Rajbir Singh Brar vs Ess Kay Fincorp Ltd. on 27 November, 2025
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
SECOND APPEAL NO. NC/SA/503/2025
(Against the Order dated 14th August 2024 in Appeal SC/3/A/515/2023 of the State Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission Punjab)
RAJBIR SINGH BRAR
PRESENT ADDRESS - NEAR BHARAT GAS AGENCY, FARIDKOT ROAD SADIQ , NEAR
BHARAT GAS AGENCY, FARIDKOT ROAD SADIQFARIDKOT,PUNJAB.
.......Petitioner(s)
Versus
ESS KAY FINCORP LTD.
PRESENT ADDRESS - ESS KAY FINCORP LTD., BRANCH OFFICE CHAHAL PALACE,
CHAHAL MARKET, MALOUT ROAD, S.A.S NAGAR, SRI MUKTSAR SAHIB, PUNJAB , ESS
KAY FINCORP LTD., BRANCH OFFICE CHAHAL PALACE, CHAHAL MARKET, MALOUT
ROAD, S.A.S NAGAR, SRI MUKTSAR SAHIB, PUNJABSRI MUKTSAR SAHIB,PUNJAB.
ESS KAY FINCORP LTD.
PRESENT ADDRESS - ESS KAY FINCORP LTD., CORPORATE OFFICE B-4, ADARSH PLAZA
BUILDING, KHASA KOTHI CIRCLE, JAIPUR, RAJASTHAN , ESS KAY FINCORP LTD.,
CORPORATE OFFICE B-4, ADARSH PLAZA BUILDING, KHASA KOTHI CIRCLE, JAIPUR,
RAJASTHANJAIPUR,RAJASTHAN.
.......Respondent(s)
BEFORE:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A. P. SAHI , PRESIDENT
HON'BLE MR. BHARATKUMAR PANDYA , MEMBER
FOR THE PETITIONER:
IN PERSON
FOR THE RESPONDENT:
MS. TIKSHA MODI, ADVOCATE (VC) MS. SONIA MUNJAL, ADVOCATE
DATED: 27/11/2025
ORDER
1. The appellant purchased a Renault Duster vehicle on a loan acquired from the respondent Ess Kay Fincorp Ltd. The complainant alleges that the finance was of Rs.4,00,000/- which amount was inappropriately enhanced by the respondents on their own thereby changing the quantum of the EMIs that were payable. The complainant alleged that he wanted a foreclosure of the loan account as he had negotiated the vehicle to be sold and simultaneously clear all the dues. The complainant alleges that the respondent failed to cooperate and attempted to forcibly repossess the vehicle as a result whereof the appellant - complainant was compelled to file CC/241/2021. The complaint was entertained and the following order was passed on 17.09.2021 by DCDRC, Muktsar Sahib, Punjab: -
"Office report seen. Heard on admission. Complainant appears to be a prima facie consumer, the matter involved appears to be a consumer dispute, the complaint is prima facie within limitation and falls within territorial jurisdiction of this Commission. So complaint is admitted. Notice to the OPs be issued for 25.10.2021.
Complaint is also accompanied by an application seeking directions to be opposite parties to provide correct foreclosure to complainant regarding his loan bearing customer number GLBCUST00000375393 bearing Loan Account having Chasis No.MEEHSRAW5D7032290, Engine No.E031594 bearing Registration No.PB30N-4015, Model Duster EXL illegally and forcibly against norms of the agreement. Heard on the application. Its notice be also issued for the above said date and the OPs are directed to produce correct foreclosure to complainant regarding his loan bearing customer number GLBCUST00000375393 bearing Loan Account No.CAMKIPLONS000005419876 alongwith the written reply and they are further restrained from taking forcible possession of vehicle in question bearing Registration No.PB30N-4015 model Duster RXL till the final disposal of present complaint."
2. According to the appellant - complainant, the respondents were not supplying the correct foreclosure accounts as a result whereof applications were filed including two applications, one under Section 71 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 for the enforcement of the order dated 17.09.2021 and the other application under Section 72 of the 2019 Act for taking action against the respondents for non-compliance of the order dated 17.09.2021. The allegation of the complainant was that instead of clear directions of the District Commission to produce the correct foreclosure account they did not supply the accounts or file any appropriate reply and to the contrary were threatening to repossess the vehicle demanding a huge amount beyond the amount that was due against the loan.
3. The applications were taken up for consideration by the District Forum and the following order was passed on 20.07.2023: -
"Complaint is fixed for consideration on four applications. We have heard the complainant as well as Ld. counsel for OPs to decide the first application as follows:-
First application has been moved by complainant u/s 71 & 72 of the Consumer Protection Act for enforcement of order dated 17.09.2021 passed by this Commission and has sought direction to OPs to comply with said order and for punishing them for dis-obeying the said order is further pleaded that OPs appeared and filed power of attorney but till date, they have not filed any reply. On the other hand, OPs sent legal notice to complainant through counsel Sh. Akhil Modi Advocate Jaipur on 21.12.2021 and Sh. Jitendra Gupta Advocate Jaipur on 23.12.2021, in which, OPs are threating to take possession of vehicle and demanded huge amount, as such, OPs have not complied the order passed by this Commission rather they are doing proceedings against the order of this Commission. In reply to this application, OPs have pleaded that OP has not violated order dated 17.09.2021 passed by this Commission. The perusal of application of complainant nowhere shows that OP violated order dated 17.09.2021. Admitted by the OPs that this Commission had directed to produce correct foreclosure of account of complainant alongwith written reply and further restrained the OP from taking forcibly possession of vehicle in question till final disposal of the complaint. The OP never tried to take forcible possession of vehicle in question and foreclosure of account of complainant is attached. Further pleaded that OP as per law and as per terms & conditions of the Loan agreement issued legal notice dated 21.12.2021 and 23.12.2021 to complainant through their counsel Akhil Modi. The complainant is willful defaulter of the OP and has intentionally not paid the loan account with interest to OP. Vide said notices dated 21.12.2021 and 23.12.2021 was intimated to compliant that amount of Rs.4,90,257/- is due towards complainant as on 17.12.2021 and OPs are going to appoint Sapan Purohit as Arbitrator and are going to initiate arbitration proceedings against complainant. Lastly prayed to dismiss the application.
It has been observed by this Commission that the OPs have complied with the order dated 17.09.2021 by not taking the forcible possession of the vehicle in question and have also attached the foreclosure of account. The correctness of the foreclosure of account will be seen at the time of final disposal of the complaint. The complainant is directed to pay all the pending due installments latest by 16th August, 2023 and continue paying the future due installments, since it has been observed that the complainant has not being paying the regular due installments to the OPs. In view of the above discussion, this application moved by the complainant u/s 71 & 72 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 is hereby disposed off accordingly. However, as has been pleaded by the OPs that they are going to appoint Arbitrator and initiate arbitration proceedings against the complainant, notice be issued to the OPs to show cause as to why they are to appoint Arbitrator and initiate proceedings on the same cause of action, whereas, the matter is subjudice before this Commission.
Adjourned to 17.08.2023 for consideration of remaining three applications as well as reply to the show cause notice by OPS."
4. The appellant felt aggrieved contending that the scope of the order to be passed in an application under Section 71 of the 2019 Act is only for enforcement and that the District Commission did not possess the power to under Section 71 of the Act modify the order passed by it on 17.09.2021 which was an interim order passed under Section 38 (8) of the 2019 Act.
5. Aggrieved, First Appeal No.515/2023 was filed by the appellant assailing the order dated 20.07.2023 contending that the District Commission had travelled beyond its jurisdiction in modifying the interim order which had been passed under Section 38 (8) of the Act on an application under Section 71 that was filed for the enforcement of the order dated 17.09.2021. The State Commission by the impugned order dated 14.08.2024 dismissed the appeal and in paragraphs 9 & 10 observed as follows: -
"9. Before proceeding further, it is very important to see the order passed on 17.09.2021 by the District Commission, Sri Muktsar Sahib, which the applicant/ appellant is alleging that the order has not been complied with by the respondents/opposite parties. The careful perusal of the order shows that specific directions were issued to the respondents/ opposite parties for giving the complete foreclosure of the account of the appellant/complainant along with the written reply and also not to take the forcible possession of the vehicle bearing No.PB-30-N- 4015. It has been specifically observed by the District Commission that the respondents/opposite parties have filed the foreclosure account of the appellant/complainant and have not take the forcible possession of the vehicle, as alleged, by the appellant/complainant.
10. The impugned order also reveals that appellant/complainant was also directed to pay the remaining installments of the loan amount regularly till 16.08 2023 but there is nothing on the record to show that the appellant/complainant is paying these installments or not. So, in the absence of any cogent and convincing evidence, the appeal challenging the order dated 20.07.2023 passed by the District Commission, whereby the District, Commission disposed of the application filed by appellant/applicant for initiating the proceedings under Section 71 & 72 for not complying the order dated17.09.2021, is devoid of any merit. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the appellant/complainant is hereby dismissed."
6. The appellant also filed Review application No.11/2024 that was held to be not maintainable vide order dated 30.10.2024.
7. Aggrieved the present appeal has been filed.
8. The objection taken by the learned counsel for the respondent Ms. T. Modi is that the present appeal would not be maintainable in terms of Section 51 (2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 and for that heavy reliance has been placed on an order passed by this Commission in the case of Divya Chadri vs. President, Madhuvana House Building Society Ltd. 2022 SCC OnLine NCDRC 368 and after taking into consideration said the submissions, notices were issued on 23.04.2024 by the following order: -
1. This Diary No. has been presented as an Appeal in terms of Section 51(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 against the appellate order of State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Punjab. The office has raised an objection to the maintainability of such an Appeal arising out of an order in enforcement proceedings instituted by the Complainant by moving an Application under Section 71 / 72 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.
2. The background in which the aforesaid issue has to be examined is that the Complainant had taken a car loan from the Respondent / Financer. He alleges that on account of the outbreak of the pandemic there was a dispute with regard to the payment of regular installments but in order to sort things out the Complainant had requested the Bank to foreclose the account for which details were sought but the Bank instead of facilitating the foreclosure, unilaterally extended the loan by re-distributing the EMIs which the Complainant had not asked for.
3. Due to the non-cooperation of the Bank the Complainant failed to sell his car that diminished in value and as a result thereof he was compelled to file a Consumer Complaint No. 241 of 2021 before the District Consumer Disputes redressal Commission, Muktsar Sahib.
4. The Complaint proceeded wherein the Complainant filed applications for consideration and one of the Application that has given rise to the present controversy was filed under the Section 71 of the 2019 Act read with Section 72 praying for enforcement of the Order dated 17.09.2021.
5. The Order dated 17.09.2021 is extracted herein under:
" Office report seen. Heard on admission. Complainant appears to be a consumer, the matter involved appears to be a consumer dispute, the complaint is prima-facie within limitation and falls within territorial jurisdiction of this Commission. So complaint is admitted. Notice to the Ops be issued for 25.10.2021.
Complaint is also accompanied by an application seeking directions to the opposite parties to provide correct foreclosure to complainant regarding his loan bearing customer number GLBCUST00000375393 bearing Loan Account No. #CAMKIPLONS000005419876 and not to take possession of Car Asset having Chassis No. MEEHSRAW5D7032290, Engine No.E031594 bearing Registration No. PB30N-4015, Model Duster RXL illegally and forcibly against norms of the agreement. Heard on the application. Its notice be also issued for the above said date and the OPs are directed to produce correct foreclosure to complainant regarding his loan bearing customer number GLBCUST00000375393 bearing Loan Account No. #CAMKIPLONS000005419876 alongwith the written reply and they are further restrained from taking forcible possession of vehicle in question bearing Registration No. PB30N-4015 model Duster RXL till the final disposal of present complaint."
6. By virtue of the aforesaid directions the District Commission had commanded the financers to produce the correct foreclosure account in respect of his loan account and they were further restrained from taking forcible possession of the vehicle in question which is a Renault Duster Rx Model bearing Registration No. PB 30N 4015.
7. The Application under Section 71 was filed for enforcing the aforesaid interim directions. It was taken up on 20.07.2023 and was disposed of by observing that the correctness of the foreclosure of the account will be seen at the time of final hearing and in the meantime the Complainant was directed to pay all the pending dues and installments latest by 16.08.2023 and to continue paying the future installments as well.
8. The Financers had stated that they have complied with the order dated 17.09.2021 by not taking forcible possession of the vehicle.
9. The Complainant felt aggrieved by the directions issued by the District Commission for making of payments without deciding the issue of foreclosure and calling upon the Financers to submit the complete accounts in this regard. The submission of the Complainant who appears in - person is that the correctness of the foreclosure account should not have been adjourned as the Complainant wanted to foreclose the account and do away with the loan and also sell the vehicle but the District Commission postponed the hearing regarding foreclosure to the stage of final hearing and in the interim period also compelled the Complainant to pay all pending dues and installments. The Complainant therefore submits that the Complainant was aggrieved by the action of the OP financer granting extension of the loan and its tenure and he wants a foreclosure, as such adjourning this issue has resulted in miscarriage of justice and thereby facilitating the continuance of the loan against the Complainant inspite of the fact that he proposes to close the loan account. Instead of addressing the issue of enforcement of its direction, the order has travelled beyond the scope of Section 71 directing the Complainant to continue making deposits.
10. Accordingly aggrieved by this Order passed under section 71/72 the Complainant filed First Appeal No. 515 of 2023 before the State Commission.
11. The provision of Appeal against an Order of the District Commission is contained in Section 41 of the 2019 Act. Section 41 is extracted herein under:
"41. Appeal against order of District Commission Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Commission may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission on the grounds of facts or law within a period of forty-five days from the date of the order, in such form and manner, as may be prescribed;..."
12. The jurisdiction of the State Commission is defined under Section 47(1)(A)(iii) which reads as under:
"47. Jurisdiction of State Commission ....
(iii) appeals against the orders of any District Commission within the State; "
13. Apart from this powers of revision are available to the State Commission under Section 47(1)(b) which is extracted herein under:
"47(b) to call for the records and pass appropriate orders in any consumer dispute which is pending before or has been decided by any District Commission within the State, where it appears to the State Commission that such District Commission has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity."
14. It is therefore evident that the Orders passed by the District Commission are appealable and there is a provision of revision as well on the ground of failure to exercise a jurisdiction or exercise of a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has proceeded to act in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.
15. It is evident from the facts of the present case that the dispute arose out of a decision by the District Commission on an application for enforcement (execution) filed under Section 71 / 72 of the 2019 Act. The Order passed on 17.09.2021 was an Interim Order and it is the enforcement of such an order that the Application was moved under Section 71 of the Act. The power to pass an interim order in a pending Complaint is contained in Section 38(8) of the 2019 which is extracted herein under:
"38. Procedure on admission of complaint (8) Where during the pendency of any proceeding before the District Commission, if it appears necessary, it may pass such interim order as is just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case."
16. Section 71 of the Act encompasses within itself an enforcement of every order made by the District Commission. Section 72 provides for a penalty against whoever fails to comply with any order made any order made by the District Commission.
17. In the instant case the Application under Section 71 has been disposed of recording that the Opposite Party has complied with the direction regarding not taking of possession of the vehicle. The issue of foreclosure has been postponed for being dealt with at the stage of final hearing. What the Complainant contends is that the finance company has not complied with the other part of the Order dated 17.09.2021 for producing the correct foreclosure accounts along with the written reply. The District Commission has postponed the hearing of the same for no justification and on the other hand has issued directions to the Complainant to make payments.
18. It is this part of the order for which the grievance was raised before the State Commission in Appeal. The Complainant submits that the order dated 20.07.2023 runs counter to the own directions of the District Commission dated 17.09.2021 for producing the foreclosure documents. This grievance of the Complainant ought to have been dealt with and enforced because the Respondent / Financers have failed to produce the correct documents regarding foreclosure and were avoiding the same. Instead it is the Complainant who was directed to pay all the dues under the Order dated 20.07.2023 without adverting to the issue of foreclosure that was postponed. This was not within the scope of the application under Section 71.
19. Prima facie the contention raised by the Complainant seems to be worth consideration inasmuch as an Application under Section 71 was moved for enforcement of the Order dated 17.09.2021. Instead, the District Commission proceeded to dispose of the application but while doing so has without dealing with the foreclosure, has proceeded to issue a direction to the Complainant to make the deposits which could not have been done under Section 71 of the Act as that was not the prayer of the Complainant. There was no order of the District Commission to the Complainant to make any payments and therefore there was no question of making it a subject matter of enforcement. In such circumstances the District Commission seems to have prima facie exercised a power in excess of jurisdiction and committed an error to that extent.
20. The Appeal filed before the State Commission was dismissed. Not only this, an Application for review of the said order has also been dismissed vide Order dated 30.10.2024 on the ground that the State Commission had no power of review.
21. The order of review relies on two judgments of the Apex Court to hold that the State Commission has no power to review if there is no error apparent on the face of record. The judgments delivered by the Apex Court prior to the 2019 Act are in a context where there was no power of review available with the State Commission under the 1986 Act. With the coming in of the new Act, Section 50 provides for review in the event there is an error apparent on the face of record. Nonetheless the Application has been entertained under Section 50 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 and has been held to be not maintainable for the reasons given therein.
22. At this stage of admission we also have to consider as to whether the present compilation arising out of an application for enforcement during the pendency of the complaint can be entertained as a Second appeal against the appellate order of the State Commission arising out of enforcement proceedings under section 71 of the 2019 Act or not.
23. The issue involved is as to whether the State Commission was justified in proceeding to issue directions against the Complainant who had filed an application for the enforcement of an order passed by the District Commission.
24. An Appeal against an Order passed by the State Commission exercising its Appellate jurisdiction would lie under Section 51(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 on a substantial question of law. However, the exercise of Appellate jurisdiction by the State Commission under Section 41 read with Section 47(1)(a)(iii) is exercisable against an Order passed by the District Commission while deciding a Complaint. In the instant case it is an Order of enforcement under Section 71 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 that was challenged in an Appeal filed under Section 41 read with Section 47(1)(a)(iii) of the 2019 Act.
25. As observed above, the direction given by the District Commission in the Order dated 20.07.2023 for making payments in the exercise of its power under Section 71 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 becomes questionable as the Application under Section 71 had been moved for an enforcement of the Order dated 17.09.2021 which was not regarding making any payments of instalments by the Complainant. The Order dated 17.09.2021 was confined to a restrained order from taking forcible possession of the vehicle that was complied with by the Opposite Party and the second part was a correct foreclosure of documents / accounts. Thus, the direction given by the District Commission in the Section 71 Application for making payments of nstalments was prima facie beyond the scope of Section 71. This therefore seems to be in excess of jurisdiction.
26. However, without further detaining the matter for issuing notice on this issue, we are of the opinion that a revision petition against the Impugned Order dated 20.07.2003 would not be maintainable in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Karnataka Housing Board versus K. A. Nagamani reported in (2019) 6 SCC 424.
27. In this background since the Order had been passed by the State Commission in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction prima facie a Second Appeal would be maintainable subject to objections and availability of a substantial question of law.
28. The substantial question of law therefore which prima facie arises for consideration is as to whether the State Commission has completely overlooked the issue of the District Commission lacking in jurisdiction to pass an interim order for payment of nstalments by the Complainant in an Application under Section 71 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 when there was no such order passed by the District Commission to be enforced by it and hence an order that is lacking in jurisdiction gives rise to a substantial question of law.
29. As to what is a substantial question of law has been laid down very recently by the Apex Court after considering a long line of precedents on the subject vis-Ã -vis Section 100 CPC in the case of Chandrabhan (Deceased) through LRs and Ors. Vs. Saraswati and Ors., 2022 SCC Online SC 1273. Paras 29 to 33 are extracted hereunder:
"29. In Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal6, this Court followed Sir Chunilal v. Mehta & Sons (supra) and other judgments and summarized the tests to find out whether a given set of questions of law were mere questions of law or substantial questions of law.
9. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth (supra) are set out herein below:
"21. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta (1927-28) 55 IA 235 : AIR 1928 PC 172] the phrase "substantial question of law" as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 :
AIR 1962 SC 1314] the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju [AIR 1951 Mad 969 : (1951) 2 Mad LJ 222 (FB)] : (Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 : AIR 1962 SC 1314], SCR p. 557) "[W]hen a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law."
31. The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would be, whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so, whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or the question raised is palpably absurd, the question would not be a substantial question of law.
32. To be 'substantial', a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law "involving in the case" there must be first, a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case or not, the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. (See Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari7).
33. The principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus:
(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law.
Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law.
(ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents and involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law.
(iii) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well- recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to "decision based on no evidence", it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding."
30. In the instant case such an issue regarding the maintainability of an Appeal before the State Commission against an Order passed by the District Commission under Section 71 would also arise as there is no specific indication of Section 71 about any Appeal against an Order passed under the said provisions even though in the matter of penalty under Section 72 specific provisions of Appeal has been provided for under Section 73.
31. Apart from this the main question would be of the maintainability of a second round of Appeal under Section 51(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 before this Commission against an Order of the State Commission passed in Appeal as in the present case.
32. As observed in the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Chandrabhan (Supra) a substantial question should be not previously settled by law or any binding precedent and should have a material bearing on the decision of the case if answered either way. This expression has been used in Paragraph No.-32 of the aforesaid reported decision.
33. Applying the same and the ratio of the entire judgment we find that prima facie subject to any objections by the Respondents the following substantial questions of law arise:
(i) Whether an Appeal would lie before the State Commission under Section 41 read with Section 47(1)(a)(iii) against an Order passed by the District Commission under Section 71 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 and as to whether the State Commission in the present case was justified in entertaining an Appeal to that effect ?
(ii) Whether an Appeal under Section 51(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 would lie before the National Commission against an Order passed by the State Commission in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction while deciding an Appeal arising out of an Order passed by the District Commission under Section 71 of the Act ?
34. Consequently the present Appeal is entertained on the aforesaid questions.
35. The Appeal is accordingly admitted under Section 51(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.
36. Issue notice to the Respondents to put in appearance and answer this Appeal on the question as framed herein above. The office shall register the same accordingly.
37. Further proceedings before the District Commission in Consumer Complaint No. 241 of 2021 shall remain stayed.
List on 30.07.2025."
9. The respondents put in appearance and raised an objection to the maintainability as referred to above and following order was passed on 30.07.2025:-
"The complainant has appeared in person. Advocate Ms. Tiksha Modi has appeared online and has invited the attention of the Bench to the order passed by this Commission in the case of Divya Chadri vs. President, Madhuvana House Building Society Ltd. 2022 SCC OnLine NCDRC 368 to urge that the ratio of the aforesaid decision squarely applies on the facts of the present case inasmuch an appeal under Section 51 (2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 would not be maintainable in proceedings arising out of an enforcement under Section 71 read with Section 72 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. Paragraph 7 of the said order is reproduced hereinunder: -
"7. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Housing Board (supra) has held that the Revision Petition U/S 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is not maintainable before this Commission which may be filed against an Order passed by the State Commission in Appeal arising out of the Execution Proceedings, as the Consumer Complaint is not pending. Principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Karnataka Housing Board (supra) would also be applicable to an Appeal preferred under Sub Section 2 of the Section 51 of the Act, 2019 for the simple reason that Section 51 of the Act, 2019 provides for filing an Appeal against an Order passed by the State Commission in exercise of its power conferred by Sub Clauses
(i) and (ii) of Clause (a) of Sub Section (1) of Section 47 of the Act 2019. Similarly, under Sub Clause (iii) of Clause (a) of Sub Section (1) of Section 47 of the Act 2019, the State Commission has been given jurisdiction to pass Order in an Appeal against the Orders of any District Commission within the State. Though, a First Appeal under Sub Section (1) of Section 51 of the Act, 2019, is not provided against an Order passed by the State Commission u/s 47 (1) (a) (iii) but a Second Appeal under Sub Section (2) of Section 51 of the Act, 2019 has been provided. It may be mentioned here that under Section 73 of the Act 2019, an Appeal has been provided against an Order passed by the District Commission under Sub Section (1) of Section 72 of the Act 2019, to the State Commission and if the Order is passed by the State Commission to the National Commission and further if the Order is passed by the National Commission to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Thus, the Order passed by the District Commission in Execution Proceedings has to be challenged before the State Commission only and thereafter, no further Appeal lies before this Commission as Complaint is not pending. The Principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Housing Board (Supra) will also apply to the Appeals arising out of Execution Proceedings."
Prima facie the said decision indicates an answer to the substantial questions framed by us under the order dated 23rd April, 2025. A copy of the said order has been handed over to the complainant in Court today. He may study the same and respond to it by the next date fixed. The complainant appears in person and therefore we also accordingly would like to indicate that in such matters where prima facie there is no remedy available under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, the Apex Court in the case of Ibrat Faizan vs. Omaxe Buildhome Pvt. Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 620 and Universal Sompo General Insurance Company Limited vs. Suresh Chand Jain, SLP No.5263/2023 decided on 26th July, 2023 has indicated the remedy available before the Constitutional Court having territorial jurisdiction in such matters.
List on 25.09.2025."
10. Written submissions have been prepared by the appellant who appeared in person and has tendered the same on 25.09.2025 vide diary No.25894 and the submissions made in paragraphs 3 & 4 are extracted herein under: -
"3. Jurisdictional Aspect - Section 38(8) Orders i. The interim order dated 17.09.2021 was passed under Section 38(8) of the Act.
ii. The scheme of the Act provides that any order of the District Commission, including interim orders, is appealable under Section 41 before the State Commission.
iii. If the Respondents were aggrieved by the interim order, their remedy was to file an appeal under Section 41 within the prescribed limitation. They failed to do so, and thus the order attained finality.
4. Improper Assumption of Review Jurisdiction: Once the order under Section 38(8) had attained finality, the District Commission, while hearing the enforcement application under Sections 71 and 72, had no jurisdiction to alter, vary, or dilute its own interim order. The District Commission's directions to the Appellant to deposit EMIs amounted to a review/alteration of its own interim order, which is impermissible.
It is respectfully submitted that:
1. The power of review/recall lies only under Section 40, and that too upon an application filed within limitation.
ii. The Respondents' application under Section 40 was time-barred.
iii. Therefore, the District Commission could not indirectly exercise review powers while deciding enforcement.
5. Distinction from Cited Case Law The Respondents rely upon Divya Chadri vs. Madhuvana House Building Society Ltd. (2022 SCC OnLine NCDRC 368) and Karnataka Housing Board (SC). However, both these authorities deal with cases where the main complaint had already been finally adjudicated, and only execution proceedings were pending. In such circumstances, no further appeal was found maintainable.
In contrast, in the present matter:
The main complaint is still pending before the District Commission, Muktsar.
il. The appeal is not against execution, but against an illegal modification of an interim order under Section 38(8) during enforcement.
ill. Thus, this appeal involves a substantial question of law: whether a District Commission can alter its own order during enforcement proceedings, contrary to the statutory scheme.
6. Enforcement Obligations under Sections 71 & 72: Sections 71 and 72 are clear that the District Commission must enforce its orders, and in case of disobedience, penalize the guilty party. The Commission's role is ministerial and supervisory in execution; it connot rewrite or re-cast its own earlier orders. By directing the Appellant to deposit EMIs, the District Commission exceeded its jurisdiction.
7. Why Section 51 Appeal Lies i. The order under challenge is not an execution order, but one that travels beyond execution and encroaches upon the substantive rights of the Appellant.
ii. Such orders, being without jurisdiction, are appealable under Section 51(2) & (3) of the Act.
iii. Since the State Commission has also dismissed the Appellant's challenge without addressing this core jurisdictional illegality, the Appellant has no remedy except to invoke the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Commission."
11. Responding to the same, learned counsel for the respondents - opposite parties has once again cited the decision of this Commission in the case of Divya Chadri vs. President, Madhuvana House Building Society Ltd. 2022 SCC OnLine NCDRC 368, paragraph-7 which is extracted herein under: -
"7. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Housing Board (supra) has held that the Revision Petition U/S 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is not maintainable before this Commission which may be filed against an Order passed by the State Commission in Appeal arising out of the Execution Proceedings, as the Consumer Complaint is not pending. Principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Karnataka Housing Board (supra) would also be applicable to an Appeal preferred under Sub Section 2 of the Section 51 of the Act, 2019 for the simple reason that Section 51 of the Act, 2019 provides for filing an Appeal against an Order passed by the State Commission in exercise of its power conferred by Sub Clauses (1) and (ii) of Clause (a) of Sub Section (1) of Section 47 of the Act 2019. Similarly, under Sub Clause (iii) of Clause (a) of Sub Section (1) of Section 47 of the Act 2019, the State Commission has been given jurisdiction to pass Order in an Appeal against the Orders of any District Commission within the State. Though, a First Appeal under Sub Section (1) of Section 51 of the Act, 2019, is not provided against an Order passed by the State Commission u/s. 47(1) (a) (iii) but a Second Appeal under Sub Section (2) of Section 51 of the Act, 2019 has been provided. It may be mentioned here that under Section 73 of the Act 2019, an Appeal has been provided against an Order passed by the District Commission under Sub Section (1) of Section 72 of the Act 2019, to the State Commission and if the Order is passed by the State Commission to the National Commission and further if the Order is passed by the National Commission to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Thus, the Order passed by the District Commission in Execution Proceedings has to be challenged before the State Commission only and thereafter, no further Appeal lies before this Commission as Complaint is not pending. The Principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Housing Board (Supra) will also apply to the Appeals arising out of Execution Proceedings."
12. It has been vehemently urged that the appeal is not maintainable as it arises out of the order dated 20.07.2023 passed by the District Commission that was on an application for enforcement under Section 71 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.
13. As noted above, the written submission as well as the oral submission of the complainant is that the District Commission had no jurisdiction to modify the order dated 17.09.2021 and therefore it acted beyond authority while disposing of the application under Section 71 of the Act by modifying it instead of compelling the respondents - opposite parties to disclose account statement for foreclosure that was directed by it on 17.09.2021. The complainant - appellant has urged that the very decision of the complaint rests on the correct disclosure of the foreclosure account which was intended under the order dated 17.09.2021 and therefore reversing the said direction in proceedings under Section 71 being impermissible, the order dated 20.07.2023 deserve to be corrected which the State Commission has failed to do.
14. The complainant has also urged that the decision which has been cited by the respondent - opposite party is a decision where the complaint had finally terminated after adjudication and orders had been passed in execution proceedings in a finally disposed of complaint whereas in the present case the complaint is still pending and therefore the said decision would not be applicable.
15. We have considered the submissions raised and we find that there cannot be any distinction with regard to the exercise of a jurisdiction whether it is a pending complaint or a finally decided complaint when orders of enforcement/execution are passed. In our opinion even if orders at the interim stage have been passed for enforcement or execution under Section 71 of the 2019 Act, the same principle would apply as in a disposed of complaint inasmuch as the enforcement or execution proceedings are separate procedures distinct from an order passed on a complaint.
16. The Apex Court has clarified the status of execution proceedings to be separate in the case of Karnataka Housing Board (supra). A revision would therefore not lie arising out of the impugned orders passed herein.
17. In the instant case also there is no appeal provided under the 2019 Act against an order passed under Section 71 of the Act. This aspect has been categorically dealt with by this Commission in the case of Divya Chadri (supra). It has been held that proceedings arising out of enforcement/execution cannot be made subject matter of second appeal under Section 51 (2) of the Act. We find no error in the conclusion drawn by this Commission in the aforesaid decision and we accordingly affirm the same.
18. We may point out that the contention of the appellant is that the District Commission has travelled beyond its jurisdiction to pass an order in an application pertaining to enforcement proceedings. Admittedly, the complaint is still pending and the District Commission is also empowered to pass such interim orders as may be necessary under Section 38 (8) of the 2019 Act. The interim order already passed by the District Commission may have been modified and then subsequently affirmed by the State Commission but we find that the State Commission has taken into consideration the circumstances which led to the dismissal of the appeal. The impugned order may have caused a concern which is subject to the final decision in the complaint and therefore even otherwise the matter should be left to be decided on merits by the District Commission itself and to draw inferences on the basis of the evidence on record including the correctness or otherwise of the correct statement of accounts for the purpose of foreclosure.
19. The complainant is correct in his submission that there are two parts of the order dated 20.07.2023 passed by the State Commission. The first is that the application under Section 71 has already been disposed of. The second part is that while disposing of the second application a mandatory injunction has been issued directing the complainant to make the deposits of the EMIs. This part of the order is being stated to be without jurisdiction.
20. In our opinion, the State Commission was entitled to entertain an appeal against this part of the order whereby a mandatory direction was given to the complainant to make the deposits of EMIs, which was an order under Section 38 (8) of the 2019 Act. The appellate forum while exercising powers as co-extensive authority to pass appropriate orders regarding interim matters and in such circumstances it cannot be said that the State Commission has acted without jurisdiction. Technically an order of mandatory command could not have been issued when the applicant/petitioner had moved an application for enforcement of an order under Section 71 of the 2019 Act. In fact the order has been passed which prejudices the petitioner as alleged by him. He was therefore well within his rights to challenge it in appeal but the order passed is a composite order in a proceeding arising out of an application for enforcement under Section 71 of the Act. The order of the District Commission was therefore partly appellable relating to the injunction order mandatory order that was passed by it but no appeal lies against that part of the order by which the application under Section 71 of the Act was disposed of. As a natural sequel to it, an appeal under Section 51 (2) would also not lie where the order arises out of a proceeding instituted under Section 71 of the Act as held by this Commission in the case of Divya Chadri (supra) and Universal Sompo General Insurance Company Limited (supra).
21. We may further point out that the Commission under the Consumer Protection Act does not have inherent powers or any inherent jurisdiction and it functions in accordance with the provisions of the Act under it. There is no provision for exercise of any suo motu power or exercise of any extraordinary jurisdiction which is only available with such Forums which are conferred with such powers by the legislature or possessed by the constitutional Courts, for example the High Court or the Apex Court. We may like to point out that the provisions of Letters Patent Appeal and Special Appeals against the orders of learned Single Judge before the High Court are amenable to the jurisdiction of a Division Bench before the High Courts in certain matters. Such jurisdictions have been created by the High Courts through the Rues framed and are exercised where they are conferred with such powers. An order passed by a learned Single Judge for being corrected is therefore amenable in a Letters Patent Appeal as per the Rules of the respective High Courts and if an order is passed in excess of jurisdiction, then also appeals are maintainable in some jurisdictions as explained in contempt matters in the case of Midnapore People's Cooperative Bank Ltd. & Ors. vs. Chunilal Nanda & Ors. (2006) 5 SCC 299 and followed in the case of Ajay Kumar Bhalla & Ors. vs. Prakash Kumar Dixit 2024 INSC 575. This Commission is not possessed of any such power and thus the remedy, if any, would be available as may be permissible under law and explained by the Apex Court in the case of Ibrat Faizan and Universal Sompo General Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra)
22. In the aforesaid circumstances the present appeal would also not be maintainable even if any substantial question arises as it emanates on an application for enforcement under Section 71 of the Act. In our considered opinion we had already expressed our prima facie view that the remedy available to the appellant would be in terms of decision of the Apex Court referred to in the order dated 30.07.2025 quoted hereinabove. We therefore hold the present appeal to be not maintainable for all the reasons given herein above, which is hereby dismissed with liberty to the appellant - complainant to approach the appropriate forum, which shall be without prejudice to his rights. The appeal is accordingly consigned.
..................J A. P. SAHI PRESIDENT ..................
BHARATKUMAR PANDYA MEMBER
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