witness of the prosecution who was not supporting the case of the prosecution and was not declared as a hostile witness.

13. Learned advocate appearing for the appellants has submitted that, since the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, the appellants should be acquitted.

14. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the state has referred to the facts of the case as also to the evidence on record. He has submitted that, the victim who was the prosecution witness No. 7, was a minor at the time of the incident. Her statement had been recorded by the magistrate under section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code which was marked as Exhibit 9. In the complaint, the prosecution witness No. 7 had vividly narrated the incident. He has contended that, the appellants had threatened the victim not to tell the incident to her home. He has referred to the evidence of the father of the victim being prosecution witness No. 3. He has submitted that, the appellants used to attack the victim on and off. On the date of the incident, the appellants had called the victim at about 6 to 6:30 PM and took her to some other place.

15. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the state has contended that, the police conducted the investigations properly. The investigating officer had visited the place of occurrence, examined the available witnesses and recorded their statements, sent the victim girl for medical examination and on completion of the investigations, filed charge sheet.

16. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the state has contended that, the appellants are influential in the locality. The appellants had in exercise of their influence suppressed the witnesses. The appellants had taken advantage of the tender age of the victim and threatened her to keep quiet. He has contended that, the appeal should be dismissed.

17. The appellants had been tried in respect of an incident alleged to be occurring on December 11, 2018 between them and the victim being the prosecution witness No. 7. The victim being the prosecution witness No. 7 had deposed on April 4, 2019. Prior thereto, she had made a complaint to the police which was marked as Exhibit 3. She had recorded a statement under section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code which was marked as Exhibit 5. She had been medically examined on December 11, 2018 and the report was marked as exhibit 4.

18. The mother of the victim had deposed as prosecution witness No. 1. In her deposition, prosecution witness No. 1 has stated that, on December 11, 2018, her daughter, the victim, had been to Bokchara Market for a photography purpose at about 4 P.M and did not return till 7 P.M. Since the victim did not return till 7 P.M, they had started a search for her. The victim had returned on 7.45 P.M. After her return, the victim had told the prosecution witness No. 1 that, the victim was detained by some friends for settling an ongoing dispute. She had stated that, the victim herself, her husband and daughter-in-law had been to the police station with regard to the incident. The police had asked the victim to produce her wearing apparels on the date of the incident and also her birth certificate. Thereafter, the birth certificate along with her wearing apparels have been produced which were seized by the police. She had put her left thumb impression, and her husband and daughter-in- law put their signature on the same. Prosecution witness No. 1, the mother of the victim, had been declared hostile by the prosecution. Subsequent such declaration, prosecution witness had denied that, she was interrogated by the police, or that she stated before the police that the appellants had spoiled the life of her daughter and that she demanded severe punishment against the appellant. She had stated that, she cannot identify the appellants.

19. Prosecution witness No. 2 is the sister-in-law of the victim and she had deposed on behalf of the prosecution. She had corroborated much of the deposition of the prosecution witness No. 1. In addition thereto, she had stated that the victim had confided in her that on some occasions, some boys used to misbehave and ill-treat the victim in course of her school and outside home. Such matter had been reported to the police. After being declared as hostile she had stated in a deposition that, she cannot identify the appellants.

20. The father of the victim had deposed as prosecution witness No. 3. He had stated that, the appellants used to hold out threats to his daughter on and off. He had stated that, on the date of the incident, the appellants had called her daughter at about 6 to 6.30 P.M and took her to some place. In cross-examination, he had claimed that he did not say before the police on the date of the incident that the appellants had called her daughter on 6 to 6.30 P.M in the evening.

21. Prosecution witness No. 4 is a police constable and had accompanied the sub-inspector of police who went to the house of the victim. He is the scribe of the complaint which the victim had made to the police. Prosecution witness No. 5 is another police personnel who had accompanied the sub-inspector of police on the date of the incident to the house of the victim. He is one of the seizure- list witnesses.

22. The sister of the victim has deposed as prosecution witness No. 6. She had stated about some dispute between the victim and some boys which he had heard over the phone. The victim herself had deposed as prosecution witness No. 7. The victim had been declared as hostile. In her cross-examination, she had claimed that the statement made before the Magistrate recorded under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code was as per tutoring by the police.

23. In her deposition recorded on April 4, 2019, prosecution witness No. 7, who was the victim, has stated that on December 11, 2018, at about 4 PM, the appellants and two others met her. The appellants had asked her to meet with another person who was at that time not with them. Thereafter, they had told her to go with them and accordingly, she had cycled with them and went to a field at Digha. She had enquired about the other person from the appellants when she was informed that, such person had gone elsewhere. The appellants had asked her to establish a relation with them by making an ugly proposal. After hearing such proposal from the appellants, she had fled away from the place and returned home. She had narrated such incident to her family members when the family members decided to initiate the complaint before the court.

24. Prosecution witness No. 7 who was the victim, had been declared hostile by the prosecution and was cross- examined by the prosecution. She had been cross-examined by the defence also. In her cross examination by the defence, she has stated that, the statement she made before the magistrate under section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code was tutored by the police.

25. The medical officer examining the victim on December 12, 2018 had deposed as prosecution witness No. 8. He had stated that, on examination of the victim, he did not find any injury on the victim. He had referred the victim to Bongaon Sub- Divisional Hospital for further medical examination. He had identified the medical examination report of the victim which was marked as exhibit 6.

26. The owner of the photography shop as Thana More, Gaighata had deposed as prosecution witness No. 9. He had identified the photographs taken at his shop. A relative of the victim has deposed as prosecution witness No. 10. In his deposition, the prosecution witness No. 10 had stated that he heard about the incident. He is not an eye witness to incident. Therefore, much reliance cannot be placed on the evidence of prosecution witness No. 10.

27. The Doctor examining the victim at Bangaon J. R. Dhar Hospital on December 13, 2018 had deposed as prosecution witness No. 11. In his deposition, he had stated that, he found the victim was capable of sexual intercourse. He had stated that, no mark of external injury was noted over the private parts of the victim and that the hymeneal link was not indicated. He had stated that vaginal examination was not so painful with one figure and that no injury was found. His report of the medical examination of the victim had been marked as exhibit 4. In cross- examination, he had stated that there is a possibility of rapture of the hymen of a minor girl in the case of applying force. However, he did not notice any external or internal marks on the private parts of the victim.

28. The sub-inspector of police conducting the investigation had deposed as prosecution witness No. 12. He had stated about the conduct of the investigation and the ultimately filing of the charge sheet against the appellants.

29. In their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, both the appellants had claimed not guilty and declined to adduce any evidence.

30. The charges that the appellants had been charged with can be divided into two parts. On one part, is the charge against the appellants that they had sexually assaulted the victim. Since the victim was a minor and given the nature of the complaint lodged by the victim the appellants had been charged with aggravated penetrative sexual assault on the victim under Section 6 of the Protection of Children against Sexual Offences Act, 2012. In relation to the sexual assault to the victim, the appellants had been charged with criminal intimidation in relation to the aggravated penetrative sexual assault.

31. The evidence of the victim as prosecution witness No. 7 does not speak of any sexual assault being committed by any of the appellant on her. The testimony of the victim in Court, under oath as prosecution witness No. 7 is at variance with the statements that the victim had recorded with the police and her statement under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

32. Apart from the victim, who had deposed as prosecution witness No. 7, none of the other prosecution witness can be said to be eye witnesses to the incident. Moreover, none of the other prosecution witnesses in Court had alleged sexual assault by any of the appellant upon the victim far to speak of aggravated penetrative sexual assault on the victim. The victim who had deposed as prosecution witness No. 7, her mother who had deposed as prosecution witness No. 1 and her sister-in-law, who had deposed as PW-2 were declared hostile by the prosecution at the trial. They had been cross- examined by the prosecution after they were declared hostile. During such cross-examination also, the prosecution had not been able to elicit any evidence relating to sexual assault on the victim or criminal intimidation in relation thereto.

33. The mother of the victim as prosecution witness No. 1 and the Sister-in-law of the victim as prosecution witness No. 2 had claimed in Court, during their testimony that, the victim confided in them as to the incident. They had narrated an incident in Court, which does not involve any sexual assault far to speak of aggravated penetrative sexual assault on victim.

34. The two doctors who had examined the victim immediately after the incident, had deposed as prosecution witness No. 8 and 11. The incident had occurred on December 11, 2018. The prosecution witness No. 8, who was posted at Chandpara, BPHC on December 12, 2018 had examined the victim. He had prepared a report of the medical examination of the victim which was marked as exhibit 6. Exhibit 6 has a recording that there was no external sign of injury at any part of the body of the victim. The report has also stated that, the genitalia of the victim has not been examined The report goes on to state that the doctor had referred the victim to a higher center for proper medico legal examination. The report had been prepared on December 12, 2018 at around 10.30 P.M

35. Prosecution witness No. 8 who was the first doctor to have examined the victim subsequent to the incident, had deposed in Court that he did not find any injury on the victim and that he had referred the victim to Bongaon Sub- Divisional Hospital for further medical examination. He has proved his report which was marked as exhibit 6. Cross- examination of PW-8 had been declined by the appellants.

36. The victim had been examined on December 13, 2018 by the Doctor who deposed as prosecution witness No. 11. He had prepared a report of the medico legal examination of the victim which was marked as exhibit 4 at the trial. In his deposition, prosecution witness No. 11 has stated that, he found the victim to be capable of sexual intercourse. He, however, did not find any mark of external injury over her private parts. He had found that the hymeneal link of the victim was not intact. He had found that the vaginal examination was not so painful with one finger but no injury was found on the victim. In cross-examination, he had stated that there is a possibility of rapture of hymen of a minor girl in case of applying force although he did not notice any external injury mark on the private parts of the victim.

37. As the evidence stood before the Learned Trial Judge on the basis of oral testimony of the victim, post occurant witnesses the testimony of the doctors, and the medical evidence, it cannot be said that, the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that, the victim suffered sexual assault, far less to speak of aggravated penetrative sexual assault. The evidence before the Trial Court also does not sustain the case of the prosecuting that, the appellant had intimidated the victim in relation to the incident complained of.

38. The Learned Trial Judge had considered the deposition of the victim being the prosecution witness No. 7. The Learned Trial Judge has relied upon the testimony of the victim as according to him, the victim was the only eye witness and that too injured victim to the incident. He had given credence to the complaint lodged by the victim being exhibit 3 series as also to the statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code being exhibit 5 series.

39. With regard to a statement recorded under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code and its user at a criminal trial, Ram Kishan Singh (supra) has observed as follows:-

"8. A statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not substantive evidence. It can be used to corroborate the statement of a witness. It can be used to contradict a witness. The first information report was considered by the Sessions Judge. Any special consideration of the statement of Hazura Singh under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could not have produced a different result by reason of the conclusions of the Sessions Judge as to rejecting the oral evidence of Nihal Kaur, Harmit Kaur and Hazura Singh as unreliable, untruthful and unworthy of credence."

40. At the trial, none of the prosecution witnesses as noted above, has spoken about any sexual assault on the victim far less aggravated penetrative sexual assault. The medical evidence of the victim has also not proved beyond reasonable doubt that, the victim suffered aggravated penetrative sexual assault at the behest of any of the appellants. The statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, has not corroborated the testimony of the prosecution witness.

41. Raja Ram (supra) and Muktihar Ahmed Ansari (supra) have held that, where the evidence of the prosecution witness was not supporting the case of the prosecution and such witness has not been declared hostile, the evidence of such prosecution witness is binding on the prosecution and that the defence can rely upon such evidence to bind the prosecution.

42. In the facts of the present case, the father of the victim, who had deposed as prosecution witness No. 3 at the trial, during his deposition, did not give any evidence with regard to the aggravated penetrative sexual assault on his daughter by any of the appellants. In fact, his evidence at the trial does not speak of any sexual assault on her daughter. The prosecution did not declare the father of the victim to be hostile at the trial although he had been examined as a prosecution witness.

43. In such circumstances, since the prosecution has not been able to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt, against any of the appellants, the impugned judgement and order of conviction dated January 21, 2020 and the impugned order of sentence dated January 28, 2020 passed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, First Court-cum- Special Court POCSO in Special POCSO No. 88/2018 (75/18) convicting the appellants under Section 376(2)(j)/376D/506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 6 of the Protection of Children against Sexual Offences Act, 2012 is set aside.

44. The appellants are acquitted of the charges they had been charged with. They are directed to be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case. They shall, however, furnish a bail bond to the satisfaction of the trial Court which shall continue for six months from date in terms of Section 437A of the Criminal Procedure Code.

45. All pending applications, including application for bail, shall stand disposed of in the above terms.

46. Let a copy of the judgement along with the lower Court Records be sent down to the Court below at once.

47. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order if applied for, be supplied expeditiously after complying with all necessary legal formalities.

[DEBANGSU BASAK, J.]

48. I Agree.

[BIBHAS RANJAN DE, J.]