Section 499 IPC / Defamation;

According to Section 499, defamation can take place through words spoken or intended to be read, signs, and visible representations published or spoken about a person with the intent of damaging that person’s reputation, or with the sufficient knowledge to believe that the imputation will affect his reputation.
Illustration: ‘A’ is questioned about who took B’s watch. ‘A’ makes a gesture toward ‘Z’, implying that ‘Z’ has stolen B’s watch. Unless one of the exceptions applies, this constitutes defamation.
The words “makes or publishes” are highlighted in this section. The essence of the offence is the spreading of injurious imputation. When a defamatory remark is published, not only the publisher but also the maker is held liable. It is essential that the imputation be transmitted to a third party in order to establish the offence, because the purpose is to incite hatred of others.

Essential ingredients of Section 499 IPC

An imputation about a specific person or individual whose identity may be ascertained must be included in the remarks. It is not necessary for the person to be a single individual.
In CL Sagar Versus Mayawati (2003), the accusation was that the vice president of a political party defamed the complainant by saying in a public assembly that the party’s member with a lengthy mustache was a corrupt person. The complaint was unable to demonstrate that he was the only party member with a lengthy mustache. There was no such statement in the meeting’s press report. So, there was no offence.

The words, signs, and imputations made by the person must either be intended to injure the reputation of an individual, or the accused must rationally know that his or her behaviour might cause such injury to constitute defamation.
In S Khushboo Versus Kanniammal (2010), since the appellant’s statement in the news magazine was a rather general acknowledgment of pre-marital sex and her comments were not directed at any individual or even a corporation, an association, or a collection of persons, it was held that it could not be construed as a personal attack on anyone’s reputation.

Whether a remark is defamatory or not is determined by how right-thinking people in the community interpret it. It is no defence to claim that the comment was not intended to be defamatory if the foreseeable impact was an injury to the plaintiff’s reputation. For example, the statement that ‘X’ is an honest man who has never stolen my watch in a sarcastic tone may be defamatory if the people who hear that, so believe that ‘X’ is a dishonest man who has stolen the watch.
In Goutam Sahu Versus State of Orissa (1999), the appellant married the plaintiff in a temple by exchanging garlands. He stayed with her for several days before demanding money and describing her as an unchaste woman with bad looks. According to the Orissa High Court, the components of Section 500, were prima facie established, and the accused was consequently subject to prosecution.

In Jacob Mathew Versus Manikantan, (2013), the complainant claimed that four images of an event were published in a newspaper, one of which revealed the complainant more or less undressed, causing defamation and injury to him. As the images were taken spontaneously to cover the event and not aimed to cover any particular person, it can never be said that the images were published in the newspaper with the intent, knowledge, or cause to think that they would hurt the complainant’s reputation. Proceedings are liable to be quashed.

The term “publication” refers to making the defamatory matter known to someone other than the individual who has been defamed. Imputations on a charge sheet delivered to the employee, for example, do not constitute publishing. Furthermore, communicating an imputation merely to the individual who has been defamed is not the same as publishing.
In Sukhdeo Versus State (1932), the president of the Municipal Committee sent a letter under a Municipal Act to a specific person, who responded with defamatory claims against the president. The president filed this response in the official file, and the members of the committee reviewed it. It was determined that the defamation had been published. The President’s placement of the reply on the official file was not a spontaneous or voluntary act on his behalf; it was his responsibility, and the accused knew or must have known that the contents of his reply would be disclosed to committee members.