Monday, December 30, 2024

Judgment on Possession taken without protest

 

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION

NEW DELHI

 

FIRST APPEAL NO. 472 OF 2007

(From the orders dated 10.04.2007 in Complaint No.37/2000 of the Delhi State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission)

 

B.S. Walia

R/o 338, Kailash Tower-I

East of Kailash

New Delhi-110065                                           Appellant

 

Versus

 

M/s DLF Universal Limited

DLF Centre

Sansad Marg

New Delhi-110001                                           Respondent

 

BEFORE :

        HON’BLE  MR. JUSTICE  D.K. JAIN,  PRESIDENT

        HON’BLE  MRS.  VINEETA  RAI,  MEMBER

 

For the Appellant       :       Mr. B.S. Walia, Appellant in person

For the Respondent    :       Mr. R. Narain, Advocate with

Ms. Kanika, Advocate &

Mr. Siddharth Banthia, Advocate

 

Pronounced : 27th November, 2013

 

O R D E R

 

PER VINEETA RAI

 

        First Appeal No. 472 of 2007 has been filed by Shri B.S. Walia, Appellant herein and Original Complainant before the Delhi State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter referred to as the State Commission) being aggrieved by the order of that Commission which while concluding that there was a breach of Agreement by M/s DLF Universal Limited, Respondent herein and Opposite Party before the State Commission, had awarded a compensation of only Rs.50,000/- which was far less than what was sought by the Appellant and warranted in the case.

2.     The facts as contended by the Appellant are that in June, 1993 he had booked a flat in Beverly Park (II) in DLF Qutub Enclave, Gurgaon with the Respondent after being assured that this flat was immediately below the penthouse.  Appellant thereafter made the entire payment of Rs.24,55,182/- as per the prescribed schedule in the Agreement, including miscellaneous charges.  However, he was “wonderstruck” when he was informed on 24.09.1997 that the Respondent had suo motu and arbitrarily changed the allotment of this flat to one storey below the agreed floor as a result of which it was not immediately below the penthouse as applied for by the Appellant and confirmed by the Respondent.  This clearly amounted to unfair trade practice.  Further, as per Agreement the Respondent was to deliver the flat after three years but instead of handing over the completed flat by the stipulated period, Respondent demanded escalation costs of Rs.4,29,595/-, which the Appellant had no option but to pay under duress whereas Respondent should have paid interest on the amount of over Rs.24,00,000/- already deposited by the Appellant for the delayed period.  Respondent was, therefore, guilty of deficiency in service on this count and liable for payment of interest @ 16.5% on this amount for the delayed period in handing over possession of the flat amounting to Rs.10,78,080/- since the flat was handed over only on 18.06.1999.  Being aggrieved by the unfair trade practice and deficiency in service on the part of Respondent, Appellant filed a complaint before the State Commission seeking (i) damages of Rs.5,00,000/-; (ii) interest for the delay in handing over possession from July, 1996 to February, 1999 amounting to Rs.9,09,600/-; and (iii) compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- towards mental agony and harassment.

3.     Respondent on being served filed a written rejoinder denying the allegations made by the Appellant and inter alia contented that the allegation of unfair trade practice in not allotting the flat as per the requirements of the Appellant is not borne out by the documentary evidence on record.  Appellant himself had written a letter on 23.06.1993 to the Respondent stating that a flat be reserved for him on the 10th floor or if it is possible on the 11th or 12th floor.  Subsequently in his formal application for allotment, he again specifically indicated that the flat No.1410-A on the 10th floor was acceptable to him and it was also confirmed in the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement signed between the parties.  There was never any request written or otherwise by the Appellant that he should be allotted a flat just below the penthouse. In fact Respondent vide letters dated 26.06.1993, 24.09.1997, 19.12.1997, 10.07.1997, 09.09.1997 and 04.08.1999 had clearly communicated to the Appellant that flat no. 1410-A had two floors above it, including the penthouse on the top floor.   Regarding the allegation of the Appellant that he was not liable to pay escalation costs because of the delay in handing over possession of the flat, for which Respondent solely was to blame, it was clearly stated in the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement that delay could be possible on account of various factors beyond the control of the Respondent and in the instant case the delay in handing over possession occurred because of time taken in getting necessary government clearances.  The escalation charges demanded by the Respondent were thus strictly in accordance with the terms of the Agreement and in fact no promise about any particular date for handing over the flat was made. Appellant took possession of flat no. 1410-A on 18.06.1999 and also sold the same.  Having done so, as per clause 20 of the Agreement, he had no claim against the Respondent for any reason whatsoever and, therefore, the present complaint filed by him was no longer maintainable.    

4.     The State Commission after hearing the parties and on the basis of evidence produced before it observed as follows :

8.    After hearing the counsel for the parties and according careful consideration to the documents on record as well as the version of the O.P. reproduced from the written submission of the O.P., we find that the O.P. had vide letter dated 10-07-1993 admitted the allotment of a floor which was required by the complainant, i.e. immediately below the penthouse. However, the O.P. is harping on the number of flat without realizing that it had already agreed to allot a flat below the penthouse to the complainant. Confusion is being created by the O.P. regarding the number of the flat. Thus, if the complainant has suffered any loss, it was on account of non-allotment of flat immediately below the penthouse but subsequently he was allotted the flat and it was sold also. …

 

11.     Taking over all view of the matter and the breach of agreement by O.P., we deem that a lump sum compensation of Rs. 50,000/- would meet the ends of justice.”

 

        Hence, the present appeal.

5.     Appellant in person and Counsel for the Respondent made oral submissions.

6.     Appellant vehemently argued that the State Commission erred in granting him a token compensation after having concluded that there was a clear breach of the Agreement.  Appellant brought to our attention a letter dated 05.08.1999 in which Respondent had admitted that there appeared to be some misunderstanding vis-à-vis numbering of the flats as communicated to the Appellant vide Respondent’s letter dated 10.07.1993 indicating that there was no intervening floor between the flat allotted to Appellant and the penthouse.  Appellant contended that he had opted for flat no. 1410-A on the clear understanding that there was only the penthouse above his flat.  He had clarified the same in writing to the Respondent on 16.07.1997 and also alleged that it appeared that the building plans were arbitrarily changed and one more floor was constructed between his flat and the penthouse.  Since Appellant was working abroad he was not in a position to meet the Respondent frequently as a result of which he was misled and the sale of the flat was foisted on him.  Appellant wanted to buy the flat for his personal use and he had no option but to sell it because it was not as per his requirement.  Appellant, therefore, requested that the order of the State Commission be modified and he be given the compensation and relief sought by him before the State Commission.

7.     Counsel for Respondent denied the above allegations and stated that even Rs.50,000/- given to the Appellant by the State Commission as compensation was not based on the merits of the case but Respondent paid this amount to avoid unnecessary litigation.  More importantly Appellant had accepted the decree of the State Commission without any reservations and, therefore, the present appeal for enhancement of compensation is untenable.  It was reiterated that the Appellant without any reservation had taken possession of the flat in question on 18.06.1999 and having done so as per the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement he had no claim against the Respondent for any reason whatsoever.  On merits, it was contended that Appellant after booking the flat had never indicated that he wanted only a flat on a floor just below the penthouse.  In this connection, Counsel for the Respondent brought to our notice the letter dated 23.06.1993 from the Appellant to the Respondent requesting that “you reserve a flat for me in your building Windsor on the 10th floor or if it is possible on the 11th or 12th floor”.  From this letter it is very clear that Appellant had made a specific request for allotment on the 10th floor and reference to the higher floors was made only as an alternative.  Regarding the allegation that there was delay in handing over possession of the flat and also that the escalation charges were unwarranted, Counsel for the Respondent reiterated that these were covered under various provisions in the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement entered into between the parties and, thus, binding on the Appellant.  In view of these facts, the present appeal having no merit deserves to be dismissed. 

8.     We have carefully considered the submissions made by the parties and have also gone through the evidence on record.  Appellant having booked a flat in Beverly Park (II) in DLF Qutub Enclave, Gurgaon with the Respondent is not in dispute.  It is also a fact that Appellant had signed the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement accepting allotment of flat no. 1410-A on the 10th floor and had consequently paid for the cost of the flat.  The main point in dispute leading to filing of the present consumer complaint is that the Respondent had misled the Appellant that the flat allotted to him was just one floor below the penthouse whereas the Appellant after having accepted the flat and signed the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement came to know only on 24.09.1997 that the Respondent had suo motu and arbitrarily built two floors above the flat allotted to him, as a result of which it was not immediately below the penthouse, as applied for by the Appellant.  Apart from this, Appellant has challenged the delay in handing over the flat and the consequent escalation charges as not being warranted.   

        After going through the evidence on record, we are unable to accept the above contentions of the Appellant.  In this connection, we note that vide letter dated 23.06.1993 written by Appellant to Respondent following discussions in the latter’s office, Appellant had requested that he be reserved a flat on the 10th floor or if it is possible on the 11th or 12 floors.  From this letter, it is obvious that the Appellant was fully aware before having entered into the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement that there were two floors above the 10th floor i.e. the 11th and 12th floors.  Subsequently, in the application for allotment Appellant himself had specifically sought allotment on the 10th floor with no condition that it should be just below the penthouse.  Some confusion regarding whether the flat was located on the 10th floor or the 11th floor may have arisen, as observed by the State Commission, because of a letter from the Respondent dated 10.07.1993, in which Respondent had stated that the building has ground floor + 10 floors and, therefore, flat no. 1410-A is actually on the 11th floor but this error was subsequently clarified in various letters written by Respondent to Appellant.  Also in the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement entered into between the parties on 05.01.1994  it was clearly stated that flat no. 1410-A was on the 10th floor.  Further, as stated earlier, there is no evidence written or otherwise that the Appellant had insisted at the time of his purchasing the flat that only a flat below the penthouse would be acceptable to him.  It was only in 1997 when the construction was almost completed that this issue was raised.  Appellant thereafter took possession of the flat without any protest in 1999 and also sold the same, which lends further credence to the Respondent’s contention that Appellant had no initial objection to the location of the flat on the 10th floor irrespective of whether it was one or two floors below the penthouse and this objection was only voiced in 1997 i.e. three years after he had signed the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement. 

        Regarding the delay in handing over the possession of the flat and consequent escalation charges levied by the Respondent and objected to by the Appellant, we note that there are provisions pertaining to these possibilities under clauses 15, 16 and 17 of the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement entered into between the parties and, therefore, we do not find the Respondent guilty of any deficiency in service on this count as well.

9.     Keeping in view the above facts, we are unable to accept the present appeal and dismiss the same with no order as to costs.   

 

 

Sd/-

                                                                          (D.K. JAIN, J.)

PRESIDENT

 

 

Sd/-

(VINEETA  RAI)

MEMBER

 

Mukesh         

 

Hemanta Consumer Case

 

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION

NEW DELHI

 

 

CONSUMER CASE NO. 2121 OF 2016

 1. DR. HEMANT & ANR.

R/o A-2/54, MAHINDRA GARDENS, S.V. ROAD, GOREGAON(WEST) MUMBAI-400062

2. MRS. MITA

R/o A-2/54, MAHINDRA GARDENS, S.V. ROAD, GOREGAON(WEST) MUMBAI-400062

...........Complainant(s)

Versus

 

1. M/S. ZENAL CONSTRUCTION PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR.

SHOP NO-6, SAURAV APARTMENT, SHAHAJI RAJE MARG, VILEPARLE(EAST) MUMBAI

2. MR. PRAKASH J. BAROT-DIR

R/O 702, SHREEJI KIRAN, PLOT NO-107, L.T. ROAD, GOREGAON(WEST)MUMBAI-400062

...........Opp.Party(s)

 

BEFORE:

 

 

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJIT BHARIHOKE,PRESIDING MEMBER

 

HON'BLE MR. ANUP K THAKUR,MEMBER

 

For the Complainant :

Mr. R.M. Bhangde, Advocate

 

For the Opp.Party :


Dated : 23 Feb 2017

ORDER

Complainant No.1 is a Doctor. He admittedly is running a clinic at 112-13, Ashoka Super Market, Junction of S.V. Road and Aarey Road, above Bata Show-Room, Goregaon West, Mumbai. The instant complaint has been filed on the allegation that the complainants booked a commercial space in the development project (Krishna Ambika Arcade) at S.V. Road, Goregaon (West), undertaken by the opposite party developer.

2.       It is the case of the complainants that although they have paid Rs.2,64,13,182/- against the consideration amount, the opposite party developer has not given the possession of the premises despite expiry of stipulated time for delivery of possession.

3.       On going through the complaint, prima-facie it appears that the complainant does not fall within the definition of consumer in view of exception carved out in the definition of consumer as provided under Section 2 (1) (d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (in short, “the Act”). We have, therefore, heard arguments on the issue of maintainability of the complaint.

4.       Before adverting to the arguments of learned counsel for the complainant, we deem it necessary to produce the definition of consumer as provided under Section 2 (1) (d) of the Act. The definition reads as under: -

“(d)  "consumer" means any person who—

(i)  buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment when such use is made with the approval of such person, but does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose; or

(ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly prom­ised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who 'hires or avails of the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned person but does not include a person who avails of such services for any commercial purposes;

Explanation.— For the purposes of this clause, “commercial purpose” does not include use by a person of goods bought and used by him and services availed by him exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment”

 

5.       On reading of the above, it is clear that consumer is a person who buys goods or hires or avails of services for consideration present, past or future. The section however carves out an exception by providing that the person who has purchased goods or hired/availed of services for commercial purpose, shall not be included in the definition of consumer. The explanation to Section 2 (1) (d) however gives restricted meaning to the term “commercial purpose” in the context of Section 2 (1) (d) by providing that if the goods are bought or services are hired or availed exclusively by the complainant for earning his livelihood by way of self-employment, it shall not be treated as commercial purpose.

6.       On perusal of the complaint it appears that it is not the case in which the complainants have hired or availed the services of the opposite parties exclusively for the purpose of earning livelihood by means of self-employment. The following allegations in the complaint support our view: -

 

“The Complainant No.l, offers various diagnostic services from his abovementioned clinic which was set up in the year 1994.The Complainant No.l offers the following services viz: Digital X-ray, Digital Sonography, Whole Body Colour Doppler Sonography, 2D Colour Echo Cardiography, Digital OPG, Digital Lateral Cephalogram, 3D & 4D Sonography and various other pathology services.

      The Complainant No.l has a staff of 10 people in the said clinic. The said staff also includes one associate Doctor. The said clinic of the Complainant No.l admeasured only 850 Sq.ft. and was insufficient for carrying on various activities listed above.  Further there was no facility in Goregaon (W) area which    provided for C.T. Scan and M.R.I. in the year 2003. The Complainant No.l being Radiologist saw this as an opportunity  to establish a state of the art Radiology Centre in Goregaon (West). For the said purpose complainant’s existing clinic was wholly insufficient as the set up for a C.T. Scan requires atleast 500 Sq.ft. area and set up for M.R.I. requires atleast 800 Sq.ft.”

 

7.       On reading of the above, it is clear that complainant No.1 is a Radiologist having a clinic with a staff of 10 persons including associate Doctors. Thus, it is clear that before hiring or availing the services of the opposite parties, complaint No.1 was running business of Radiologist with the assistance of associate Doctors and support staff. This clearly indicates that the complainant No.1 was not only earning livelihood before booking of the commercial premises but he was also providing employment to 10 persons. That being the case, the case of the complainants does not fall within the explanation to Section 2 (1) (d) of the Act. In aforesaid view, we are supported by the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Lakshmi Engineering Works vs. P.S. G. Industrial Institute (1995) 3 SCC 583. Relevant observation of Hon’ble Supreme Court reads as under: -

 

          “The explanation excludes certain purposes from the purview of the expression "commercial purpose" - a case of exception to an exception. Let us elaborate: a person who buys a typewriter or a car and uses them for his personal use is certainly a consumer but a person who buys a typewriter or a car for typing others' work for consideration or for plying the car as a taxi can be said to be using the typewriter/car for a commercial purpose. The explanation however clarifies that in certain situations, purchase of goods for "commercial purpose" would not yet take the purchaser out of the definition of expression "consumer". If the commercial use is by the purchaser himself for the purpose of earing his livelihood by means of self-employment, such purchaser of goods is yet a "consumer". In the illustration given above, if the purchaser himself works on typewriter or plies the car as a taxi himself, he does not cease to be a consumer. In other words, if the buyer of goods uses them himself, i.e., by self- employment, for earning his livelihood, it would not be treated as a "commercial purpose" and he does not cease to be a consumer for the purposes of the Act. The explanation reduces the question, what is a "commercial purpose", to a question of fact to be decided in the facts of each case. It is not the value of the goods that matters but the purpose to which the goods bought are put to. The several words employed in the explanation, viz., "uses them by himself", "exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood" and "by means of self-employment" make the intention of Parliament abundantly clear, that the goods bought must be used by the buyer himself, by employing himself for earning his livelihood. A few more illustrations would serve to emphasis what we say. A person who purchases an auto-rickshaw to ply it himself on hire for earning his livelihood would be a consumer. Similarly, a purchaser of a truck who purchases it for plying it as a public carrier by himself would be a consumer. A person who purchases a lathe machine or other machine to operate it himself for earning his livelihood would be a consumer. (In the above illustrations, if such buyer takes the assistance of one or two persons to assist/help him in operating the vehicle or machinery, he does not cease to be a consumer.) As against this a person who purchases an auto-rickshaw, a car or a lathe machine or other machine to be plied or operated exclusively by another person would not be a consumer. This is the necessary limitation flowing from the expressions "used by him", and "by means of self-employment" in the explanation. The ambiguity in the meaning of the words "for the purpose of earning his livelihood" is explained and clarified by the other two sets of words.

 

8.       In view of the discussion above, the complainants do not fall within the definition of consumer. As such they have no locus standi to maintain the consumer complainant. Complaint is accordingly rejected with the observation that this order will not prevent the complainants from availing of their legal remedy before the appropriate Forum on the same cause of action.

 

 

......................J

AJIT BHARIHOKE

PRESIDING MEMBER

......................

ANUP K THAKUR

MEMBER

 

Sumana Devi Consumer Case

 

NAWAB SINGH J, Suman Devi-complainant, has filed the instant complaint under section 17 of the consumer protection act, 1986 (for short the act, 1986) with the averments that she booked a residential plot No.R-70 Type-A, in a forthcoming project of M/s IREO Fiveriver Private Limited-Opposite Party (for short the builder) known as IREO Fiveriver. The complainant initially deposited Rs.6,25,000/- vide receipt Exhibit C-1. In all, she paid Rs.28,50,461/- to the builder. A Plot Buyers Agreement (Exhibit C-2) was executed between the parties on June 23 , 2011. The totalth sale consideration of the plot was Rs.62,64,750/-. The possession of the plot was to be handed over to the complainant within 24 months from the execution of the agreement, that is, by June 22 ,nd 2013. The builder neither handed over the possession of the plot nor responded to the complainant with regard to the progress of the project. The complainant requested for refund of the amount deposited, alongwith interest but the builder did not pay any heed to her request.

2. The builder, in its written version, resisted the complaint on various grounds including its maintainability. The builder in preliminary objections averred that the complainant is not Consumer within the meaning of section 2(1)(d) of the consumer act; vide Clause-34 of the Buyers Agreement, dated June 23 , 2011, it was resolved between the parties that all theirrd disputes, differences or disagreements arising out of, in connection with or in relation to the Agreement, shall be decided by Arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, Arbitration Act, 1996) and in view thereof, no Court or Commission or Tribunal, except the Arbitral Tribunal, has jurisdiction to entertain any dispute arising out of the transaction in question; the complainant has not hired any services from the -2- builder. On merits, the builder admitted the payment of Rs.28,50,461/- made by the complainant. The builder also admitted the execution of Plot Buyers Agreement (Exhibit C-2). It is pleaded that the possession has got delayed due to force majeure circumstances because the builder was granted Forest Clearance on December 17 , 2009, which was later revalidated and Wild Lifeth Clearance was granted on October 30 , 2009, Airport Clearance on February 26 , 2010,th th Ground Water Board permission on August 19 , 2011, License No.28, 55 and 74 were issued onth March 23 , 2010, August 1 , 2013 and August 1 , 2013 respectively. It was submitted thatrd st st environment clearance was given on April 15 , 2014, No Objection Certificate (NOC) fromth Pollution Control Board on May 2 , 2014 but still NOC from National Wild Life Board wasnd awaited.

3. The complainant-Suman Devi in evidence examined herself as CW1 and produced documents. The builder examined Rajneesh-OPW1, authorized representative alongwith documents Exhibit OP-1 to OP-44.

4. The following questions arise for consideration:-

(i) Whether the complainant is consumer or not?

(ii) Whether the present complaint is to be referred to Arbitration in view of Clause-34 of the Buyers Agreement, dated June 23 , 2011?rd

(iii) Whether the builder defaulted in delivering the possession of the plot to the complainant or not?

5. The first question, that falls for consideration is whether the complainant is consumer or not? Unless there is evidence on record to show that the complainant had booked more than one property/flat for the purpose of trading, a bald assertion by the builder that property/flat had been bought for the purpose of making profits is not sufficient to hold that the transaction was for Commercial purpose. Except for a bald plea in the reply that the plot had been purchased by the complainant with a view to sell it on premium and make profits, Builder has not said even an additional word in this behalf, leave alone leading evidence to prove the assertion. So, this plea of the builder is hereby rejected.

6. The next question is as to whether the matter is to be referred to the Arbitration per clause 34 of the Buyers Agreement, dated June 23 , 2011 or not? rd

7. Learned counsel for the builder has contended that after enactment of the arbitration and conciliation (amendment) act, 2015 in section 8 of the arbitration act, it is mandatory for this Commission to refer the parties to arbitration.

8. section 8 of the arbitration act, 1996 is reproduced as under:-

8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement. -3- A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the(1) subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration. The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is(2) accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. Notwithstanding that an application has been made under(3) sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.

9. After amendment of the section in the year 2015, section 8 reads as under:-

8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement. A judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the(1) subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming through or under him, so applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court or any Court, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no valid arbitration agreement exists.

10. section 3 of the consumer act is relevant to adjudicate the point at issue. So, it is necessary to reproduce the provisions of section 3 of the consumer act:-

3. Act not in derogation of any other law.The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.

11. Upon reading of the section 3 of the consumer act, it is clear that it provides additional remedy and existence of arbitration clause, in the agreement, to settle disputes between the parties, is not a bar to entertain a complaint filed by the consumer, alleging deficiency in service in providing services etc. It is a remedy in addition to and not in derogation to any other remedy available to an individual. Honble Supreme Court in Skypak Couriers Ltd. v. Tata Chemicals Ltd. held as under:-Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC 294 Even if there exists an arbitration clause in an agreement and a complaint is made by the consumer, in relation to a certain deficiency of service, then the existence of an arbitration clause will not be a bar to the entertainment of the complaint by the Redressal Agency, constituted under the Consumer Protection Act, since the remedy provided under the Act is in addition to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.

12. In another case Trans Mediterranean Airways v. Universal Exports 2011(4) R.C.R.(Civil) , Honble Supreme Court held as under:472 (SC) -4- In our view, the protection provided under the CP Act to consumers is in addition to the remedies available under any other statute. It does not extinguish the remedies under another statute but provides an additional or alternative remedy

13. No doubt these authorities were rendered prior to the amendment of section 8 of the arbitration act, 1996 but even then the spirit of section 8 of arbitration (amendment) act, 2015 and section 3 of the consumer act is the same, that is, the remedy is in addition to and not in derogation to any other remedy available. In a recent judgment Lt. Col. Anil Raj and Another decided on May 02 , 2016 byVersus M/s Unitech Limited and another, C.C. No.346 of 2013, nd Honble Mr. Justice D.K. Jain, President, National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi after considering the amendment in section 8 of the arbitration (amendment) act, 2015 held that in spite of the recent amendments in the Arbitration Act that the protection provided to the consumers under this Act is in addition to the remedies available under any other statute, including the consentient arbitration under the Arbitration Act. It was held that the complaint filed by a consumer before the Consumer Fora would be maintainable despite there being an arbitration clause in the agreement to refer the dispute to the Arbitrator. Hence, the aforesaid contention advanced by learned counsel for the builder is rejected.

14. Clause 11.1 of the agreement is relevant, which is reproduced as hereunder:-

11. POSSESSION AND HOLDING CHARGES 11.1 Subject to Force Majeure as defined herein, and further subject to the Allottee having complied with all its obligations under the terms and conditions of the Agreement and not being in default of any provision(s) of this Agreement including but not limited to the timely payment of all dues and charges including the total Sale Consideration, registration charges, stamp duty and other charges, and also subject to the Allottee having complied with all formalities or documentation as prescribed by the Company, the Company proposes to hand over the possession of the said Plot to the Allottee within a period of 24 (Twenty Four) months from the date of execution of this Agreement (Commitment Period). The Allottee further agrees and understands that the Company shall additionally be entitled to a period of 6 (Six) months (Grace Period), after the expiry of the said Commitment Period.

15. It is not disputed that the builder floated the project and they were bound to obtain all the permissions before they invite applications from public. The builder cannot raise plea that for want of certain clearances, the possession of the plot could not be delivered. When the builder invited the applications and collected huge amount from the public, they cannot delay the allotment/possession of the plot for awaiting clearances. Thus, delay/breach, if any, was on the part of the builder. The builder has not even remotely alleged any default on the part of complainant. It is clearly made out that the builder was at fault in non-performance of the services agreed. The builder could not deny the refund of the deposited amount sought by the complainant. The complainant has paid Rs.28,50,461/- to the builder. The builder is a commercial organization and used the amount for promotion of its business. -5-

16. In view of above, the complaint is allowed. M/s IREO Fiveriver Private Limited-builder is directed to pay Rs.28,50,461/- (Rupees Twenty Eight Lac Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty One Only) to the complainant, alongwith interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of its respective deposits till the date of realization; Rs.25,000/- as compensation for rendering deficient services and Rs.10,000/- towards litigation expenses. The entire amount be paid by the builder within a period of 45 days, from the date of receipt of the order, otherwise, it will carry interest at the rate of 18% per annum, till realization and it calls for pointed notice that under Section 27 of the Act, if the builder fails or omits to comply with this order, it shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one month but which may extend to three years or with fine or with both. Announced 26.07.2016 (Diwan Singh Chauhan) Member (B.M. Bedi) Judicial Member (Nawab Singh) President