Criminal Revision Petition High Court

 

DISTRICT: SOUTH 24-PARGANAS

 

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION

 

C.R.R. No.                              of 2023

 

In the Matter of

An application under Section 401, read with Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code’ 1973;

 

And

 

In the Matter of

Judgment dated 07-10-2023, passé in Criminal Motion No. 270 of 2022, by Shri Anjan Kumar Sengupta, Additional Session Judge, 7^th Court, Alipore, South 24 Parganas;

 

And

 

In the Matter of

Shri Subrata Mondal, Son of Kartick Mondal, aged about 29 years, residing at Premises being no. C/28, Jamuna Nagar, Police Station – Jadavpur, Kolkata – 700099, District South 24 Parganas, Mobile Number __________.

       _________Petitioner

 

Versus

 

1.   Shri Kartik Mondal, Son of Late Shreekanto Mondal, aged about 60 years, residing at Premises being no. C/28, Jamuna Nagar, Police Station – Jadavpur, Kolkata – 700099, District South 24 Parganas.

 

2.   The State of West Bengal.

     ________ Opposite Parties

To

The Hon’ble T. S. Sivagnanam, Chief Justice and His Companion Justices of the said Hon’ble Court

 

The humble petition of the petitioner above-named most respectfully;

Sheweth: -

 

1.   That the Opposite Party/ Father lodged an application under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code’ 1973, against the Petitioner, claiming interim maintenance as Rs. 12,000/- (Rupees Twelve Thousand) only, per month. The said application has been registered as Misc. Case no. ACM-659 of 2021, pending before the Learned Judicial Magistrate, 4^th Court, at Alipore, South 24 Parganas.

 

2.   That the Opposite Party/ Father states that he has obtained one free-hold property measuring about 1 cottah, 4 chhitack from the Government of West Bengal and constructed therein a residential house. His wife is not residing with him and she has been residing separately in the 1^st floor of the same premises and he used to reside at ground floor of the said premises with his mother. His daughter is a working lady and she is married and his son is a sales consultant at Mukesh Hyundai and his wife is a private tutor and they run a tutorial home together at his residence. The Opposite Party/ Father stated that he is more than 60 years and suffering from various ailments and he has no independent income of his own and living at the mercy of others.

 

3.   That the Petitioner appeared in the said maintenance proceeding on receipt of the notice issued by the Learned Judicial Magistrate, 4^th Court, at Alipore, South 24 Parganas, and submitted his written objection and Affidavit of his Assets and Liabilities, in the said application for maintenance. Upon hearing of the interim maintenance, the Learned Judicial Magistrate was pleased to pass an Order dated 05-07-2022, directing your petition to pay a sum of Rs. 4,000/- per month to the Opposite Party/ Father.

 

Photostat Copies of the Petition, written objection, affidavit of assets and liabilities, and the Order dated 05-07-2022, are annexed herewith and marked as Annexure – “P-1”.

 

4.   That the said Order has been Challenged by the Petitioner before the Learned District Session Judge, Alipore, South 24 Parganas, by way of placing Criminal Motion No. 270 of 2022, on 07-09-2022. The Learned District Session Judge, at Alipore, South 24 Parganas, was pleased to grant stay on the said impugned order dared 05-07-2022, subject to the payment of Rs. 2,500/- per month as interim maintenance. The petitioner continued to pay such sum of Rs. 2,500/- per month to the Opposite Party/ Father, in pursuance of the said Order dated 07-09-2022.

 

Photostat copy of the Order dated 07-09-2022, passed in Criminal Motion no. 270 of 2022, is annexed and marked as Annexure – “P-2”.

 

5.   The said Criminal Motion no. 270 of 2022 has been consequently transferred to the Learned Additional Session Judge, 7^th Court, Alipore, South 24 Parganas for disposal. The Learned Additional Session Judge, 7^th Court, Alipore, South 24 Parganas, was pleased to pass Judgment dated 07-10-2023, thereby rejecting the said Criminal Motion and affirming the Order dated 05-07-2022, passed by the Learned Judicial Magistrate, 4^th Court, at Alipore, South 24 Parganas, in Misc. Case no. ACM-659 of 2021.

 

6.   That the Petitioner states and submits that your Petitioner is presently aged about 29 years old is only Son of the Opposite Party, who married in the year 2019. The Petitioner is a married person having his Spouse namely Smt. Aparna Mondal, and having a minor male child born in the year 2021, namely Sadhvik Mondal. The Petitioner have one Elder Sister namely Smt. Tumpa Mondal, who married in the year 2010, and thereafter she is staying at her matrimonial house at Santoshpur, Kolkata.

 

7.   That the Petitioner states and submits that the Petitioner is looking after and caring his old aged mother Smt. Putul Mondal, Grand Mother Smt. Raboti Mondal, who died recently, his Father Sri Kartik Mondal, and his Wife and minor child, out of his earning as Rs. 10,661/- ( rupees Ten Thousand and Six Hundred and Sixty One ) only.

 

8.   That the Petitioner states and submits that the Petitioner and his mother experienced much immoral behavior of the Opposite Party no.1, Sri Kartik Mondal, in their life and still experiencing. The Opposite Party no. 1, Sri Kartik Mondal, is in illicit relationship with one lady, all along, therefore most of his earning spend on his unwarranted choices. The opposite party did not take care of the petitioner and his mother.  The petitioner followed his mother’s word and education to prevail the protection and care of the family members without uttering any words to the opposite party. The Petitioner’s income is much limited and on paper as given by the Employer.

 

9.   That the Petitioner states and submits that the O.P. No. 1, Sri Kartik Mondal, is still working and thereby earning sufficiently, and since the opposite party working freelance therefore it is much difficult to ascertain his exact income unless he himself depose in that respect, which he will not do, as he is claiming maintenance from the petitioner with his oblique motive.

 

10.                That the Petitioner states and submits that the O.P. No. 1, Sri Kartik Mondal, is much healthy, as he is not suffering with any ailment, so far. He is leading his life at his own terms, he did not care to prevail moral obligations and bondage of the relationship within the family.

 

11.                That the Petitioner states and submits that the Petitioner is earning a sum of Rs. 10,661/- ( rupees Ten Thousand and Six Hundred and Sixty One ) only, from his employer, and thereby maintaining his (1) mother, (2) wife, (3) minor male child of 2 years old, (4) himself, and (5) paying Rs. 2,500/- (Rupees Two Thousand and Five Hundred) only to the Opposite Party number 1, Sri Kartik Mondal, in terms of the Order of the Learned Court. In maintaining the family members your petitioner’s income is not sufficient and therefore your petitioner is in need to borrow money from his friend and relatives.

 

12.                That the Petitioner states and submits that while passing the order impugned the Learned Court did not consider the geology of the family and their ability and inability.

 

13.                That the petitioner states and submits that the Order dated 05-07-2022, passed in Misc. Case no. ACM-659 of 2021, by the Learned Judicial Magistrate, 4^th Court, at Alipore, South 24 Parganas, is patently wrong and erroneous and thus not sustainable in the Law.

 

14.                That the petitioner states and submits that the Judgment  dated 07-10-2023, passed in Criminal Motion no. 270 of 2022, by the Learned Additional Session Judge, 7^th Court, at Alipore, South 24 Parganas, is patently wrong and erroneous and thus not sustainable in the Law.

 

15.                That being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the impugned Judgment dated 07-10-2023, passed in Criminal Motion no. 270 of 2022, by the Learned Additional Session Judge, 7^th Court, at Alipore, South 24 Parganas, Your petitioner begs to move Your Lordship for revision on the following amongst other

 

G R O U N D S

 

I.             For that your Petitioner is presently aged about 29 years old is only Son of the Opposite Party, who married in the year 2019. The Petitioner is a married person having his Spouse namely Smt. Aparna Mondal, and having a minor male child born in the year 2021, namely Sadhvik Mondal. The Petitioner have one Elder Sister namely Smt. Tumpa Mondal, who married in the year 2010, and thereafter she is staying at her matrimonial house at Santoshpur, Kolkata.

 

II.           For that the Petitioner is looking after and caring his old aged mother Smt. Putul Mondal, Grand Mother Smt. Raboti Mondal, who died recently, his Father Sri Kartik Mondal, and his Wife and minor child, out of his earning as Rs. 10,661/- ( rupees Ten Thousand and Six Hundred and Sixty One ) only.

 

III.          For that the Petitioner and his mother experienced much immoral behavior of the Opposite Party no.1, Sri Kartik Mondal, in their life and still experiencing. The Opposite Party no. 1, Sri Kartik Mondal, is in illicit relationship with one lady, all along, therefore most of his earning spend on his unwarranted choices. The opposite party did not take care of the petitioner and his mother.  The petitioner followed his mother’s word and education to prevail the protection and care of the family members without uttering any words to the opposite party. The Petitioner’s income is much limited and on paper as given by the Employer.

 

IV.         For that the O.P. No. 1, Sri Kartik Mondal, is still working and thereby earning sufficiently, and since the opposite party working freelance therefore it is much difficult to ascertain his exact income unless he himself depose in that respect, which he will not do, as he is claiming maintenance from the petitioner with his oblique motive.

 

V.           For that the O.P. No. 1, Sri Kartik Mondal, is much healthy, as he is not suffering with any ailment, so far. He is leading his life at his own terms, he did not care to prevail moral obligations and bondage of the relationship within the family.

 

VI.         For that the Petitioner is earning a sum of Rs. 10,661/- ( rupees Ten Thousand and Six Hundred and Sixty One ) only, from his employer, and thereby maintaining his (1) mother, (2) wife, (3) minor male child of 2 years old, (4) himself, and (5) paying Rs. 2,500/- (Rupees Two Thousand and Five Hundred) only to the Opposite Party number 1, Sri Kartik Mondal, in terms of the Order of the Learned Court. In maintaining the family members your petitioner’s income is not sufficient and therefore your petitioner is in need to borrow money from his friend and relatives.

 

VII.        For that while passing the order impugned the Learned Court did not consider the geology of the family and their ability and inability.

 

VIII.      For that the Order dated 05-07-2022, passed in Misc. Case no. ACM-659 of 2021, by the Learned Judicial Magistrate, 4th Court, at Alipore, South 24 Parganas, is patently wrong and erroneous and thus not sustainable in the Law.

 

IX.         For that the Judgment  dated 07-10-2023, passed in Criminal Motion no. 270 of 2022, by the Learned Additional Session Judge, 7th Court, at Alipore, South 24 Parganas, is patently wrong and erroneous and thus not sustainable in the Law.

 

16.                That the Petitioner craves leave to produce the copy of relevant documents relied on by the petitioner, at the time of hearing before the Hon’ble Court.

 

17.                That the application is made bona fide and for the ends of justice.

Under the above circumstances, Your petitioner most humbly prays that Your Lordship may graciously be pleased to show cause as to why the order impugned Judgment dated 07-10-2023, passé in Criminal Motion No. 270 of 2022, by Shri Anjan Kumar Sengupta, Additional Session Judge, 7^th Court, Alipore, South 24 Parganas, shall not be set aside and to stay operation of the Order dated 05-07-2022, passed in Misc. Case no. ACM-659 of 2021, by the Learned Judicial Magistrate, 4th Court, at Alipore, South 24 Parganas, immediately, and/or to pass such other further Order/Orders as to Your Lordship may deem fit and proper

 

And Your petitioner as in duty bound shall ever pray.

 

 

 

AFFIDAVIT

 

I, Shri Subrata Mondal, Son of Kartick Mondal, aged about 29 years, by faith Hindu, by Occupation Service, residing at Premises being no. C/28, Jamuna Nagar, Police Station – Jadavpur, Kolkata – 700099, District South 24 Parganas,, do hereby solemnly affirm and say as follows:

 

1.       That I am the petitioner of this application and I am well acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.

 

2. That the statements made in paragraph No. 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, & 11, are true to my knowledge and those made in paragraphs   2, 3, 4, & 5, are true to my information derived from the records of the case and rest paragraphs are my respectful submission before this Hon’ble Court.

 

Prepared in my office                           The deponent is known to me

 

                 Advocate                                Clerk to: Mr.                                                                                                                        Advocate

Solemnly affirmed before me

on this the       day of November, 2023.

 

I certify that all annexures

are legible.

 

               Advocate.                                                COMMISSIONER

DISTRICT : South 24 Parganas.

IN THE HIGH COURT CALCUTTA

CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION

 

C.R.R. No.                of 2023;

 

In the matter of:

An application under Section 401, read with Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code’ 1973;

And

In the matter of:

Sri Subrata Mondal

………..Petitioner

-Versus-

Sri Kartik Mondal & Another.

……Opposite Parties

 

CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION

 

MR. ASHOK KUMAR SINGH

Advocate

Bar Association, Room No.15,

High Court, Calcutta.

(M) 9883070666 / 9836829666.

Email : aksinghadvocate@rediffmail.com

Enrollment Number : F/872/2000

Bail Conditions

Question;

 In my Bail order, conditions were imposed on me such as: 1. Furnish the current residential address to IO. 2. Do not leave the state without prior permission of court. I have given affidavit stating my residential address and when police approached the same I was not available as I have gone outside but the landlord confirmed that he is residing here. Now police is threatening me to apply for cancellation of Bail. Can police really do the same and what can I do. Please guide.

Answer;

The bail cannot be cancelled for this reason, however it becomes your duty to comply with the bail conditions, if you were summoned to police station for investigation you should very well attend the police stations setting aside all your personal works, if you refuse or neglect then that can be conspired as non compliance of the bail condition, where the police will send a report to the court about this and can seek cancellation of bail.

The bail can cancel in a very specific circumstances more particularly in terms of violation of the condition given in the Bail Order if apparent and or placed by the Prosecution or by the Defacto Complainant or any other Person, so far.

Prosecution of accused in different charges on same self fact is not double jeopardy

HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT SRINAGAR Reserved on: 05.07.2022 Pronounced on: 15.07.2022 CRM(M) No.280/2021 CRM(M) No.281/2021 FAYAZ AHMAD SHEIKH FAYAZ AHMAD SHEIKH …PETITIONER(S) Through: Mr. Sheikh Hilal, Advocate. Vs. MUSHTAQ AHMAD KHAN MUZAFFAR AHMAD DAR ….RESPONDENT(S) Through: Mr. Waseem Shamas, Advocate. CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE JUDGMENT 1) By this common judgment, the afore titled two petitions filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are proposed to be disposed of. 2) Through the medium of CRM(M) No.280/2021, the petitioner has challenged the complaint filed by respondent against him for commission of offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as the NI Act) as also the proceedings emanating therefrom. P a g e | 2 3) It appears that respondent/complainant had filed a complaint for commission of offence under Section 138 of NIA Act against the petitioner before the Court of Forest Magistrate, Srinagar (hereinafter referred to as the trial Magistrate). In the complaint, it was alleged that the petitioner had approached the respondent and offered to sell a patch of land measuring 01 kanal situated at Gangbugh Tehsil and District Budgam, pursuant to which the respondent/complainant advanced a sum of Rs.29.00 lacs as part payment. It was further averred in the complaint that the petitioner/accused had promised to provide the land in question within a week’s time, failing which he was to pay damages to the tune of Rs.10.00 lacs. It was further alleged that the petitioner/accused failed to provide the land within the stipulated time as per the agreed terms which made him liable to return the amount received by him along with the damages. According to the respondent/complainant, the petitioner/accused issued three cheque bearing Nos.0010168 for an amount of Rs.5.00 lacs, 000170 for an amount of Rs.5.00 lacs and 000171 for an amount of Rs.5.00 lacs all dated 20th March, 2021, drawn on HDFC Bank Ltd. Branch office Baghat Barzulla. The respondent/complainant presented these cheques before the concerned bank but the same P a g e | 3 were dishonoured with the endorsement “drawers account closed” vide memo dated 9th April, 2021.The respondent/complainant is stated to have served a demand notice upon the petitioner/accused by sending the same through registered post on 16th April, 2021 but in spite of having received the said notice, the petitioner/accused did not liquidate the amount of cheques to the respondent/complainant compelling him to file the impugned complaint before the trial Magistrate on 30.07.2021. 4) CRM(M) No.281/2021 arises out of a complaint filed by the respondent against the petitioner before the Court of Forest Magistrate, Srinagar, alleging commission of offence under Section 138 of the NI Act. As per the impugned complaint, the petitioner/accused had offered to sell a patch of land measuring 10 marlas situated at Gangbugh Tehsil and District Budgam, to respondent. Accordingly, the respondent is stated to have advanced a sum of Rs.14.00 lacs to the petitioner/accused and it was promised by him that the land in question would be handed over to the respondent/complainant within a period of one week failing which the petitioner/accused was to return the amount along with damages to the tune of Ra.10.00 lacs. It was alleged in the complaint that the P a g e | 4 petitioner/accused did not deliver the possession of the land to the respondent/complainant within the stipulated time whereafter he, in order to liquidate the debt, issued two cheques bearing Nos.00169 for an amount of Rs.5.00 lacs and 000172 for an amount of Rs.9.00 lacs both dated 20th March, 2021, drawn on HDFC Bank Branch unit Baghat, Barzulla. The cheques, when presented to the bank for encashment, were dishonoured by the banker with the endorsement “account closed” vide memo dated 9th April, 2021, and when petitioner/accused did not liquidate the amount of cheques despite receipt of statuotyr demand notice, the impugned complaint came to be filed by the respondent/complainant before the trial Magistrate on 30.07.2021. 5) It has been contended in both the petitions that the respondent/complainant Mushtaq Ahmad, prior to the filing of the aforesaid two complaints, filed an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Budgam, and pursuant to order passed by the said Court, FIR No.85/2021 for offences under Section 420, 506 IPC of P/S, Budgam, came to be registered. It is contended that the contents of the aforesaid FIR are identical to the impugned complaints. It is further averred that investigation in the said FIR has been completed and P a g e | 5 challan against the petitioner has been produced before the competent court and as per the challan, the offences under Section 420 and 506 of IPC stand disclosed against the petitioner. 6) On the strength of the aforesaid admitted facts, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the petitioner cannot be prosecuted twice on the basis of some set of facts as it would amount to double jeopardy. He has contended that continuance of proceedings in the impugned criminal complaints against the petitioner would be an abuse of process of law and it would amount of forum shopping. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. M/S Cipla Ltd, (2017) 5 SCC 262 and Rajiv Thapar & Ors. vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, 2013 1 Crimes (SC) 169. 7) It has also been urged by the petitioner that the impugned complaints have been filed by the respondent/complainant beyond the stipulated time, inasmuch as the complaints have been filed after about two and half months of service of statutory notice of demand by the petitioner/accused. P a g e | 6 8) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record including the trial court record. 9) It is not in dispute that the cheques which are subject matter of the two impugned complaints also find mention in the challan filed against the petitioner emanating from FIR No.85/2021 of Police Station, Budgam. It is also not in dispute that respondent Mushtaq Ahmad has lodged the said FIR on the basis of allegations which are identical to the allegations made in the impugned complaints. The question that arises for consideration is whether a person can be prosecuted for offence under Section 420 of IPC as also for offence under Section 138 of NI Act on the same set of facts and whether or not it would amount to double jeopardy. In order to find answer to this question, it would be profitable to analyze the legal position on the subject. 10) In Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 SC 325, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of double jeopardy. The issue arose in the context of the fact that a person who had arrived at an Indian airport from abroad on being searched was found in possession of gold in contravention of the relevant P a g e | 7 notification, prohibiting the import of gold. Action was taken against him by the customs authorities and the gold seized from his possession was confiscated. Later on, a prosecution was launched against him in the criminal court at Bombay charging him with having committed the offence under Section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 read with the relevant notification. In the background of these facts, the plea of “autrefois acquit” was raised seeking protection under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court held that the fundamental right which is guaranteed under Article 20 (2) enunciates the principle of “autrefois convict" or "double jeopardy" i.e. a person must not be put in peril twice for the same offence. The doctrine is based on the ancient maxim "nemo debet bis punire pro uno delicto", that is to say that no one ought to be twice punished for one offence. The plea of “autrefois convict” or "autrefois acquit" avers that the person has been previously convicted or acquitted on a charge for the same offence as that in respect of which he is arraigned. The test is whether the former offence and the offence now charged have the same ingredients in the sense that the facts constituting the one are sufficient to justify a conviction of the other and not that the facts relied on by P a g e | 8 the prosecution are the same in the two trials. A plea of "autrefois acquit" is not proved unless it is shown that the verdict of acquittal of the previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal of the latter. 11) In State of Bombay vs. S. L. Apte and anr. AIR 1961 SC 578, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, while dealing with the issue of double jeopardy under Article 20(2), held as under: To operate as a bar the second prosecution and the consequential punishment thereunder, must be for “the same offence”. The crucial requirement therefore for attracting the Article is that the offences are the same i.e. they should be identical. If, however, the two offences are distinct, then notwithstanding that the allegations of facts in the two complaints might be substantially similar, the benefit of the ban cannot be invoked. It is, therefore, necessary to analyse and compare not the allegations in the two complaints but the ingredients of the two offences and see whether their identity is made out. xx xx xx xx The next point to be considered is as regards the scope of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act. Though Section 26 in its opening words refers to “the act or omission constituting an offence under two or more enactments”, the emphasis is not on the facts alleged in the two complaints but rather on the ingredients which constitute the two offences with which a person is charged. This is made clear by the concluding portion of the section which refers to “shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence”. If the offences are not the same but are distinct, the ban imposed by this provision also cannot be invoked. 12) In A.A. Mulla & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., AIR 1997 SC 1441, the appellants were charged under Section 409 IPC and Section 5 of the Prevention of P a g e | 9 Corruption Act, 1947 for making false panchnama disclosing recovery of 90 gold biscuits on 21-9-1969 although according to the prosecution case the appellants had recovered 99 gold biscuits. The appellants were tried for the same and acquitted. The appellants were also tried for offence under Section 120-B IPC, Sections 135 and 136 of the Customs Act, Section 85 of the Gold (Control) Act and Section 23(1-A) of FERA and Section 5 of Import and Export (Control) Act, 1947. The appellants filed an application before the Judicial Magistrate contending that on the selfsame facts they could not be tried for the second time in view of Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (corresponding to Section 300 Cr. P. C). The Supreme Court held as under: “After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties, it appears to us that the ingredients of the offences for which the appellants were charged in the first trial are entirely different. The second trial with which we are concerned in this appeal, envisages a different fact-situation and the enquiry for finding out facts constituting offences under the Customs Act and the Gold (Control) Act in the second trial is of a different nature. Not only the ingredients of offences in the previous and the second trial are different, the factual foundation of the first trial and such foundation for the second trial is also not indented (sic). Accordingly, the second trial was not barred under Section 403 Cr. P. C of 1898 as alleged by the appellants.” P a g e | 10 13) After noticing the aforesaid judgments, the Supreme Court in the case of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat & anr. (2012) 7 SCC 621, while dealing with exactly the same question i.e. whether prosecution for offence under Section 138 of the NI Act and offences under Section 406, 420 of IPC can be continued simultaneously against an accused on same set of facts, observed as under: 27. Admittedly, the appellant had been tried earlier for the offences punishable under the provisions of Section 138 N.I. Act and the case is subjudice before the High Court. In the instant case, he is involved under Sections 406/420 read with Section 114 IPC. In the prosecution under Section 138 N.I. Act, the mens rea i.e. fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of issuance of cheque is not required to be proved. However, in the case under IPC involved herein, the issue of mens rea may be relevant. The offence punishable under Section 420 IPC is a serious one as the sentence of 7 years can be imposed. In the case under N.I. Act, there is a legal presumption that the cheque had been issued for discharging the antecedent liability and that presumption can be rebutted only by the person who draws the cheque. Such a requirement is not there in the offences under IPC. In the case under N.I. Act, if a fine is imposed, it is to be adjusted to meet the legally enforceable liability. There cannot be such a requirement in the offences under IPC. The case under N.I. Act can only be initiated by filing a complaint. However, in a case under the IPC such a condition is not necessary. 28. There may be some overlapping of facts in both the cases but ingredients of offences are entirely different. Thus, the subsequent case is not barred by any of the aforesaid statutory provisions. 14) A similar question arose before the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of V. Kutumba Rao vs. Chandrasekhar Raso and anr. 2003 CriLJ 4405. It P a g e | 11 would be apt to reproduce the observations of the Court made in para 11 of the judgment and the same read as under: 11. In my considered opinion the offences under Section 420, IPC and Section 138 of the Act are distinct and separate offences. If a person fraudulently or dishonestly induces another person to deliver any property or to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not deceived and such act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property commits an offence of cheating. Such a person commits the offence punishable under Section 420, IPC. In a prosecution under Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act any inducement so as to make the other person to deliver any property etc. as defined in Section 415, IPC, is not an ingredient. If a person issues a cheque and subsequently if the cheque was dishonoured by the Bank for want of funds, etc. and thereafter even after issuance of demand notice, the said person fails to pay the amount covered by the cheque within the time stipulated by Negotiable Instruments Act, that person commits an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. The question of inducement to other person to part with any property to do or omit to do anything does not at all arise for a decision in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Act. The offence under Section 138 of the Act is not committed on the date of issuing the cheque. The offence happens after it was dishonoured by the Bank for specified reasons and thereafter even after demand the person concerned fails to pay the amount covered by the cheque to the other person. These facts do not fall for a decision in a prosecution under Section 420, I.P.C. Some times at the time of issuing the cheque a person may induce the other person to part with property, etc. If such inducement is dishonest or fraudulent he may be committing the offence of cheating and thereby he becomes liable for prosecution. If such a person later within the time stipulated under the provisions of Negotiable Instruments Act repays the other person amount covered by the cheque he will not be liable for prosecution for the offence under Section 138 of the Act but still he can be prosecuted for the offence of cheating if at the time of issuing the cheque he had fraudulently or dishonestly induced the other person to part with property, etc. In a prosecution P a g e | 12 under Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act, the mens rea viz., fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of issuance of cheque need not be proved. However, in a prosecution under Section 420,I.P.C. mens rea is an important ingredient to be established. In the former case the prosecution has to establish that the cheque was issued by accused to discharge a legally enforceable debt or other liability. This ingredient need not be proved in a prosecution for the charge under Section 420, I.P.C. Therefore, the two offences covered by Section 420, IPC and Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act are quite distinct and different offences even though sometimes there may be overlapping and sometimes the accused person may commit both the offences. The two offences cannot be construed as arising out of same set of facts. Therefore, Section 300, Cr.P.C. is not a bar for separate prosecutions for the offences punishable under Section 420, IPC and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The question of application of the principles of double jeopardy or rule estoppel does not come into play. The acquittal of the accused for the charge under Section 420, IPC does not operate as estoppel or res judicata for a finding of fact or law to be given in prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The issue of fact and law to be tried and decided in prosecution under Section 420, IPC are not the same issue of fact and law to be tried in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Act. ……….” 15) From the aforesaid analysis of law on the subject, it is clear that offences under Section 138 of the NI Act and Section 420 of IPC are distinct from each other because ingredients of the two offences are different. While in a prosecution under Section 138 of NI Act, fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of issuance of cheque need not be proved but in a prosecution under Section 420 of IPC, such intention is an important ingredient to be established. For proving offence under Section 138 of NI Act, it has to be established that the cheque has been P a g e | 13 issued by the accused to discharge a legally enforceable debt or liability and the same has been dishonoured for insufficiency of funds etc. and despite receipt of statutory notice of demand, the accused has failed to pay the amount of cheque within the stipulated time. It is only when accused fails to make the payment within the stipulated time upon receipt of notice of demand that the offence under Section 138 of NI Act is made out against an accused. In the case of prosecution for the charge under Section 420 of IPC, these ingredients need not be proved by the prosecution. However, it has to be proved by prosecution that at the very inception i.e. at the time of issuance of the cheque by the accused, he had a dishonest intention. Thus, offence under Section 420 of IPC is made out at the time of issuance of the cheque itself which is not the case with offence under Section 138 of NI Act. Therefore, the two offences are distinct from each other and the principle of double jeopardy or rule of estoppel does not come into play. 16) Thus, the mere fact that respondent Mushtaq Ahmad had lodged an FIR, which has culminated in lodging of a challan against the petitioner containing allegations relating to the same transaction which is subject matter of the impugned complaints, does not make out a case of P a g e | 14 forum shopping or double jeopardy. The complainants are well within their rights to continue prosecution for both these offences i.e. offences under Section 138 of NI Act and Section 420 of IPC simultaneously. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard is without any merit. 17) The other contention raised by the petitioner is with regard to belated filing of the impugned complaints. In this regard it is to be noted that the impugned complaints have been filed by respondents/complainants during the period which is covered by the order of the Supreme Court dated 10th January, 2022, passed in the case titled IN RE: COGNIZANCE FOR EXTENSION OF LIMITATION (Suo Motu writ petition (C) No.3 of 2020), wherein it has been laid down that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under proviso (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In view of the aforesaid order of the Supreme Court, it cannot be stated that the impugned complaints have been filed by respondents belatedly. Therefore, the order of taking cognizance and issuing process by the learned trial Magistrate, which has been impugned herein, does not call for any interference from this Court. P a g e | 15 18) For the foregoing reasons, both the petitions lack merit and the same are dismissed accordingly. 19) A copy of this order be sent to the learned trial court for information. 20) Copy of this judgment be placed on both the files. (Sanjay Dhar) Judge Srinagar, 15.07.2022 “Bhat Altaf, PS” Whether the order is speaking: Yes/No Whether the order is reportable: Yes/No

if a person is acquitted or convicted of any offence, he may be tried for a distinct offence

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION B.R. GAVAI; J., B.V. NAGARATHNA; J. CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.187-188 OF 2017; 8 December, 2022 T.P. Gopalakrishnan versus State of Kerala Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 300 - Section 300 of the CrPC places a bar wherein, a person who has already been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence arising out of the same facts, and has either been acquitted or convicted of such offence cannot be tried again for the same offence as well as on the same facts for any other offence as long as such acquittal or conviction remains in force. Constitution of India, 1950; Article 20(2) - Articles 20 to 22 deal with personal liberty of citizens and others. Article 20(2) expressly provides that no person shall be prosecuted or punished for the same offence, more than once. The protection against double jeopardy is also supplemented by statutory provisions contained in Section 300 of the CrPC, Section 40 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 71 of the IPC and Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. For Appellant(s) Mr. Adolf Mathew,Adv. Mr. Sanjay Jain, AOR; For Respondent(s) Mr. C.K. Sasi, AOR Mr. Abdulla Naseeh V.T.,Adv. Ms. Meena K. Poulose,Adv. J U D G M E N T NAGARATHNA, J. 1. These Criminal Appeals have been filed assailing the impugned judgment and order dated 13.06.2016 passed by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in Criminal Appeal Nos. 947 and 948 of 2009 by which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27.04.2009 passed in C.C. No.24 and 25 of 2003 by the Court of the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Kozhikode (‘Trial Court’, for the sake of convenience) has been upheld by dismissing the aforesaid appeals and consequently confirming the conviction of the appellant herein. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to as per their rank before the Trial Court. 3. The Trial Court vide its judgment and order dated 27.04.2009 in both the aforesaid cases convicted the appellant herein-accused for offences under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘the Act’, for short) and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rupees Two Thousand and in default thereof, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. The accused was further convicted for the offence under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’ for short) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rupees Two Thousand and in default thereof, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. 4. The appellant herein was released on bail vide order of this Court dated 30.01.2017 subject to fulfilment of the conditions imposed by the Trial Court. Facts of the Case: 5. Succinctly stated, the case of the prosecution in C.C. No. 24 of 2003 is that while the accused was working as Agricultural Officer, State Seed Farm, Perambra, for the 2 period 31.05.1991 to 31.05.1994, he abused his official position as a public servant and committed criminal breach of trust and misappropriated an amount of Rs.20,035/-, during the period from 27.04.1992 to 25.08.1992, by not remitting the same to the Sub-Treasury, Perambra. The amount included Rs.17,449/-, being two-thirds of the proceeds received from the auction of 5510 coconuts harvested and auctioned on 28.05.1992 at the State Seed Farm, Perambra; Rs.2,098/- being two-thirds of the proceeds from the auction of 1049 kgs of half-filled grains auctioned on 28.05.1992; and Rs.488.80/- being the price of 104 coconuts harvested from the State Feed Farm, Permbra on 24.08.1992 and 25.08.1992 respectively. 6. The case of the prosecution in C.C. No.25 of 2003 is that while the accused was working as Agricultural Officer, State Seed Farm, Perambra, from 31.05.1991 to 31.05.1994, abused his official position as a public servant and committed criminal breach of trust and misappropriated an amount of Rs.58,671/- during the period from 01.03.1993 to 12.04.1994, being auction proceeds from the sale of 11,109 coconuts harvested from State Seed Farm, Perambra, auctioned on 23.07.1993; Rs. 12,290/- being the proceeds from the auction of 6,046 coconuts; Rs.11,844/- being the proceeds from the auction of 3,883 coconuts harvested from State Seed Farm, Perambra; Rs.654/- being the price of 160 coconuts harvested on 13.02.1992, 07.04.1993, 17.03.1994 and 12.04.1994, by not accounting for them and has thereby committed the aforesaid offences under Section 13(1)(c) read with Section 13(2) of the Act and Section 409 of the IPC. 7. It is prosecution’s case that prior to registration of these two cases against the accused, three other cases, being C.C. No. 12 of 1999, C.C. No. 13 of 1999 and C.C. No. 14 of 1999 were registered against him. In May 1994, a surprise inspection was carried out in the State Seed Farm, Perambra and the inspection team found that the cash book was not properly maintained and that the Agricultural Officer received amounts from the Treasury. The inspection report was submitted to the Director of Agriculture. On the basis of the said report, an enquiry was conducted by the vigilance department and a criminal case was registered against the accused on 05.02.1996. On completion of investigation, the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau submitted three reports and C.C. No. 12 of 1999 (for offences committed for the period between 28.03.1994 and 02.04.1994); C.C. No. 13 of 1999 (for offences committed for the period from 15.12.1992 to 31.03.1993) and C.C. No. 14 of 1999 (for offences committed for the period from 05.03.1994 to 08.03.1994) were registered against the accused under Section 13(1)(c) read with Section 13(2) of the Act and Sections 409 and 477A of IPC. The Accounts Officer conducted an audit in the State Seed Farm, pertaining to the period from 31.05.1991 to 31.05.1994 and gave a report. On the basis of the same, the two cases, out of which this appeal arises, were registered against the appellant herein. The FIR in respect of the present cases was registered on 03.12.2001. It is prosecution’s case that it was in the re-audit, that these instances were unearthed and therefore the two cases, C.C. No.24/2003 and C.C. No.25/2003, were registered against the appellant herein. 8. Charges were framed against the accused for the said offences on 30.06.2007 and the same were read over and explained to the accused to which the accused pleaded ‘not guilty’ and claimed to be tried. The accused filed an application for joint trial, being CMP No. 1019 of 2008 which was allowed and therefore both the cases were tried together. The prosecution examined a total of 13 witnesses. Thereafter, statements of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC’, for short) were recorded. The accused denied the allegations and submitted that he was innocent and had been falsely implicated. 3 9. It was the appellant’s case before the Trial Court and the High Court that during the period in question, he had additional charge of some other farms and had to heavily depend on his subordinates at the office to conduct the affairs of the State Seed Farm, Perambra. The appellant contended that he did not misappropriate any amount from the farm and has not committed any offence as alleged by the prosecution. Findings of the Trial Court: 10. The Trial Court vide judgment dated 27.04.2009, on considering the evidence of record convicted the accused for the offences under Sections 13(1)(c) read with Section 13 (2) of the Act and Section 409 of the IPC, holding that the accused misappropriated an amount of Rs.78,706/-, being two-thirds of the auction proceeds, without remitting it to the treasury during the period from 27.04.1992 to 25.08.1992 and from 01.03.1993 to 12.04.1994. The salient findings of the Trial Court can be epitomised as under: i. That it could be seen from the Attendance Register (Ext. P22) that the accused was an Agricultural Officer at the State Seed Farm, Perambra, during the period in question. The accused has also admitted the same in his statement under Section 313 of the CrPC. ii. That perusal of documents such as posting order of the accused as Agricultural Officer (Ext.P2), copy of report of transfer of charge of the accused (Ext.P3) and file containing posting details of the accused (Ext.P4) would prove that the accused was working as an Agricultural Officer in the State Seed Farm from 31.05.1991 to 31.05.1994, beyond any reasonable doubt. iii. That the accused was removed from service at the time of filing of the chargesheet, therefore there was no need for sanction under Section 19 of the Act. iv. That the accused conducted auction of agricultural products of the State Seed Farm, Perambra and collected one-third of auction amount on the date of auction itself. Receipt for the said amount was issued to the successful bidder. After collecting the remaining two-thirds amount, the articles were to be delivered to the auction purchaser. On 28.05.1993, 5510 coconuts were harvested and auctioned. The two-thirds of the auction amount was Rs.17,449/. The accused did not remit the said amount after collecting the same from the auction purchaser. v. That Rs.2,098/- being two-thirds of the proceeds from the auction of 1049 kgs of half-filled grains auctioned on the same date and Rs.488.80/- being the price of 104 coconuts harvested on 24.08.1992 and 25.08.1992 were also not remitted to the SubTreasury and the accused had misappropriated the said amounts for his own gain. Similarly, an amount of Rs.58,671/- was misappropriated by the accused from the auction proceeds of coconuts harvested from the State Seed Farm, Perambra from 01.03.1993 to 12.04.1994. vi. That the charges levelled in the present two cases were for the period from 27.04.1992 to 25.08.1992 and from 01.03.1993 to 12.04.1994. In the previous case, the accused had misappropriated some amount to be paid to the Proprietor, Agricultural Marketing Corporation, Kozhikode; Kerala State Coir Marketing Corporation, Kozhikode, from the State Seed Farm, Perambra by falsifying and forging the records. That the accused also misappropriated some amounts to be paid to Kerala State Cooperative Marketing Federation, Kozhikode. The said amounts were neither accounted in the cash book, nor were they disbursed to the beneficiaries. However, in the present case, after conducting the auction of coconuts and half-filled grains, two-thirds of the auction proceeds collected from the successful bidders were not remitted to the treasury. Therefore, the period of misappropriation and the nature of the offences committed by the 4 accused in the previous three cases and the present two cases were entirely different. The accused was thus convicted under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(c) of the Act. vii. That the accused was the custodian of the cash, cash chest, cash book and other documents as the Agricultural Officer, State Seed Farm, Perambra and during his tenure and capacity as a public servant, he misappropriated the aforesaid amount for his own gain. The accused was therefore held to have committed breach of trust in respect of the property and thus convicted under Section 409 of the IPC. 11. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court, the appellant-accused preferred Criminal Appeal Nos. 947 and 948 of 2009 before the High Court, assailing the judgment of the Trial Court. The said appeals were dismissed by the common impugned judgment dated 13.06.2016 and the conviction was upheld. However, the High Court reduced the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for two years, to rigorous imprisonment of one year. The pertinent findings of the High Court can be noted as under: i. That admittedly, the instances pointed out in these two cases were not included in the earlier three cases registered against the appellant. That it was during the audit for the period from 23.12.1997 to 27.12.1997 that these instances were unearthed and the present cases were registered. ii. That it was an admitted fact that the records did not show that the amounts involved in the present two cases were remitted to the Sub-Treasury. iii. That evidence of PW11 established that she assumed charge on 04.06.1994. While working as an Agricultural Officer at Krishi Bhavan, Kayanna, she had to assume additional charge as the Agricultural Officer, Seed Farm, Perambra. As per her statement, at the time when she assumed charge in the presence of the Joint Director of Agriculture and the Deputy Director of Agriculture, she had not taken possession of the documents or properties of the office at the Seed Farm at Perambra since no such documents were available at the office. iv. That as per the statement of PW4 who assumed charge as an Agricultural Officer at the State Seed farm, Perambra for the period from 07.06.1994 to 24.04.1997, he did not receive any cash book for the period from 10.02.1992 to 11.03.1994. The appellant herein entrusted the cash book for the period from 12.03.1994 to 03.06.1994 and cash balance of Rs.2,763/- after PW4 took charge. That from the evidence of PW4, it was clear that he did not get the cash book at the time of taking charge and only after he assumed charge, the appellant entrusted to him the cash book and the cash balance. When there is no challenge with regard to the fact that the appellant had handed over the cash book for the period from 12.03.1994 to 03.06.1994, it goes without saying that he had never handed over the earlier cash book. No further proof was required. v. That as a responsible gazetted officer, the appellant ought to have exercised more caution and therefore, could not wash his hands off by stating he was dependent on his subordinate staff, since he had additional charge of other farms also. He ought to have kept the cash book and maintained it properly and made timely entries. The appellant clearly removed the cash book and did not return the same for the period from 10.02.1992 to 11.03.1994. 12. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Courts below, the appellant has knocked on the doors of this Court by preferring the present appeals. 5 13. We have heard Sri Adolf Mathew, learned counsel for the appellant-accused and Sri C.K. Sasi, learned counsel for the respondent-State and perused the material on record. Submissions of the parties: 14. Learned counsel for the appellant herein-accused at the outset submitted that the High Court was not right in confirming the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court and the impugned judgments suffer from legal as well as factual infirmities and the findings therein are perverse and are liable to be set-aside, and the appellant is liable to be acquitted. The submissions of the learned counsel for accused are summarised as under: 14.1 That the accused is a public servant. Section 197(1) of the CrPC requires sanction of the State Government before taking cognizance of offence against public servants such as the accused. 14.2 That the entire prosecution proceedings in the present cases are barred by Section 300(1) of the CrPC which incorporates the principle of double jeopardy. The accused was already prosecuted in the year 1999 for the charges of misappropriating public funds entrusted to him, when C.C. No.12 to 14/1999 were filed against him. The core allegation in all the five cases is one and the same i.e., making false entries in the cash book and misappropriating money. 14.3 That the charges in the first three cases were framed on 17.08.1999 which is much after the audit and on the said day, the prosecution was very well aware of the alleged misappropriation in respect of the present case. Therefore, the allegations/offences in the instant cases might have been framed at the previous trial and the accused could have been tried for the present allegations in the said cases itself. 14.4 That vide judgment and order dated 27.02.2001, the Trial Court acquitted the appellant from all the charges levelled against him in C.C. No.13/1999 i.e., acquitted of all the charges levelled against during the period from 15.12.1992 to 31.03.1993. However, the appellant herein was convicted of the charges in C.C. No.12 and 14 of 1999. The petitioner herein was dismissed from service on 02.05.2001. The FIR in the present cases was filed on 03.12.2001 after the appellant herein was dismissed from the service and the judgment of the Trial Court was passed. The allegations/offences in the present two cases could have been framed at the previous trial and the appellant herein could have been tried for the same along with the trial of the earlier three cases. 14.5 If the accused was to be tried again for the present offences, previous consent of the State Government is necessary as is mandated under sub-section (2) of Section 300 of the CrPC. 14.6 The charges framed in the present case pertain to several acts of misappropriation and falsification of accounts. The same were allegedly committed in the course of same transaction/same series of acts. For a series of acts to be regarded as the same transaction, they must be connected. That the different acts of misappropriation alleged against the accused are interlinked, connected with proximity of time and place and community of purpose and design. 14.7 During the period in question, the appellant herein held an additional charge of some other farms and therefore had to depend heavily on his subordinates at the office. 6 14.8 The conviction of the appellant herein under Section 409 of the IPC has no legal basis since the prosecution could not prove the most vital ingredient of the said offence, namely, entrustment of goods or dominion over property. 14.9 The conviction under Section 13(1)(c) of the Act is not made out since the prosecution failed to prove that the property was entrusted to him or was under his control, and that the same was fraudulently or dishonestly misappropriated by him. 15. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-State supported the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court and judgment of the Trial Court and contended that the Courts below have rightly perceived and assessed the evidence on record. The following submissions were also made: 15.1 That the accused, while working as an Agricultural Officer at the State Seed Farm, Perambra from 31.05.1991 to 31.05.1994, in the capacity of a public servant, misappropriated an amount of Rs.20,035/- during the period from 27.04.1992 to 25.08.1992 and an amount of Rs.58,671/- during the period from 01.03.1993 to 12.04.1994. 15.2 The appellant conducted auction of coconuts and half-filled grains and collected one-third of the auction amount from PW5 and PW-6 on the date of auction itself. After confirmation, twothirds of the auction amount was also collected and the receipts were issued, but the said two-thirds amount was not remitted to the Sub-Treasury. 15.3 The Agricultural Officer is the custodian of the challan receipts, cash, cash books, etc. and during the said period when the funds were misappropriated, the appellant herein was the Agricultural Officer at the State Seed Farm, Perambra. The certified copy of the Attendance Register marked at Ext.P-22 proves the same. 16. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties, the following points would arise for our consideration: (a) Whether the High Court was justified in confirming the judgment of conviction and sentence of Trial Court? (b) Whether the judgment of the High Court calls for any interference or modification by this Court? (c) What order? Discussion: 17. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that there is a bar to the prosecution in the two cases namely - since the appellant herein has already been prosecuted as well as punished for the same offences, in same set of facts. That prosecuting the appellant herein in the present two cases would amount to double jeopardy. In India, protection against double jeopardy is a fundamental right enshrined under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India. Section 300 of the CrPC is also based on the said principle. 18. Before proceeding further, it is pertinent to understand the concept of double jeopardy. As per the Black’s Law Dictionary, 9 th Edition, ‘double jeopardy’ is defined as “being prosecuted or sentenced twice, for substantially the same offence”. 19. The word ‘jeopardy’ is used to designate the danger of conviction and punishment which an accused in a criminal action incurs. ‘Jeopardy’ implies an exposure to a lawful conviction for an offence for which a person has already been acquitted or convicted. The terms ‘double jeopardy’, ‘former jeopardy’, ‘jeopardy for life or limb’, ‘jeopardy for the same 7 offence’, ‘twice put in jeopardy of punishment’ and other similar expressions used in various Constitutions and statutes are to be construed substantially, to the same effect. In other words, double jeopardy is used to denote the protection to an accused, that he has had a fair trial for the same offence, wherein fair trial means trial according to law and established legal procedure. 20. Part III of the Constitution of India deals with Fundamental Rights. Articles 20 to 22 deal with personal liberty of citizens and others. Article 20(2) expressly provides that no person shall be prosecuted or punished for the same offence, more than once. The protection against double jeopardy is also supplemented by statutory provisions contained in Section 300 of the CrPC, Section 40 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 71 of the IPC and Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India reads as under: “20. Protection in respect of conviction for offences.— (1) xxx xxx xxx (2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. (3) xxx xxx xxx ” 21. It would also be useful to discuss on the import of Section 300 of the CrPC. The said provision has been extracted hereinunder for ready reference: “Section 300 CrPC- Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence. (1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under subsection (1) of section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof. (2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried, with the consent of the State Government, for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him at the former trial under sub-section (1) of section 220. (3) A person convicted of any offence constituted by any act causing consequences which, together with such act, constituted a different offence from that of which he was convicted, may be afterwards tried for such last mentioned offence, if the consequences had not happened, or were not known to the Court to have happened, at the time when he was convicted. (4) A person acquitted convicted of any offence constituted by any acts may, notwithstanding such acquittal or conviction, be subsequently charged with, and tried for, any other offence constituted by the same acts which he may have committed if the Court by which he was first tried was not competent to try the offence with which he is subsequently charged. (5) A person discharged under section 258 shall not be tried again for the same offence except with the consent of the Court by which he was discharged or of any other Court to which the first mentioned Court is subordinate. (6) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) or of section 188 of this Code. Explanation.—The dismissal of a complaint, or the discharge of the accused, is not an acquittal for the purposes of this section.” 22. Section 300 of the CrPC embodies the general rule which affirms the validity of the pleas of autrefois acquit (previously acquitted) and autrefois convict (previously convicted). Sub-section (1) of Section 300 lays down the rule of double jeopardy and subsections (2) to (5) deal with the exceptions. Accordingly, so long as an order of acquittal or conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction remains in force, the person cannot be tried for the same offence for which he was tried earlier or for any other offence arising 8 from the same fact situation, except the cases dealt in with under sub-sections (2) to (5) of the section. 23. Section 300 of the CrPC is based on the maxim nemo deber bis vexari, si costest curiae quod sit pro una et eadem causa which means that a person cannot be tried a second time for an offence which is involved in an offence with which he was previously charged. As per the decision of this Court in Vijayalakshmi vs. Vasudevan (1994) 4 SCC 656 in order to bar the trial of any person already tried, it must be shown that: (i) he has been tried by a competent court for the same offence or one for which he might have been charged or convicted at a trial, on the same facts, (ii) he has been convicted or acquitted at the trial, and (iii) such conviction or acquittal is in force. 24. The whole basis for this provision is that the first trial should have been before court of competent jurisdiction. There must have been a trial of the accused, that is to say, that there should have been a hearing and determination or adjudication of the case on merits. Where the accused has not been tried and as such convicted or acquitted, Section 300(1) shall not be applicable. 25. Section 300 of the CrPC bars the trial of a person not only for the same offence but also for any other offence on the same facts, vide Thakur Ram vs. State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 911. Article 20 of the Constitution: 26. Under clause (2) of Article 20, no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India incorporates within its scope, the plea of autrefois convict, meaning, previously convicted as known to British jurisprudence, or the plea of double jeopardy known to the American Constitution. However, the said concepts are circumscribed in Article 20(2) which provides that there should be not only a prosecution but also punishment in the first instance in order to operate as a bar to a second prosecution and punishment for the same offence. On a plain reading the of sub clause (2) of Article 20, it is clear that the said provision bars a second prosecution only where the accused has been both prosecuted and punished for the same offence previously vide S.A. Venkataraman vs. Union of India AIR 1954 SC 375 (“S.A. Venkataraman”). But this clause does not bar subsequent trial if the ingredients of the offences in the previous and subsequent trials are distinct. In Maqbool Hussain vs. State of Bombay AIR 1953 SC 325, this Court has held that clause (2) is not applicable unless the person has been both prosecuted and punished. 27. There are three conditions for the application of the clause. Firstly, there must have been previous proceeding before a court of law or a judicial tribunal of competent jurisdiction in which the person must have been prosecuted. The said prosecution must be valid and not null and void or abortive. Secondly, the conviction or acquittal in the previous proceeding must be in force at the time of the second proceeding in relation to the same offence and same set of facts, for which he was prosecuted and punished in the first proceeding. Thirdly, the subsequent proceeding must be a fresh proceeding, where he is, for the second time, sought to be prosecuted and punished for the same offence and same set of facts. In other words, the clause has no application when the subsequent proceeding is a mere continuation of the previous proceeding, for example, where an appeal arises out of such acquittal or conviction. In order to sustain a plea of double jeopardy, it must be shown that all the aforesaid conditions of this clause are satisfied, vide S.A. Venkataraman. 9 28. What is to be noted here is that both these provisions, i.e., Section 300 of the CrPC and Article 20 of the Constitution of India use the term ‘same offence’. Before dealing with the issue at hand, it is necessary to understand what the term ‘same offence’ means and includes. The term ‘same offence’ in simple language means, where the offences are not distinct and the ingredients of the offences are identical. Where there are two distinct offences made up of different ingredients, the embargo under Article 20 of the Constitution of India, has no application, though the offences may have some overlapping features. The crucial requirement of Article 20 is that the offences are the same and identical in all respects, vide State (N.C.T. of Delhi) vs. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600. 29. The concept of double jeopardy can also be understood in terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India which states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. ‘Life’ under Article 21 of the Constitution is not merely the physical act of breathing. It does not connote mere animal existence or continued drudgery through life. It has a much wider connotation; it includes the right to live with human dignity. In the celebrated judgment in the case of Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India 1978 AIR 597, this Court gave a new dimension to Article 21, wherein it stated that the right to live includes within its ambit the right to live with dignity. Under the umbrella of Article 21, various rights like right to free legal aid, right to speedy trial, right to fair trial, etc. have been included. Similarly, protection against double jeopardy is also included under the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Prosecuting a person for the same offence in same series of facts, for which he has previously either been acquitted or has been convicted and undergone the punishment, affects the person’s right to live with dignity. 30. Double jeopardy is often confused with double punishment. There is a vast difference between the two. Double punishment may arise when a person is convicted for two or more offences charged in one indictment however, the question of double jeopardy arises only when a second trial is sought on a subsequent indictment following a conviction or acquittal on an earlier indictment. This doctrine is certainly not a protection to the individual from peril of second sentence or punishment, nor to the service of a sentence for one offence, but is a protection against double jeopardy for the same offence that is, against a second trial for the same offence. 31. Before this Court, the appellant has vehemently contended that he was employed as the Agricultural Officer, State Seed Farm, Perambra during the period from 31.05.1991 to 31.05.1994. He also held an additional charge of Agricultural Officer, Krishi Bhavan, Perambra for the period from 20.10.1993 to 27.10.1994. The appellant had to rely on his subordinate for performing various office works. The files including stock registers, etc. were handled by the subordinate staff. The cash was received by the Agricultural Assistant during the absence of Agricultural Officer. The appellant herein referred to the testimonies of PW-5 who was a resident of Ulliyeri engaged in coconut business, PW-11 who was the Agricultural Officer at Thayanna, PW-12 who was the Accounts Officer, Principal Agricultural Officer, Kozhikode and PW-13 who was the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau, Northern Range, Kozhikode. 32. It will be relevant to refer to the testimonies of these witnesses relied upon by the appellant herein. PW-5 was a resident of Ulliyeri and engaged in coconut business for ten years. He stated that he had purchased coconuts from the Perambra Seed Farm many times during 1992-1993. He stated that the appellant who was the Agricultural Officer then, handed over to him, a carbon copy of the receipt for payment of Rs.8,724/- on 28.05.1992. That one-third amount was deposited on the date of auction and remaining 10 two-thirds amount was paid later and the coconuts were taken by him. This witness stated that he did not remember if the receipt for payment of two-thirds of the amount was given or not. In his cross-examination, the witness stated that he was examined after eight years from the date of incident and that there were other staff in the said office. That he could not exactly say as to whom he handed over the amount and also that he did not insist on the receipts and does not remember if the receipts were given or not. 33. PW-11 was the Agricultural Officer at Thayanna from 21.12.1992 to 02.04.1996. He had additional charge as Agricultural Officer of State Deed Farm, Permabra. In his testimony, he stated that when he took charge in the presence of Joint Director of Agriculture and Deputy Director, he did not take over the movable and immovable properties of the said office. That the documents were not taken over since there were no documents in the office and that he did not ask about the cash and the cash book. In his cross examination, this witness stated that when he assumed charge, it was the office staff who briefed him on the matters in the said office. As per this witness, there were a lot of cash transactions in the Seed Farm and in the absence of the officers, the staff would handle the matters of cash. The Agricultural Officer would have field work too, and would also go out for periodical conferences. 34. PW-12 was the Accounts Officer of the Principal Agriculture Office, from 24.01.1996 to 31.08.1998. In his testimony, he stated that during that period, he conducted re-audit of the Seed Farm from for the period from 01.04.1992 to 31.12.1994. The re-audit was done since there were objections that the details of the income of the farm were not checked in detail. The Agricultural Officer for the period from 01.04.1992 to 03.06.1994 was T.P. Gopalakrishnan, the appellant herein; from 04.06.1994 to 06.06.1994 was Mini; and from 07.06.1994 was Vinod Kumar. Since there were irregularities in the previous audit, reaudit was done. In his cross-examination, PW-12 stated that he had not seen the departmental audit that was firstly conducted. During his audit period, the accused was under suspension. In his crossexamination, this witness stated that he did not know the reasons for non-availability of the cash book and other documents in the office. 35. PW-13 is the Deputy Superintendent of Vigilance and AntiCorruption Bureau, Kozhikode who registered the FIR in the present case on 05.12.2001 and seized the documents. This witness carried out the investigation and laid the charges against the accused. The certified copies of the documents showing cases pending against the accused in the present case were also recovered. In his cross examination, PW-13 stated that he came to know of the previous three cases where the accused was named; he convicted in two cases and acquitted in one case, and he informed the higher authorities of the same. 36. On perusal of the testimonies of the aforementioned witnesses, what emerges is that there are vital discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. PW-5 in his testimony stated that he gave the amount to the appellant herein whereas in his cross-examination, he stated that he does not know to whom he handed over the money. As per the statement made by PW-11 in his cross examination, the staff of the Seed Farm used to handle the matters in absence of the officers therein. The testimony of this witness supports the case of the appellant herein since the appellant has also contended the same. PW-12 in his cross, examination has stated that he did not know the reasons as to why the cash book and other documents were not in office. PW-12 has no where stated that the same were in the custody of the appellant herein. 37. It is further the case of the appellant herein that the previous three cases, C.C. No.12, 13 and 14 of 1999 pertained to the period from 28.03.1994 to 02.04.1994, 11 15.12.1992 to 31.03.1993 and 05.03.1994 to 08.03.1994, respectively. Admittedly, the charge in C.C. No.24 of 2003 is for misappropriation of an amount of Rs.20,035/- during the period from 27.04.1992 to 25.08.1992; the charge in C.C. No.25 of 2003 is for an amount of Rs.58,671/-, allegedly misappropriated during the period from 01.03.1993 to 12.04.1994. It is appellant’s case that he has already faced trial in the previous three cases and the present two cases pertain to the same period. Section 300 of the CrPC places a bar wherein, a person who has already been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence arising out of the same facts, and has either been acquitted or convicted of such offence cannot be tried again for the same offence as well as on the same facts for any other offence as long as such acquittal or conviction remains in force. The appellant herein was earlier charged for offences under Section 13(1)(c) read with Section 13(2) of the Act and Sections 409 and 477A of the IPC and was convicted in two cases and acquitted in one case. The present two cases arise out of the same set of facts and the same transaction as that in the previous three cases wherein the appellant was tried and convicted/acquitted respectively. As already discussed above, for an offence to be considered as the ‘same offence’ as the last offence, it is necessary to show that the offences are not distinct and the ingredients of the offences are identical. The previous charge as well as the present charge is for the same period of misappropriation. The matter of offences in all the previous three cases and the present case are the same and are said to be committed in the course of same transaction while holding the one and same post of Agricultural Officer by the appellant. 38. The Trial Court has erred in holding that the facts of previous case and misappropriation committed by the accused are not the same as the facts relevant to present case. The Trial Court has held that in the present case, the allegation is that after conducting the auction of coconuts and half filled grains, two-thirds of the amount collected from the successful bidder was not remitted to the treasury, however, in the earlier cases, the allegations were that the accused misappropriated some amount to be paid to the proprietor of Agricultural Marketing Corporation, Kozhikode, Kerala State Coir marketing Corporation, Kozhikode from the State Seed Farm, Perambra by forging and falsifying records. It is the admitted case of the prosecution that the present cases were based on the re-audit conducted by PW-9- the Assistant Sub-Inspector, Vigilance and AntiCorruption Bureau, Kozhikode. The re-audit was done for the period from 01.04.1992 to 31.12.1994. The charges in the present case are for relevant period from 27.04.1992 to 25.08.1992 and 01.03.1993 to 12.04.1994 which time period is same as in the previous three cases, that is, 28.03.1994 to 02.04.1994, 15.12.1992 to 31.03.1993 and 05.03.1994 to 08.03.1994 respectively. Thus, it can be said that the present cases pertain to the same set of facts and are in respect of same offences, for the same period, committed in the same capacity as the previous three cases wherein the appellant herein was already prosecuted in the year 1999. The core allegation in all these five cases pertains to misappropriation by making false entries in the cash book. The allegation of the prosecution that two-thirds of the auction amount was not remitted to the treasury would be covered under the allegations of misappropriation of funds, that the appellant has already been prosecuted for in the year 1999. The appellant is right in contending that the charge in the first three cases were framed on 17.08.1999 which is much after the audit and the prosecution would have been well aware of the misappropriation in respect of the present cases on 17.08.1999. 39. The learned counsel for the appellant has also brought to the attention of this Court, sub-section (2) of Section 300 of the CrPC which states that a person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be tried thereafter, but with the consent of the State 12 Government, for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been framed against him under sub-section (1) of Section 220 of the CrPC. It has already been observed hereinabove that the allegations/offences in the instant cases are the same as the allegations/offences in the previous three cases, therefore as per the mandate under Section 300(2) of the CrPC, the consent of the State Government is necessary. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the allegations are different in present cases from those in the previous cases, the prosecution has failed to obtain the prior consent of the State Government necessary to prosecute the accused-appellant and therefore the trial in the instant case is unlawful. 40. It would not be wrong to say that the charges framed against the accused reveal that there were several acts of misappropriation and falsification of accounts however the same were committed in the same transaction as the one for which he was prosecuted in the year 1999. The series of acts alleged against him are so connected to one another. 41. Sub-section (2) of Section 300 of the CrPC states that when the charge of the second trial is for a distinct offence, the trial is not barred. This means that if a person is acquitted or convicted of any offence, he may be tried for a distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him at the former trial under sub-section (1) of Section 220 of the CrPC but the same is subject to a condition precedent being, that the consent of the State Government is sought before such a person could be tried. Applying the said provision to the present case, it is noted that earlier the petitioner was tried in C.C. No.12 of 1999, C.C. No. 13 of 1999 and C.C. No.14 of 1999 for the offences under Section 13(1)(c) read with Section 13(2) of the Act as well as under Sections 409 and 477A of the IPC. In C.C. No. 24 of 2003 and C.C. No. 25 of 2003, the appellant is being tried once again for the offences under Section 13(1)(c) read with Section 13(2) of the Act and Section 409 of the IPC for the same period. There is no material on record to demonstrate that C.C. No.24 of 2003 and C.C. No.25 of 2003 have been initiated pursuant to the consent of the State Government. It is also not brought on record that the C.C. No.24 of 2003 and C.C. No.25 of 2003 is for any distinct offence for which a separate charge had been made against the appellant and the earlier trials. (a) Having re-appreciated the evidence of the witnesses and on considering the contentions of the rival parties, we find that the High Court was not justified in affirming the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court. (b) In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find that the Trial Court as well as the High Court were not right in convicting and sentencing the appellant herein and therefore, the impugned judgments are liable to be set aside. 42. In the circumstances, we find that the initiation of C.C. No.24 of 2003 and C.C. No. 25 of 2003 are not in accordance with law and hence, the said proceedings are quashed. Consequently, the judgment of the Special Judge, Kozikhode in C.C. No.24 of 2003 and C.C. No.25 of 2003 and of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in Criminal Appeal Nos.947 and 948 of 2009 are set aside. The appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. No costs.

Double Jeopardy - meaning

 The word ‘double jeopardy’ comes from the English common law rule ‘Nemo bis punitur pro eodem delicto,’ which means “no one should be punished twice for the same offence.” The word ‘double jeopardy’ comes from the common-law rule ‘Nemo debet bis vexari,’ which means “a man must not be put in peril twice for the same offence.” In simple terms, it implies ‘penalty twice’ or “punishment given more than once for the same offence.”

 

Conditions where the doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply

The double jeopardy clause’s protection may not always be applicable. The courts have evolved some principles for determining the application of double jeopardy as a valid defence, mostly through legal interpretations over history.

• Civil lawsuit: Double jeopardy is a defence that can only be used in criminal court and cannot be used in civil court. The defendant cannot defend himself against punishment in civil court for the same crime committed in criminal court. For example, if ‘A’ killed ‘B’ in a drunk and drive case, ‘B’s family can sue in both civil and criminal courts. They can sue in civil court to recover the ‘B’s financial damages. In a civil proceeding, ‘A’ cannot defend himself with double jeopardy to protect him from punishment for his crime. However, he could use double jeopardy to defend himself in criminal court.
• Jeopardy must begin: The executive authorities must first put the defendant in jeopardy before applying the double jeopardy doctrine. This requires that defendants must be tried first before claiming double jeopardy doctrine as a defence. After the trial jury is called in, jeopardy begins or attaches to the case.
• Jeopardy must end: Jeopardy must begin and conclude in the same way. To put it another way, before the double jeopardy doctrine may be utilised to prevent the defendant from being arrested and punished for the same offence, the case must come to a conclusion.  When a judge enters an acquittal judgement before submitting the matter to the jury or when the sentence has been served. When the court renders a decision, jeopardy is usually over.