Cox And Kings Ltd. vs Sap India Pvt. Ltd. on 6 December, 2023
Author: Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha
Bench: Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha
2023 INSC 1051 Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL / APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Arbitration Petition (Civil) No. 38 of 2020
Cox and Kings Ltd. …Petitioner
Versus
SAP India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. …Respondents
With
SLP (C) No. 8607 of 2022
And With
SLP (C) No. 5833 of 2022
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Sanjay Kumar
Date: 2023.12.06
12:31:02 IST
Reason:
1
JUDGMENT
Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI
Table of Contents
A. The reference ........................................................................................................4
B. Submissions ..........................................................................................................7
C. Legal background ................................................................................................16
i. India..................................................................................................................16
a. Chloro Controls .............................................................................................20
b. Development of Law after Chloro Controls ................................................... 24
ii. France – The Dow Chemicals case..................................................................29
iii. Switzerland .......................................................................................................33
iv. England ............................................................................................................34
v. Singapore .........................................................................................................37
vi. United States of America ..................................................................................38
D. Arbitration Agreement ..........................................................................................41
i. Consent as the basis for arbitration..................................................................41
ii. Parties to Arbitration Agreement .......................................................................45
E. Group of Companies Doctrine .............................................................................56
i. Separate legal personality ................................................................................56
ii. Adopting a pragmatic approach to consent ...................................................... 61
2
iii. Group of companies doctrine – a fact based doctrine ...................................... 66
iv. The determination of mutual intention ..............................................................70
v. Threshold standard ..........................................................................................80
F. The group of companies doctrine has independent existence............................. 85
i. Party and Persons “claiming through or under” are different............................ 88
ii. The approach adopted by this Court in Chloro Controls is Incorrect ................ 92
iii. Power of the Courts to issue directions under Section 9 .................................. 97
G. The standard of determination at the referral stage – Sections 8 and 11 ............ 98
H. Conclusions .......................................................................................................104
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PART A
A. The reference
1. More than a century ago, James Joyce published Ulysses. Joyce
experimented with the narrative technique by extensively using a stream of
consciousness. In its modernist narrative technique, Ulysses is feted by
literary critics and novelists as a literary masterpiece. Novelists such as
Vladimir Nabokov and T S Elliot eulogized it as a divine work of art. However,
others such as Virginia Woolf and Aldous Huxley criticized the novel for being
technical and boring. Despite the varied criticism, the legacy of Ulysses
endures particularly because its experimental narrative technique challenged
the conventional literary style. Similar is the case of the group of companies
doctrine – a modern theory which challenges the conventional notions of
arbitration law. It is celebrated by some, reviled by many others. Yet, its legacy
continues.
2. Five judges of this Court are called upon to determine the validity of the
‘Group of Companies’ doctrine in the jurisprudence of Indian arbitration. The
doctrine provides that an arbitration agreement which is entered into by a
company within a group of companies may bind non-signatory affiliates, if the
circumstances are such as to demonstrate the mutual intention of the parties
to bind both signatories and non-signatories. This doctrine is called into
question purportedly on the ground that it interferes with the established legal
principles such as party autonomy, privity of contract, and separate legal
personality. The challenge before this Court is to figure out whether there can
be a reconciliation between the group of companies doctrine and well settled
legal principles of corporate law and contract law.
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PART A
3. A Bench of three Judges of this Court, while considering an application under
Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act and Conciliation 1996 1, sought to
reexamine the validity of the group of companies doctrine in the Indian context
on the ground that it is premised more on economic efficiency rather than law.
The Bench of three judges (speaking through the majority opinion authored
by Chief Justice N. V. Ramana (as he was then), and the concurring opinion
by Justice Surya Kant) doubted the correctness of the application of the
doctrine by the Indian courts.
4. Chief Justice Ramana criticised the approach of a three-Judge Bench of this
Court in Chloro Controls India (P) Ltd v. Severn Trent Water Purification
Inc 2 of relying upon the phrase “claiming through or under” in Section 45 of
the Arbitration Act to adopt the group of companies doctrine. He noted that
the subsequent decisions of this Court established the doctrine in Sections 8
and 35 without adequately examining the interpretation of the phrase
“claiming through or under” appearing in those provisions. These decisions
include: Cheran Properties Ltd v. Kasturi and Sons Ltd 3, Mahanagar
Telephone Nigam Ltd. v. Canara Bank 4, and Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation Ltd v. Discovery Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.5 He also observed that
economic concepts such as tight group structure and single economic unit
alone cannot be utilized to bind a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement
in the absence of an express consent. Consequently, he referred the matter
1 “Arbitration Act”
2 (2013) 1 SCC 641
3 (2018) 16 SCC 413
4 (2020) 12 SCC 767
5 (2022) 8 SCC 42
5
PART A
to the larger Bench to seek clarity on the interpretation of the phrase “claiming
through or under” appearing under Sections 8, 35, and 45 of the Arbitration
Act by formulating the following two questions:
a. Whether the phrase ‘claiming through or under’ in Sections 8 and 11 6 could
be interpreted to include the ‘Group of Companies’ doctrine; and
b. Whether the ‘Group of Companies’ doctrine as expounded by Chloro
Controls Case (supra) and subsequent judgments is valid in law.
5. In a concurring opinion, Justice Surya Kant observed that the decisions of this
Court before Chloro Controls (supra), rendered in Sukanya Holdings (P)
Ltd v. Jayesh H Pandya 7 and Indowind Energy Ltd v. Wescare (I) Ltd,8
adopted a “rigid” and “restrictive” approach by placing undue emphasis on
formal consent. Justice Surya Kant traced the evolution of the group of
companies doctrine to observe it had gained a firm footing in Indian
jurisprudence. However, he opined that that this Court adopted inconsistent
approaches while applying the doctrine in India, which needed to be clarified
by a larger Bench. Accordingly, he highlighted the following questions of law
for determination by the larger Bench:
a. Whether the Group of Companies Doctrine should be read into Section 8
of the Act or whether it can exist in Indian jurisprudence independent of
any statutory provision;
6 The reference to Section 11 seems inadvertent as the phrase “claiming through or under” is not found in the said
provision. Rather, Section 11 ought to be read as Section 45 where the phrase “claiming through or under” appears.
7 (2003) 5 SCC 531
8 (2010) 5 SCC 306
6
PART B
b. Whether the Group of Companies Doctrine should continue to be invoked
on the basis of the principle of ‘single economic reality’;
c. Whether the Group of Companies Doctrine should be construed as a
means of interpreting implied consent or intent to arbitrate between the
parties; and
d. Whether the principles of alter ego and/or piercing the corporate veil can
alone justify pressing the Group of Companies Doctrine into operation
even in the absence of implied consent.
6. We are not reproducing the factual matrix of the case, as we have been called
upon to settle the broader legal issues raised in the reference. In the process,
we will answer the above legal issues, as well as other ancillary issues that
have been raised before us by counsel.
B. Submissions
7. Mr Hiroo Advani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Arbitration
Petition No. 38 of 2020, made the following submissions:
a. The basis for the application of the group of companies doctrine is the tacit
or implied consent by the non-signatory to be bound by the arbitration
agreement;
b. The definition of “party” under Section 2(1)(h) of the Arbitration Act cannot
be restricted to the signatories to an arbitration agreement. The definition
should be read expansively to also include non-signatories depending
upon the facts and circumstances;
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PART B
c. Section 7 of the Arbitration Act provides that the defined legal relationship
between the parties may be non-contractual as well. Moreover, Section
7(4)(b) indicates that a non-signatory could be bound by an arbitration
agreement if in the course of a written communication, it has demonstrated
an intention to be bound by the agreement; and
d. The group of companies doctrine should ideally be applied by the arbitral
tribunal. At the stage of referral, the court should merely take a prima facie
view and leave it for the arbitral tribunal to determine the necessity of
joining the non-signatories to the arbitration agreement.
8. Mr Darius J Khambata, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents
in SLP (C) No. 8607 of 2022, made the following submissions:
a. The applicability of the group of companies doctrine must be examined
from the touchstone of whether a non-signatory could be made a party to
the arbitration agreement. The expression “claiming through or under” a
party cannot be the basis to apply the doctrine;
b. The doctrine is a consensual theory premised on the existence of a dispute
arising from a defined legal relationship and mutual intention of the parties
to be bound by the arbitration agreement. The intention of the non-
signatory has to be ascertained from the cumulative factors laid down in
Chloro Controls (supra);
c. The following requirements must be met for the application of the group of
companies doctrine to bind the non-signatory as a “veritable” party to the
arbitration agreement:
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PART B
i. mutual intention of all the parties, both signatories and non-
signatories, to be bound by the arbitration agreement;
ii. absolute and unqualified acceptance by the non-signatory party to
the arbitration agreement; and
iii. such acceptance must either be expressed or implied. In the context
of a non-signatory, such acceptance will be implied and manifested
in the negotiation, performance, or termination of the contract;
d. Mutual consent of the parties to refer disputes arising out of their defined
legal relationship to arbitration is the essential ingredient of an arbitration
agreement. It would be against the concept of party autonomy to bind a
non-signatory to an arbitration agreement without ascertaining their
consent;
e. The concept of “party” to an arbitration agreement is distinct from the
concept of “person claiming through or under” a party. The latter
expression conveys the notion of a derivative cause of action where the
non-signatory steps into the shoes of the party rather than claiming an
independent right under the agreement. The typical scenarios where a
person claims through or under a party are assignment, subrogation, and
novation; and
f. Concepts such as ‘tight group structure’ and ‘single economic unit’ cannot
be the sole basis to invoke the group of companies doctrine. This doctrine
cannot be applied to bind a non-signatory merely on account of it being
under the ownership, control, or supervision of the signatory party;
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PART B
9. Dr A M Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing for the interveners in IA No.
92757 of 2022, made the following submissions:
a. The group of companies doctrine constitutes a true and genuine
effectuation of the real intent of the parties to subject both the signatory
and non-signatory parties to the arbitration agreement;
b. The doctrine is a reasonable and natural extension of the principle of
piercing the corporate veil. The application of the doctrine is also justified
in affixing responsibility when the requisite and sufficient degree of
common ownership and control exists;
c. The intention of the parties cannot be the only basis to join a non-signatory
party to an arbitration agreement. The court can also consider non-
consensual doctrines such as piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, or tight
group structure; and
d. The Arbitration Act does not prohibit or inhibit the adoption of the group of
companies doctrine in Indian arbitration jurisprudence. On the contrary,
Section 7 of the Arbitration Act provides an expansive concept of an
arbitration agreement. Moreover, the legislature specifically amended
Section 8 of the Arbitration Act by inserting the words “any person claiming
through or under” to recognize and codify the reality of non-signatories
acting through or under the signatory parties.
10. Mr Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel appearing for the intervener in IA No.
56615 of 2023, made the following submissions:
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PART B
a. A non-signatory can be impleaded in an arbitration proceeding provided:
(i) there is a defined legal relationship between the non-signatory and the
parties to the arbitration agreement; and (ii) the non-signatory consented
to be bound by the arbitration agreement in terms of Section 7 of the
Arbitration Act;
b. The onus to prove the intention of the non-signatory to be bound by the
arbitration agreement lies on the party seeking to implead the non-
signatory;
c. In view of the requirement under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act, an
arbitration agreement has to be in writing and there cannot be an oral
agreement to arbitrate. Regardless, the intention of the non-signatory to
be bound by the arbitration agreement can be gathered from conduct;
d. Arbitration is in the realm of private law, and a matter of choice and intent
of the parties. Therefore, factors such as economic convenience, justice,
or equity cannot be grounds for binding non-signatories to an arbitration
agreement; and
e. The cumulative factors laid down by this Court in Discovery Enterprises
(supra) cannot be considered in isolation, and must be applied holistically
to determine the applicability of the group of companies doctrine in a given
factual matrix.
11. Mr Nakul Dewan, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent in SLP
(C) No. 8607 of 2022, made the following submissions:
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PART B
a. The group of companies doctrine and single economic entity doctrine are
purely economic concepts without any basis in either contract law or
company law. Therefore, they cannot be applied to determine the intention
of non-signatories to be bound by an arbitration agreement;
b. The decision of a party to not sign the arbitration agreement may form the
basis to demonstrate an intent not to be bound by it;
c. The mere factum of multiple agreements or that the non-signatory was
involved in the negotiation of the contract cannot form the basis to bind it
to the arbitration agreement;
d. The phrase “claiming through or under” which finds mention under
Sections 8 and 45 of the Arbitration Act cannot be the basis for the
application of the group of companies doctrine; and
e. The determination of the intention of parties to a contract should relate
only to the intention held at the time of entering into the contract, which
can be gathered objectively from the text of the contract. However, Chloro
Controls (supra) which considers consequential or subsequent
agreements to determine the mutual intention of the parties is incorrect.
12. Mr Ritin Rai, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent in
Arbitration Petition No. 38 of 2020, made the following submissions:
a. Section 7 of the Arbitration Act requires the arbitration agreement to be in
writing. Therefore, an arbitration agreement cannot be created on the
basis of implied consent of the non-signatory;
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PART B
b. Complex multi-party contracts are outcomes of detailed negotiations
entered into after parties have fully applied their mind. To impute intention
to parties in contradiction to the express terms of the agreement would
defeat the purpose of the parties’ memorializing their understanding in a
negotiated, written document;
c. An arbitration agreement which sets out the executing parties and the
arbitral procedure agreed among them cannot be read to expand its reach
to third parties;
d. The group of companies doctrine cannot be traced to the phrase “claiming
through or under” as provided under Sections 8 and 45 of the Arbitration
Act; and
e. Chloro Controls (supra) erroneously failed to consider whether an
implied consent derived from the conduct of a non-signatory satisfied the
requirement of a clear intention to arbitrate. Moreover, Chloro Controls
(supra) wrongly held that the courts have the discretion to refer non-
signatory parties to arbitration under Sections 8 or 45 of the Arbitration Act
in exceptional cases. The introduction of such a discretion brings in
uncertainty in the arbitration practice in India.
13. Mr Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the Union
of India, made the following submissions:
a. Since India follows the UNCITRAL Model Law, concepts of ‘commercial
element’ and ‘business prudence’ have to be considered while interpreting
the provisions of the Arbitration Act;
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PART B
b. The group of companies doctrine is inbuilt in the overall scheme of the
Arbitration Act. Section 7 uses the broad phrase “defined relationship
whether contractual or otherwise” to convey that an arbitration agreement
is not restricted to a conventional agreement;
c. The insertion of the words “claiming through or under” in Section 8 of the
Arbitration Act is merely in furtherance of the legislative intent to confer
locus on yet another category of persons to insist that the judicial authority
must refer the dispute before it to arbitration; and
d. If the referral court under Sections 8 and 11 cannot prima facie determine
the issue of joinder of a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement on the
basis of the group of companies doctrine, it can refer the issue to be
decided by the arbitral tribunal.
14. Mr Sanjoy Ghose, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner in SLP (C) No. 8607 of 2022, made the following submissions:
a. Section 2(1)(h) uses the term “party” and not “signatory” to account for
situations where a non-signatory enters the shoes of a signatory party
either by succession, operation of law, assignment, or death; and
b. The group of companies doctrine contravenes the provisions of corporate
law by fixing liability on an entity that is not a party to an arbitration
agreement. Mere participation in the negotiation or performance of the
contract cannot bind a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement in the
absence of express consent.
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PART B
15. Mr Pallav Mongia, learned advocate on behalf of the interveners in IA No.
58168 of 2023, submitted that Section 2(1)(h) of the Arbitration Act does not
restrict the definition of parties to “signatories”. Rather, the definition has to
be inferred from Section 7. Section 7(4) expands the definition of parties to
non-signatories.
16. Ms Meenakshi Arora, learned senior counsel on behalf of the respondent in
SLP (C) No. 8607 of 2022, argued for de-tagging of SLP (C) No. 8607 of 2022
from the lead matter, that is Arbitration Petition No. 38 of 2020, as the former
deals with power of the courts to issue directions under Section 9 of the
Arbitration Act against third parties. Further, the learned senior counsel
submitted that the courts can take aid of the group of companies doctrine to
issue interim directions against non-signatories to the arbitration agreement.
17. The arguments advanced by advocates on both sides of the aisle indicate
that this Constitution Bench has been primarily called upon to determine the
validity of the group of companies doctrine in Indian arbitration jurisprudence.
However, there are other broad ancillary issues which have been raised by
the learned counsel. These include: (i) whether the Arbitration Act allows
joinder of a non-signatory as a party to an arbitration agreement; and, (ii)
whether Section 7 of the Arbitration Act allows for determination of an
intention to arbitrate on the basis of the conduct of the parties. This Bench will
address the issues arising out of the order of reference as well as the above-
mentioned ancillary issues in due course.
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PART C
C. Legal background
i. India
18. Before the enactment of the Arbitration Act, the law on arbitration was
substantially contained in the Arbitration Act of 1940,9 the Arbitration (Protocol
and Convention) Act of 1937, and the Foreign Awards (Recognition and
Enforcement) Act of 1961. In 1978, the Law Commission of India suggested
substantive amendments to the 1940 Act. Moreover, the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law10 adopted the Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration in 1985. 11 The General Assembly of the
United Nations recommended all the Member States to adopt the UNCITRAL
Model Law in their domestic legislation with a view to uniformize the law of
arbitral procedures.12 The Arbitration Act was enacted to consolidate and
amend the law relating to arbitration. It brought the law relating to domestic
and international commercial arbitration in consonance with the UNCITRAL
Model Law, the New York Convention, and the Geneva Convention.
19. Section 2(1)(h) of the Arbitration Act defines a “party” to mean “a party to an
arbitration agreement.” An “arbitration agreement” is defined under Section
2(1)(b) to mean “an agreement referred to in Section 7.” Section 7 lays down
the essential elements of a valid and binding arbitration agreement. It defines
an arbitration agreement as an agreement by the parties to submit to
arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise
9 “1940 Act”
10 “UNCITRAL”
11 “UNCITRAL Model Law”
12 UN General Assembly, Fortieth Session, ‘Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law’ 40/72 (1985)
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PART C
between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual
or not. The provision also mandates that an arbitration agreement shall be in
writing. An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in:
(a) a document signed by the parties;
(b) an exchange of letters, telexes, telegrams, or other means of
telecommunication including communication through electronic means which
provide a record of the agreement; or
(c) an exchange of statements of claim and defense in which the existence of
the agreement in alleged by one party and not denied by the other.
Section 7(5) further stipulates that the reference in a contract to a document
containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement if two
conditions are satisfied. These conditions are first, that the contract is in
writing; and second, that the reference is such as to make the arbitration
clause part of the contract.
20. An arbitration agreement, being a creature of contract, 13 is based on the
consent of parties to submit their disputes to an alternate dispute resolution
mechanism. Generally, a party to an arbitration agreement is determined on
the basis of persons or entities who are signatories to the arbitration
agreement or the underlying contract containing the arbitration agreement.
However, over the past two decades the law on joinder of non-signatory
parties has evolved substantially. The evolution could roughly be classified
13 Bhaven Construction v. Executive Engineer, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd, (2022) 1 SCC 75
17
PART C
into two stages: before Chloro Controls (supra) and after Chloro Controls
(supra).
21. In the pre Chloro Controls (supra) era, this Court construed “parties” by
limiting it only to the signatories to the arbitration agreement. In Sukanya
Holdings (supra) the applicant filed an application under Section 8 of the
Arbitration Act before the High Court and sought to enforce the arbitration
agreement against both the signatories and non-signatories to the
agreement. The High Court rejected the application on the ground that the
non-signatories were not parties to the arbitration agreement. In appeal, this
Court upheld the decision of the High Court by observing that there is no
provision under the Arbitration Act stipulating what is required to be done
where some parties to the suit are not parties to the arbitration agreement. In
Sumitomo Corporation v. CDC Financial Services (Mauritius) Ltd, 14 this
Court, while dealing with an international commercial arbitration held that a
“party” to an arbitration agreement means a party to the judicial proceedings.
This was expressly held to be erroneous in Chloro Controls (supra), where
it was held that “party” has to be construed in view of Section 2(1)(h) to mean
a party to an arbitration agreement.
22. The interpretation of the expression “party” as defined under Section 2(1)(h)
came up for the consideration of this Court in Indowind Energy Ltd (supra).
In that case, an agreement of sale was entered into by the first and second
respondents. The agreement described the second respondent as the ‘buyer’
and promoter of Indowind, the non-signatory. After a dispute arose, the first
14 (2008) 4 SCC 91
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PART C
respondent instituted an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act
against the second respondent and Indowind. Indowind resisted the
impleadment on the ground that it was not a party to the underlying sale
agreement and, therefore, had not consented to be bound by the arbitration
clause. The issue before this Court was whether the arbitration agreement
contained in the sale agreement was binding on Indowind. This Court refused
to join Indowind to the arbitration agreement on the ground that (i) Indowind
was not a signatory to the sale agreement; (ii) Indowind and the promoter
company were two independent companies with a separate and distinct legal
existence; and (iii) the fact that Indowind did not sign the sale agreement
indicated that it was the mutual intention of all the parties to not make it a
party to the arbitration agreement.
23. The pre Chloro Controls (supra) position was characterized by three
underlying precepts: (i) arbitration could be invoked at the instance of a
signatory to the arbitration agreement only in respect to disputes with another
signatory party; 15 (ii) the court would adopt a strict interpretation of the
provisions of the Arbitration Act, particularly the unamended Section 8 which
only allowed reference of “parties” to an arbitration agreement; and (iii) there
was an emphasis on formal consent of the parties, thereby excluding any
scope for implied consent of the non-signatories to be bound by an arbitration
agreement. This position of law underwent a significant change when a Bench
of three Judges of this Court in Chloro Controls (supra) allowed joinder of
15 S N Prasad v. Monnet Finance Ltd, (2011) 1 SCC 320
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PART C
non-signatory parties to the arbitration agreement on the basis of the group
of companies doctrine.
a. Chloro Controls
24. In Chloro Controls (supra) this Court was called upon to determine an
arbitral reference in case of multi-party agreements where performance of the
ancillary agreements was substantially dependent upon effective execution
of the principal agreement. In that case, a foreign entity and an Indian entity
incorporated a joint venture company to market and distribute chlorination
equipment. With respect to the joint venture, the related companies of both
the Indian and foreign entity were also involved. Consequently, the parties
concluded several ancillary agreements such as a Shareholders’ Agreement
which contained an arbitration clause. All the contracting parties were not
signatories to all the agreements, including the Shareholders’ Agreement.
When disputes arose between the parties, the foreign entities sought to
terminate the joint venture. The Indian entity filed an application before the
High Court seeking a declaration to restrain the foreign entities from
repudiating their obligations under the agreements. In response, the foreign
entities applied for referring the disputes to arbitration in view of the fact that
the agreements were binding on the non-signatories because of the
composite nature of the transaction. A Single Judge of the High Court granted
the application of the Indian entity, which was set aside by the Division Bench
of the High Court. The primary issue before this Court pertained to the ambit
and scope of Section 45 of the Arbitration Act. This Court framed the issue in
the following terms:
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PART C
“1.3. Whether in a case where multiple agreements are signed
between different parties and where some contain an arbitration
clause and others do not and further the parties are not identically
common in proceedings before the court (in a suit) and the
arbitration agreement, a reference of disputes as a whole or in part
can be made to the Arbitral Tribunal, more particularly, where the
parties to an action are claiming under or through a party to the
arbitration agreement”
25. Section 45 of the Arbitration Act in its unamended form read as follows:
“45. Power of judicial authority to refer parties to arbitration.—
Notwithstanding anything contained in Part I or in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), a judicial authority, when seized of an
action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an
agreement referred to in Section 44, shall, at the request of one
of the parties or any person claiming through or under him,
refer the parties to arbitration, that the said agreement is null and
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.”
(emphasis supplied)
In view of the language of Section 45, this Court held that the expression “any
person” reflects a legislative intent of enlarging the scope beyond “parties”
who are signatories to the arbitration agreement to include non-signatories.
However, the court noted that such non-signatory parties are required to claim
“through or under the signatory party.” Thus, this Court accepted that
arbitration is possible between a signatory to an arbitration agreement and a
third party or non-signatory claiming through a party.
26. The next issue before this Court was to determine whether there was any
legal relationship between the signatory and the non-signatory for the latter
to “claim through or under” the former. The court noted that the group of
companies doctrine has been developed by courts and tribunals in the
international context to bind a non-signatory affiliate or sister concern within
the same corporate group as the signatory party, to an arbitration agreement
provided there was a mutual intention of all the parties. This court emphasized
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PART C
that the “intention of the parties” is the underlying principle for the application
of the group of companies doctrine. It observed:
“72. This evolves the principle that a non-signatory party could be
subjected to arbitration provided these transactions were with group
of companies and there was a clear intention of the parties to bind
both, the signatory as well as the non-signatory parties. In other
words, “intention of the parties” is a very significant feature
which must be established before the scope of arbitration can
be said to include the signatory as well as the non-signatory
parties.”
(emphasis supplied)
27. The court held that a non-signatory could be subjected to arbitration “without
their prior consent” in “exceptional cases” on the basis of four determinative
factors:
(i) A direct relationship to the party which is a signatory to the arbitration
agreement;
(ii) A direct commonality of the subject-matter and the agreement between
the parties being a composite transaction;
(iii) The transaction being of a composite nature where performance of the
mother agreement may not be feasible without the aid, execution, and
performance of supplementary or ancillary agreements for achieving
the common object and collectively have a bearing on the dispute; and
(iv) A composite reference of such parties will serve the ends of justice.
28. In Chloro Controls (supra), this Court acknowledged that cases of composite
transactions involving multi-party agreement give rise to peculiar challenges
where non-signatories may be implicated in the dispute because of their legal
relationship and involvement in the performance of contractual obligations. To
remedy such situations, it was held that the group of companies doctrine
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PART C
could be applied to systematically evaluate the facts and circumstances to
determine “a clear intention of the parties to bind both, the signatory as well
as the non-signatory parties” to the arbitration agreement.
29. Chloro Controls (supra) was dealing with a situation where the success of
the joint venture agreement was dependent upon the fulfilment of all the
ancillary agreements. In this context, this Court observed that all the ancillary
agreements were relatable to the parent agreement and the ancillary
agreements were intrinsically linked with each other, to the extent that they
could not be severed. This in the view of the court indicated the intention of
the parties to refer all disputes arising out of the parent agreement and
ancillary agreements to the arbitral tribunal.
30. Furthermore, this Court explained the phrase “legal relationship” to mean the
relationship of the signatory party with the person claiming under or through
them. It observed that all the agreements were signed by “some parties or
their holding companies or the companies into which the signatory company
had merged.” Although these companies did not put pen to paper for all the
agreements, they were descendants in interest or subsidiaries of the
signatory parties and therefore would be covered under the expression
“claiming through or under” the parties to the agreement. In this context the
Court observed that being part of the same corporate group, the interests of
the non-signatory companies were not adverse to the interest of the principal
company and the joint venture company. Therefore, the group of companies
doctrine formed the basis for a non-signatory to claim through or under the
signatory. Chloro Controls (supra) laid down the ratio that a non-signatory
23
PART C
person or entity could be made a party to an arbitration agreement, as
“claiming through or under” a signatory party, if the circumstances
demonstrate the mutual intention of the parties on the basis of the composite
nature of the transaction, direct commonality of subject-matter, and direct
relationship of the non-signatory to the signatory parties.
b. Development of Law after Chloro Controls
31. In the aftermath of Chloro Controls (supra), the Law Commission of India
published a Report in 2014 recommending amendments to the Arbitration Act.
The Commission observed that the phrase “claiming through or under” as
used and understood in Section 45 is absent in the corresponding provision
of Section 8. To cure this anomaly, it was suggested that the definition of
“party” under Section 2(1)(h) be amended to also include the expression “a
person claiming through or under such party.” 16 In 2016, the legislature
amended Section 8 to bring it in line with Section 45 of the Arbitration Act. The
unamended Section 8(1) provided that a party to an arbitration agreement
could make an application seeking a reference to arbitration. The amended
Section 8(1) provided that “a party to an arbitration agreement or any person
claiming through or under him” could seek a reference to arbitration. However,
the legislature did not bring about any change in the language of Section
2(1)(h) or Section 7 of the Arbitration Act. Since Chloro Controls (supra) and
the amendment to Section 8, subsequent decisions of this Court have referred
16 Law Commission of India, ‘Amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996’, Report No. 246 (August
2014)
24
PART C
to the group of companies doctrine to join non-signatories persons or entities
to arbitration agreements.
32. In Cheran Properties (supra), the issue before this Court was whether the
arbitral award could be enforced under Section 35 of the Arbitration Act
against a non-signatory, who was a nominee of one of the signatories to the
arbitration agreement and a direct beneficiary of the underlying contract
between the signatories. Section 35 of the Arbitration Act postulates that an
arbitral award “shall be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming
under them respectively.” This Court observed that the expression “persons
claiming under them” refers to every person whose capacity or position is
derived from and is same as a party to the proceedings. It held that the non-
signatory, being a nominee of one of the signatory parties, was bound by the
arbitral award as it was claiming under the signatory.
33. This Court in Cheran Properties (supra) interpreted the group of companies
doctrine to hold that its true purport is to enforce the common intention of the
parties where the circumstances indicate that both the signatories and non-
signatories were intended to be bound. One of us (D Y Chandrachud J)
explained the evolution of the group of companies doctrine in the Indian
context in the following terms:
“23. As the law has evolved, it has recognised that modern business
transactions are often effectuated through multiple layers and
agreements. There may be transactions within a group of
companies. The circumstances in which they have entered into
them may reflect an intention to bind both signatory and non-
signatory entities within the same group. In holding a non-signatory
bound by an arbitration agreement, the court approaches the matter
by attributing to the transactions a meaning consistent with the
business sense which was intended to be ascribed to them.
Therefore, factors such as the relationship of a non-signatory to a
25
PART C
party which is a signatory to the agreement, the commonality of
subject-matter and the composite nature of the transaction weigh in
the balance. The group of companies doctrine is essentially
intended to facilitate the fulfilment of a mutually held intent
between the parties, where the circumstances indicate that the
intent was to bind both signatories and non-signatories. The
effort is to find the true essence of the business arrangement
and to unravel from a layered structure of commercial
arrangements, an intent to bind someone who is not formally a
signatory but has assumed the obligation to be bound by the
actions of a signatory.”
(emphasis supplied)
34. The decision in Cheran Properties (supra) holds that the group of companies
doctrine is applied to bind a non-signatory party upon a construction of the
arbitration agreement, circumstances which exist at the time of entering into
the contract, and the performance of the underlying contract. Nevertheless, it
must be noted that Cheran Properties (supra) did not apply the group of
companies doctrine to make the non-signatory a party to the arbitration
agreement. Rather, this Court made the arbitral award binding on a non-
signatory under Section 35 on the ground that it was claiming under a party
which was a signatory to the arbitration agreement.
35. In Ameet Lalchand Shah v. Rishabh Enterprises, 17 a two-Judge Bench of
this Court was dealing with an arbitral dispute arising out of four
interconnected agreements executed towards a single commercial project.
The issue was whether the four agreements were interconnected to refer all
the parties to arbitration. In that case, all the parties were not signatories to
the main agreement containing the arbitration clause. This Court relied on
Chloro Controls (supra) to hold that a non-signatory, which is a party to an
17 (2018) 15 SCC 678
26
PART C
interconnected agreement, would be bound by the arbitration clause in the
principal agreement. It observed that in view of the composite nature of the
transaction, the disputes between the parties to various agreements could be
resolved effectively by referring all of them to arbitration.
36. Over time, this Court has identified certain additional factors for the invocation
of the group of companies doctrine. In Reckitt Benckiser (India) Private
Limited v. Reynders Label Printing India Private Limited, 18 a two-Judge
Bench of this Court was dealing with an application under Section 11(6) of the
Arbitration Act seeking the appointment of an arbitrator. This Court prima facie
observed that the parties belonged to the same group of companies.
Subsequently, the issue before this Court was whether there was a clear
intention of the parties to bind both the signatory and non-signatory parties
based on their participation in the negotiation of the underlying contract. The
court held that the non-signatory party, even though a constituent part of the
corporate group, did not have “any causal connection with the process of
negotiations preceding the agreement or the execution thereof, whatsoever.”
Thus, the participation of the non-signatory party in the negotiation and
performance of the underlying contract was held to be the key determinant of
the intention of the parties to be bound by an arbitration agreement.
37. In Canara Bank (supra), this Court emphasized that the group of companies
doctrine could be invoked on the basis of the principle of “single economic
unit”. In that case, the facts were that Canbank Financial Services Ltd 19, a
18 (2019) 7 SCC 62
19 “CANFINA”
27
PART C
wholly owned subsidiary of Canara Bank, subscribed to the bonds floated by
MTNL. CANFINA subsequently transferred the bonds to Canara Bank.
Eventually, MTNL cancelled the bonds which gave rise to the dispute between
the parties. Canara Bank filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court
challenging the cancellation of bonds by MTNL. The High Court referred the
parties to arbitration, but Canara Bank challenged the impleadment of
CANFINA. This Court dismissed Canara Bank’s objection on the ground that
CANFINA was a necessary and proper party to the arbitral proceedings, being
the original purchaser to the bonds. While dealing with the contours of the
group of companies doctrine, this Court noted that the doctrine could also be
invoked “in cases where there is a tight group structure with strong
organizational and financial links, so as to constitute a single economic unit,
or a single economic reality.”
38. The last in the series of decisions dealing with the group of companies
doctrine is a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Discovery
Enterprises (supra). In that case, ONGC entered into a contract with
Discovery Enterprises for operating a shipping vessel. After a dispute arose
between the parties, ONGC invoked the arbitration clause in the contract
against Discovery Enterprises and Jindal Drilling and Industries Ltd., a sister
company of Discovery Enterprises. The arbitral tribunal refused to proceed
with the claim against Jindal Drilling and Industries Ltd. on the ground that it
was not a signatory to the arbitration agreement. In an appeal filed by ONGC
under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the High Court upheld the decision of
the tribunal. The High Court’s decision was challenged before this Court
28
PART C
under Article 136 of the Constitution. This Court cited Chloro Controls
(supra) and the subsequent decisions with approval to emphasize that the
group of companies doctrine can be applied to bind a company within a group
which is not a signatory to the arbitration agreement. The Court held that in
addition to the cumulative factors laid down in Chloro Controls (supra), the
performance of the contract was also an essential factor to be considered by
the courts and tribunals to bind a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement.
Ultimately, this Court set aside the decision of the arbitral tribunal on the
ground that it failed to address the plea raised by ONGC, and remanded the
matter back to the tribunal to decide afresh.
ii. France – The Dow Chemicals case
39. The application of the group of companies doctrine in arbitration law mainly
originated from the decisions rendered by international arbitral tribunals.
Before proceeding to analyze the contours of the doctrine, it is necessary to
understand its origin and development in the international context. Such an
analysis is particularly relevant because any authoritative determination by
this Court with regard to the group of companies doctrine ought to be in tune
with the internationally accepted principles on the vexed issue of joining non-
signatories to arbitration agreements.
40. The origin of the doctrine is primarily attributed to a number of arbitration
awards rendered mainly in France. The most prominent among them remains
an interim award delivered more than four decades ago by an ICC tribunal in
Case No. 4131, 20 more popularly known as the Dow Chemicals case. In that
20 Dow Chemical v. Isover Saint Gobain, Interim Award, ICC Case No. 4131, 23 September 1982
29
PART C
case, Dow Chemical (Venezuela) entered into a contract with a French
company, which later assigned the rights to Isover Saint Gobain, for
distribution of thermal isolation products in France. Dow Chemical
(Venezuela) subsequently assigned the contract to Dow Chemical AG, which
was a subsidiary of Dow Chemical Company – the holding company.
Thereafter, Dow Chemical Europe, a subsidiary of Dow Chemical AG, entered
into a similar contract with three companies, which subsequently assigned the
contract to Isover Saint Gobain. Both contracts provided that the deliveries of
products to the distributors will be made by Dow Chemical France, or any
other subsidiary of Dow Chemical Company. Several suits were instituted
against the companies of the Dow Chemical group before the French courts.
In response, the four companies of the Dow Chemical group (the two formal
parties to the contract – Dow Chemical AG and Dow Chemical Europe, and
the two non-signatories – Dow Chemical Company and Dow Chemical
France) instituted arbitral proceedings against Isover Saint Gobain before the
ICC tribunal.
41. The primary issue before the ICC tribunal was to determine its own jurisdiction
over the non-signatory parties. The tribunal sought to determine whether
there existed a common intention of the parties to be bound by the arbitration
agreement. The tribunal established the common intention of the parties by
analyzing the factual circumstances underpinning the negotiation,
performance, and termination of the contracts. The tribunal held that Dow
Chemical France “was a party” to the two contracts, and consequently to the
arbitration agreements contained in them, because it played a preponderant
30
PART C
role in the negotiation, performance, and termination of the contract. As for
Dow Chemical Company, the tribunal held that the holding company had
ownership of the trademarks under which the products were marketed in
France and had absolute control over its subsidiaries who were involved in
the negotiation, performance, and termination of the two contracts. The
tribunal also relied on the fact that Isover Saint Gobain applied for the joinder
of the holding company into the court proceedings in France before the Court
of Appeal of Paris.
42. After concluding that the non-signatories were also a party to the arbitration
agreement, the tribunal proceeded to analyze the factual circumstances of
the signatory and non-signatory belonging to the same group of companies.
At the outset, the tribunal observed that a group of companies constitutes one
and the same economic reality. However, the tribunal emphasized that a non-
signatory may be bound by the arbitration agreement entered into by another
entity of the same group if the non-signatory appears to be a veritable party
to the contracts on the basis of their involvement in the negotiation,
performance, and termination of the contracts. The relevant observation is
extracted below:
“Considering, in particular, that the arbitration clause expressly
accepted by certain of the companies of the group should bind the
other companies which, by virtue of their role in their conclusion,
performance, or termination of the contracts containing said clause,
and in accordance with the mutual intention of all parties to the
proceedings, appear to have been veritable parties to these
contracts or to have been principally concerned by them and the
disputes to which they may give rise.”
43. In Dow Chemical (supra), the arbitral tribunal did not base its decision to
extend the arbitration agreement to non-signatories solely on the fact that
31
PART C
both the signatory and non-signatory parties were members of the same
group. The tribunal emphasized the importance of determining the true parties
to the arbitration agreement on the basis of their participation in the
negotiation, performance, and termination of the agreement. The Dow
Chemical case has been regarded as being instrumental in the transition from
a restrictive interpretation of consent focusing only on its express
manifestation to a more flexible approach attaching necessary relevance to
implied consent to be bound by the arbitration agreement.21
44. In a series of subsequent rulings, the Court of Appeal of Paris acknowledged
the extension of an arbitration agreement to non-signatories provided there
was common intention of all the parties. According to the Court of Appeal, the
common intention may be ascertained from the active role played by the non-
signatories in the performance of the contract containing the arbitration
agreement, which gives rise to the presumption that the non-signatory had
knowledge of the arbitration agreement.22
45. The French law has been succinctly summarized in an unpublished ICC
award in case No. 11405 of 2001 in the following terms:
“[t]here is no general rule, in French international arbitration law, that
would provide that non-signatory parties members of a same group
of companies would be bound by an arbitration clause, whether
always or in determined circumstances. What is relevant is whether
all parties intended non-signatory parties to be bound by the
arbitration clause. Not only the signatory parties, but also the non-
signatory parties should have intended (or led the other parties to
reasonably believe that they intended) to be bound by the arbitration
clause.” 23
21 Bernard Hanotiau and Leonardo Ohlrogge, ‘40th Year Anniversary of the Dow Chemical Award’ 40(2) ASA Bulletin
300-308.
22 Paris Court of Appeal, 7 December 1994, V 2000 (formerly Jaguar France) v. Project XS, Rev. Arb. (1996) 67.
23 Yves Derains, ‘Is there a Group of Companies Doctrine?’ in Bernard Hanotiau and Eric Schwartz (eds) in Dossier
of the ICC Institute of World Business Law, Volume 7, 131-145.
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PART C
Hence our understanding of the position in French law is that an arbitration
agreement can be extended to non-signatory parties if all the parties to the
arbitration agreement had a common intention to be bound by the agreement.
The subjective intention of the parties is to be inferred on the basis of their
objective conduct during the negotiation, performance, and termination of the
underlying contract containing the arbitration agreement.
iii. Switzerland
46. Section 178(1) of the Swiss Private International Law Act 1987 states that an
“arbitration agreement must be made in writing or any other means of
communication allowing it to be evidenced by text.” In 2003, the Swiss
Federal Supreme Court held that once there is a valid arbitration clause
according to Section 178(1) of the Swiss Act, the issue whether it also extends
to non-signatories may be decided by the courts or the arbitral tribunals. As a
matter of general rule, the Swiss courts have extended an arbitration
agreement to non-signatories typically in cases of assignment of a claim,
assumption of debt or delegation of a contract. 24
47. In a decision rendered in 1996, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court held that
the fact that a non-signatory party belonged to the same group of companies
as the signatory party to the arbitration agreement was not a sufficient
justification for binding the non-signatory to the arbitration agreement. 25
However, the Swiss Courts are not averse to extending an arbitration
agreement to non-signatory parties if there is an independent and formally
24 A, B, C v. D and State of Libya, 4A_636/2018
25 Saudi Butec Ltd et Al Fouzan Trading v. Saudi Arabian Saipem Ltd, unpublished ICC Interim Award of 25 October
1994, confirmed by DFT on 29 January 1996, ASA Bulletin (1996) Vol 3 p 496.
33
PART C
valid manifestation of consent of the non-signatory party to the arbitration
agreement.
48. In Swiss law, the consent of the parties to be bound by an arbitration
agreement may be express or implied by conduct. In a 2008 decision, the
Swiss Federal Court held that certain behavior or conduct may substitute
compliance with a formal requirement of an arbitration agreement. 26 To
determine the implied consent, it was held that the courts or tribunals may
take into consideration the fact whether the non-signatory party was involved
in the negotiation and performance of the contract, and thereby expressed its
willingness to be bound by the arbitration agreement.27 Thus, the subjective
element of willingness to be bound by an arbitration agreement ought to be
expressed through an objective element in the form of negotiation or
performance of the contract.
iv. England
49. The English courts have generally taken a conservative approach to binding
non-signatory parties to arbitration agreements. Section 82(2) of the English
Arbitration Act 1996 defines a “party to arbitration agreement” to include “any
person claiming under or through a party to the agreement.” The English law
envisages that even non-signatory parties may be bound by an arbitration
agreement but only if they are claiming under or through the original party to
the agreement. The English courts have adopted an approach which favors
a strict adherence to the doctrine of privity. Under English law, an arbitration
26 Decision 4A_376/2008 of 5 December 2008.
27 X v. Y Engineering S.p.A. and Y S.p.A., 4A_450/2013, ASA Bull., 160 (2015).
34
PART C
agreement is extended to non-signatory parties on the basis of traditional
contractual principles and doctrines such as agency, novation, assignment,
operation of law, and merger and succession. 28 However, the English law has
explicitly rejected other doctrines such as piercing the corporate veil,
equitable estoppel, and group of companies as a basis for extending an
arbitration agreement to non-signatory parties.
50. In Peterson Farms INC v. C & M Farming Limited, 29 a claim for damages
was brought against Peterson Farms by the respondent C & M Farming for
damages suffered by several C & M group entities, some of them being non-
signatories to the arbitration agreement. The arbitral tribunal applied the
group of companies doctrine to hold that C & M Farming contracted on behalf
of the entire C & M group entities, and therefore was entitled to claim all the
damages suffered by the C & M group entities arising out of the contractual
relationship with Peterson. In appeal, the Commercial Court held that the
chosen proper law of the Agreement - Arkansas law – is similar to the English
law which excludes the application of the group of companies doctrine. Thus,
the English law does not favor the application of the group of companies
doctrine for extending an arbitration agreement to non-signatory parties.
51. The English precedents have also dealt with the meaning of the phrase
“claiming through or under”, which was referred to by this Court in Chloro
Controls (supra). In Roussel-Uclaf v. G D Searle and Co Ltd 30, the issue
28 Audley William Sheppard, ‘Third Party Non-Signatories in English Arbitration Law’ in Stavros Brekoulakis, Julian
Lew, et al (eds) The Evolution and Future of International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, 2016) 183-198.
29 [2004] EWHC 121 (Comm)
30 [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep
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PART C
before the Court of Chancery Division was whether a wholly owned subsidiary
company could claim to be a party to an arbitration agreement between the
parent company and a third party. The Court was called upon to interpret
Section 1 of the Arbitration Act of 1975 which allowed any party to an
arbitration agreement “or any person claiming through or under him” to apply
to a court to stay proceedings where an arbitration agreement existed. It was
held that the subsidiary can claim the benefit of the arbitration agreement
because the parent company and the subsidiary were “so closely related” that
it could be said that the subsidiary was “claiming through or under” the parent
company. In City of London v. Sancheti,31 the Court of Appeal overturned
Roussel-Uclaf (supra) on the ground that an entity cannot be considered to
be claiming through or under merely because there is a “legal or commercial
connection” between them.
52. Section 5 of the English Arbitration Act, 1996 requires an arbitration
agreement to be in writing. Further, Section 5(2)(a) provides that it is not
necessary for the parties to sign the arbitration agreement. In such situations,
the critical question that arises before the English courts is whether a non-
signatory party is bound by an arbitration agreement. The English law position
is that “contracts are not to be lightly implied” and the court “must be able to
conclude with confidence both that the parties intended to create contractual
relations and that the agreement was to the effect contended for.” 32 However,
31 The Mayoralty and Commonalty & Citizens of the City of London v. Ashok Sancheti, [2008] EWCA Civ 1283
32 Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club Ltd. v. Blackpool Borough Council, [1990] 1 WLR 1195
36
PART C
in limited situations, a contract is implied if the parties conducted themselves
in a manner as if they have formally entered into a contract.33
53. In Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v. The Ministry of
Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan 34, the Government of Pakistan
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with Dallah Real Estate and
Tourism Holding Company 35 for construction of housing facilities in Mecca,
Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, an agreement was executed between Dallah
and the Awami Hajj Trust, which was established by the Government through
an Ordinance. However, the trust ceased to exist as a legal entity because
the Ordinance was not laid before Parliament and no further ordinance was
promulgated. Dallah commenced arbitral proceedings against the
Government. The UK Supreme Court had to determine whether there was a
common intention on behalf of the Government and Dallah to make the former
a party to the agreement. The Court observed that the “common intention of
the parties means their subjective intention derived from the objective
evidence.” It was held that there was no evidence to conclude that the
Government’s behavior showed that it always considered itself to be a true
party to the agreement.
v. Singapore
54. In Manuchar Steel Hong Kong Limited v. Star Pacific Line Pte Ltd, 36 the
Singapore High Court expressly rejected the group of companies doctrine to
33 Chitty on Contracts, Hugh Beale (ed), (32nd edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2015) para 2-169.
34 [2010] UKSC 46
35 “Dallah”
36 [2014] SGHC 181
37
PART C
bind non-signatories to arbitration agreement. The High Court reasoned that
the group of companies doctrine was: first, anathema to the logic of
consensual basis of an agreement to arbitrate; and second, ordering of
companies within a broader group did not mean one could dispense with
separate legal entity. The Singapore High Court relied on position of law taken
in Peterson Farms INC (supra) to observe that enforceable obligations
cannot be imposed on “strangers” to an arbitration agreement.
vi. United States of America
55. The Federal Arbitration Act is silent on the aspect of the joinder of non-
signatory parties to the arbitration agreement. Nevertheless, the US courts
have often used the general principles of contract law such as incorporation
by reference, assumption, agency, veil piercing or alter ego, and estoppel for
binding non-signatories to arbitration agreements. 37 Although the United
States follow a pro-arbitration policy, an important issue that often comes up
for deliberation is whether the domestic doctrines could be applied for binding
non-signatories in cases of international arbitration.
56. In G E Energy Power Conversion France SAS v. Outokumpu Stainless,38
the issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether the New York
Convention precludes a non-signatory to an international arbitration
agreement from compelling arbitration by invoking domestic doctrines such
as equitable estoppel. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit Court refused to apply
the domestic doctrine of equitable estoppel on the ground that it conflicts with
37 Andrijana Misovic, ‘Binding non-signatories to arbitrate: the United States approach’ (2021) 37(3) Arbitration
International 749-768.
38 140 S. Ct. 1637 (2020)
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PART C
the signature requirements under the New York Convention. The Circuit Court
observed that Article II of the New York Convention contains a strict
requirement that the parties “actually sign” the arbitration agreement in order
to compel the parties to arbitration. The US Supreme Court held that the
Article II of the New York Convention does not restrict the contracting states
from applying domestic law to refer parties to arbitration agreements.
Moreover, it was observed that “the provisions of Article II contemplate the
use of domestic doctrines to fill gaps in the Convention.” Thus, it was held
that the New York Convention does not set out a comprehensive regime to
preclude the use of domestic law to enforce arbitration agreements.
57. Unlike the English courts, the US Courts have used non-consensual doctrines
to extend arbitration agreements to non-signatory parties. For instance, the
US Courts have pierced the corporate veil and held the alter ego liable in
exceptional circumstances where the parent company exercised complete
control over the subsidiary with respect to the transaction at issue. 39 Similarly,
the doctrine of arbitral estoppel has been developed by the US Courts to bind
non-signatory parties to an arbitration agreement. The doctrine of arbitral
estoppel suggests that a party is estopped from denying its obligation to
arbitrate when it received a ‘direct benefit’ from a contract containing an
arbitration agreement. 40 The second type of arbitral estoppel developed by
the US courts places emphasis on the substantial interdependent relationship
between the signatory and non-signatory party. 41 In a situation where claims
39 American Fuel Corp v. Utah Energy Development Co, Inc, 122 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir 1997)
40 American Bureau, Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard, 170 F.3d 349, 353 (2d Cir 1999)
41 Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc v. Sunkist Growers, Inc, 10 F.3d 753, 757 (11th Cir 1993)
39
PART C
of concerted misconduct were raised against both the signatory and non-
signatory to the contract, the courts have resorted to the doctrine of equitable
estoppel to further the policy of pro-arbitration. 42
58. The above discussion shows that international jurisdictions, in some form or
the other, have moved beyond the formalistic requirement of consent to bind
a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement. The primary conclusion is that
the issue of binding a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement is more of a
fact-specific aspect. 43 In jurisdictions such as France and Switzerland, there
is a broad consensus that consent or subjective intention of a non-signatory
to arbitrate may be proved by conduct. Such subjective intention could be
derived from the objective evidence in the form of participation of the non-
signatory in the negotiation, performance, or termination of the underlying
contract containing the arbitration agreement. However, the group of
companies doctrine has not been universally accepted by all jurisdictions.
In jurisdictions such as France where the doctrine has gained acceptance,
group of companies is one of the several factors that a court or tribunal
considers to determine the mutual intention of all the parties to join the non-
signatory to the arbitration agreement. Keeping in mind the above
background, we now move on to analyze the applicability of the group of
companies doctrine in the Indian context.
42 Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC, 210 F.3d 524 (2000)
43 Bernard Hanotiau, ‘May an Arbitration Clause be Extended to Non-signatories: Individuals, States or Other
Companies of the Group?’ in Complex Arbitrations: Multi-party, multi-contract, Multi-issue – A comparative study’
Bernard Hanotiau (eds) (2nd edn, 2020) 95, 194.
40
PART D
D. Arbitration Agreement
i. Consent as the basis for arbitration
59. Arbitration is an alternative dispute resolution mechanism where parties
consensually decide to submit a dispute between them to an arbitral tribunal
to the exclusion of domestic courts. 44 Arbitration provides a neutral, efficient,
and expert process for dispute resolution at a single forum whose decision is
final and binding on the parties. The principle of party autonomy underpins
the arbitration process as it allows the parties to dispense with technical
formalities and agree upon substantive and procedural laws and rules
applicable to the merits of the dispute. 45 Party autonomy allows the parties to
choose the seat of arbitration, number of arbitrators, procedure for
appointment of arbitrators, rules governing the arbitral procedure, and the
institution which will administer the arbitration. An arbitration proceeding is
broadly divided into two stages: The first stage commences with an arbitration
agreement and ends with the making of an arbitral award. The second stage
pertains to the enforcement of the arbitral award. 46
60. Consent forms the cornerstone of arbitration. An arbitration agreement
records the consent of the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration. A two-
Judge Bench of this Court in Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation
v. Encon Builders (I) Pvt. Ltd. 47 laid down four essential elements of an
arbitration agreement:
44 Gary Born, International Arbitration Law and Practice (3rd ed, 2021) 2.
45 Bharat Aluminium Company v Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services, (2016) 4 SCC 126
46 Satish Kumar v. Surinder Kumar, (1969) 2 SCR 244
47 (2003) 7 SCC 418
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PART D
(i) There must be a present or a future difference in connection with some
contemplated affair
(ii) The parties must intend to settle such difference by a private tribunal
(iii) The parties must agree in writing to be bound by the decision of such
tribunal.
(iv) The parties must be ad idem.
61. An arbitration agreement is a contractual undertaking by two or more parties
to resolve their disputes by the process of arbitration, even if the disputes
themselves are not based on contractual obligations. An arbitration
agreement is a conclusive proof that the parties have consented to submit
their dispute to an arbitral tribunal to the exclusion of domestic courts. The
basis for an arbitration agreement is generally traced to the contractual
freedom of parties to codify their intention to consensually submit their
disputes to an alternative dispute resolution process.
62. According to Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908, the courts
have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature except suits whose cognizance
is expressly or impliedly barred. The said provision gives a right to any person
to file a civil suit before a court of competent jurisdiction. Moreover, Section
28 of the Indian Contract Act of 1872 48 provides that any agreement
restraining a party from enforcing their rights under a contract before courts
or tribunals is void to that extent. However, the provision specifically saves a
contract by which two or more persons agree that any dispute, which may
48 “Contract Act”
42
PART D
arise between them, in respect of any subject or class of subjects shall be
referred to arbitration. Thus, arbitration agreements are granted a statutory
exception under Section 28 of the Contract Act. In Dhulabhai v. State of
Madhya Pradesh a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the jurisdiction
of civil courts may be excluded by an express provision of law or by clear
intendment arising from such law. 49 In Chloro Controls (supra), this Court
observed that Section 45 of the Arbitration Act shall prevail over the provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in case of a valid arbitration agreement.
Considering the fact that an arbitration agreement excludes the jurisdiction of
civil courts, such an agreement ought to be valid and enforceable.
63. An arbitration agreement must satisfy the principles of contract law laid down
under the Contract Act, in addition to satisfying other requirements stipulated
under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act, to qualify as a valid agreement.50
Section 2(e) of the Contract Act defines an agreement as every promise and
every set of promises forming the consideration for each other. An agreement
enforceable by law is a contract. An agreement should satisfy the mandate of
Section 10 of the Contract Act to be enforceable by law. Section 10 provides
that all agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of
parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful
object. According to Section 13, two or more persons are said to consent
when they agree upon the same thing in the same sense. Thus, consensus
49 (1968) 3 SCR 662
50 Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1
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ad idem between the parties forms the essential basis to constitute a valid
arbitration agreement.
64. Being a creature of a contract, an arbitration agreement is also bound by the
general principles of contract law, including the doctrine of privity. The doctrine
of privity means that a contract cannot confer rights or impose liabilities on
any person except the parties to the contract. This doctrine has two aspects:
first, only the parties to the contract are entitled under it or bound by it; and
second, the parties to the contract cannot impose a liability on a third party.
As a corollary, a third party cannot acquire rights and entitlements under a
contract. In M C Chacko v. State Bank of Travancore, this Court held it as
a settled principle of law that a person who is not party to a contract cannot
enforce the terms of the contract, subject to certain well-recognised
exceptions such as trust, family arrangement, and assignment. 51 The
principle that only the parties to an arbitration agreement are either bound or
benefited by such an agreement is fundamental to arbitration.52 This principle
is uniformly reflected in international arbitration conventions as well as the
Arbitration Act. For instance, Section 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law defines
an arbitration agreement as “an agreement by the parties to submit to
arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise
between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual
or not.” (emphasis supplied)
51 (1969) 2 SCC 343
52 Gary Born (n 44) 1518.
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65. It is a generally accepted legal proposition that arbitration is a matter of
contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute
which they have not agreed so to submit. 53 Since consent forms the
cornerstone of arbitration, a non-signatory cannot be forcibly made a “party”
to an arbitration agreement as doing so would violate the sacrosanct
principles of privity of contract and party autonomy. However, In case of multi-
party contracts, the courts and tribunals are often called upon to determine
the parties to an arbitration agreement.
ii. Parties to Arbitration Agreement
66. The general method to figure out the parties to an arbitration agreement is to
look for the entities who are named in the recitals and have signed the
agreement. The signature of a party on the agreement is the most profound
expression of the consent of a person or entity to submit to the jurisdiction of
an arbitral tribunal. However, the corollary that persons or entities who have
not signed the agreement are not bound by it may not always be correct. A
written contract does not necessarily require that parties put their signatures
to the document embodying the terms of the agreement.54 Therefore, the term
“non-signatories”, instead of the traditional “third parties”, seems the most
suitable to describe situations where consent to arbitration is expressed
through means other than signature. A non-signatory is a person or entity that
is implicated in a dispute which is the subject matter of an arbitration, although
it has not formally entered into an arbitration agreement.55 The important
53 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation, (1960) 363 US 574, 582
54 Pollock and Mulla, The Indian Contract and Specific Reliefs Act (14th edn, 2016) 235.
55 Stavros Brekoulakis, ‘Rethinking Consent in International Commercial Arbitration: A General Theory for Non-
signatories’ (2017) 8 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 610.
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determination is whether such a non-signatory intended to effect legal
relations with the signatory parties and be bound by the arbitration
agreement. There may arise situations where persons or entities who have
not formally signed the arbitration agreement or the underlying contract
containing the arbitration agreement may intend to be bound by the terms of
the agreement. In other words, the issue of who is a “party” to an arbitration
agreement is primarily an issue of consent.
67. Section 2 of the Contract Act provides that when a person signifies their
willingness to do or to abstain from doing anything, with a view to obtaining
the assent of that other to such act or abstinence, is said to make a proposal.
The proposal is said to be accepted when the person to whom the proposal
is made signifies their assent. A proposal becomes promise upon acceptance.
Every promise and every set of promises, forming the consideration for each
other, is an agreement. Importantly, Section 9 provides that a promise is said
to be express if the proposal or acceptance of any promise is made in words,
while a promise is said to be implied if such proposal or acceptance is “made
otherwise than in words.” Thus, a contract may either be express or implied.
68. Chitty on Contracts explains the difference between express and implied
contracts as follows:
“Contracts may either be express or implied. The difference is not
one of legal effect but simply of the way in which the consent
of the parties is manifested. Contracts are express when their
terms are stated in words by the parties. They are often said to
be implied when their terms are not so stated, as, for example,
when a passenger is permitted to board a bus: from the conduct of
the parties the law implies a promise by the passenger to pay the
fare, and a promise by the operator of the bus to carry him safely to
his destination.[…] Express and implied contracts are both
contracts in the true sense of the term, for they both arise from
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PART D
the agreement of the parties, though in one case the agreement
is manifested in words and in the other case by conduct. Since,
as we have seen, agreement is not a mental state but an act, an
inference from conduct, and since many of the terms of an express
contract are often implied, it follows that the distinction between
express and implied contracts has little importance.” 56
69. The above exposition gives rise to the inference that in case of an implied
contract, the question revolves around the determination of the consent of the
parties to be bound by the terms of the contract. Such determination is
manifested through the acts or conduct. The theory of implied contract by
conduct has also been accepted by this Court. In Haji Mohammed Ishaq v.
Mohamad Iqbal,57 the plaintiff supplied tobacco to the defendant. Although
there was no express agreement between the parties, the defendant
accepted the goods, but allegedly failed to clear the outstanding dues despite
repeated demands raised by the plaintiff. A Bench of three Judges of this
Court observed that the conduct of the defendants in accepting the goods and
not repudiating any of the demand letters raised by the plaintiff “clearly
showed that a direct contract which in law is called an implied contract by
conduct was brough about between them.” Under the Indian contract law, it
is posited that actions or conduct can be an indicator of consent of a party to
be bound by a contract. This also applies to an arbitration agreement
considering the fact that it is a creature of contract. However, an arbitration
agreement also has to meet the requirements laid down under the Arbitration
Act to be valid and enforceable.
56 Chitty on Contracts, Hugh Beale (ed) (32nd edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2015) para 1-104.
57 (1978) 2 SCC 493
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PART D
70. Section 2(h) of the Arbitration Act defines a “party” to mean a party to an
arbitration agreement. Section 7 defines an arbitration agreement to mean an
agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which
have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a “defined legal
relationship.” Section 7 requires that an arbitration agreement has to be in
writing. Section 7 indicates the circumstances in which it is regarded as an
agreement in writing. Such an agreement may be embodied in a document,
an exchange of communications, including in the electronic form, or in a
statement of claim which is not traversed in the defence. In Vidya Drolia v.
Durga Trading Corporation,58 this Court observed that a legal relationship
means a relationship which gives rise to legal obligations and duties, and
confers a right. Such a right may be contractual or non-contractual. In case of
a non-contractual legal relationship, the cause of action arises in tort,
restitution, breach of statutory duty, or some other non-contractual cause of
action. Thus, the legislative intent underlying Section 7 suggests that any
legal relationship, including relationships where there is no contract between
the persons or entities, but whose actions or conduct has given rise to a
relationship, could form a subject matter of an arbitration agreement under
Section 7. This approach is in line with the observations of Lord Hoffman in
Fiona Trust and Holding Company v. Privalov where it was observed that
“the construction of an arbitration clause should start from the assumption
that the parties, as rational businessmen, are likely to have intended any
dispute arising out of the relationship into which they have entered or
58 (2021) 2 SCC 1
48
PART D
purported to enter to be decided by the same tribunal.”59 (emphasis
supplied)
71. Section 7(3) requires an arbitration agreement to be in writing. Section 7(4)
lays down three circumstances to elaborate when an arbitration agreement
can be said to be in writing. According to the first circumstance laid down
under Section 7(4)(a), an arbitration agreement is in writing if it is signed by
the parties. This circumstance refers to a situation where the parties have
formally executed and expressly assumed the status of parties by attesting
their signatures to the arbitration agreement or the underlying contract
containing the arbitration agreement. In such situations, the courts or tribunals
only need to refer to the signature page or the recitals to figure out the parties
to the arbitration agreement.
72. Section 7(4)(b) provides the second circumstance, according to which an
arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in an exchange of letters,
telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication including
communication through electronic means which provide a record of the
agreement. According to this provision, the existence of an arbitration
agreement can be inferred from various documents duly approved by the
parties. 60 Section 7(4)(b) dispenses with the conventional sense of an
agreement as a document with signatories. Rather, it emphasizes on the
manifestation of the consent of persons or entities through their actions of
exchanging documents. However, the important aspect of the said provision
59 [2007] UKHL 40
60 Shakti Bhog Foods Limited v. Kola Shipping Ltd, (2009) 2 SCC 134; Trimex International FZE Ltd v.
Vedanta Aluminium Ltd, (2010) 3 SCC 1
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lies in the fact that the parties should be able to record their agreement
through a documentary record of evidence. In Great Offshore Ltd. v. Iranian
Offshore Engineering and Construction Company, this Court observed
that Section 7(4)(b) requires the court to ask whether a record of agreement
is found in the exchange of letters, telex, telegrams, or other means of
telecommunication. 61 Thus, the act of agreeing by the persons or entities has
to be inferred or derived by the courts or tribunals from the relevant
documents and communication, neither of which can be equated with a
conventional contract.
73. The third circumstance is provided under Section 7(4)(c), according to which
an arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in an exchange of
statements of claim and defence in which the existence of the agreement is
alleged by one party and not denied by the other. A two-Judge Bench of this
Court clarified in S N Prasad v. Monnet Finance Limited 62 that there will be
an “exchange of statements of claim and defence” for the purposes of Section
7(4)(c) if there is an assertion of the existence of an arbitration agreement in
any suit, petition or application filed before any court or tribunal, and if there
is no denial of it in the defence, counter, or written statement. Thus, in the
third circumstance the court proceeds on the assumption that the conduct of
the person or entity in not denying the existence of an arbitration agreement
leads to the conclusive proof of its existence. All the three circumstances
61 (2008) 14 SCC 240
62 (2011) 1 SCC 320
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PART D
contained in Section 7(4) are geared towards determining the mutual intention
of the parties to be bound by the arbitration agreement.
74. Section 7 of the Arbitration Act contains two aspects: a substantive aspect
and a formal aspect. The substantive aspect is contained is Section 7(1)
which allows parties to submit disputes arising between them in respect of a
defined legal relationship to arbitration. The legal relationships between and
among parties could either be contractual or non-contractual. For legal
relations to be contractual in nature, they ought to meet the requirements of
the Indian contract law as contained in the Contract Act. It has been shown in
the preceding paragraphs that a contract can either be express or implied,
which is inferred on the basis of action or conduct of the parties. Thus, it is
not necessary for the persons or entities to be signatories to a contract to
enter into a legal relationship – the only important aspect to be determined is
whether they intended or consented to enter into the legal relationship by the
dint of their action or conduct.
75. The second aspect is contained in Section 7(3) which stipulates the
requirement of a written arbitration agreement. A written arbitration agreement
need not be signed by the parties if there is a record of agreement. 63 The
mandatory requirement of a written arbitration agreement is merely to ensure
that there is a clearly established record of the consent of the parties to refer
their disputes to arbitration to the exclusion of the domestic courts.
63 Govind Rubber Ltd v. M/s Louis Dreyfus Commodities, (2015) 13 SCC 477
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PART D
76. Section 2(h) read with Section 7 does not expressly require the “party” to be
a signatory to an arbitration agreement or the underlying contract containing
the arbitration agreement. This interpretation is in line with the general trend
in national and international legislations that a signature is not necessary for
an arbitration agreement. The UNCITRAL Model Law as amended in 2006
lays down the writing requirement for an arbitration agreement under Article
7 in the following terms:
“(3) An arbitration agreement is in writing if its content is recorded in
any form, whether or not the arbitration agreement or contract
has been concluded orally, by conduct, or by other means.”
The above provision states that an arbitration agreement may be entered into
in any form, for example orally or tacitly, as long as the content of the
agreement is recorded. It eliminates the requirement of the signature of
parties or an exchange of messages between the parties.
77. Article II paragraph 2 of the New York Convention defines “agreement in
writing” to include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement,
signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.
Article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law establishes a more favourable
requirement for a written arbitration agreement. In 2006, UNCITRAL
recommended that the circumstances described in Article II paragraph 2 of
the New York Convention “be applied recognizing that the circumstances
described therein are not exhaustive.” 64 Additionally, it also recommended
that Article 7 paragraph 1 of the UNCITRAL Model Law should be applied “to
64 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Recommendation regarding the interpretation of
article II, paragraph 2, and article VII, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, done in New York, 10 June 1958, (adopted by the UNCITRAL on 7 July 2006) 39.
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PART D
allow any interested party to avail itself of rights it may have, under the law or
treaties of the country where an arbitration agreement is sought to be relied
upon, to seek recognition of the validity of such an arbitration agreement.”
The Arbitration Act is largely based on the UNCITRAL Model Law. Therefore,
the UNCITRAL Model Law could be referred to while construing the
provisions of the Arbitration Act. 65 Although the amended Section 7 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law has not been adopted in the Indian law, it reflects the
modern commercial reality where substance is given precedence over
technical legal formalities. 66
78. Reading Section 7 of the Arbitration Act in view of the above discussion gives
rise to the following conclusions: first, arbitration agreements arise out of a
legal relationship between or among persons or entities which may be
contractual or otherwise; second, in situations where the legal relationship is
contractual in nature, the nature of relationship can be determined on the
basis of general contract law principles; third, it is not necessary for the
persons or entities to be signatories to the arbitration agreement to be bound
by it; fourth, in case of non-signatory parties, the important determination for
the courts is whether the persons or entities intended or consented to be
bound by the arbitration agreement or the underlying contract containing the
arbitration agreement through their acts or conduct; fifth, the requirement of
a written arbitration agreement has to be adhered to strictly, but the form in
which such agreement is recorded is irrelevant; sixth, the requirement of a
65 Sundaram Finance Ltd v. NEPC India Ltd, (1999) 2 SCC 479, para 9; P Manohar Reddy and Bros v.
Maharashtra Krishna Valley Development Corporation, (2009) 2 SCC 494, para 27.
66 Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (7th edn, Oxford University Press, 2023) para 2.23.
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PART D
written arbitration agreement does not exclude the possibility of binding non-
signatory parties if there is a defined legal relationship between the signatory
and non-signatory parties; and seventh, once the validity of an arbitration
agreement is established, the court or tribunal can determine the issue of
which parties are bound by such agreement.
79. It is presumed that the formal signatories to an arbitration agreement are
parties who will be bound by it. However, in exceptional cases persons or
entities who have not signed or formally assented to a written arbitration
agreement or the underlying contract containing the arbitration agreement
may be held to be bound by such agreement. As mentioned in the preceding
paragraphs, the doctrine of privity limits the imposition of rights and liabilities
on third parties to a contract. Generally, only the parties to an arbitration
agreement can be subject to the full effects of the agreement in terms of the
reliefs and remedies because they consented to be bound by the arbitration
agreement. Therefore, the decisive question before the courts or tribunals is
whether a non-signatory consented to be bound by the arbitration agreement.
To determine whether a non-signatory is bound by an arbitration agreement,
the courts and tribunals apply typical principles of contract law and corporate
law. The legal doctrines provide a framework for evaluating the specific
contractual language and the factual settings to determine the intentions of
the parties to be bound by the arbitration agreement.67
80. Gary Born suggests that the legal theories and doctrines provide a basis for
determining the real intent of parties to be bound by an arbitration agreement.
67 Gary Born (n 44) 1531.
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PART D
Therefore, it is incorrect to use terminologies such as ‘extension’ of an
arbitration agreement to non-signatories or ‘third parties’:
“Judicial case law and commentary on international arbitration
sometimes make reference to the “extension” of an arbitration
agreement to non-signatories, or to “third parties” on the basis of
one or more of the foregoing theories. These expression are
inaccurate, in that they imply that an entity which is not a party to an
arbitration agreement is nonetheless subject to that agreement’s
effects, by virtue of something other than the parties’ consent.
Contrary to the references to “extension” or “third parties”, most of
the theories […] provide a basis for concluding that an entity is in
reality a party to the arbitration agreement – which therefore does
not need to be “extended” to a “third party” – because that party’s
actions constitute consent to the agreement, or otherwise bind it to
the agreement, notwithstanding the lack of its formal execution of
the agreement. The arbitration agreement is therefore not ordinarily
“extended”, but rather the true parties that have consented to the
arbitration agreement are identified.”
81. Courts and tribunals across the world have been applying traditional
contractual and commercial doctrines to determine the consent of the non-
signatory parties to be bound by the arbitration agreement. Generally, consent
based theories such as agency, novation, assignment, operation of law,
merger and succession, and third party beneficiaries have been applied in
different jurisdictions. In exceptional circumstances, non-consensual theories
such as piercing the corporate veil or alter ego and estoppel have also been
applied to bind to bind a non-signatory party to an arbitration agreement. The
group of companies doctrine is one such consent-based doctrine which has
been applied, albeit controversially, for identifying the real intention of the
parties to bind a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement.
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PART E
E. Group of Companies Doctrine
i. Separate legal personality
82. The phenomenon of group companies is the modern reality of economic life
and business organisation. Group companies are a set of separate firms
linked together in formal or informal structures under the control of a parent
company. The group companies can be defined in the Indian context as “an
agglomeration of privately held and publicly traded firms operating in different
lines of business, each of which is incorporated as a separate legal entity, but
which are collectively under the entrepreneurial, financial, and strategic
control of a common authority, typically a family, and are linked by trust-based
relationships forged around a similar persona, ethnicity, or community.” 68 A
group company involving the parent and subsidiary companies are created
for myriad purposes such as limiting the liability of the parent corporation,
facilitating international trade, entering into business ventures with investors,
establishing domestic corporate residence, and avoiding tax liability.
83. The principle of separate legal personality has been the cornerstone of
corporate law. In Salomon v. Salomon,69 the House of Lords famously
observed that a company is at law a different person altogether from the
promoters, directors, shareholders, and employees. The principle of separate
legal personality equally applies to corporate groups. A parent company is not
generally held to be liable for the actions of the subsidiary company of which
68 Jayati Sarkar, ‘Business Groups in India’ in Asli Coplan, Takashi Hikino, and James Lincoln (eds) The Oxford
Handbook of Business Groups (2010) 299
69 [1897] AC 22
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PART E
it is a direct or indirect shareholder. The Companies Act, 2013 70 has statutorily
recognized a subsidiary company as a separate legal entity. 71 Section 2(46)
of the 2013 Act defines a holding company as a company of which one or
more other companies are subsidiary companies. Section 2(87) defines
“subsidiary company” to mean a company in which the holding company
exercises control over the composition of the Board of Directors and has a
controlling interest of at least 50 percent over the voting rights. Although a
holding company owns a controlling interest in the subsidiary company, they
are considered as separate legal entities. Group companies’ structures allow
multinational corporations to structure their businesses at both the national
and international level to leverage better returns for the investors and ensure
business growth of the corporation.
84. A Bench of three Judges of this Court in Vodafone International Holding BV
v. Union of India 72 emphasized the principles of corporate separateness in
the following terms:
101. A company is a separate legal persona and the fact that all its
shares are owned by one person or by the parent has nothing to do
with its separate legal existence. If the owned company is wound
up, the liquidator, and its parent company, would get hold of the
assets of the subsidiary. In none of the authorities have the assets
of the subsidiary been held to be those of the parent unless it is
acting as an agent. Thus, even though a subsidiary may normally
comply with the request of a parent company it is not just a puppet
of the parent company. The difference is between having power or
having a persuasive position. Though it may be advantageous for
parent and subsidiary companies to work as a group, each
subsidiary will look to see whether there are separate commercial
interests which should be gained.”
70 “2013 Act”
71 Balwant Rai Saluja v. Air India, (2014) 9 SCC 407
72 (2012) 6 SCC 613
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PART E
85. The separateness of corporate personality will be ignored by courts in
exceptional situations where a company is used as a means by the members
and shareholders to carry out fraud or evade tax liabilities. If the court, on the
basis of factual evidence, determines that the company was acting as an
agent of the members or shareholders, it will ignore the separate personality
of the company to attribute liability to the individuals. In Tata Engineering
and Locomotive Co Ltd v. State of Bihar 73, the issue before a Constitution
Bench of this Court was whether a company could be treated as a citizen for
the purposes of maintaining a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.
The company urged that the corporate veil should be lifted to treat the petition
as one filed by the shareholders. This Court held that the veil of a corporation
can be lifted where fraud is intended to be prevented or trading with an enemy
is sought to be defeated.
86. In case of group companies, there may arise situations where a holding
company completely dominates the affairs of the subsidiary company, to the
extent of misusing its control, to avoid or conceal liability. In such situations,
the courts apply the doctrine of “alter ego” or piercing the corporate veil to
disregard the corporate separateness between the two companies and treat
them as a single entity. 74 In LIC v. Escorts Ltd, 75 a Constitution Bench of this
Court noted that the principle of distinct legal personality may be ignored
where the associate companies are inextricably connected as to be, in reality,
73 (1964) 6 SCR 885
74 Gary Born (n 44) 1545.
75 (1986) 1 SCC 264
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PART E
part of one concern. Speaking for the Bench, Justice O Chinnappa Reddy
observed:
“90. […] Generally and broadly speaking, we may say that the
corporate veil may be lifted where a statute itself contemplates lifting
the veil, or fraud, or improper conduct is intended to be prevented,
or a taxing statute or a beneficent statute is sought to be evaded or
where associated companies are inextricable connected as to be, in
reality, part of one concern. It is neither necessary nor desirable to
enumerate the classes of cases where lifting the veil is permissible,
since that must necessarily depend on the relevant statutory or other
provisions, the object sought to be achieved, the impugned conduct,
the involvement of the element of the public interest, the effect on
parties who may be affected, etc.”
87. The application of the doctrine of lifting the corporate veil rests on the
overriding considerations of justice and equity. 76 Often, the courts pierce the
corporate veil when maintaining the separateness of corporate personality is
found opposed to justice, convenience, and public interests.77 In Balwant Rai
Saluja v. Air India,78 this Court cautioned that the principle of piercing the
corporate veil should be applied in a restrictive manner and only in scenarios
where it is evident that the subsidiary company was a mere camouflage
deliberately created by the holding company for the purpose of avoiding
liability. It was further observed that the intent of piercing the corporate veil
must be such that would seek to remedy a wrong done by the holding
company. In the context of arbitration, the principle of piercing the corporate
veil has been sparingly used because it disregards the intention of the parties
by emphasizing on the overriding considerations of good faith and equity to
bind the non-signatories to an arbitration agreement.
76 Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 662
77 Kapila Hingorani v. State of Bihar, (2003) 6 SCC 1
78 (2014) 9 SCC 407
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PART E
88. Moreover, since the companies in a group have separate legal personality,
the presence of common shareholders or directors cannot lead to the
conclusion that the subsidiary company will be bound by the acts of the
holding company. The statements or representations made by promoters or
directors in their personal capacity would not bind a company. Similarly, the
mere fact that the two companies have common shareholders or a common
Board of Directors will not constitute a sufficient ground to conclude that they
are a single economic entity. The single economic entity or the single
economic unit theory imposes general enterprise liability on the corporate
group. In D H N Food Distributors Ltd v. Tower Hamlets London Borough
Council79, Lord Denning held that a group of three companies should be
treated as a single economic entity on the basis of two factors: first, the parent
company owned all the shares of the subsidiary companies to the extent that
it controlled every movement of the given subsidiary companies; and second,
all the three companies in the group virtually acted as partners and could not
be treated separately. Thus, the determination of whether two or more
companies constitute a single economic entity depends upon the concerted
efforts of the companies to act in pursuance of a common endeavour or
enterprise.
89. From the above discussion, we can infer that entities within a corporate group
have separate legal personality, which cannot be ignored save in exceptional
circumstances such as fraud. The distinction between a parent company and
its subsidiary is fundamental, and cannot be easily abridged by taking
79 [1976] 1 WLR 852 (2)
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PART E
recourse to economic convenience. 80 Legally, the rights and liabilities of a
parent company cannot be transferred to the subsidiary company, and vice
versa, unless, there is a strong legal basis for doing so.
ii. Adopting a pragmatic approach to consent
90. In the context of arbitration law, the intention of the parties has to be derived
from the words used in the arbitration agreement. While construing the
arbitration agreement, it is the duty of the court to not delve deep into the
intricacies of the human mind, but only consider the expressed intentions of
the parties. 81 The words used in the contract reflect the commercial
understanding between the parties. The intention of the parties has to be
ascertained from the words used in the contract, considered in light of the
surrounding circumstances and the object of such contract. 82
91. An arbitration agreement encapsulates the commercial understanding of
business entities as regards to the mode and manner of settlement of
disputes that may arise between them in respect of their legal relationship. In
most situations, the language of the contract is only suggestive of the intention
of the signatories to such contract and not the non-signatories. However,
there may arise situations where a person or entity may not sign an arbitration
agreement, yet give the appearance of being a veritable party to such
arbitration agreement due to their legal relationship with the signatory parties
and involvement in the performance of the underlying contract. Especially in
80 Bank of Tokyo v. Karoon, (1986) 3 All ER 468
81 Kamla Devi v. Takhatmal Land, AIR 1964 SC 859; Bangalore Electricity Supply Co Ltd v. E S Solar Power
(P) Ltd, (2021) 6 SCC 718
82 Bank of India v. K Mohandas, (2009) 5 SCC 313; M Dayanand Reddy v. A P Industrial Infrastructure
Corporation Ltd, (1993) 3 SCC 137
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cases involving complex transactions involving multiple parties and contracts,
a non-signatory may be substantially involved in the negotiation or
performance of the contractual obligations without formally consenting to be
bound by the ensuing burdens, including arbitration.
92. Modern commercial reality suggests that there often arise situations where a
company which has signed the contract containing the arbitration clause is
not always the one to negotiate or perform the underlying contractual
obligations. In such situations, emphasis on formal consent will lead to the
exclusion of such non-signatories from the ambit of the arbitration agreement,
leading to multiplicity of proceedings and fragmentation of disputes. In A
Ayyasamy v. A Paramsivam, 83 this Court observed that it is the duty of the
courts “to impart to that commercial understanding a sense of business
efficacy.” The courts must interpret contracts in a manner that would give them
a sense of efficacy rather than invalidating the commercial interests of the
parties. The meaning of the contract must be gathered by adopting a common
sense approach, which should “not be allowed to be thwarted by a narrow,
pedantic and legalistic interpretation.”84 Therefore, there is a need to adopt a
modern approach to consent, which takes into consideration the
circumstances, apparent conduct, and commercial facets of business
transactions.
93. As Professor Hanotiau suggests, there is a need to adopt a modern and
pragmatic approach to consent:
83 (2016) 10 SCC 386
84 Union of India v. D N Revri, (1976) 4 SCC 147
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“I would suggest that it is more accurate to refer to a modern
approach to consent; an approach that is more pragmatic, more
focussed on an analysis of facts, which places an emphasis on
commercial practice, economic reality, trade usages, and the
complex and multifaceted dimensions of large projects involving
group of companies and connected agreements in multiparty multi-
contract scenarios; an approach that is no longer restricted to
express consent but that takes into consideration all its various
expressions and tends to give much more importance than before
to the conduct of the individuals or companies concerned.” 85
94. It has been urged before us that where a written arbitration agreement clearly
sets out the parties to it, the courts or tribunals cannot read into the agreement
an intention to bind persons or entities other than the signatory parties.
Reliance was placed on Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani,86 where this Court
observed that “wherever written instruments are appointed, either by the
requirement of law, or by the contract of the parties, to be the repositories and
memorials of truth, any other evidence is excluded from being used either as
a substitute for such instruments, or to contradict or alter them.”
Consequently, it was urged that the courts or tribunals cannot interpret the
arbitration agreement in a manner so as to expand its reach to parties not
named in the agreement.
95. Arbitration law is an autonomous legal field. While the main purpose of
corporate law and contract law is imputation of substantive legal liability, the
main purpose behind the law of arbitration is to determine whether an arbitral
tribunal has jurisdiction over the dispute arising between parties to an
arbitration agreement. On the one hand, the courts and tribunals cannot
lightly brush aside the decision of the parties to not make a person or entity a
85 Bernard Hanotiau, ‘Consent to Arbitration: Do We Share a Common Vision?’ (2011) 27(4) Arbitration International
539, 554
86 (2003) 6 SCC 595
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party to the arbitration agreement. The fact that the non-signatory did not put
pen to paper may be an indicator of its intention to not assume any rights or
responsibilities under the arbitration agreement. On the other hand, courts
and tribunals cannot adopt a rigid approach to exclude all persons or entities
who, through their conduct and relationship with the signatory parties,
intended to be bound by the underlying contract containing the arbitration
agreement. The area of arbitration law not only concerns domestic law, but it
also encompasses the international law, particularly when it pertains to the
enforcement of international arbitral awards. Therefore, this Court ought to
adopt a balanced approach without comprising on the basic principles of
arbitration law, contract law, and company law to ensure that the resultant
legal framework is consistent with internationally accepted practices and
principles.
96. A formalistic construction of an arbitration agreement would suggest that the
decision of a party to not sign an arbitration agreement should be construed
to mean that the mutual intention of the parties was to exclude that party from
the ambit of the arbitration agreement. Indeed, corporate entities have the
commercial and contractual freedom to structure their businesses in a
manner to limit their liability. However, there have been situations where a
corporate entity deliberately made an effort to be not bound by the underlying
contract containing the arbitration agreement, but was actively involved in the
negotiation and performance of the contract. The level of the non-signatory
party’s involvement was to the extent of making the other party believe that it
was a veritable party to the contract, and the arbitration agreement contained
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under it. Therefore, the group of companies doctrine is applied to ascertain
the intentions of the parties by analysing the factual circumstances
surrounding the contractual arrangements.87
97. Increasingly, multinational groups often adopt new and sophisticated
corporate structures for execution and delivery of complex commercial
transactions such as construction contracts, concession contracts, license
agreements, long-term supply contracts, banking and financial transactions,
and maritime contracts. For the execution of such contracts, corporate
structures may take the form of groups based on equity, joint ventures, and
informal alliances. 88 A multi-corporate structure helps a group in adopting
commercially effective models of operation as different companies can get
involved at different stages of a single transaction. Often, persons or entities,
who are not signatories to the underlying contract containing the arbitration
agreement, are involved in the negotiation, performance, or termination of the
contract. In the context of arbitration law, the challenge arises when only one
member of the group signs the arbitration agreement, to the exclusion of other
members. Should the non-signatories be excluded from the arbitration
proceedings, even though they were implicated in the dispute which forms
the subject matter of arbitration? As a response to this challenge, arbitration
law has developed and adopted the group of companies doctrine, to allow or
compel a non-signatory party to be bound by an arbitration agreement.
87 Gary Born (n 44) 1568.
88 Stavros Brekoulakis, ‘Parties in International Arbitration: Consent v. Commercial Reality’ in Stavros Brekoulakis,
Julian DM Lew, et al (eds) in ‘The Evolution and Future of International Arbitration’ (2016) 119, 120.
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iii. Group of companies doctrine – a fact based doctrine
98. The group of companies doctrine is used in the context of companies which
are related to each other by virtue of their being a part of the same corporate
group. Since every company in a group has a separate legal personality, a
contract formally entered by one member of a group will not be binding on the
other members by virtue of the limited liability principle. The group of
companies doctrine is used to bind a non-signatory company within a group
to an arbitration agreement which has been signed by other member of the
group. 89 The underlying basis of the group of companies doctrine rests on
maintaining the corporate separateness of the group companies while
determining the common intention of the parties to bind the non-signatory
party to the arbitration agreement. In other words, the group of companies
doctrine is a means of identifying the common intention of the parties to bind
a non-signatory to arbitration agreement by emphasizing and analysing the
corporate affiliation of the distinct legal entities. 90
99. The group of companies doctrine has been a subject of rigorous academic
debate among practitioners of arbitration law and academics with domain
expertise. The first view questions the necessity of adopting the doctrine by
suggesting that the determination of consent in complex multi-party arbitration
can be done on the basis of traditional contractual and commercial law
theories. Professor Bernard Hanotiau suggests that the group of companies
doctrine should be discarded because it has been used as a “shortcut to avoid
89 UNCITRAL, ‘Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Possible uniform rules on certain issues concerning settlement
of commercial disputes: conciliation, interim measures of protection, written form of arbitration agreement: Report
of the Secretary General’ A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.108/Add.1 (26 January 2000)
90 Gary Born (n 44) 1563.
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legal reasoning” leading to a distorted approach by courts and arbitral
tribunals. 91 However, Professor Hanotiau does concede that the existence of
a group of companies may be a relevant factual element to determine whether
the conduct of a non-signatory party amounts to consent.
100. In contrast, the second view suggests that the group of companies doctrine
is an integral aspect of arbitration law. According to this view, the existence
of specific patterns of corporate structure could be a useful factual indicator
to determine the common intention of the parties to make the non-signatory
a party to the arbitration agreement. 92 For instance, the active involvement of
a non-signatory group company in the facilitation and performance of a
commercial project helmed by other signatory companies of the group can be
considered as an indication that the non-signatory party also consented to
arbitrate. Moreover, Gary Born also suggests that the group of companies
doctrine is helpful because it allows the courts to go beyond the objective
intentions of the parties to determine their dynamic subjective intentions both
before, during, and after the execution of the contract.93 According to Born,
the doctrine also promotes efficacy of arbitration agreements by prohibiting
circumvention of arbitration through satellite litigation by non-signatory parties
within a group. We are broadly in agreement with this view for the reasons to
follow.
91 Hanotiau (n 85) 546.
92 Stavros Brekoulakis, ‘Parties in International Arbitration: Consent v. Commercial Reality’ in Stavros Brekoulakis,
Julian DM Lew, et al (eds) ‘The Evolution and Future of International Arbitration’ (2016) 119, 137.
93 Gary Born (n 44) 1568.
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101. The group of companies doctrine was developed by international arbitral
tribunals specifically in the context of arbitration, and is not generally used in
other areas of law. 94 Although the existence of a group of companies is a
necessary condition, it is not the sufficient condition to determine the intention
of the parties. In almost all formulations, the courts and tribunals have
cautioned that the mere membership of a non-signatory in a group of
companies is not enough to bind it to the arbitration agreement. Rather, the
courts need to determine: first, the existence of a group of companies; and
second, the conduct of the signatory and non-signatory parties which indicate
their common intention to make the non-signatory a party to the arbitration
agreement.95 Thus, the group of companies doctrine is similar to other
consent based doctrines such as agency, assignment, assumption, and
guarantee to the extent that it is ordinarily applied as a means of identifying
the common intention of the parties to bind the non-signatory to the arbitration
agreement.
102. The above position was explicitly adopted by the ICC Tribunal in Dow
Chemicals (supra) where it held that an arbitration agreement signed by
certain companies of a corporate group will bind the other non-signatory
members only where all the parties intended and understood the non-
signatories to be the “veritable parties” to the underlying contract containing
the arbitration agreement based on their participation in the “conclusion,
performance, or termination of the contracts”. Thus, the existence of a group
94 Gary Born (n 44) 1559.
95 Gary Born (n 44) 1562.
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of companies is a factual element that the court or tribunal has to consider
when analysing the consent of the parties. It inevitably adds an extra layer of
criteria to an exercise which at its core is preponderant on determining the
consent of the parties in case of complex transactions involving multiple
parties and agreements.
103. In Chloro Control (supra), this Court rightly observed that a non-signatory
could be subjected to arbitration provided the underlying transactions were
with a group of companies and there was a clear intention of the parties to
bind both the signatory as well as non-signatory parties to the arbitration
agreement. This legal proposition has been reiterated in a series of
subsequent decisions of this Court including Canara Bank (supra) and
Discovery Enterprises (supra). Further, this Court in Cheran Properties
(supra) held that the group of companies doctrine helps in decoding the
layered structure of commercial arrangements to unravel the true intention of
the parties to bind someone who is not formally a signatory to the contract,
but has “assumed” the obligation to be bound by the actions of a signatory.
This court explained the purport of the doctrine to discern the “true” party in
interest:
“25. […] The group of companies doctrine has been applied to
pierce the corporate veil to locate the “true” party in interest, and
more significantly, to target the creditworthy member of a group of
companies. Through the extension of this doctrine is met with
resistance on the basis of the legal imputation of corporate
personality, the application of the doctrine turns on a construction of
the arbitration agreement and the circumstances relating to the
entry into and performance of the underlying contract.”
104. In Cox and Kings (supra), Surya Kant, J questioned whether the principles
of alter ego or piercing the corporate veil can alone justify the application of
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the group of companies doctrine even in the absence of implied consent. This
Court in Cheran Properties (supra) clarified that there is an important
distinction between the group of companies doctrine and the principle of veil
piercing or alter ego. The principle of alter ego disregards the corporate
separateness and the intentions of the parties in view of the overriding
considerations of equity and good faith. In contrast, the group of companies
doctrine facilitates the identification of the intention of the parties to determine
the true parties to the arbitration agreement without disturbing the legal
personality of the entity in question. Therefore, the principle of alter ego or
piercing the corporate veil cannot be the basis for the application of the group
of companies doctrine.
iv. The determination of mutual intention
105. In multi-party agreements, the courts or tribunals will have to examine the
corporate structure to determine whether both the signatory and non-
signatory parties belong to the same group. This evaluation is fact specific
and must be carried out in accordance with the appropriate principles of
company law. Once the existence of the corporate group is established, the
next step is the determination of whether there was a mutual intention of all
the parties to bind the non-signatory to the arbitration agreement.
106. The group of companies doctrine requires the courts and tribunals to consider
the commercial circumstances and the conduct of the parties to evince the
common intention of the parties to arbitrate. It is important to note that the
group of companies doctrine concerns only the parties to the arbitration
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agreement and not the underlying commercial contract. 96 Consequently, a
non-signatory could be held to be a party to the arbitration agreement without
becoming a formal party to the underlying contract. The existence of a group
companies is one of the essential factors to determine whether the conduct
amounts to consent but membership of a group is not sufficient in itself. This
has been the consistent position of law, starting from the Dow Chemicals
(supra) award, where it was observed that the common intention of the parties
to bind the non-signatory party to the arbitration can be inferred from the
”circumstances that surround the conclusion and characterize the
performance and later the termination of the contracts.” In other words, it was
held that a non-signatory party could be considered as a “true party” to the
arbitration agreement on the basis of their role in the conclusion,
performance, or termination of the underlying contract containing the
arbitration agreement.
107. This Court in Chloro Controls (supra) laid down four factual indices that the
courts or tribunals should consider to bind a non-signatory party to arbitration
agreement. It is important to extract the relevant paragraphs in full:
“72. This evolves the principle that a non-signatory could be
subjected to arbitration provided these transactions were with group
of companies and there was a clear intention of the parties to bind
both, the signatory as well as the non-signatory parties. In other
words, “intention of the parties” is a very significant feature
which must be established before the scope of the arbitration
can be said to include the signatory as well as the non-
signatory party.”
73. A non-signatory or third party could be subjected to arbitration
without their prior consent, but this would only be in exceptional
cases. The court will examine these exceptions from the touchstone
of direct relationship to the party signatory to the arbitration
agreement, direct commonality of the subject-matter and the
96 Gary Born (n 44) 1567
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agreement between the parties being a composite transaction. The
transaction should be of a composite nature where performance of
the mother agreement may not be feasible without aid, execution
and performance of the supplementary or ancillary agreements, for
achieving the common object and collectively having bearing on the
dispute. Besides all this, the court would have to examine whether
a composite reference of such parties would serve the ends of
justice. Once this exercise is completed and the court answers the
same in the affirmative, the reference of even non-signatory parties
would fall within the exception afore-discussed.”
(emphasis supplied)
108. In Cox and Kings (supra), Justice Surya Kant observed a contradiction in
terms of the above extracted paragraphs 72 and 73 of Chloro Controls
(supra). According to Justice Surya Kant, on the one hand, Chloro Controls
(supra) emphasizes on the “intention of the parties”, while on the other hand
it allows joinder of non-signatory parties to arbitration proceedings “without
their prior consent”. Justice Surya Kant is indeed correct in noticing this
inconsistency in the observations in the above two paragraphs. Para 72
underlines mutual intent while para 73 seems to move away from it by
suggesting an absence of prior consent as well. We would like to clarify that
the phrase “without their prior consent” has to be construed as “without prior
formal consent to the arbitration agreement or the underlying contract
containing the arbitration agreement.” Reading the above two paragraphs
harmoniously, it is evident that paragraph 72 emphasizes on determining the
“intention of the parties” to bind a non-signatory party to an arbitration
agreement. In paragraph 73, the Court deals with the tests for joining a non-
signatory party which has not formally consented to the arbitration agreement.
Furthermore, the said paragraph enlist the cumulative factors for deciphering
the mutual intention of the parties to join non-signatory parties to the
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arbitration agreement. In view of the above clarification, we are of the opinion
that so construed there would be no inconsistency between paragraphs 72
and 73 of Chloro Controls (supra).
109. One of the contentions that has been raised before us pertains to the
observations in paragraph 73 of Chloro Controls (supra) that the composite
reference of all the parties should “serve the ends of justice”. It was contended
that the equity jurisdiction doesn’t generally apply to arbitration agreements
because they are in the realm of private law. Since arbitration is a matter of
consent, interests of justice and equity cannot be the sole grounds for
invoking arbitration agreement. The primary test to apply the group of
companies doctrine is by determining the intention of the parties on the basis
of the underlying factual circumstances. The application of the group of
companies doctrine will serve to stymie satellite litigation by non-signatory
members of the corporate group, thereby ensuring the efficacy of the
agreement between the parties. Avoiding multiplicity of proceedings and
fragmentation of disputes is certainly in the interests of justice. However, it
can never be the sole consideration to invoke the group of companies
doctrine.
110. In Discovery Enterprises (supra), this Court refined and clarified the
cumulative factors that the courts and tribunals should consider in deciding
whether a company within a group of companies is bound by the arbitration
agreement:
“40. In deciding whether a company within a group of companies
which is not a signatory to arbitration agreement would nonetheless
be bound by it, the law considers the following factors:
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(i) The mutual intent of the parties;
(ii) The relationship of a non-signatory to a party which is a signatory
to the agreement;
(iii) The commonality of the subject-matter;
(iv) The composite nature of the transactions; and
(v) The performance of the contract.”
111. Since the group of companies doctrine is a consent based theory, its
application depends upon the consideration of a variety of factual elements
to establish the mutual intention of all the parties involved. In other words, the
group of companies doctrine is a means to infer the mutual intentions of both
the signatory and non-signatory parties to be bound by the arbitration
agreement. The relationship between and among the legal entities within the
corporate group structure and the involvement of the parties in the
performance of the underlying contractual obligations are indicators to
determine the mutual intentions of the parties. The other factors such as the
commonality of the subject matter, composite nature of the transactions, and
the performance of the contract ought to be cumulatively considered and
analysed by courts and tribunals to identify the intention of the parties to bind
the non-signatory party to the arbitration agreement. The party seeking
joinder of a non-signatory bears the burden of proof of satisfying the above
factors to the satisfaction of the court or tribunal, as the case may be.
112. Section 7 of the Arbitration Act broadly talks about an agreement by the
parties in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.
Such a legal relationship must give rise to legal obligations and duties. In a
corporate group, a company may have various related companies. The legal
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relationship must be analysed in the context of the underlying contract
containing the arbitration agreement. The nature of the contractual
relationship can either be formally encrusted in the underlying contract, or it
can also be inferred from the conduct of the signatory and non-signatory
parties with respect to such contract. However, we clarify that mere presence
of a commercial relationship between the signatory and non-signatory parties
is not sufficient to infer “legal relationship” between and among the parties. If
this factor is applied solely, any related entity or company may be impleaded
even when it does not have any rights or obligations under the underlying
contract and did not take part in the performance of the contract. The group
of companies doctrine cannot be applied to abrogate party consent and
autonomy. The doctrine, properly conceptualised and applied, gives effect to
mutual intent and autonomy.
113. In Canara Bank (supra), this Court observed that the group of companies
doctrine can also be invoked in cases where a “tight group structure with
strong organisational and financial links, so as to constitute a single economic
unit, or a single economic reality.” In Cox and Kings (supra), Justice Surya
Kant observed that applying this approach has the tendency to overlook the
principle of corporate separateness and dispense with the consent of the
parties. There is weight in the caution expressed by Justice Surya Kant. The
presence of commercial relationships between a party and a non-signatory
cannot be the sole criteria to bind non-signatory parties to the arbitration
agreement. Adopting such an approach would bind all the non-signatories
within a corporate group, even though they are not related to the contractual
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obligations under consideration, to the arbitration agreement. Consequently,
such an approach will lead to the violation of the basic legal tenet of arbitration
– the necessity of consent, either express or implied, to be bound by an
arbitration agreement. Moreover, the imposition of liability on a non-signatory
company within a group for the acts of other members of the group merely on
the basis of the fact that they belong to a “single economic unit” will ride
roughshod over the principle of distinct corporate personality. The objective
of the group of companies doctrine is to identify the mutual intentions of the
parties without disregarding the legal personality of the entities.
114. In Dow Chemicals (supra), it was held that a group of companies constitutes
the same economic reality, which has to be considered by the arbitral tribunal
while deciding on its jurisdiction. According to the tribunal, the presence of the
group of companies is merely an additional factor that the tribunal may
consider to determine the mutual intention of the parties. In Canara Bank
(supra), this Court did not apply the group of companies doctrine solely on
the basis that the companies belonged to a single economic unit. Rather, it
was held that there was an implied or tacit consent by the non-signatory party
(CANFINA) to being impleaded in the arbitral proceedings. The presence of
strong organizational links and financial links between the signatory and non-
signatory parties is only one of the factual elements that the court or tribunal
may consider to determine the legal relationship between the signatory and
non-signatory parties. We accordingly clarify that the principle of “single
economic entity” cannot be used as a sole basis to invoke the group of
companies doctrine.
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115. In case of multiple parties, the necessity of a common subject-matter and
composite transaction is an important factual indicator. An arbitration
agreement arises out of a defined legal relationship between the parties with
respect to a particular subject matter. Commonality of the subject matter
indicates that the conduct of the non-signatory party must be related to the
subject matter of the arbitration agreement. For instance, if the subject matter
of the contract underlying the arbitration agreement pertains to distribution of
healthcare goods, the conduct of the non-signatory party should also be
connected or in pursuance of the contractual duties and obligations, that is,
pertaining to the distribution of healthcare goods. The determination of this
factor is important to demonstrate that the non-signatory party consented to
arbitrate with respect to the particular subject matter.
116. In case of a composite transaction involving multiple agreements, it would be
incumbent for the courts and tribunals to assess whether the agreements are
consequential or in the nature of a follow-up to the principal agreement. This
Court in Canara Bank (supra) observed that a composite transaction refers
to a situation where the transaction is interlinked in nature or where the
performance of the principal agreement may not be feasible without the aid,
execution, and performance of the supplementary or ancillary agreements.
117. The general position of law is that parties will be referred to arbitration under
the principal agreement if there is a situation where there are disputes and
differences “in connection with” the main agreement and also disputes
“connected with” the subject-matter of the principal agreement.97 In Chloro
97 Olympus Superstructures (P) Ltd v. Meena Vijay Khetan, (1999) 5 SCC 651
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Controls (supra), this Court clarified that the principle of “composite
performance” would have to be gathered from the conjoint reading of the
principal and supplementary agreements on the one hand, and the explicit
intention of the parties and attendant circumstances on the other. The
common participation in the commercial project by the signatory and non-
signatory parties for the purposes of achieving a common purpose could be
an indicator of the fact that all the parties intended the non-signatory party to
be bound by the arbitration agreement. Thus, the application of the group of
companies doctrine in case of composite transactions ensures accountability
of all parties who have materially participated in the negotiation and
performance of the transaction and by doing so have evinced a mutual intent
to be bound by the agreement to arbitrate.
118. The participation of the non-signatory in the performance of the underlying
contract is the most important factor to be considered by the courts and
tribunals. The conduct of the non-signatory parties is an indicator of the
intention of the non-signatory to be bound by the arbitration agreement. The
intention of the parties to be bound by an arbitration agreement can be
gauged from the circumstances that surround the participation of the non-
signatory party in the negotiation, performance, and termination of the
underlying contract containing such agreement. The UNIDROIT Principle of
International Commercial Contract, 2016 98 provides that the subjective
intention of the parties could be ascertained by having regard to the following
circumstances:
98 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 2016, Article 4.3
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(a) preliminary negotiations between the parties;
(b) practices which the parties have established between themselves;
(c) the conduct of the parties subsequent to the conclusion of the contract;
(d) the nature and purpose of the contract;
(e) the meaning commonly given to terms and expressions in the trade
concerned; and
(f) usages.
119. In Dow Chemicals (supra), consent of the non-signatory parties to arbitrate
was implied primarily in view of their predominant participation in the
conclusion, performance, and termination of contracts. Similarly, this Court in
Canara Bank (supra) observed that a non-signatory entity may be bound by
an arbitration agreement where a parent or a member of the group of
companies is a signatory to the arbitration agreement and the non-signatory
entity of the group has been engaged in the negotiation or performance of the
commercial contract.
120. In Reckitt Benckiser (supra), this Court was called upon to determine
whether the representation of a purported promoter of a non-signatory entity
would bind it to the said representation. In that case, the applicant entered
into an agreement with an Indian company for the supply of packing materials.
During the stage of negotiation, the applicant circulated a draft of the
agreement by email with the Indian company. This email was reverted by one
Mr. Frederick Reynders, who the applicant claimed was the promoter of a
Belgian sister company of the Indian company. The Belgian company was a
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non-signatory to the agreement. Yet, the applicant sought to implead the
Belgian company on the basis that it had participated during the negotiations
preceding the execution of the agreement. This Court refused to allow the
joinder of the Belgian company to the arbitration agreement on the grounds
that Mr. Reynders was not the promoter of the Belgian company, and was
therefore not acting in that capacity on or behalf of the company and the
applicant failed to discharge its burden to prove that the Belgian company
consented to the arbitration agreement.
121. Evaluating the involvement of the non-signatory party in the negotiation,
performance, or termination of a contract is an important factor for a number
of reasons. First, by being actively involved in the performance of a contract,
a non-signatory may create an appearance that it is a veritable party to the
contract containing the arbitration agreement; second, the conduct of the non-
signatory may be in harmony with the conduct of the other members of the
group, leading the other party to legitimately believe that the non-signatory
was a veritable party to the contract; and third, the other party has legitimate
reasons to rely on the appearance created by the non-signatory party so as
to bind it to the arbitration agreement.
v. Threshold standard
122. In Cox and Kings (supra), Justice Surya Kant observed that Reckitt
Benckiser (supra) fixed a higher threshold of evidence for the application of
the group of companies doctrine as compared to earlier decisions of this
Court. This Court’s approach is Reckitt Benckiser (supra) is indicative of the
fact that the mere presence of a group of companies is not the sole or
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determinative factor to bind a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement.
Rather, the courts or tribunals should closely evaluate the overall conduct and
involvement of the non-signatory party in the performance of the contract.
The nature or standard of involvement of the non-signatory in the
performance of the contract should be such that the non-signatory has
actively assumed obligations or performance upon itself under the contract.
In other words, the test is to determine whether the non-signatory has a
positive, direct, and substantial involvement in the negotiation, performance,
or termination of the contract. Mere incidental involvement in the negotiation
or performance of the contract is not sufficient to infer the consent of the non-
signatory to be bound by the underlying contract or its arbitration agreement.
The burden is on the party seeking joinder of the non-signatory to the
arbitration agreement to prove a conscious and deliberate conduct of
involvement of the non-signatory based on objective evidence.
123. An arbitration agreement is a distinct and separate agreement from the
substantive commercial contract which contains the arbitration agreement. An
arbitration agreement is independent of the other terms of the contract, to the
extent that nullification of the contract will not lead to invalidation of the
arbitration agreement. 99 The concept of separability of the arbitration
agreement from the underlying contract ensures that the intention of the
parties to resolve the disputes through arbitration does not vanish merely
because of a challenge to the legal validity of the underlying contract. 100 To
99 Reliance Industries Ltd v. Union of India, (2014) 7 SCC 603
100 Enercon (India) Ltd v. Enercon Gmbh, (2014) 5 SCC 1
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join a non-signatory to arbitration, the decisive question that has to be
answered is whether a non-signatory consented to the arbitration agreement,
as distinct from the underlying contract containing the arbitration
agreement.101
124. Stavros Brekoulakis argues that the application of legal theories such as
group of companies doctrine rests on an assumption that an arbitration
agreement requires “less consent” or “less evidence of consent” than the
underlying contract containing the arbitration agreement.102 Brekoulakis
further notes that the assumption that implied consent of a non-signatory to
the underlying contract is sufficient to constitute consent to the arbitration
agreement contained in such contract militates against the principle of
separability of contracts. 103
125. The non-signatory’s participation in the negotiation, performance, or
termination of the contract can give rise to the implied consent of it being
bound by the contract. Brekoulakis rightly points out an anomalous situation
where the legal theories such as the group of companies doctrine treat
consent as a functional legal construct without actually determining the main
question – whether the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction over the parties (and
non-signatory parties) to resolve the disputes? 104
126. The involvement of a non-signatory in the negotiation, performance, or
termination of the underlying contract could be an important indicator of the
101 Gary Born (n 44) 1545.
102 Stavros Brekoulakis, ‘Rethinking Consent in International Commercial Arbitration: A General Theory for Non-
signatories’ (2017) 8 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 610, 621.
103 Stavros Brekoulakis, ‘Parties in International Arbitration: Consent v. Commercial Reality’ in Stavros Brekoulakis,
Julian DM Lew, et al (eds) ‘The Evolution and Future of International Arbitration’ (2016) 119, 148.
104 Ibid, at 121.
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fact that such non-signatory accepted to be bound by the contract. However,
transposition of such consent to an arbitration agreement is a legal fiction to
accommodate commercial reality. The contemporary commercial reality
suggests that different companies within a group often become involved in
different stages of execution and performance of a contractual transaction.
For instance, a non-signatory may merely participate in the performance of a
contract to carry out a specific task or assist the parent company. Such
incidental involvement in the contractual performance is insufficient to
constitute consent to the underlying contract, let alone the arbitration
agreement. Rather, it has been suggested that it should also be considered
whether the commercial dispute sufficiently implicates the non-signatory party
for the arbitral tribunal to exercise its jurisdiction. 105 The emphasis on the
scope of the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal with respect to the subject
matter of the dispute between the signatory parties would ensure effective
arbitration and prevent unnecessary fragmentation of disputes. It also
adequately accounts for the lack of formal consent on behalf of the non-
signatory to the arbitration agreement (and the ensuing procedural aspects
such as the constitution of arbitral tribunal) by considering facts and
circumstances, such as close relationship and composite transactions, which
indicates that there was a mutual understanding or convergence among all
the parties to treat non-signatory as parties to the arbitration agreement. 106
105 Brekoulakis (n 102) 629.
106 Karim Youssef, ‘The Limits of Consent: The Right or Obligation to Arbitrate of Non-Signatories in Group of
Companies’ in Multiparty Arbitration: Dossiers of the ICC Institute of Worlds Business Law, Volume 7 (2010) 71,
79.
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127. We are of the opinion that there is a need to seek a balance between the
consensual nature of arbitration and the modern commercial reality where a
non-signatory becomes implicated in a commercial transaction in a number
of different ways. Such a balance can be adequately achieved if the factors
laid down under Discovery Enterprises (supra) are applied holistically. For
instance, the involvement of the non-signatory in the performance of the
underlying contract in a manner that suggests that it intended to be bound by
the contract containing the arbitration agreement is an important aspect.
Other factors such as the composite nature of transaction and commonality
of subject matter would suggest that the claims against the non-signatory
were strongly inter-linked with the subject matter of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
Looking at the factors holistically, it could be inferred that the non-signatories,
by virtue of their relationship with the signatory parties and active involvement
in the performance of commercial obligations which are intricately linked to
the subject matter, are not actually strangers to the dispute between the
signatory parties.
128. We hold that all the cumulative factors laid down in Discovery Enterprises
(supra) must be considered while determining the applicability of the group of
companies doctrine. However, the application of the above factors has to be
fact-specific, and this Court cannot tie the hands of the courts or tribunals by
laying down how much weightage they ought to give to the above factors.
This approach ensures that a dogmatic emphasis on express consent is
eschewed in favour of a modern approach to consent which focuses on the
factual analysis, complexity of commercial projects, and thereby increases
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the relevance of arbitration in multi-party disputes. Moreover, it is also keeping
in line with the objectives of the Arbitration Act which aims to make the Indian
arbitration law more responsive to the contemporary requirements.
F. The group of companies doctrine has independent existence
129. In Cox and Kings (supra), Chief Justice Ramana observed that Chloro
Controls (supra), and the series of subsequent decisions, have not
appropriately dealt with the scope and ambit of the phrase “claiming through
or under” as appearing under Sections 8 and 45 of the Arbitration Act.
Connectedly, one of the issues that arises for the consideration of this Court
is whether the phrase “claiming through or under” could be interpreted to
include the group of companies doctrine.
130. The Arbitration Act does not define the phrase “person claiming through or
under” a party. A person “claiming through or under” a party is not a signatory
to the contract or agreement, but can assert a right through or under the
signatory party. Russel on Arbitration states that an assignee can invoke the
arbitration agreement as a person “claiming through or under” a party to the
arbitration agreement. 107 An assignee takes the assigned right under a
contract with both the benefit and burden of the arbitration clause.108 Similarly,
the English courts have held that a transferee or subrogate can claim through
or under a party to the arbitration agreement. 109 Under the English law, the
typical scenarios where a person or entity can claim through or under a party
107 Russel on Arbitration (23rd edn, 2007) 99 para 3-018.
108 Schiffahrts–gesellschaft Detlev von Appen v Voest Alpine Intertrading, [1997] EWCA Civ 1420.
109 Through Transport Mutual Insurance Association (Eurasia) Ltd v. New India Assurance Co Ltd, [2005]
EWHC 455 (Comm); West Tankers Inc. v. Allianz Spa, [2012] EWCA Civ 27.
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are assignment, subrogation, and novation. In these situations, the assignees
or representatives become successors to the signatory party’s interests under
the arbitration agreement. They step into the shoes of the signatory party,
from whom they derive the right to arbitrate, rather than claiming an
independent right under the arbitration agreement.
131. The scope of an arbitration agreement under the English law is limited to the
parties who entered into it and those claiming through or under them.110 In
Roussel-Uclaf (supra), it was held that a subsidiary company can invoke the
arbitration agreement on the basis that it is “claiming through or under” the
parent company because of the close relationship between the two
companies. However, Roussel-Uclaf (supra) was expressly overruled by the
Court of Appeal in Sancheti (supra) on the ground that a mere legal or
commercial connection is not sufficient for a person to claim through or under
a party to an arbitration agreement.
132. The scope of the phrase “claiming through or under” has been evaluated by
other common law jurisdictions. In Tanning Research Laboratories Inc v.
O’Brien, 111 the issue before the High Court of Australia was whether a
liquidator could be regarded as a person “claiming through or under” a party
to an arbitration agreement. The High Court construed the words “through” or
“under” to hold that the liquidator had a derivative interest through the
company. The relevant observation is extracted below:
“[T]he prepositions “through” or “under” convey the notion of a
derivative cause of action or ground of defence, that is to say, a
cause of action or ground of defence derived from the party. In other
110 Section 82(2) of the English Arbitration Act, 1996
111 [1990] HCA 8
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words, an essential element of the cause of action or defence must
be or must have been vested in or exercisable by the party before
the person claiming through or under the party can rely on the cause
of action or ground of defence. A liquidator may be a person claiming
through or under a company because the causes of action or
grounds of defence on which he relies are vested in or exercisable
by the company; a trustee in bankruptcy may be such a person
because the causes of action or grounds of defence on which he
relies were vested in or exercisable by the bankrupt.”
The test of derivative action conveys that a third party’s cause of action is
derived from the original party to the arbitration agreement. The third party
cannot be saddled with new duties and liabilities to which it has not
consented. They can only be held liable or entitled to the extent they derive
their rights or entitlements from the original party to the agreement.
133. The above formulation was further clarified by the Australian High Court in
Rinehart v. Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd 112, where it observed that the
ultimate test in Tanning Research (supra) was whether an essential element
of the defence was or is vested in or exercisable by the party to the arbitration
agreement. In Rinehart (supra), the Court was dealing with a situation where
a signatory party had assigned mining tenements in breach of trust. It was
held that assignees stand in the same position vis-Ã -vis the claimant as the
assignor since the “assignee [took] its stand upon a ground which [was]
available to the assignor.” The Court concluded that the assignees were
persons claiming through or under the signatory parties on the basis that the
parties to the arbitration agreement had agreed that any dispute as to the
beneficial title to the mining tenements would be determined by arbitration.
Since the third parties accepted the benefits of the agreement, it was held
112 [2019] HCA 13
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that they must also accept the burdens of its stipulated conditions, including
arbitration.
134. In Rinehart (supra), the Australian High Court’s approach is similar to the
doctrine of equitable estoppel developed by the US Courts, to the effect that
a non-signatory party who elects to take the benefit of some aspects of the
contract, must also accept the burden of it. 113 However, we cannot adopt the
Rinehart (supra) position in the context of the phrase “claiming through or
under” as doing so would be contrary to the common law position and the
legislative intent underpinning the Arbitration Act, as will be discussed below.
135. An analysis of the cases cited above establishes the following propositions of
law: first, the typical scenarios where a person or entity can claim through or
under a party are assignment, subrogation, and novation; second, a person
“claiming through or under” can assert a right in a derivative capacity, that is
through the party to the arbitration agreement, to participate in the agreement;
third, the persons claiming through or under do not possess an independent
right to stand as parties to an arbitration agreement, but as successors to the
signatory parties’ interest; and fourth, mere legal or commercial connection is
not sufficient for a non-signatory to claim through or under a signatory party.
i. Party and Persons “claiming through or under” are different
136. The 246th Law Commission suggested that the definition of “party” under
section 2(1)(h) of the Arbitration Act be amended to include the words “or any
persons claiming through or under such party”. The Commission reasoned
113 Vicky Priskich, ‘Binding non-signatories to arbitration agreements – who are person ‘claiming through or under’
a party?’ (2019) 35(3) Arbitration International 375-386.
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that in appropriate contexts, a party also include persons “claiming through or
under” a signatory party such as successors-in-interest. However, the
suggested amendment was not carried out by Parliament.
137. The word “claim” is of very extensive significance embracing every species of
legal demand. In the ordinary sense, it means to demand as one’s own or as
one’s right. 114 A “claim” also means assertion of a cause of action. 115 The
expression “through” connotes “by means of, in consequence of, by reason
of.” 116 The term “under” is used with reference to an inferior or subordinate
position. P Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Lexicon defines “claiming under” or
“claiming under him” to denote a person putting forward a claim under derived
rights. 117 When the above definitions are read harmoniously, it gives rise to
an inference that a person “claiming through or under” is asserting their legal
demand or cause of action in an intermediate or derivative capacity. We can
also conclude that a person “claiming through or under” has inferior or
subordinate rights in comparison to the party from which it is deriving its claim
or right. Therefore, a person “claiming through or under” cannot be a “party”
to an arbitration agreement on its own terms because it only stands in the
shoes of the original signatory party.
138. An arbitration is founded upon the consent of the parties to refer their disputes
to an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. Consequently, third parties
typically cannot be compelled to arbitrate based on an agreement to which
114 Black’s Law Dictionary (5th edn, 1979) 224
115 P Ramanatha Aiyar’s, The Law Lexicon (1997) 330
116 Black’s Law Dictionary (5th edn, 1979) 1328
117 P Ramanatha Aiyar’s, The Law Lexicon (1997) 331
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they have not consented. The phrase “claiming through or under” has not
been used either in Section 2(1)(h) or Section 7 of the Arbitration Act. This is
because those provisions are based on the concept of party autonomy and
party independence, which requires the party to provide consent to submit
their disputes to arbitration. On the contrary, a person claiming through or
under a party to an arbitration agreement is merely standing in the shoes of
the original party to the extent that it is merely agitating the right of the original
party to the arbitration agreement.
139. The phrase “claiming through or under” has been used in Sections 8, 35, and
45 in their specific contexts. Section 8 contains a mandate that when an action
is brought before a judicial authority which is the subject of an arbitration
agreement, the dispute shall be referred to arbitration on an application made
by a party or any person claiming through or under him. As mentioned above,
the phrase “claiming through or under” was inserted in Section 8 to bring it in
line with Section 45. Sections 8 and 45 are peremptory in nature mandating
the court to refer the parties to arbitration if there is a valid arbitration
agreement.118 In A Ayyasamy (supra), it was held that Section 8 imposes an
affirmative obligation on every judicial authority to “hold down parties to the
terms of the agreement entered into between them to refer disputes to
arbitration.” 119 Thus, the legislative intent behind Sections 8 and 45 is to
ensure that parties fulfil their mutual intention of settling disputes arising
between or among them by way of arbitration.
118 Agri Gold Exims Ltd v. Sri Lakshmi Knits & Wovens, (2007) 3 SCC 686
119 (2016) 10 SCC 386
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140. Section 35 of the Arbitration Act provides that an arbitral award shall be final
and binding on the parties and persons claiming under them respectively. In
Cheran Properties (supra), this Court rightly observed that the expression
“persons claiming under them” is “a legislative recognition of the doctrine that
besides the parties, an arbitral award binds every person whose capacity or
position is derived from and is the same as a party to the proceedings.” It was
further observed that “[h]aving derived its capacity from a party and being in
the same position as a party to the proceedings binds a person who claims
under it.” Similarly, Section 73 also provides that a settlement agreement
signed by the parties shall be final and binding “on the parties and persons
claiming under them respectively.”
141. Sections 8, 35, and 45 use the phrase “parties or any person claiming through
or under”. The word “or” is used in Section 8 and 45 as a disjunctive particle
to express an alternative or give a choice between “parties” or “any person
claiming through or under”. Consequently, either the party to an arbitration
agreement or any person claiming through or under the party can make an
application to the judicial authority to refer the dispute to arbitration. It is in the
interest of respecting the intention of the parties and promoting commercial
efficacy, that the above provisions allow either the party or any person
“claiming through or under him” to refer the disputes to arbitration.
142. On the other hand, Sections 35 and 73 use the phrase “parties and persons
claiming under them”. The use of the word “and” in Sections 35 and 73
conveys the idea that “parties” is to be added or taken together with the
subsequent phrase “any person claiming through or under.” The above
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provisions provide that an arbitration award binds not only the parties but also
all such persons who derive their capacity from the party to the arbitration
agreement. Again, the foundational basis for this provision is commercial
efficacy as it ensures that an arbitral award leads to finality, such that both the
parties and all persons claiming through or under them do not reagitate the
claims. Moreover, the use of the word “and” in Sections 35 and 73 leads to an
unmistakable conclusion that under the Arbitration Act, the concept of a
“party” is distinct and different from the concept of “persons claiming through
or under” a party to the arbitration agreement.
ii. The approach adopted by this Court in Chloro Controls is Incorrect
143. This Court in Chloro Controls (supra) observed: first, that the use of the
expression “any person” reflects the legislative intent of enlarging the scope
of the words beyond the “parties” who are signatory to the arbitration
agreement; second, a signatory party to an arbitration agreement may have
a legal relationship with the party claiming through or under the party on the
basis of the group of companies doctrine; and third, in case of a multi-party
contract, a subsidiary company which “derives” its basic interest from the
parent contract would be covered under the expression “claiming though or
under.”
144. The first proposition of law relies on the construction of the expression “any
person” to conclude that the language of Section 45 has wider import.
However, the expression “any person” cannot be singled out and construed
devoid of its context. The context, in terms of Section 8 and 45, is provided
by the subsequent phrase – “claiming through or under”. Therefore, such “any
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persons” are acting only in a derivative capacity. Since an arbitration
agreement excludes the jurisdiction of national courts, it is essential that the
parties consent, either expressly or impliedly, to submit their dispute to the
arbitral tribunal.
145. The second and third proposition of law states that a non-signatory party may
claim through or under a signatory party by virtue of its legal or commercial
relationship with the latter. However, this proposition is contrary to the
common law position as evidenced in Sancheti (supra) and Tanning
Research Laboratories (supra) according to which a mere legal or
commercial connection is not sufficient to allow a non-signatory to claim
through or under a party to the arbitration agreement. In A Ayyasamy (supra),
this Court observed that the Arbitration Act should be interpreted “so as to
bring in line the principles underlying its interpretation in a manner that is
consistent with prevailing approaches in the common law world.” Therefore,
even though a subsidiary derives interests or benefits from a contract entered
into by the company within a group, they would not be covered under the
expression “claiming through or under” merely on the basis that it shares a
legal or commercial relationship with the parties.
146. One of the questions that has been referred before us is whether the phrase
“claiming through or under” in Section 8 could be interpreted to include the
group of companies doctrine. The group of companies doctrine is founded on
the mutual intention of the parties to determine if the non-signatory entity
within a group could be made a party to the arbitration agreement in its own
right. Such non-signatory entity is not “claiming through or under” a signatory
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party. As mentioned above, the phrase “claiming through or under” is used in
the context of successors in interest that act in a derivative capacity and
substitute the signatory party to the arbitration agreement. To the contrary, the
group of companies doctrine is used to bind the non-signatory to the
arbitration agreement so that it can agitate the benefits and be subject to the
burdens that it derived or is conferred in the course of the performance of the
contract. The doctrine can be used to bind a non-signatory party to the
arbitration agreement regardless of the phrase “claiming through or under” as
appearing in Sections 8 and 45 of the Arbitration Act.
147. In Chloro Controls (supra), this Court joined the non-signatory entities as
parties to the arbitration agreement in their own rights on the basis that they
were signatories to ancillary agreements which were closely interlinked with
the performance of the principal agreement containing the arbitration
agreement. This Court in Chloro Controls (supra) reasoned that the non-
signatory entities, being part of the same corporate group as the signatory
parties, were subsidiaries in interest or subsidiary companies, and therefore
were “claiming through or under” the signatory parties. As held above, the
phrase “claiming through or under” only applies to entities acting in a
derivative capacity and not with respect to joinder of parties in their own right.
Therefore, we hold that the approach of this Court in Chloro Controls (supra)
to the extent that it traced the group of companies doctrine to the phrase
“claiming through or under” is erroneous and against the well-established
principles of contract and commercial law. As observed above, the existence
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of the group of companies doctrine is intrinsically found on the principle of the
mutual intent of parties to a commercial bargain.
148. Chief Justice N. V. Ramana also sought our consideration on the question of
whether the “group of companies doctrine” as expounded by Chloro
Controls (supra) and subsequent judgments is valid in law. The group of
companies doctrine has important utility in determining the mutual intention
of the parties in the context of complex transactions involving multiple parties
and multiple agreements. Moreover, the doctrine has been substantively
entrenched in the Indian arbitration jurisprudence. We are aware of the fact
that the group of companies doctrine has not found favor in some other
jurisdictions, including in English law. However, we deem it appropriate to
retain the doctrine which has held the field in Indian jurisprudence though by
firmly establishing it within the realm of the mutual consent or the mutual intent
of the parties to a commercial bargain. This will ensure on the one hand that
Indian arbitration law retains a sense of dynamism so as to respond to
contemporary challenges. At the same time, structuring the doctrine in the
manner suggested so as to ground it in settled principles governing the
elucidation of mutual intent is necessary. This will ensure that the doctrine has
a jurisprudential foundation in party autonomy and consent to arbitrate.
149. Although the issue before us largely concerns the application of the group of
companies doctrine in the Indian context, this Court cannot be oblivious to the
changing currents in the international arbitration jurisprudence. In deciding
the contours of the group of companies doctrine, we have reiterated the
general legal proposition that non-signatory persons or entities can also be
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bound by an arbitration agreement. The basis for such joinder stems from the
harmonious reading of Section 2(1)(h) along with Section 7 of the Arbitration
Act. Since the scope of this judgment was limited to the group of companies
doctrine, any authoritative determination given by this Court in the course of
this judgment should not be interpreted to exclude the application of other
doctrines and principles for binding non-signatories to arbitration agreements.
However, we also need to be mindful of the fact that the Indian courts and
tribunals should not adopt an overzealous approach to extending the
jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals to non-signatory parties merely on the ground
that they are part of a corporate group.
150. In Cheran Properties (supra), this Court found the non-signatory to be
“claiming through or under” the signatory party to the arbitration agreement
and not as a “party” to the arbitration agreement. In that case, this Court was
dealing with an issue pertaining to enforcement of an arbitral award. On the
available facts and circumstances, the Court held that the non-signatory was
a nominee of the signatory party under the underlying commercial contract,
and therefore was acting in a derivative capacity. In Canara Bank (supra) this
Court indirectly adopted the principle of estoppel to bind the non-signatory on
the basis that it had already participated in the judicial proceedings before the
High Court, and cannot subsequently deny being a party to the proceedings
before the arbitral tribunal. In Discovery Enterprises (supra), this Court
remanded the matter back to the arbitral tribunal to decide afresh the
application for discovery and inspection by applying the group of companies
doctrine. Therefore, we can conclude that the observations pertaining to the
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group of companies doctrine were rendered in the facts and circumstances of
each case. We have harmonized the divergent strands of law emanating from
these judgments in the preceding paragraphs.
151. In Law’s Empire, Ronald Dworkin proposed a hypothetical where a group of
novelists write a novel seriatim, each novelist interpreting the chapters given
to them to write a new chapter. 120 The novelists are expected to “take their
responsibilities of continuity more seriously” to create “a single unified novel
that is the best it can be.” 121 Chloro Controls (supra) was the first chapter in
the group of companies doctrine in Indian arbitration jurisprudence. The
series of subsequent judgments starting from Cheran Properties (supra) and
ending with Cox and Kings (supra) were the incremental chapters – each
adding further dimensions to the theory already propounded in the previous
chapters. In this case, we have added another chapter to the theory of group
of companies doctrine. Our aim was to make further progress in the course
of evolution of arbitration law. In the process, we have tweaked the plotline to
make the novel a more coherent read, instead of rewriting or discarding the
previous chapters.
iii. Power of the Courts to issue directions under Section 9
152. In Cox and Kings (supra), Chief Justice Ramana observed that establishing
the group of companies doctrine in the phrase “claiming through or under”
creates an anomalous situation where a party “claiming through or under”
could be referred to an arbitration agreement, but would not have a right to
120 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Belknap Press, Harvard University Press 1986) 229.
121 Ibid.
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seek relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act. Section 9 allows a “party” to
approach the court to seek interim measures such as appointment of a
guardian for a minor or person of unsound mind, custody or sale of any goods
which are the subject matter of the arbitration agreement, and appointment of
receiver.
153. The group of companies doctrine is based on determining the mutual intention
to join the non-signatory as a “veritable” party to the arbitration agreement.
Once a tribunal comes to the determination that a non-signatory is a party to
the arbitration agreement, such non-signatory party can apply for interim
measures under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act. Establishing the legal basis
for the application of the group of companies doctrine in the definition of
“party” under Section 2(1)(h) read with Section 7 of the Arbitration Act
resolves the anomality pointed out by Chief Justice Ramana.
G. The standard of determination at the referral stage – Sections 8 and 11
154. The last but not the least issue that arises for our consideration pertains to
the stage of applicability of the group of companies doctrine under the
Arbitration Act. In Cox and Kings (supra), Chief Justice Ramana observed
that there is a need to have a relook at the scope of judicial reference at the
stage of Sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration Act considering the ambit of the
unamended Section 2(1)(h). Section 5 of the Arbitration Act provides that “no
judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part.” The
context for “so provided” is contained in Sections 8 and 11 which mandate the
courts to refer the parties to arbitration. Under Section 8, the court has to
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“prima facie” ascertain the existence of a valid arbitration agreement before
referring the parties to arbitration. Section 11 empowers the Supreme Court
and High Courts to appoint arbitrators on the failure of the parties to comply
with the agreed arbitration procedure. Section 11 could be invoked in situation
where a dispute has arisen and one of the parties to the arbitration agreement
unsuccessfully invoked the agreed procedure for the appointment of an
arbitrator due to the non-cooperation of the other party.
155. In SBP & Co v. Patel Engineering Ltd,122 a seven-Judge Bench of this Court
was called upon to determine the scope of the powers of the Chief Justice or
their designate under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. It was held that the
Chief Justice or the designated judge will have the powers to determine the
jurisdiction to entertain the request, the existence of a valid arbitration
agreement, the existence of a live claim, the existence of the condition for the
exercise of their powers, and the qualifications of the arbitrators. Furthermore,
it was held that the Chief Justice has to decide whether there is an arbitration
agreement as defined under the Arbitration Act and whether the person who
has made a request is party to such an agreement.
156. In 2015, the Arbitration Act was amended to insert Section 11(6-A). The said
provision reads as follows:
“(6A) The Supreme Court, or as the case may be, the High Court,
while considering any application under sub-section (4) or sub-
section (5) or (sub-section (6), shall, notwithstanding any judgment,
decree, or order of any Court, confine to the examination of the
existence of an arbitration agreement.”
122 (2005) 8 SCC 618
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By virtue of non-obstante clause, Section 11(6A) has set out a new position,
which takes away the basis of the position laid down in Patel Engineering
(supra). In 2019, the Parliament passed the Arbitration and Conciliation
(Amendment) Act, 2019 omitting Section 11(6-A). However, the amendment
to Section 11(6-A) is yet to be notified. Till such time, Section 11 as amended
in 2015 will continue to remain in force.
157. When deciding the referral issue, the scope of reference under both Sections
8 and 11 is limited. Where Section 8 requires the referral court to look into the
prima facie existence of a valid arbitration agreement, Section 11 confines
the court’s jurisdiction to the existence of the examination of an arbitration
agreement.
158. Section 16 of the Arbitration Act enshrines the principle of competence-
competence in Indian arbitration law. The provision empowers the arbitral
tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction, including any ruling on any objections
with respect to the existence or validity of arbitration agreement. Section 16
is an inclusive provision which comprehends all preliminary issues touching
upon the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. 123 The doctrine of competence-
competence is intended to minimize judicial intervention at the threshold
stage. The issue of determining parties to an arbitration agreement goes to
the very root of the jurisdictional competence of the arbitral tribunal.
159. In Vidya Drolia (supra), Justice N. V. Ramana (as the learned Chief Justice
then was) held that the amendment to Section 8 rectified the shortcomings
123 Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Ltd. v. Northern Coal Field, (2020) 2 SCC 455
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pointed out in Chloro Controls (supra) with respect to domestic arbitration.
He further observed that the issue of determination of parties to an arbitration
agreement is a complicated exercise, and should best be left to the arbitral
tribunals:
“239. […] Jurisdictional issues concerning whether certain parties
are bound by a particular arbitration, under group-company doctrine
or good faith, etc. in a multi-party arbitration raises complicated
factual questions, which are best left for the tribunal to handle. The
amendment to Section 8 on this front also indicates the legislative
intention to further reduce the judicial interference at the stage of
reference.”
160. In Pravin Electricals Pvt Ltd v. Galaxy Infra and Engineering Pvt Ltd,124 a
Bench of three Judges of this Court was called upon to decide an appeal
arising out of a petition filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act for
appointment of sole arbitrator. The issue before the Court was the
determination of existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of the
documentary evidence produced by the parties. This Court prima facie opined
that there was no conclusive evidence to infer the existence of a valid
arbitration agreement between the parties. Therefore, the issue of existence
of a valid arbitration agreement was referred to be decided by the arbitral
tribunal after conducting a detailed examination of documentary evidence and
cross-examination of witnesses.
161. The above position of law leads us to the inevitable conclusion that at the
referral stage, the court only has to determine the prima facie existence of an
arbitration agreement. If the referral court cannot decide the issue, it should
leave it to be decided by the arbitration tribunal. The referral court should not
124 (2021) 5 SCC 671
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unnecessarily interfere with arbitration proceedings, and rather allow the
arbitral tribunal to exercise its primary jurisdiction. In Shin-Etsu Chemical
Co Ltd v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd,125 this Court observed that there are distinct
advantages to leaving the final determination on matters pertaining to the
validity of an arbitration agreement to the tribunal:
74. […] Even if the Court takes the view that the arbitral agreement
is not vitiated or that it is not valid, inoperative or unenforceable,
based upon purely a prima facie view, nothing prevents the arbitrator
from trying the issue fully rendering a final decision thereupon. If the
arbitrator finds the agreement valid, there is no problem as the
arbitration will proceed and the award will be made. However, if the
arbitrator finds the agreement invalid, inoperative or void, this
means that the party who wanted to proceed for arbitration was
given an opportunity of proceedings to arbitration, and the arbitrator
after fully trying the issue has found that there is no scope for
arbitration.”
162. In Chloro Controls (supra), this Court held that it is the legislative intent of
Section 45 of the Arbitration Act to give a finding on whether an arbitration
agreement is “null and void, inoperative and incapable of being performed”
before referring the parties to arbitration. In 2019, the expression “unless it
prima facie finds” was inserted in Section 45. In view of the legislative
amendment, the basis of the above holding of Chloro Controls (supra) has
been expressly taken away. The present position of law is that the referral
court only needs to give a prima facie finding on the validity or existence of
an arbitration agreement.
163. In Deutsche Post Bank Home Finance Ltd v. Taduri Sridhar, 126 a two-
Judge Bench of this Court held that when a third party is impleaded in a
petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act, the referral court should
125 (2005) 7 SCC 234
126 (2011) 11 SCC 375
102
PART G
delete or exclude such third party from the array of parties before referring
the matter to the tribunal. This observation was made prior to the decision of
this Court in Chloro Controls (supra) and is no longer relevant in light of the
current position of law. Thus, when a non-signatory person or entity is arrayed
as a party at Section 8 or Section 11 stage, the referral court should prima
facie determine the validity or existence of the arbitration agreement, as the
case may be, and leave it for the arbitral tribunal to decide whether the non-
signatory is bound by the arbitration agreement.
164. In case of joinder of non-signatory parties to an arbitration agreement, the
following two scenarios will prominently emerge: first, where a signatory party
to an arbitration agreement seeks joinder of a non-signatory party to the
arbitration agreement; and second, where a non-signatory party itself seeks
invocation of an arbitration agreement. In both the scenarios, the referral court
will be required to prima facie rule on the existence of the arbitration
agreement and whether the non-signatory is a veritable party to the arbitration
agreement. In view of the complexity of such a determination, the referral
court should leave it for the arbitral tribunal to decide whether the non-
signatory party is indeed a party to the arbitration agreement on the basis of
the factual evidence and application of legal doctrine. The tribunal can delve
into the factual, circumstantial, and legal aspects of the matter to decide
whether its jurisdiction extends to the non-signatory party. In the process, the
tribunal should comply with the requirements of principles of natural justice
such as giving opportunity to the non-signatory to raise objections with regard
to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. This interpretation also gives
103
PART H
true effect to the doctrine of competence-competence by leaving the issue of
determination of true parties to an arbitration agreement to be decided by
arbitral tribunal under Section 16.
H. Conclusions
165. In view of the discussion above, we arrive at the following conclusions:
a. The definition of “parties” under Section 2(1)(h) read with Section 7 of the
Arbitration Act includes both the signatory as well as non-signatory parties;
b. Conduct of the non-signatory parties could be an indicator of their consent
to be bound by the arbitration agreement;
c. The requirement of a written arbitration agreement under Section 7 does
not exclude the possibility of binding non-signatory parties;
d. Under the Arbitration Act, the concept of a “party” is distinct and different
from the concept of “persons claiming through or under” a party to the
arbitration agreement;
e. The underlying basis for the application of the group of companies doctrine
rests on maintaining the corporate separateness of the group companies
while determining the common intention of the parties to bind the non-
signatory party to the arbitration agreement;
f. The principle of alter ego or piercing the corporate veil cannot be the basis
for the application of the group of companies doctrine;
104
PART H
g. The group of companies doctrine has an independent existence as a
principle of law which stems from a harmonious reading of Section 2(1)(h)
along with Section 7 of the Arbitration Act;
h. To apply the group of companies doctrine, the courts or tribunals, as the
case may be, have to consider all the cumulative factors laid down in
Discovery Enterprises (supra). Resultantly, the principle of single
economic unit cannot be the sole basis for invoking the group of
companies doctrine;
i. The persons “claiming through or under” can only assert a right in a
derivative capacity;
j. The approach of this Court in Chloro Controls (supra) to the extent that
it traced the group of companies doctrine to the phrase “claiming through
or under” is erroneous and against the well-established principles of
contract law and corporate law;
k. The group of companies doctrine should be retained in the Indian
arbitration jurisprudence considering its utility in determining the intention
of the parties in the context of complex transactions involving multiple
parties and multiple agreements;
l. At the referral stage, the referral court should leave it for the arbitral
tribunal to decide whether the non-signatory is bound by the arbitration
agreement; and
m. In the course of this judgment, any authoritative determination given by
this Court pertaining to the group of companies doctrine should not be
105
PART H
interpreted to exclude the application of other doctrines and principles for
binding non-signatories to the arbitration agreement.
166. We answer the questions of law referred to this Constitution Bench in the
above terms. The Registry shall place the matters before the Regular Bench
for disposal after obtaining the directions of the Chief Justice of India on the
administrative side.
…….……………………………………CJI
[Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]
.…….………………………………………J
[Hrishikesh Roy]
.…….………………………………………J
[J B Pardiwala]
..……………………………………………J
[Manoj Misra]
New Delhi;
December 06, 2023
106
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Arbitration Petition (Civil) No. 38 of 2020
Cox and Kings Ltd. …Petitioner (s)
Versus
SAP India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. …Respondent (s)
With
SLP (C) No. 8607 of 2022
SLP (C) No. 5833 of 2022
JUDGMENT
Index A. Introduction .......................................................................... 1 B. Civil Remedy and Arbitration ................................................. 4 i. Arbitration Agreement is a Contract .................................... 6 ii. Section 7(4)(b) ..................................................................... 9 C. Group of Companies Doctrine ............................................. 17 i. International Perspectives ................................................. 17 ii. Indian Precedents on the Group of Companies Doctrine ... 27 D. Group of Companies Doctrine in the Context of Section 7 ... 39 E. Conclusion .......................................................................... 43 PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.
A. Introduction
1. The reference to this Constitution Bench is for an authoritative determination of the applicability of the ‘Group of Companies doctrine’ to proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,1 and if found to be applicable and statutorily anchored, to delineate its precise contours.
2. In the reference order, Chief Justice N.V. Ramana highlighted the variations in the exposition and application of the doctrine as it has evolved in India. He questioned the statutory source of the doctrine in the phrase “claiming through or under”, which appears in Sections 8 and 45 of the Act. He also cautioned that maintaining the separate legal identities of members within the same group of companies is a fundamental principle of corporate and contract law. In this light, the specific questions formulated and referred to this Constitution Bench by Chief Justice N.V. Ramana,2 are as follows:
“(a) Whether phrase “claiming through or under” in Sections 8 and 113 could be interpreted to include “Group of Companies” doctrine?
1 Hereinafter referred to as the Act.
2 For himself and for Justice A.S. Bopanna.
3 The phrase “claiming through or under” does not appear in Section 11. Rather, the reference to Section 11 must be read as Section 45 that contains this phrase.
(b) Whether the “Group of Companies” doctrine as expounded by Chloro Controls case4 and subsequent judgments are valid in law?”5
3. Justice Surya Kant concurred with Chief Justice Ramana and supplemented his reasons for reference. At the outset, he emphasised the need to retain the doctrine in India to keep pace with the complexity of multi-party business transactions, where certain persons do not formally sign the contract but are involved in its negotiation and performance. Especially in India, with large number of family-run business groups, he expressed that the inclusion of the non-signatory company is essential for effective and complete dispute resolution through arbitration. However, he also indicated the need to iron out inconsistencies in the formulation of the doctrine. He questioned the reliance on equity considerations and ‘single economic reality’ to determine non-signatories to be parties, as these undermine well-entrenched principles of party autonomy and separate legal entity. In this light, for an authoritative determination of the contours of the doctrine, he framed the following questions:
“(a) Whether the Group of Companies doctrine should be read into Section 8 of the Act or whether it can exist in
4 Chloro Controls India (P) Ltd. v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc., (2013) 1 SCC 641 [2012 INSC 436].
5 Cox and Kings Ltd v. SAP India Pvt Ltd, (2022) 8 SCC 1, para 54 [2022 INSC 523]. Indian jurisprudence independent of any statutory provision?
(b) Whether the Group of Companies doctrine should continue to be invoked on the basis of the principle of “single economic reality”?
(c) Whether the Group of Companies doctrine should be construed as a means of interpreting the implied consent or intent to arbitrate between the parties?
(d) Whether the principles of alter ego and/or piercing the corporate veil can alone justify pressing the Group of Companies doctrine into operation even in the absence of implied consent?”6
4. I have had the advantage of going through the erudite and comprehensive opinion of the learned Chief Justice. While I agree with his reasoning and conclusions, I consider it necessary to supplement them with my own reasoning on some important aspects. The broad question before us relates to the ‘parties’ to an ‘arbitration agreement’. This question must take us to Section 7 of the Act that defines an ‘arbitration agreement’ as under:
“7. Arbitration agreement.—(1) In this Part, “arbitration agreement” means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. (2) An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement.
(3) An arbitration agreement shall be in writing. (4) An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in—
(a) a document signed by the parties;
6 ibid, para 104.
(b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication including communication through electronic means which provide a record of the agreement; or
(c) an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of the agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other.
(5) The reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement if the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that arbitration clause part of the contract.”
5. It is evident from the above-referred statutory prescription that an ‘arbitration agreement’ is described in sub-section (1) of Section 7 as, “an agreement by the parties”. Both these expressions, ‘agreement’ and ‘parties’ are important for our consideration. For a proper understanding of these expressions, it is necessary to examine the place of arbitration as a dispute redressal mechanism in the larger body of institutional remedies in civil law.
B. Civil Remedy and Arbitration
6. In our legal system, access to civil courts is a standard judicial remedy. Civil courts have the jurisdiction to try all civil suits,7 and any agreement to restrict the remedy is declared void 7 Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 reads:
“9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred. —The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Explanation I.—A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies.
under Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.8 However, exceptions to Section 28 save a “contract to refer to arbitration” any dispute that has arisen or may arise between two or more persons.9 Thus, a restriction on accessing civil remedy is saved under Section 28 of the Contract Act, if there is a contract to arbitrate.
7. A ‘contract’ is defined under the Contract Act as an agreement enforceable by law.10 Agreement11 is formed when a promise or mutual promises (defined in Section 2(b))12 are Explanation II. —For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place.” 8 Hereinafter the ‘Contract Act’. The relevant portion of Section 28, Indian Contract Act, 1872 reads:
“28. Agreements in restraint of legal proceedings, void. —Every agreement, —
(a) by which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals, or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his rights; or
(b) which extinguishes the rights of any party thereto, or discharges any party thereto, from any liability, under or in respect of any contract on the expiry of a specified period so as to restrict any party from enforcing his rights, is void to that extent.” 9 The relevant portion of Section 28, Indian Contract Act, 1872 reads:
“Exception 1. —Saving of contract to refer to arbitration dispute that may arise. —This section shall not render illegal a contract, by which two or more persons agree that any dispute which may arise between them in respect of any subject or class of subjects shall be referred to arbitration, and that only the amount awarded in such arbitration shall be recoverable in respect of the dispute so referred.
Exception 2. —Saving of contract to refer questions that have already arisen. —Nor shall this section render illegal any contract in writing, by which two or more persons agree to refer to arbitration any question between them which has already arisen, or affect any provision of any law in force for the time being as to references to arbitration.” 10 Section 2(h) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 reads:
“(h) An agreement enforceable by law is a contract;” 11 Section 2(e), Indian Contract Act 1872 reads:
“(e) Every promise and every set of promises, forming the consideration for each other, is an agreement;” 12 Section 2(b), Indian Contract Act 1872 reads:
“(b) When the person to whom the proposal is made signifies his assent thereto, the proposal is said to be accepted. A proposal, when accepted, becomes a promise;” reciprocated with a consideration (defined in Section 2(d))13, and these promises can either be express (when its proposal or acceptance is in words) or implied (when its proposal or acceptance is otherwise than in words).14 An agreement is legally enforceable as a contract if it is formed with the free consent of parties who are competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and lawful object.15 i. Arbitration Agreement is a Contract
8. An arbitration agreement is more specifically defined in Section 7(1) of the 1996 Act as an “an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.” The use of the phrase ‘whether contractual or not’ qualifies the dispute, not the agreement; an arbitration agreement must always be a contract, but 13 Section 2(d), Indian Contract Act 1872 reads:
“(d) When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise;”
14 Section 9, Indian Contract Act 1872 reads:
“9. Promises, express and implied.—In so far as the proposal or acceptance of any promise is made in words, the promise is said to be express. In so far as such proposal or acceptance is made otherwise than in words, the promise is said to be implied.”
15 Section 10, Indian Contract Act 1872 reads:
“10. What agreements are contracts. —All agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void.” the dispute that is referred to arbitration need not necessarily be contractual, suffice it to be arising out of a “defined legal relationship”.16
9. Arbitration Agreement must be in writing, as against an oral agreement. However, it need not be signed document: India has adopted the UNCITRAL model17 which lays emphasis on the substance of an agreement, rather than its form, to determine the existence of the agreement to arbitrate. Sub-Section (2) of Section 7 incorporates this principle and recognises an agreement, either in the form of an arbitration clause in the contract or in the form of a separate agreement.
10. Section 7(3) mandates that an arbitration agreement shall be in writing, meaning that the arbitration agreement must be in express terms. Subsequently, Section 7(4) declares that an arbitration agreement “is in writing” if it is contained in: (a) a document signed by the parties; (b) exchange of correspondence that provides the record of the agreement; and (c) admission in the proceedings, i.e., the statement of claim and defence. It is evident from the deliberate language of Section 7 that the arbitration
16 Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1, para 24 [2020 INSC 697]; Gemini Bay Transcription Pvt Ltd v. Integrated Sales Service Ltd, (2022) 1 SCC 753, para 30 [2021 INSC 392].
17 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985. agreement must be in a written form, in contradistinction to an oral agreement, and at the same time, that it is not necessary for it to be signed by the parties.18 A signed document containing the arbitration agreement is only one of the written forms, where the signature of the party is absolute proof for the existence and privity of the contract.
11. Section 7 therefore comprehensively defines what an arbitration agreement is and also from where it is to be identified. The referral court under Sections 8, 11 or 45 of the Act, or the arbitral tribunal, is the forum that identifies and deciphers the existence of an arbitration agreement and its parties. The real question, however, is how must the court or tribunal make this determination, particularly when a non-signatory seeks to initiate arbitration, or is sought to be made party by a signatory. Apart from the standard methods of drawing inferences by interpreting the express language employed in the agreement, what are the other external aids to assist the court or the arbitral tribunal in constructing the existence of the arbitration agreement with the non-signatory, is the question that we are called upon to answer. 18 Jugal Kishore Rameshwardas v. Goolbai Hormusji, (1955) 2 SCR 857, para 7 [1955 INSC 22]; Caravel Shipping Services (P) Ltd v. Premier Sea Foods Exim (P) Ltd, (2019) 11 SCC 461, para 8 [2018 INSC 1008].
ii. Section 7(4)(b)
12. An arbitration agreement with non-signatories is to be inferred from the record of the agreement consisting the exchange of correspondence such as letters, telex, telegrams, and other telecommunication and electronic communication, wherein it “unequivocally and clearly emerge(s) that the parties were ad idem”.19 In Rickmers Verwaltung Gmbh v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd,20 this Court referred to the role of courts while considering the existence of an arbitration agreement as under:
“12. …The question, however, is: can any agreement be spelt out from the correspondence between the parties in the instant case?
13. In this connection the cardinal principle to remember is that it is the duty of the court to construe correspondence with a view to arrive at a conclusion whether there was any meeting of mind between the parties, which could create a binding contract between them but the court is not empowered to create a contract for the parties by going outside the clear language used in the correspondence, except insofar as there are some appropriate implications of law to be drawn. Unless from the correspondence, it can unequivocally and clearly emerge that the parties were ad idem to the terms, it cannot be said that an agreement had come into existence between them through correspondence. The court is required to review what the parties wrote and how they acted and from that material to infer whether the intention as expressed in the correspondence was to bring into existence a mutually binding contract. The intention of the parties is to be gathered only from the expressions used in the correspondence and the meaning it conveys and in 19 Rickmers Verwaltung Gmbh v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd, (1999) 1 SCC 1, para 13 [1998 INSC 436].
20 ibid; also see MTNL v. Canara Bank, (2020) 12 SCC 767, para 9.3 [2019 INSC 881]. case it shows that there had been meeting of mind between the parties and they had actually reached an agreement upon all material terms, then and then alone can it be said that a binding contract was capable of being spelt out from the correspondence.
14. From a careful perusal of the entire correspondence on the record, we are of the opinion that no concluded bargain had been reached between the parties as the terms of the standby letter of credit and performance guarantee were not accepted by the respective parties. In the absence of acceptance of the standby letter of credit and performance guarantee by the parties, no enforceable agreement could be said to have come into existence. The correspondence exchanged between the parties shows that there is nothing expressly agreed between the parties and no concluded enforceable and binding agreement came into existence between them. Apart from the correspondence relied upon by the learned Single Judge of the High Court, the fax messages exchanged between the parties, referred to above, go to show that the parties were only negotiating and had not arrived at any agreement. There is a vast difference between negotiating a bargain and entering into a binding contract. After negotiation of bargain in the present case, the stage never reached when the negotiations were completed giving rise to a binding contract…” Further in Babanrao Rajaram Pund v. Samarth Builders and Developers,21 this Court held:
“29. It is thus imperative upon the courts to give greater emphasis to the substance of the clause, predicated upon the evident intent and objectives of the parties to choose a specific form of dispute resolution to manage conflicts between them. The intention of the parties that flows from the substance of the agreement to resolve their dispute by arbitration are to be given due weightage. It is crystal clear to us that Clause 18, in this case, contemplates a binding 21 (2022) 9 SCC 691 [2022 INSC 935].
reference to arbitration between the parties and it ought to have been given full effect by the High Court.” The parties must mutually intend to refer their differences to arbitration as consent is the source of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction over them.22
13. The settled jurisprudence under Section 7(4)(b) is that the non-signatory’s consent to an arbitration agreement can be made out from its conduct by way of exchange of letters, telegrams and other forms of written communication.23 These correspondences constitute the written record of the agreement. In Smita Conductors v. Euro Alloys,24 this Court was tasked with determining whether certain correspondences by the appellant therein, that were not addressed to the respondent, showed the appellant’s consent to arbitration as per the Article II(2) of the New York Convention, under the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961. The Court noted that the contracts containing the arbitration clause were not signed by the appellant, nor were there any letters or telegrams between the appellant and respondent where the appellant expressly assented to these contracts. Rather, it relied on 22 KK Modi v. KN Modi, (1998) 3 SCC 573, para 17 [1998 INSC 63]; Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation v. Encon Builders (I) Pvt Ltd, (2003) 7 SCC 418, para 13 [2003 INSC 409].
23 Shakti Bhog Foods v. Kola Shipping Ltd, (2009) 2 SCC 134, para 17 [2008 INSC 1081]. 24 (2001) 7 SCC 728 [2001 INSC 417].
correspondences by the appellant to a bank where it acted in pursuance of the terms of the contract, as providing a record of the arbitration agreement.25 Therefore, even in the absence of a signature, the non-signatory’s consent to arbitration can be gathered from its written correspondence (even with third parties) that shows its conduct pursuant to the contract containing the arbitration agreement.
14. This principle has been consistently applied by the Court to determine whether the non-signatory is a party to an arbitration agreement in accordance with Section 7(4)(b).26 Our courts and tribunals have sufficiently developed the interpretive tools to determine the intention of the parties to refer disputes to arbitration by construing the express language in the correspondence. It has also been held that once the terms of the contract show that there is an intention to refer disputes to arbitration, parties cannot “wriggle out” of the arbitration agreement.27
15. Having considered the statutory scheme and also the consistent approach of this Court in interpreting and construing 25 ibid, paras 6-7.
26 Unissi (India) Pvt Ltd v. Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, (2009) 1 SCC 107 [2008 INSC 1111]; Powertech World Wide Ltd v. Delvin international General Trading LLC, (2012) 1 SCC 361 [2011 INSC 799]; Govind Rubber v. Louids Dreyfus Commodities Asia Pvt Ltd, (2015) 13 SCC 477 [2014 INSC 1042]. 27 Unissi (India) (supra), paras 16-19; Govind Rubber (supra), paras 21-22. the existence or lack of intention to arbitrate, the following principle can be restated:
i. An arbitration agreement is a contract. It must meet the requirements of an agreement enforceable by law under the Indian Contract Act, 1872.28 ii. Section 7(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 recognises the existence of an arbitration agreement in substance, rather than in form.29 The agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or it may be in the form of a separate agreement.
iii. Section 7(3) mandates that the arbitration agreement shall be in writing, as against an oral agreement. However, the written form of the document evidencing the agreement need not be signed by the parties.30 iv. ‘Party’ is defined in Section 2(1)(h) as “a party to an arbitration agreement”. The determination of the arbitration agreement and its parties are inextricably connected with one another, their existence is based on the written agreement.
28 Vidya Drolia (supra), para 21.
29 Nimet Resources Inc v. Essar Steels Ltd, (2000) 7 SCC 497, para 5; Babanrao Rajaram Pund (supra), paras 15 and 29.
30 Jugal Kishore Rameshwardas (supra), para 7; Rickmers Verwaltung Gmbh (supra), para 12; Shakti Bhog Foods Ltd (supra), para 17; Caravel Shipping Services (P) Ltd (supra), para 8. v. If the arbitration agreement is evidenced in the written form as contained in a document signed by the parties (Section 7(4)(a)), the parties to the agreement are evidently those who have signed the agreement.
vi. If the arbitration agreement is evidenced in the written form as contained as admissions in pleadings comprising statements of claim and defence (Section 7(4)(c)), parties to this agreement would be evident from the statements of claim and defence and the admissions made therein. vii. The arbitration agreement may also be in writing if it is contained in the record of the agreement comprising exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication including communication through electronic means (Section 7(4)(b)). In these instances, parties to the agreement as well as the existence of the arbitration agreement is a matter of interpretation and construction by the referral court or arbitral tribunal. The inquiry under Section 7(4)(b) is to determine whether there exists an agreement for referring the matter to arbitration, and who are the parties to such an agreement.
viii. The referral court or the arbitral tribunal, while considering the claim of a non-signatory for reference, or the objection of a non-signatory to the inclusion in an arbitration, will primarily examine the record of agreement under Section 7(4)(b) and consider the express language employed by the parties.
ix. Once the express terms are ascertained,31 their meaning is a matter of construction by the court or arbitral tribunal. The object of such construction is to discover the intention of the parties.32 Intention must always be ascertained through the words actually used, for there is no intention independent of the language employed by the parties. x. For the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of the express words, the court or tribunal may also look into the surrounding circumstances such as the nature and object of the contract,33 and conduct of the parties during the formation, implementation, and discharge of the contract.34 31 Rickmers Verwaltung Gmbh (supra), para 13; MTNL v. Canara Bank (supra), para 9.3. 32 Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Ltd (BESCOM) v. E.S. Solar Power Pvt Ltd (2021) 6 SCC 718, paras 16 and 17; Food Corporation of India v. Abhijit Paul 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1605, para 27 [2022 INSC 1216]; Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts (6th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2016) para 2.01, 27.
33 Bank of India v. K. Mohandas (2009) 5 SCC 313, para 28 [2009 INSC 417]. 34 Godhra Electricity Co Ltd v. State of Gujarat (1975) 1 SCC 199, paras 11, 16 [1974 INSC 174]; McDermott International Inc v. Burn Standard Co Ltd (2006) 11 SCC 181, para 112 [2006 INSC 326].
Trade practices also assume importance in determining the meaning of the language employed by the parties.35 While interpreting the contract, courts or tribunals adopt well- established principles of construction. These principles are in the nature of guidelines for the court to presume the intention of the parties.
xi. As the arbitration agreement is confined to a written document contained in the material specified in Section 7(4)(b) and the interpretation and construction is based on its text, Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 disable adducing of oral evidence.36 This is necessary to prevent a referral proceeding from being converted into a full-fledged trial. If the arbitration agreement cannot be deduced from the record of agreement as provided in Section 7(4)(b), the inquiry must conclude. This approach is in consonance with the requirement of a written agreement and also subserves the important policy consideration as surmised in Section 5 of the Act.
16. It is in the context of the above referred legal regime, statutory as well as precedential, that we need to consider the questions 35 ONGC v. Saw Pipes Ltd (2003) 5 SCC 705, para 13 [2003 INSC 241]. 36 See Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani (2003) 6 SCC 595, paras 13, 16-18 [2003 INSC 206]. referred to this Constitution Bench – whether the Group of Companies Doctrine is part of Indian arbitration jurisprudence and whether it has any statutory basis.
C. Group of Companies Doctrine i. International Perspectives
17. I am in complete agreement with the opinion of the learned Chief Justice, who has in his scholarly exposition considered this matter in great detail. He has examined the precedents on the applicability of the doctrine in France, England, Switzerland, and the USA.
18. The Group of Companies Doctrine was formulated and initially applied by international arbitral tribunals to determine whether a person who has not formally signed an arbitration agreement can be made party to it. It is one of the various legal theories used to determine whether a non-signatory is a party to the arbitration agreement. Before we proceed to the doctrine itself, it may be relevant for us to briefly set out the other legal bases, so as to locate the doctrine in the broader jurisprudence on non- signatories being a party.
19. The legal bases for making a non-signatory a party can be classified as consensual and non-consensual. The consensual theories that are focused on determining the mutual intent of the parties include agency, implied consent, and assignment and transfer of contractual rights, and the non-consensual theories that are based on equity considerations include alter ego/ piercing the corporate veil, estoppel, succession, and apparent authority.37 The formulation of these principles, whether consensual or non- consensual, is not new. They are derived from general principles of contractual law and corporate law.38
20. The Group of Companies doctrine was formulated and theorised exclusively in international arbitration jurisprudence to specifically determine whether a company which is a non-signatory is party to the arbitration agreement. Gary Born clarifies that this principle is not evoked outside the context of arbitration.39
21. With this background, I will now discuss the doctrine along with other considerations and legal tests that guide its application.
22. The doctrine was first developed by a French arbitral tribunal in an interim award by the International Chamber of Commerce in 37 Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration, vol 1 (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 2021) 1531.
38 ibid 1525.
39 ibid 1559.
Dow Chemical v. Isover Saint Gobain.40 In this case, Dow Chemical A.G. and Dow Chemical Europe (fully-owned subsidiaries of Dow Chemical Company (USA)) were signatories to two separate agreements containing arbitration clauses with Isover Saint Gobain. Dow Chemical France, a non-signatory to these agreements but a member of the Dow group, effectuated the deliveries under these agreements. When disputes arose and Isover instituted suits in the French courts against all four Dow companies, both the signatory and the non-signatory Dow companies instituted arbitral proceedings. Isover objected to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction to render an award with respect to Dow Chemical France and Dow Chemical Company (USA), as they were non-signatories. On the other hand, the non-signatory companies argued that they can invoke arbitration due to their involvement in the conclusion and performance of these contracts, and by virtue of them being in the same group of companies.
23. The Arbitral Tribunal applied French law to determine whether the non-signatories are parties “by reference to the common intent of the parties to these proceedings, such as it appears from the circumstances that surround the conclusion and characterize the performance and later the termination of the contracts in which they appear”. It held that Dow Chemical France and Dow Chemical Company (USA) were central to the negotiation and conclusion of both contracts. Further, they were also involved in the performance of the contracts and their subsequent termination since Dow Chemical France effected the deliveries and Dow Chemical Company (USA) owned the trademarks for the goods and also exercised absolute control over its subsidiaries. Relying on these facts, the Tribunal concluded that both companies participated in the conclusion, performance, and termination of the contracts. It held:
“Considering that irrespective of the distinct juridical identity of each of its members, a group of companies constitutes one and the same economic reality (une réalité économique unique) of which the arbitral tribunal should take account when it rules on its own jurisdiction subject to Article 13 (1955 version) or Article 8 (1975 version) of the ICC Rules.
Considering, in particular, that the arbitration clause expressly accepted by certain of the companies of the group should bind the other companies which, by virtue of their role in the conclusion, performance, or termination of the contracts containing said clauses, and in accordance with the mutual intention of all parties to the proceedings, appear to have been veritable parties to these contracts or to have been principally concerned by them and the disputes to which they may give rise.”41 41 ibid.
24. From the above extracts, it is clear that membership in the same group of companies or “same economic reality” were neither the sole nor the guiding factors to hold that the non-signatory companies were parties. Rather, the Tribunal’s emphasis was on the mutual intent of the parties, gathered from their conduct in the conclusion, performance, and termination of the contracts.42
25. The subsequent exposition and application of the doctrine by French arbitral tribunals and courts also largely reflects a focus on mutual intent, rather than mere membership in the same group, which has been held to be insufficient in and of itself to make the non-signatory a party.43 In Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co. v. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan, the Paris Court of Appeal enforced the arbitral award against the Pakistan government (non-signatory) as its conduct through involvement in the negotiation and performance of the contract reflected common will to be a party to the arbitration.44 Common will must be ascertained according to the principles of good faith (parties must not be allowed to evade commitments) and 42 Also see Born (supra) 1561; Bernard Hanotiau, ‘Chapter 14: Group of Companies in International Arbitration’ in Loukas A. Mistelis and Julian D.M. Lew (ed), Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration, vol 15 (Kluwer Law International 2006), 286. 43 Born (supra) 1562-1563.
44 Case No. 9-28533, dated 17 February 2011 (Paris Cour d’Appel). effectiveness (when parties insert an arbitration clause, it must be presumed that their intent is to be governed by the arbitration).45
26. The focus on mutual intention reflects a fundamental difference between the Group of Companies doctrine and ‘piercing the veil’ or alter ego. In veil-piercing, the separate legal identities of the parent and subsidiary companies are disregarded or nullified on equity and fairness considerations (such as to prevent fraud). Application of the Group of Companies doctrine does not result in lifting the corporate veil, and is rather based on identifying the mutual intention of the parties.46
27. The doctrine has not been accepted in the same terms across the world.
28. In UK, in Peterson Farms Inc v. C&M Farming Ltd,47 the Court rejected the applicability of the doctrine in English law. The separate legal identities of the parent and subsidiary companies is held to be a fundamental legal tenet.48 In the Dallah case, the UK Supreme Court differed from the Paris Court of Appeal on enforcing the arbitral award against the Government of Pakistan (non- 45 Malakoff Corporation Berhad and TLEMCEN Desalination Investment Company v. Algerian Energy Company SA and Hyflux Limited, Case No. 21-07296, dated 13 June 2023 (Paris Cour d’Appel).
46 Born (supra) 1563.
47 [2004] EWHC 121 (Comm); Mayor and Commonalty & Citizens of the City of London v. Ashok Sancheti, [2008] EWCA Civ 1283. 48 Bank of Tokyo Ltd v. Karoon, [1987] AC 45.
signatory). Even after applying French law to determine when a non-signatory is a party, based on the material before it, the Court held there was no mutual intention in this case to make the Government of Pakistan a party.49 Similarly, in Kabab-Ji SAL (Lebanon) v. Kout Food Group (Kuwait),50 the UK Supreme Court did not enforce the arbitral award against the non-signatory company as there was no material to show that it was a party as per the terms of the contract.
29. Similarly, Singapore courts have also rejected the applicability of the Group of Companies doctrine by emphasising the fundamental corporate law principle of separate legal identities.51
30. Swiss courts, on the other hand, have allowed for non- signatories to be made party to the arbitration agreement based on their conduct, manifesting implied consent. The Swiss Federal Court has held that an arbitration agreement must itself be in writing as per Article 178 of the Swiss Private International Law Act. However, the question of whether a non-signatory is a party to such written arbitration agreement can be determined by reference 49 [2010] UKSC 46.
50 [2021] UKSC 48.
51 Manuchar Steel Hong Kong Ltd v. Star Pacific Line Pte Ltd [2014] SGHC 181. to its involvement in the preparation and performance of the contract containing the arbitration clause, which reflects its intent to be party to such arbitration agreement.52
31. American courts also do not expressly rely on the Group of Companies doctrine to determine whether a non-signatory is a party. Rather, they use principles such as equitable estoppel, assumption, piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, and waiver.53 In the recent decision in GE Energy Power Conversion v. Outokumpu Stainless, the US Supreme Court relied on equitable estoppel to hold that a non-signatory can compel arbitration where a signatory is relying on terms of the contract to make its claim against the non-signatory.54 American courts have also relied on implied consent,55 third party beneficiary,56 and general contractual and agency law principles to hold that a non-signatory is a party.57
32. This comparative perspective makes it clear that a determination of parties to an arbitration agreement that is based on mutual intention can take place without reference to whether 52 X._____ et al v. Z._____, 4A_115/2003; A.________, v. B.________ Ltd., 4A_376/2008; X.________ v. Y.________ Engineering and Y.________ S.p.A., 4A_450/2013. 53 GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS Corp., FKA Converteam SAS v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, et al., Case No. 18-1048 (1 June 2020). 54 ibid.
55 McBro Planning & Dev. Co. v. Triangle Elec. Constr. Co. Inc., 741 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1984). 56 Nauru Phosphate Royalties, Inc. v. Drago Daic Interests, Inc. 138 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1998). 57 Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp, 404 F. 3d 657 (2nd Cir. 2005). the non-signatory is a part of the group of companies. In fact, Bernard Hanotiau, an international arbitration scholar, argues that the award in Dow Chemical has been misinterpreted to give rise to the Group of Companies doctrine. Rather, he emphasises that the real implication of Dow is that it enables us to determine whether a non-signatory is a party by reference to its conduct that reflects its consent. In this light, he argues that any reference to a group of companies is unnecessary as membership within the same group is not a determinative factor in the inquiry of who is a party to the arbitration agreement.58
33. The conclusions from the above analysis can be succinctly put forth as follows:
i. Various jurisdictions use both consensual and non-
consensual legal principles to determine whether a non-
signatory is a party to an arbitration agreement.59 ii. The Group of Companies doctrine is applied irrespective of the distinct juridical identities of each member of the group when they share a common economic reality by virtue of their role in the formation, performance, and termination 58 Bernard Hanotiau, ‘Consent to Arbitration: Do We Share a Common Vision?’ (2011) 27(4) Arbitration International 539.
59 Born (supra), 1531.
of the contract. The principle is based on mutual intention of all the parties to settle the dispute through arbitration.60 iii. The acceptance of the doctrine is highly contested across jurisdictions. The doctrine was developed in France and is applied there by emphasising mutual consent of the signatory and non-signatory companies.61 iv. On the other hand, countries like the United Kingdom62 and Singapore63 have expressly rejected the doctrine and have emphasised the fundamentality of separate legal personalities of members within the same group. v. Some jurisdictions, such as Switzerland64 and the USA,65 have not accepted the Group of Companies doctrine in those terms. However, they invoke other legal principles to hold a non-signatory to be a party to the arbitration agreement (such as conduct, implied consent, contractual and agency principles).
60 Dow Chemical (supra).
61 Dallah Real Estate (supra) [Paris Cour d’Appel]; Malakoff Corporation (supra). 62 Peterson Farms (supra).
63 Manuchar Steel (supra).
64 X._____ et al v. Z._____, 4A_115/2003; A.________, v. B.________ Ltd., 4A_376/2008; X.________ v. Y.________ Engineering and Y.________ S.p.A., 4A_450/2013. 65 GE Energy Power Conversion (supra); McBro Planning & Dev. Co (supra); Nauru Phosphate Royalties, Inc. (supra); Sarhank Group (supra). vi. American courts also solely rely on equity considerations (non-consensual) to hold a non-signatory to be party, such as when they apply equitable estoppel and veil piercing/alter ego.66 ii. Indian Precedents on the Group of Companies Doctrine
34. I will now consider the application of the Group of Companies doctrine by our courts and formulate principles that arise from the precedents.
35. I am in agreement with the detailed analysis of the Indian case-law on this doctrine by the learned Chief Justice. The position of law in India can broadly be divided as it existed before and after the decision in Chloro Controls (supra). I have already referred to the decisions interpreting and applying Section 7(4)(b) in Part B(ii) of my opinion. The decisions cited therein recognise the possibility of a non-signatory company being a party to the arbitration. I have also referred to the reasoning in those decisions where the Court has examined the record of the agreement and constructed the existence of an arbitration agreement based on the express language, coupled with the consent of the parties. 66 GE Energy Power Conversion (supra).
36. Two decisions of this Court which preceded Chloro Controls (supra), namely, Sukanya Holdings67 and Indowind Energy68 were based on a strict interpretation of Section 7 and considered that parties to an agreement are limited to its signatories.
37. There was a definitive shift in this position from the case of Chloro Controls v. Severen Trent (supra). Arising out of the conspectus of a multi-party multi-contractual dispute, a petition for reference to arbitration under Section 45 of the Act was filed in a suit, despite asymmetry in the parties to the contracts and the parties to the arbitration agreement. Interpreting the words and phrases “any person”, “claiming through or under”, and “shall” in Section 45 of the Court, this Court enlarged the scope of reference for the first time, to bind non-signatories.
38. It noted that if a claim is made against or by someone who is not originally a signatory to an arbitration agreement, the Group of Companies doctrine can bind the “non-signatory affiliates or sister or parent concerns” to arbitration, “if the circumstances demonstrate that the mutual intention of all the parties was to 67 Sukanya Holdings v. Jayesh H Pandya (2003) 5 SCC 531 [2003 INSC 230]. 68 Indowind Energy Ltd v. Wescare (India) Ltd (2010) 5 SCC 306 [2010 INSC 246]. bind both the signatories and the non-signatory affiliates.”69 The Court noted in the following words:
“72. This evolves the principle that a non-signatory party could be subjected to arbitration provided these transactions were with group of companies and there was a clear intention of the parties to bind both, the signatory as well as the non-signatory parties. In other words, “intention of the parties” is a very significant feature which must be established before the scope of arbitration can be said to include the signatory as well as the non-signatory parties.
73. A non-signatory or third party could be subjected to arbitration without their prior consent, but this would only be in exceptional cases. The court will examine these exceptions from the touchstone of direct relationship to the party signatory to the arbitration agreement, direct commonality of the subject-matter and the agreement between the parties being a composite transaction. The transaction should be of a composite nature where performance of the mother agreement may not be feasible without aid, execution and performance of the supplementary or ancillary agreements, for achieving the common object and collectively having bearing on the dispute...” (emphasis supplied)
39. In his opinion, the learned Chief Justice has considered the concern of Justice Surya Kant about an apparent contradiction between the above-referred paragraphs 72 and 73, and has correctly reconciled the two paragraphs. I am in agreement with the same.
69 Chloro Controls (supra), para 71.
40. In this context, it is critical to emphasize that the Court in Chloro Controls was interpreting Section 45, in Part II of the Act, in particular, the phrase “claiming through or under”. The conclusion to include non-signatories to the arbitration agreement pivoted on their derivative claim to being a party to the arbitration agreement. The Group of Companies doctrine thus found recognition in the interpretation of the phrases of Section 45 of the Act. Further, for the derivative action to pass muster, “a clear intention” of the signatories and non-signatories had to be ascertained, through the circumstances delineated by the Court, i.e., i) direct relationship with the party to the agreement, ii) commonality of subject matter,
iii) composite nature of transaction, and iv) interlinked performance of the contract.
41. In 2015, the Law Commission of India’s 246th Report acknowledged this interpretation of Section 45 to the Act. In the pursuant amendments, Section 8 in Part I of the Act was amended to mirror the language of Section 45;70 thus, parties in domestic 70 The amended Section 8(1) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 reads as under:
“8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.— (1) A judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming through or under him, so applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court or any Court, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no valid arbitration agreement exists.” arbitrations could also petition for reference to arbitration in a derivative capacity.
42. We will now examine the application of the Group of Companies doctrine in the subsequent cases. In Duro Felguera, S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Ltd,71 the application of the doctrine as recognised in Chloro Controls (supra) was not applied on the facts of that case.
43. Until now, the precedents pertained to situations where the parties invoked the pre-referral jurisdiction of the courts. In Cheran Properties Ltd v. Kasturi and Sons Ltd,72 the Court was approached at the enforcement stage.73 The Court allowed the enforcement of an arbitral award against a subsequent purchaser of shares under Section 35 of the Act, interpreting the phrase “persons claiming under them”. However, expositions pertaining to the Group of Companies doctrine were observed in the judgment,
71 (2017) 9 SCC 729 [2017 INSC 1026].
72 (2018) 16 SCC 413 [2018 INSC 394].
73 The respondent sold shares of its subsidiary company to one K.C. Palanisamy, who undertook to discharge the outstanding liabilities of this company. Clause 14 of this agreement recognised the right of K.C. Palanisamy to sell or transfer his holdings in the company to any other person of his choice, provided that transferee accepts the terms of the agreement regarding the management and financial aspects of the company. This agreement also contained an arbitration clause. K.C. Palaniswamy nominated the appellant to receive 95% of the shares that were to be transferred to him. Subsequently, disputes arose and an arbitral tribunal directed him to return the share certificates and title documents. The appellant was made party to the proceedings filed by the respondents to enforce the arbitral award.
in response to certain arguments advanced before the Court. In that context, the Court made the following observations:
“23. As the law has evolved, it has recognised that modern business transactions are often effectuated through multiple layers and agreements. There may be transactions within a group of companies. The circumstances in which they have entered into them may reflect an intention to bind both signatory and non-signatory entities within the same group. In holding a non-signatory bound by an arbitration agreement, the court approaches the matter by attributing to the transactions a meaning consistent with the business sense which was intended to be ascribed to them. Therefore, factors such as the relationship of a non- signatory to a party which is a signatory to the agreement, the commonality of subject-matter and the composite nature of the transaction weigh in the balance. The group of companies doctrine is essentially intended to facilitate the fulfilment of a mutually held intent between the parties, where the circumstances indicate that the intent was to bind both signatories and non-signatories. The effort is to find the true essence of the business arrangement and to unravel from a layered structure of commercial arrangements, an intent to bind someone who is not formally a signatory but has assumed the obligation to be bound by the actions of a signatory.”74
44. The Court did not rely on the Group of Companies doctrine.
Yet, Cheran (supra) is an important case to demonstrate that a non-signatory company can be determined to be a party to an arbitration agreement, based on factors such as relationship of the non-signatory with the signatory parties, commonality of subject- 74 ibid, para 23.
matter, and composite nature of transaction. It is also possible for the court to construct such an agreement where the intention of a business arrangement is apparent and the non-signatories have bound themselves by their conduct to fulfill such business arrangement.
45. The subsequent decision in Ameet Lalchand Shah v. Rishabh Enterprises75 is yet another instance where this Court has allowed a non-signatory to be party to an arbitration agreement, in connected contracts, on the ground of business efficacy, noting that all agreements were executed for a single commercial project. This approach was noted in the subsequent decision of Discovery Enterprises,76 where learned Chief Justice has noted:
“In Ameet Lalchand, the Court did not explicitly invoke the group of companies doctrine to bind a non-signatory, rather it relied on Chloro Controls to hold that a non-signatory would be bound by the arbitration clause in the mother agreement, since it is a party to an inter-connected agreement, executed to achieve a common commercial goal.”77 (emphasis supplied)
46. In Reckitt Benckiser (India) Pvt Ltd v. Reynders Label Printing India Pvt Ltd,78 the Court inferred that since the non-signatory 75 (2018) 15 SCC 678 [2018 INSC 450].
76 ONGC v. Discovery Enterprises Pvt Ltd (2022) 8 SCC 42 [2022 INSC 483]. 77 ibid, para 28.
78 (2019) 7 SCC 62 [2019 INSC 700].
neither signed the arbitration agreement nor had any causal connection with the negotiation or execution of the agreement, an intent to consent to the arbitration agreement could not be discerned. Hence, the non-signatory was not bound by the arbitration agreement.79 Thus, in Reckitt, the Court reverted to the approach of ascertaining mutual intention of the parties for applying the doctrine, although it did not result in the non- signatory being made a party to the arbitration.
47. MTNL v. Canara Bank80 is the decision which acknowledged the Group of Companies doctrine, formulated its principles, and applied them to the proceedings by recognising CANFINA, a non- signatory, to be party to the arbitration agreement. The Court held:
“10.5. The group of companies doctrine has been invoked by courts and tribunals in arbitrations, where an arbitration agreement is entered into by one of the companies in the group; and the non-signatory affiliate, or sister, or parent concern, is held to be bound by the arbitration agreement, if the facts and circumstances of the case demonstrate that it was the mutual intention of all parties to bind both the signatories and the non-signatory affiliates in the group. The doctrine provides that a non-signatory may be bound by an arbitration agreement where the parent or holding company, or a member of the group of companies is a signatory to the arbitration agreement and the non- signatory entity on the group has been engaged in the negotiation or performance of the commercial contract, or made statements indicating its intention to be bound by the 79 ibid, para 12.
80 (2020) 12 SCC 767 [2019 INSC 881].
contract, the non-signatory will also be bound and benefitted by the relevant contracts.
10.6. The circumstances in which the “group of companies” doctrine could be invoked to bind the non-signatory affiliate of a parent company, or inclusion of a third party to an arbitration, if there is a direct relationship between the party which is a signatory to the arbitration agreement; direct commonality of the subject-matter; the composite nature of the transaction between the parties. A “composite transaction” refers to a transaction which is interlinked in nature; or, where the performance of the agreement may not be feasible without the aid, execution, and performance of the supplementary or the ancillary agreement, for achieving the common object, and collectively having a bearing on the dispute.
10.7. The group of companies doctrine has also been invoked in cases where there is a tight group structure with strong organisational and financial links, so as to constitute a single economic unit, or a single economic reality. In such a situation, signatory and non-signatories have been bound together under the arbitration agreement. This will apply in particular when the funds of one company are used to financially support or restructure other members of the group.”
48. Finally, in ONGC v. Discovery Enterprises Pvt Ltd,81 while the decision on whether the non-signatory was a party was remitted to the arbitral tribunal, the Court undertook a comprehensive review of the academic literature and judicial pronouncements on the issue. The court compendiously concluded the following:
“40. In deciding whether a company within a group of companies which is not a signatory to arbitration agreement 81 Discovery Enterprises (supra).
would nonetheless be bound by it, the law considers the following factors:
(i) The mutual intent of the parties;
(ii) The relationship of a non-signatory to a party which is a signatory to the agreement;
(iii) The commonality of the subject-matter;
(iv) The composite nature of the transaction; and
(v) The performance of the contract.
41. Consent and party autonomy are undergirded in Section 7 of the 1996 Act. However, a non-signatory may be held to be bound on a consensual theory, founded on agency and assignment or on a non-consensual basis such as estoppel or alter ego...”
49. What emerges from the aforementioned precedents is that:
i. The Group of Companies doctrine was adopted and applied in Indian arbitration jurisprudence in Chloro Controls (supra), where the Court read the doctrine into the phrase “claiming through or under” in Section 45. It held that a non-signatory affiliate or sister or parent company can be a party to an arbitration agreement if there is mutual intention of the signatories and non-signatories to this effect. In order to determine mutual intention, the Court laid down factors such as direct relationship, direct commonality of subject-matter, and a composite transaction where the performance of multiple agreements is inextricably connected.82 ii. Pursuant to the 2015 Amendment of Section 8, the Court made a composite reference of signatories and non-
signatories to arbitration by emphasising that all agreements were executed for a single commercial project,83 but without explicitly referring to the Group of Companies doctrine.84 iii. Subsequently, this Court relied on mutual intention as the test for the doctrine. However, it deviated from Chloro (supra) by prescribing the non-signatory’s causal connection with the negotiation and execution of the contract as factors to determine its mutual intent to arbitrate.85 iv. In MTNL (supra), the Court summarised the test under the doctrine as being based on the common intention of the parties to bind both signatory and non-signatory members of the group of companies. Such common intention can be inferred from the non-signatory’s involvement in negotiation and performance of the contract (similar to Reckitt Benckiser (supra)), or from its statements that indicate its intention to 82 Chloro Controls (supra), paras 72 and 73. This was later followed in Cheran Properties (supra), para 23.
83 Rishabh Enterprises (supra), para 25.
84 Discovery Enterprises (supra), para 28.
85 Reckitt Benckiser (supra), para 12.
be a party.86 Simultaneously, the Court also referred to the test in Chloro Controls (supra) for determining mutual intention.87 Lastly, the Court held the doctrine to be applicable when there is a tight group structure or single economic reality, without any reference to the intention of the parties.88 However, the Court ultimately relied on implied or tacit consent by the non-signatory, evidenced by its conduct, to hold that it is a party.89 v. In Discovery (supra), the Court comprehensively reviewed the above cases and ironed out the various tests formulated in them. It held that (a) mutual intent of the parties, (b) relationship of the non-signatory to the signatory, (c) commonality of subject-matter, (d) composite nature of transaction, and (e) performance of the contract, are the factors to determine whether the non-signatory is a party.90 These factors emphasise mutual intention and draw from the tests laid down in Chloro Controls and Reckitt Benckiser but do not include the test of single economic reality as a determinative factor, as held in MTNL (supra). 86 MTNL (supra), para 10.5.
87 ibid, para 10.6.
88 ibid, para 10.7.
89 ibid, para 10.16.
90 Discovery Enterprises (supra), para 40.
50. At this juncture, it is necessary to clarify and answer a common question referred for our consideration, i.e., whether the Group of Companies doctrine is anchored in Sections 8 and 45 of the Act. The expression “claiming through or under” employed in Sections 8 and 45 is concerned with instances of succession and derivative rights. Learned Chief Justice has dealt with this aspect in great detail in Part F (i) and (ii) of his opinion and held that the doctrine cannot be anchored in Sections 8 and 45 and to this extent, Chloro Controls (supra) is wrongly decided. I am in complete agreement with his reasons and findings.
D. Group of Companies Doctrine in the Context of Section 7
51. In this reference, we are tasked to determine whether the Group of Companies doctrine is in accord with the statutory regime of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, defining an arbitration agreement and parties thereto. The adaptation of the doctrine has been doubted, and that is the reason for this reference. While dealing with the international perspective on the doctrine in Part C(i) of my opinion, it was noticed that the doctrine could not attain any conceptual singularity, and it remains contested. Perhaps, this is for two reasons: first, the expression ‘single economic reality’ employed in Dow (supra) is not in line with the concept of separate legal personality of a company, and second, the doctrine is applied for determining the intention of the parties, which is completely fact-based. For these reasons, the doctrine has remained dynamic, if not uncertain, and is subject to many qualifications and exceptions. At the same time, there are certain advantages to adopting the doctrine, considering modern business practices. I am of the opinion that it is necessary to entrench the doctrine within the statutory regime of the Act, to enable a court or arbitral tribunal to apply it as a principle to decipher the intention of the parties. I find it necessary to subsume the doctrine of Group of Companies within the judicial process under Section 7(4)(b), where a court or arbitral tribunal is called upon to determine the existence of an arbitration agreement and parties to it.
52. A conjoint reading of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act informs us that the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal to settle disputes between the parties, to the exclusion of ordinary civil courts, must arise out of a contract to arbitrate between them. An arbitration agreement, being a contract, must necessarily be in writing, as against an oral agreement, but need not be signed by the parties. The written arbitration agreement can be in the form of a document signed by the parties, or be evidenced in the record of agreement. Section 7(4)(b) prescribes the written material from which a non-signatory’s consent and intention can be deciphered by a court or arbitral tribunal.
53. The existence of an arbitration agreement with a non- signatory is a matter of interpretation and construction. The express words employed by the parties enable the court to ascertain the intention of the parties and their agreement to resolve disputes through arbitration. For ascertaining the true meaning of the express words, the court or tribunal may look into the surrounding circumstances such as nature and object of the contract and the conduct of the parties during the formation, performance, and discharge of the contract. While interpreting and constructing the contract, courts or tribunals may adopt well- established principles, which aid and assist proper adjudication and determination. The Group of Companies doctrine is one such principle. It may be adopted by courts or arbitral tribunals while interpreting the record of agreement to determine whether the non- signatory company is a party to it.
54. Although the application of the Group of Companies doctrine in India has until now been independent of Section 7, its juxtaposition with Section 7(4)(b) case-law shows that the inquiry under both is premised on determining the mutual intention of parties to submit to arbitration. The mutual intention of the parties is discernible from their conduct in the performance of the contract and this inquiry is common to Section 7(4)(b) jurisprudence and the Group of Companies doctrine. Even the precedents on the doctrine, national and international, look to additional factors beyond the non-signatory being in the same group of companies, such as commonality of subject-matter, composite nature of transaction, and interdependence of the performance of the contracts to determine mutual intent.
55. Since the fundamental issue before the court or tribunal under Section 7(4)(b) and the Group of Companies doctrine is the same, the doctrine can be subsumed within Section 7(4)(b). Consequently, the record of agreement that evidences conduct of the non-signatory in the formation, performance, and termination of the contract and surrounding circumstances such as its direct relationship with the signatory parties, commonality of subject- matter, and composite nature of transaction, must be comprehensively used to ascertain the existence of the arbitration agreement with the non-signatory. In this inquiry, the fact of a non- signatory being a part of the same group of companies will strengthen its conclusion. In this light, there is no difficulty in applying the Group of Companies doctrine as it would be statutorily anchored in Section 7 of the Act.
E. Conclusion
56. In view of the above, while concurring with the judgment of the learned Chief Justice, my conclusions are as follows:
I. An agreement to refer disputes to arbitration must be in a written form, as against an oral agreement, but need not be signed by the parties. Under Section 7(4)(b), a court or arbitral tribunal will determine whether a non-signatory is a party to an arbitration agreement by interpreting the express language employed by the parties in the record of agreement, coupled with surrounding circumstances of the formation, performance, and discharge of the contract.
While interpreting and constructing the contract, courts or tribunals may adopt well-established principles, which aid and assist proper adjudication and determination. The Group of Companies doctrine is one such principle.
II. The Group of Companies doctrine91 is also premised on ascertaining the intention of the non-signatory to be party to an arbitration agreement. The doctrine requires the intention to be gathered from additional factors such as direct relationship with the signatory parties, commonality of subject-matter, composite nature of the transaction, and performance of the contract.
III. Since the purpose of inquiry by a court or arbitral tribunal under Section 7(4)(b) and the Group of Companies doctrine is the same, the doctrine can be subsumed within Section 7(4)(b) to enable a court or arbitral tribunal to determine the true intention and consent of the non-signatory parties to refer the matter to arbitration. The doctrine is subsumed within the statutory regime of Section 7(4)(b) for the purpose of certainty and systematic development of law.
IV. The expression “claiming through or under” in Sections 8 and 45 is intended to provide a derivative right; and it does not enable a non-signatory to become a party to the arbitration agreement. The decision in Chloro Controls (supra) tracing the Group of Companies doctrine through 91 As delineated in para 40 of Discovery Enterprises (supra).
the phrase “claiming through or under” in Sections 8 and 45 is erroneous. The expression ‘party’ in Section 2(1)(h) and Section 7 is distinct from “persons claiming through or under them”. This answers the remaining questions referred to the Constitution Bench.
........................................J. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA] December 06, 2023 New Delhi
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