IN THE COURT OF THE LEARNED 3RD CIVIL
JUDGE (SENIOR DIVISION) AT ALIPORE
SOUTH 24 PARGANAS
TITLE SUIT NO. 107 OF 2024
IN THE MATTER OF;
DR. SUBRATA
CHAKRABORTY
…
Plaintiff
-Versus-
SRI SUBIR KUMAR CHAKRABORTY & ORS.
…
Defendants
WRITTEN
STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE SUBSTITUTED DEFENDANT NOS. 1(a)(i) & 1(a)(ii),
NAMELY SRI SOMNATH CHAKRABORTY AND SMT. RIYA CHAKBORTY
The substituted
Defendant Nos. 1(a)(i) and 1(a)(ii), namely Sri Somnath Chakraborty and Smt.
Riya Chakborty, most respectfully submit this Written Statement in answer to
and in defence of the suit instituted by the plaintiff;
State
as follows;
1.
That
the instant suit as framed and presented by the plaintiff is wholly
misconceived, untenable, devoid of merits and not maintainable either in law or
on facts. The plaintiff has failed to disclose any valid, subsisting and
enforceable right in respect of the suit property which could give rise to the
reliefs claimed in the present suit.
2.
That
the plaintiff has approached this Learned Court with an incorrect, distorted
and incomplete narration of facts and has deliberately suppressed several
material facts relating to the history of the suit property, the execution and
subsequent revocation of the Family Settlement Deed, the revocation of the
plaintiff's licence, the earlier eviction proceeding, the decree passed therein
and the execution of the said decree.
3.
That
the instant suit is further liable to be dismissed as the reliefs claimed by
the plaintiff are self-contradictory and mutually inconsistent. The plaintiff
seeks to establish a right on the basis of an old arrangement while
simultaneously ignoring the subsequent registered revocation thereof and the
legal and factual consequences flowing from the same.
4.
That
the plaintiff has failed to disclose any proper cause of action for institution
or continuation of the instant suit. The alleged cause of action pleaded by the
plaintiff relates to events which took place several decades ago and which were
followed by subsequent acts, correspondence, litigation, decree and execution
proceedings.
5.
That
the suit is barred by limitation. The plaintiff cannot, after an enormous and
unexplained lapse of time, seek to reopen transactions and proceedings dating
back to the years 1992, 1993, 1995 and 1997. The plaintiff has not disclosed
any legally sustainable basis for excluding the period of delay or for treating
an alleged stale claim as a fresh cause of action.
6.
That
the plaintiff's claim is also hit by the principles of res judicata and/or
constructive res judicata and/or the principles underlying finality of judicial
proceedings, subject to the issues and matters actually and substantially
adjudicated in the earlier proceedings concerning the suit property and the
plaintiff's occupation thereof.
7.
That
the plaintiff has deliberately omitted material facts relating to Title Suit
No. 491 of 1995, the ex parte decree for eviction passed therein, and Title
Execution No. 36 of 1995 whereby the decree was executed and possession of two
rooms at the first floor of the suit premises was obtained through the process
of Court.
8.
That
the plaintiff has also failed to fairly disclose the subsequent institution of
Title Suit No. 329 of 1997, which was filed before the Learned 1st Civil Judge
(Junior Division), Alipore, and the plaint whereof was returned on the ground
of want of jurisdiction.
9.
That
the plaintiff, having failed to establish any continuing right, title or
interest in the suit property and having suppressed the earlier litigation, is
not entitled to obtain any equitable or discretionary relief from this Learned
Court.
10.
That
the suit has been instituted with an ulterior and mala fide motive and with an
attempt to create a fresh cause of action out of matters which had occurred
several decades earlier. The plaintiff has not approached this Learned Court
with clean hands and is therefore disentitled to the reliefs claimed.
11.
That
save and except matters which are specifically admitted herein or which are
matters of record, each and every allegation, statement, averment, contention
and submission contained in the plaint is denied and disputed.
12.
That
the plaintiff is put to strict proof of each and every allegation made in the
plaint and cannot obtain any decree merely upon the basis of assertions,
allegations or inferences which are unsupported by legally admissible evidence.
13.
That
the facts and circumstances relating to the suit property are materially
different from the case sought to be projected by the plaintiff.
14.
That
one Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty, since deceased, was the absolute owner of the
suit property. With the object of maintaining peace, harmony and good relations
amongst the family members, she executed and registered a Deed of Family
Settlement dated 16.07.1992 in respect of the suit property.
15.
That
the said Family Settlement Deed has to be considered in the context of the
family relationship and the circumstances existing at the relevant point of
time. The subsequent conduct of the plaintiff and the circumstances which
thereafter arose materially altered the position and resulted in the subsequent
revocation of the said arrangement.
16.
That
the first floor of the suit premises had been constructed long prior to the
present dispute and the construction was undertaken from the funds of Smt.
Kiron Rekha Chakraborty as well as the contribution of her husband, namely Sri
Surendra Kumar Chakraborty.
17.
That
the plaintiff did not contribute any amount towards construction of the said
two-storied building. The allegation that the plaintiff had spent money towards
construction of the second floor is false, incorrect and specifically denied.
18.
That
even assuming, without admitting, that the plaintiff had at any point of time
paid any amount to Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty, such payment was not made
towards construction of the building and did not create, confer or vest in the
plaintiff any independent right, title or interest in the suit property.
19.
That
during the relevant period the plaintiff was residing at Dhanbad in connection
with his employment and used to visit the suit premises occasionally during
holidays and remain there for a few days.
20.
That
the plaintiff's occupation of the suit premises was permissive in nature. The
plaintiff was allowed to use and occupy the premises under the leave and
licence of Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty and such permissive occupation never
created any independent ownership or proprietary interest in favour of the
plaintiff.
21.
That
the plaintiff was never the absolute or exclusive owner of the suit property
merely by reason of his occupation thereof. Physical occupation, particularly
when permissive, cannot by itself create or establish title.
22.
That
within a few months after execution of the Family Settlement Deed dated
16.07.1992, the relationship between the plaintiff and Smt. Kiron Rekha
Chakraborty deteriorated considerably.
23.
That
the plaintiff and his wife, according to the defendants' case, started
subjecting Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty to mental and physical torture and
behaved with her in an abusive and disrespectful manner.
24.
That
the plaintiff and his wife are alleged to have abused Smt. Kiron Rekha
Chakraborty with filthy and insulting language and to have assaulted her on
several occasions.
25.
That
as a consequence of the aforesaid conduct, Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty became
completely disillusioned and disgusted with the plaintiff's conduct and was no
longer willing to continue the arrangement which had been made for maintaining
family harmony.
26.
That
in the aforesaid circumstances, Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty exercised her
rights and caused the Family Settlement Deed to be revoked and/or cancelled.
27.
That
the plaintiff's challenge to the Deed of Revocation/Cancellation dated
21.12.1993 is wholly misconceived and proceeds upon an incorrect assumption
that the Family Settlement Deed dated 16.07.1992, irrespective of its true
legal character, had become irrevocable in all circumstances.
28.
That
the true nature, character and legal effect of the document dated 16.07.1992
are required to be determined upon a proper construction of the recitals,
operative clauses, surrounding circumstances, antecedent rights of the parties
and the manner in which the parties acted thereunder.
29.
That
the defendants state that a family settlement is essentially an arrangement
intended to preserve family peace and harmony and to resolve or avoid disputes
amongst family members. The Court is required to examine the substance of the
transaction and not merely the nomenclature assigned to the document.
30.
That
if, as is the case of the defendants, the document dated 16.07.1992 was
executed in the backdrop of the family relationship and for maintaining peace
and harmony amongst the family members, the same cannot be construed in
isolation from the subsequent conduct of the parties and the circumstances
which led to its revocation.
31.
That
Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty was the absolute owner of the suit property and
had entered into the family arrangement with the bona fide object of
maintaining peace and cordiality amongst the members of the family.
32.
That
subsequent to execution of the said arrangement, the relationship between Smt.
Kiron Rekha Chakraborty and the plaintiff and his wife deteriorated seriously
and the plaintiff and his wife subjected her to grave mental and physical
harassment, abuse and ill-treatment, as a result whereof the very circumstances
and family relationship which had formed the basis of the arrangement
materially changed.
33.
That
in the aforesaid circumstances, Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty consciously and
voluntarily decided to revoke and/or cancel the earlier arrangement and
accordingly executed and registered the Deed of Revocation/Cancellation dated
21.12.1993.
34.
That
the said Deed of Revocation/Cancellation dated 21.12.1993 was not a clandestine
or informal act but was a registered instrument executed by Smt. Kiron Rekha
Chakraborty during her lifetime and while she was competent to deal with her
property and her subsisting rights therein.
35.
That
the plaintiff is put to strict proof of the allegation that the said Deed of
Revocation/Cancellation was obtained by fraud, coercion, undue influence,
misrepresentation or any other legally recognised vitiating circumstance.
36.
That
a mere allegation that the Deed of Revocation/Cancellation was invalid does not
render the said registered instrument void. The burden lies upon the plaintiff,
who seeks to impeach the said registered instrument, to establish the specific
legal and factual grounds upon which such cancellation is alleged to be void or
voidable.
37.
That
the defendants further state that the plaintiff has not pleaded or established
any legally sustainable basis showing that the Deed of Revocation dated
21.12.1993 was executed without authority or that Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty
had ceased to possess any legally recognisable interest or authority in respect
of the suit property at the relevant time.
38.
That
the defendants further state that the subsequent conduct of the parties
furnishes important corroborative circumstances concerning the legal effect of
the revocation. In particular, after the execution of the Deed of Revocation,
Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty revoked the plaintiff's licence by letter dated
29.06.1995 through her Learned Advocate Sri Biswajit Roy.
39.
That
thereafter, owing to the plaintiff's failure to vacate the premises, Smt. Kiron
Rekha Chakraborty instituted Title Suit No. 491 of 1995, in which, despite
service of summons, the plaintiff did not appear and an ex parte decree for
eviction was passed against him.
40.
That
the said decree was thereafter executed through Title Execution No. 36 of 1995
and possession of two rooms at the first floor of the suit premises was
obtained through the process of Court.
41.
That
the aforesaid subsequent acts are wholly inconsistent with the plaintiff's
present attempt to contend that the Family Settlement Deed dated 16.07.1992
continued to operate as an unconditional and irrevocable source of title in his
favour.
42.
That
the defendants therefore submit that the Deed of Revocation dated 21.12.1993
has to be considered together with the subsequent conduct of the parties, the
revocation of licence, the institution of the eviction proceeding, the decree
passed therein and the execution thereof.
43.
That
in any event, the plaintiff cannot seek a declaration that the Deed of
Revocation dated 21.12.1993 is void merely by making a bald allegation of
invalidity without establishing the precise legal ground upon which such
declaration is sought.
44.
That
if the plaintiff relies upon the document dated 16.07.1992 as an instrument
which itself created or transferred an absolute and irrevocable interest in the
suit property, the plaintiff is required to establish the precise nature of the
right allegedly created, the legal character of the instrument, the
consideration or absence thereof, acceptance, possession, performance and all other
facts necessary to sustain such alleged title.
45.
That
the defendants specifically deny that the plaintiff acquired any absolute or
indefeasible title which survived the subsequent registered revocation and the
subsequent judicial proceedings concerning his occupation.
46.
That
the defendants further submit that the plaintiff's claim is additionally
weakened by his extraordinary delay and by his failure to challenge the alleged
revocation at the relevant point of time, despite the subsequent revocation of his
licence and the institution of the eviction proceeding in 1995.
47.
That
the plaintiff's present challenge, raised after several decades and after the
aforesaid subsequent proceedings, is liable to be rejected on the grounds of
limitation, delay, acquiescence, suppression of material facts and absence of
any subsisting cause of action, apart from the substantive merits of the
challenge.
48.
That
accordingly, the plaintiff is not entitled to a declaration that the Deed of
Revocation/Cancellation dated 21.12.1993 is void, illegal, inoperative or not
binding upon the parties.
49.
That
after revocation of the Family Settlement, Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty further
took steps for termination of the plaintiff's permissive occupation.
50.
That
on 29.06.1995, Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty, through her Learned Advocate Sri
Biswajit Roy, issued a letter to the plaintiff revoking the licence granted to
him in respect of the premises.
51.
That
upon revocation of the licence, the plaintiff had no continuing right to remain
in occupation of the suit premises.
52.
That
the plaintiff was therefore called upon to vacate and deliver possession, but
instead of complying with the lawful demand, the plaintiff failed and neglected
to vacate the premises.
53.
That
owing to the plaintiff's failure to vacate the premises, Smt. Kiron Rekha
Chakraborty was constrained to institute Title Suit No. 491 of 1995 before the
Learned 1st Civil Judge (Junior Division).
54.
That
summons of the said suit was duly served upon the plaintiff, but despite
service the plaintiff did not appear and contest the said proceeding.
55.
That
consequently an ex parte decree for eviction was passed against the plaintiff.
56.
That
the said decree was thereafter put into execution through Title Execution No.
36 of 1995.
57.
That
pursuant to the said execution proceeding, possession of two rooms situated at
the first floor of the suit premises was obtained through the process of the
Learned Court.
58.
That
Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty incurred substantial expenditure and was compelled
to undertake prolonged litigation for obtaining possession from the plaintiff
through due process of law.
59.
That
the aforesaid decree and execution proceeding constitute material and relevant
circumstances which the plaintiff was under an obligation to disclose fully and
fairly in the present proceeding.
60.
That
the plaintiff cannot suppress the previous eviction proceeding and execution
thereof and thereafter seek to project himself before this Learned Court as
though his occupation and alleged rights in the suit property had never
previously been subjected to judicial proceedings.
61.
That
after the aforesaid eviction proceeding, the plaintiff instituted another
proceeding being Title Suit No. 329 of 1997 for permanent injunction before the
Learned 1st Civil Judge (Junior Division), Alipore.
62.
That
the plaint in the said proceeding was returned on the ground of want of
jurisdiction.
63.
That
the existence of the aforesaid proceeding further demonstrates that the dispute
concerning the suit property and the plaintiff's alleged rights therein is not
a recent dispute but has a long and continuous history.
64.
That
despite the aforesaid history, the plaintiff has sought to revive the dispute
after decades by challenging the Deed of Revocation/Cancellation dated
21.12.1993 and by seeking consequential reliefs in respect of the suit
property.
65.
That
the present suit therefore constitutes an attempt to reopen matters which have
been the subject matter of earlier litigation and judicial process and is
liable to be dismissed on the grounds stated herein.
66.
That
with regard to paragraph no. 1 of the plaint, the statements contained therein
are partly matters of record and, insofar as they are matters of fact or
assertion, the same are denied. It is specifically denied that the plaintiff
became the sole or exclusive beneficiary of the suit property or that he was in
exclusive possession thereof by virtue of any alleged right.
67.
It
is further denied that the plaintiff alone incurred expenditure towards
construction of the second floor or any other portion of the building. The
plaintiff is put to strict proof of the alleged expenditure and the source,
purpose and legal effect thereof.
68.
That
with regard to paragraph no. 2 of the plaint, the statements are denied in toto
except those which are matters of record. It is specifically denied that the
suit property was Trust property or that the relevant deed constituted a Trust
Deed.
69.
It
is further denied that Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty lacked authority to revoke
the Family Settlement Deed or that the revocation was legally impermissible.
70.
That
with regard to paragraph no. 3 of the plaint, the allegations are denied. It is
denied that the plaintiff had no prior knowledge of the revocation/cancellation
of the Family Settlement Deed. The plaintiff is put to strict proof of the
allegation that information regarding the cancellation was communicated to him
only on 10.07.1995.
71.
That
with regard to paragraph no. 4 of the plaint, the allegations are denied in
toto. It is specifically denied that Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty had not
reserved or possessed the power or authority to revoke/cancel the Family
Settlement Deed.
72.
It
is further denied that the Deed of Revocation dated 21.12.1993 is invalid,
inoperative, void or otherwise unenforceable.
73.
That
with regard to paragraph nos. 5 and 6 of the plaint, the statements are denied
in toto. It is denied that the plaintiff had any subsisting beneficial interest
in the suit property after the revocation of the Family Settlement Deed.
74.
It
is further denied that there was no justification or necessity for revocation
of the Family Settlement Deed. The circumstances leading to the revocation have
already been stated hereinabove.
75.
The
allegations of fraud, fraudulent practice, receipt of money or issuance of any
receipt in favour of the plaintiff are specifically denied and the plaintiff is
put to strict proof thereof.
76.
That
with regard to paragraph no. 7 of the plaint, the allegations are denied in
toto. It is denied that the plaintiff spent any amount towards the property in
such a manner as to acquire any right, title or interest therein.
77.
It
is further denied that Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty was legally debarred from
revoking the Family Settlement Deed or that the Deed of Revocation dated
21.12.1993 is invalid, inoperative or void.
78.
That
with regard to paragraph no. 7A of the plaint, the statements are denied. It is
specifically denied that after the death of the plaintiff's father on
14.10.2001 and the death of Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty on 08.04.2003, the
plaintiff automatically became the absolute owner of the suit property.
79.
It
is also denied that the present defendants have no right, title or interest in
the suit property or that they are unauthorized occupants.
80.
It
is further denied that the plaintiff acquired any automatic right to recover
possession from the present defendants or to evict them merely on the basis of
the allegations contained in the plaint.
81.
That
with regard to paragraph no. 8 of the plaint, it is denied that any cause of
action for the present suit arose on 21.12.1993, 10.07.1995 or on any other
date as alleged by the plaintiff.
82.
The
plaintiff is put to strict proof of the alleged cause of action, including the
date on which the alleged right accrued, the date on which the plaintiff
allegedly acquired knowledge, and the circumstances in which the present suit
has been instituted after such an extraordinary lapse of time.
83.
That
the plaintiff has failed to make a full and frank disclosure of all material
facts relevant for adjudication of the present suit.
84.
In
particular, the plaintiff has suppressed and/or failed to place the complete
factual history relating to;
a. the original
ownership of the suit property by Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty;
b. the execution and
registration of the Family Settlement Deed dated 16.07.1992;
c. the subsequent
circumstances which resulted in its revocation;
d. the registered
Deed of Revocation/Cancellation dated 21.12.1993;
e. the revocation of
the plaintiff's licence on 29.06.1995;
f. Title Suit No. 491
of 1995;
g. the ex parte decree
for eviction passed therein;
h. Title Execution
No. 36 of 1995;
i. delivery of
possession through the process of Court; and
j. subsequent Title
Suit No. 329 of 1997.
85.
That
suppression of such material facts is fatal to the plaintiff's claim, particularly
when the plaintiff seeks discretionary and declaratory reliefs from this
Learned Court.
86.
That
a litigant seeking equitable and discretionary relief is required to approach
the Court with utmost candour and clean hands. The plaintiff has failed to satisfy
such requirement.
87.
That
the plaintiff has failed to establish any subsisting legal right in the suit
property.
88.
That
the Family Settlement Deed dated 16.07.1992 cannot be considered in isolation
from the registered Deed of Revocation/Cancellation dated 21.12.1993.
89.
That
after the revocation and subsequent termination of the plaintiff's licence, the
plaintiff cannot claim an independent right merely on the basis of his earlier
permissive occupation.
90.
That
the plaintiff's alleged expenditure, if any, does not by itself confer
ownership or title upon him.
91.
That
the plaintiff's allegation that he became absolute owner of the suit property
after the death of his parents is legally and factually denied.
92.
That
inheritance cannot be claimed in disregard of the legal status and rights
existing in the property and the plaintiff cannot derive a better title merely
from the death of the persons concerned when his alleged foundational right had
itself been revoked and disputed.
93.
That
the present suit is grossly delayed.
94.
That
the principal documents and events relied upon by the plaintiff concern the
years 1992 and 1993, while the plaintiff also refers to events of 1995 and
thereafter.
95.
That
the plaintiff has not disclosed any legally sufficient explanation for approaching
the Court after such a prolonged period.
96.
That
the plaintiff cannot, by describing an old grievance in a different manner or
by seeking a declaration at a much later stage, circumvent the statutory bar of
limitation.
97.
That
the relief of declaration sought by the plaintiff is therefore liable to be
rejected on the ground of limitation alone, apart from the other objections
raised herein.
98.
That
the plaint does not disclose a complete and subsisting cause of action against
the present defendants.
99.
That
the alleged cause of action is based upon historical events and documents which
were known or ought to have been known to the plaintiff for decades.
100.
That
no fresh cause of action can be manufactured merely because the plaintiff now
seeks a declaration concerning the validity of an old document.
101.
That
the plaintiff is therefore not entitled to maintain the present proceeding in
its present form.
102.
That
the earlier Title Suit No. 491 of 1995, the decree passed therein and Title
Execution No. 36 of 1995 are highly material to the determination of the
plaintiff's present claim.
103.
That
the plaintiff cannot be permitted to circumvent the effect and consequences of
previous judicial proceedings by simply changing the nature of the relief
sought in the present proceeding.
104.
That
the defendants reserve their right to rely upon the pleadings, orders, decree,
execution records and other documents relating to the earlier proceedings at
the appropriate stage of hearing.
105.
That
the subsequent proceeding being Title Suit No. 329 of 1997 also demonstrates
that the plaintiff had knowledge of and had already sought judicial
intervention in relation to his alleged rights concerning the suit property.
106.
That
the present proceeding, instituted decades thereafter, is therefore liable to
be dismissed on the grounds of limitation, want of cause of action, suppression
of material facts and the principles governing finality of litigation.
107.
That
the plaintiff is not entitled to recover possession of the suit property from
the present defendants.
108.
That
the plaintiff has failed to establish any present title or superior right which
would entitle him to seek eviction of the present defendants.
109.
That
the defendants deny that they are trespassers or persons having no right, title
or interest in the suit property.
110.
That
the plaintiff cannot obtain a decree for possession merely by alleging that he
became the absolute owner after the death of his parents.
111.
That
the plaintiff is required to establish his own title and cannot succeed merely
by attempting to point out alleged defects in the defendants' case.
112.
That
the plaintiff is therefore not entitled to any declaration, recovery of
possession, injunction or any other consequential relief as prayed for.
113.
That
save and except what has been expressly admitted herein, all allegations,
statements, averments, submissions and contentions contained in the plaint are
denied.
114.
That
no statement contained in the plaint shall be deemed to have been admitted
merely because the same has not been dealt with in identical language or
seriatim, and the plaintiff is put to strict proof of all matters not expressly
admitted.
115.
That
the defendants reserve the right to make further submissions and to place
additional documents and evidence on record, if required, in accordance with
law and subject to the leave of this Learned Court.
116.
That
the defendants further reserve their right to amend, alter or supplement this
Written Statement, if any subsequent fact, document or circumstance
necessitates such amendment in accordance with law.
In the facts and
circumstances stated hereinabove, it is most respectfully prayed that Your Honour
may graciously be pleased to;
a) dismiss the
instant Title Suit No. 107 of 2024 as being misconceived, not maintainable and
devoid of merits;
b) hold that the
plaintiff has failed to establish any subsisting right, title or interest in
the suit property on the basis of the allegations made in the plaint;
c) hold that the
plaintiff's claim is barred by limitation;
d) hold that the suit
is barred by the principles of res judicata and/or constructive res judicata
and/or the principles governing finality of judicial proceedings, insofar as
applicable;
e) hold that the
plaintiff has suppressed material facts relating to the Family Settlement Deed
dated 16.07.1992, the Deed of Revocation/Cancellation dated 21.12.1993, the
revocation of licence dated 29.06.1995, Title Suit No. 491 of 1995, the decree
passed therein, Title Execution No. 36 of 1995 and the subsequent Title Suit
No. 329 of 1997;
f) reject the
plaintiff's claim for declaration that the Deed of Revocation/Cancellation
dated 21.12.1993 is void, illegal, invalid or inoperative;
g) reject the
plaintiff's claim for recovery of possession and/or eviction of the present
defendants from the suit property;
h) dismiss all
consequential reliefs claimed by the plaintiff;
i) award exemplary
costs of the suit in favour of the present defendants and against the
plaintiff;
j) pass such other or
further order or orders as Your Honour may deem fit and proper in the interest
of justice, equity and good conscience.
And
for this act of kindness, the defendants as in duty bound shall ever pray.
VERIFICATION
I,
Smt. Riya Chakborty, Defendant No. 1(a)(ii) in the instant suit, do hereby
solemnly affirm and state that the statements contained in paragraphs 1 to 113
hereinabove are true and correct to my knowledge and belief, based upon the
records available to me and information received and believed by me to be true,
and that I have not knowingly suppressed any material fact.
Verified
at Alipore, South 24 Parganas, West Bengal, on this ____ day of August, 2026.
Defendant No. 1(a)(ii)
Smt. Riya Chakborty
AFFIDAVIT
I,
Smt. Riya Chakborty, daughter of ____________________, aged about ______ years,
by faith Hindu, by occupation ____________________, residing at
____________________________________________, do hereby solemnly affirm and declare
as follows;
1.
That
I am the Defendant No. 1(a)(ii) in the instant suit and the Defendant No.
1(a)(i), namely Sri Somnath Chakraborty, is my brother.
2.
That
I have been duly authorised by the Defendant No. 1(a)(i) to affirm this
affidavit on behalf of the substituted Defendant Nos. 1(a)(i) and 1(a)(ii), and
as such I am competent and duly authorised to swear and affirm this affidavit.
3.
That
I am well acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the instant case and
have personal knowledge of the matters stated herein and/or have derived
knowledge thereof from the records of the case and the documents available to
the defendants.
4.
That
I have carefully read and understood the accompanying Written Statement filed
on behalf of the substituted Defendant Nos. 1(a)(i) and 1(a)(ii).
5.
That
the statements contained in the said Written Statement, insofar as they relate
to facts within my knowledge, are true and correct to my knowledge and belief,
and the legal submissions contained therein are based upon legal advice which I
believe to be correct.
6.
That
the statements made hereinabove are true to the best of my knowledge and belief
and the rest are my respectful submissions before this Learned Court.
DEPONENT
Identified by me,
Advocate
N O T A R Y
