Smt. Tara Rani Mondal And Ors vs State Of West Bengal & Ors on 26 August, 2025

 

Smt. Tara Rani Mondal And Ors vs State Of West Bengal & Ors on 26 August, 2025

Author: Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya

Bench: Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya

                                                                         2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB


                  IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
                 CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
                          APPELLATE SIDE

The Hon'ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
              And
The Hon'ble Justice Uday Kumar


                           WPLRT 362 of 2001
                                  with
                CAN 3 of 2016 (Old No: CAN 7771 of 2016)
                                  With
                CAN 4 of 2018 (Old No: CAN 1146 of 2018)
                                  With
                CAN 5 of 2018 (Old No: CAN 1148 of 2018

                       Smt. Tara Rani Mondal and Ors.
                                   Vs.
                       State of West Bengal & Ors.


For the Appellants                :     Mr. Gopal Ghosh, Snr. Adv.
                                        Mr. Arnab Roy
                                        Mr. Saibal Rakshit


For the State Respondents.        :     Mr. Chandi Charan De,

Ld. Addl. Govt. Pleader, Mr. Soumitra Bandyopadhyay, Ld. Sr. Govt. Adv., Ms. Suchanda Banerjee Heard on : 13.08.2025, 14.08.2025 19.08.2025 Hearing concluded on : 19.08.2025 Judgment on : 26.08.2025 Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-

1. The present proceeding arises out of a judgment passed by the Second Bench (in charge of First Bench) of the West Bengal Land Reforms and 2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB Tenancy Tribunal in TA No.2023 of 2000 (LRTT), whereby the challenge thrown by the petitioners against a notice dated April 24, 1995 issued by the Revenue Officer under Section 14T (6) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the "1955 Act"), was turned down. Initially, the said notice was challenged by way of a writ petition, giving rise to CO no.12726(W) of 1995 which was subsequently transferred to the Tribunal, under Section 9 of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997, and renumbered as TA No.2023 of 2000 (LRTT).

2. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners argues that the impugned notice was barred by the principle of res judicata. In earlier proceedings, the issue had been settled finally. Initially, in a proceeding under the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 (hereinafter refer to as the "1953 Act"), the quantum of land which stood vest in the State was decided in respect of the predecessor-in-interest of the present petitioners. While doing so, the land in respect of which a trust was created in favour of a deity was left out of the purview of the consideration.

3. In a subsequent proceeding under Section 14T(3) of the 1955 Act, the Revenue Officer, determined the ceiling area of the raiyat and observed that the land of the debuttar property, vested in the idol, was also declared to be absolute under the 1953 Act and was not taken into account and it was observed that the income from the debuttar property was not being enjoyed by the raiyat's family. Upon such conclusive 2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB adjudication having already been effected, it is argued that the subsequent notice under Section 14T (6) of the 1955 Act was redundant and not maintainable in law. It is argued that the self-same issue cannot be reopened repeatedly.

4. Learned senior counsel places reliance on the judgment of Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti & Ors.Vs State of West Bengal & Ors., reported at (1996) 2 CLJ 285, rendered by a Division Bench of this Court, the legality of which has been challenged and is now pending before a larger bench of this Court.

5. Learned senior counsel argues that by necessary implication, the Division Bench held Section 14M (5) to be ultra vires. By the said provision, the lands owned by a trust or endowment other than that of a public nature shall be deemed to be lands owned by the author of the trust or endowment, who shall be deemed to be a raiyat under the Act to the extent of his share in the said lands, and the share of such author in the said lands shall be taken into account for calculating the area of lands owned and retainable by such author and for determining his ceiling area.

6. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners places particular reliance on paragraphs 189 and 190 of the said judgment, where the Division Bench categorically observed that where a person dedicated its property in favour of an idol by creating a private trust or a public trust, the idol becomes the owner thereof. Once a trust or an idol becomes a raiyat for the purpose of the 1955 Act, the question of divesting its interest and 2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB creating an interest in respect of the lands owned by it in the author of the trust, in the opinion of the court, could not be sustained.

7. Learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioners next cites Anil Baran Nandi v. State of West Bengal and Ors., reported at (1992) CHN 32, in support of the proposition that where an order under Section 14T(3) of the 1955 Act attained its finality with the expiry of the limitation period for preferring an appeal under Section 54, read with Section 55 of the 1955 Act, the said order could not be reopened under Section 14T(3A) of the Act as well.

8. Learned senior counsel next cites Shri Shri Dayaleshwar Mahadeb Jew and others v. Junior Land Reforms Officer, Balrughat, reported at (1984) 1 CHN 104, in support of the proposition that once a Revenue Officer, upon consideration of all relevant materials and evidence, has come to a definite finding and conclusion in the proceeding under Section 44(2a) and Section 6(1)(i) of the 1953 Act and has granted relief, such finding and conclusion are binding on the Revenue Officer deciding a similar issue under the provisions of Section 14T of the 1955 Act. The learned Single Judge held that there must be some finality in the judgments and orders passed by the Revenue Officers and such an officer should not be allowed to come to a contrary finding or conclusion on an identical issue determined earlier by another Revenue Officer under the 1953 Act, unprovoked by any knowledge of any new fact or law coming to him.

9. The learned Single Judge further held in the said report that under the deed of Arpannama in the said case, the properties mentioned therein 2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB had absolutely vested in the deities, who were raiyats within the meaning of Section 2(10) and were entitled to retain so much of the land as permissible under Clause (e) of Section 14N(1). The property which had been dedicated to the deities vested in the deities themselves as juristic persons, who cannot be treated as the members of the family of the Shebait.

10. Learned senior counsel further relies on State of W.B. and Ors. v. Atis Chandra Sinha and Ors reported at (2000) 10 SCC 376 where it was held that the mere fact that the trustees or Shebaits may not be utilising the income for the purpose for which it was meant to be used, cannot detract from the fact that the debuttar was established wholly and exclusively for religious or charitable purposes.

11. Learned senior counsel, thus, contends that in view of the proposition laid down in Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti1 (supra), which has not yet been upset, no enquiry could be initiated under Section 14T(6) of the 1955 Act to ascertain whether a trust holding land is a public or a private trust, which would necessarily entail a reopening of the conclusively decided issue as to what portion of the land would vest in the State and what the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners (now the petitioners) will be entitled to retain within the ceiling limit.

Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti & Ors.Vs State of West Bengal & Ors. reported at (1996) 2 CLJ 285, 2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB

12. Learned Additional Government Pleader (AGP), while controverting the arguments of the petitioners, submits that the power of revision stems from Section 14T (3A) of the 1955 Act, which vests on the Revenue Officer the authority to reopen even a conclusive determination under Section 14T(3) of the said Act. An enquiry of similar nature as that under Section 14T (6) of the 1955 Act was not envisaged under Section 6(1)(i) of the 1953 Act. Thus, the notice under Section 14T (6) is on an entirely different footing than the previous adjudication under the 1953 Act.

13. Learned AGP next argues that Section 14T (8) of the 1955 Act starts with a non-obstante clause, thereby, irrespective of the provisions of the 1953 Act or any other law for the time being in force, as well as any agreement, custom or usage or decree, judgement, decision or award of any court, tribunal or authority, confers retrospective effect on the provisions of sub-sections (5), (6) and (7)of Section 14T of the 1955 Act from May 5, 1953.

14. Section 14T (9) of the 1955 Act categorically provides that the rule of res judicata shall not apply to such cases of re-opening and fresh determination under sub-sections (5) to (8) of Section 14T. Thus, the contention of the writ petitioners that the impugned notice is barred by the principle of res judicata is not tenable in the eye of law.

15. Learned AGP next submits that a composite reading of sub-Sections (5) and (6) of Section 14M clearly shows that whereas public trusts and charitable/religious endowments have been treated as raiyats for the purpose of retention of land under the 1955 Act, private trusts and 2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB charitable/religious endowments have been left out of the purview of the definition of raiyats. As a necessary consequence, the land made over in the name of deities under private trusts and endowments would be treated to be the land of the author of the trust/endowment for the purpose of calculation of the ceiling limit. It is argued that Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti2 (supra) did not consider the effect of Section 14M (6).

16. It is submitted that the nature of the three proceedings-in-question are different. Whereas the first proceeding was under Section 6(1)(i) of the 1953 Act, the second notice was issued under Section 14T(3) of the 1955 Act. It is argued that Section 14T(3A) stands on an entirely different footing, permitting the Revenue Officer to reopen all questions decided previously under Section 14T(3).

17. Learned AGP contends that the impugned (third) notice was issued for inquiry under Section 14T (6), which is under a different provision and also stands on a different footing than the earlier notices/proceedings. Such notice does not contemplate an adjudication under Section 14T (3). Hence, it is argued that the learned Tribunal rightly dismissed the challenge against the impugned notice.

18. Upon hearing learned counsel, the Court comes to the following findings:

Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti & Ors.Vs State of West Bengal & Ors. reported at (1996) 2 CLJ 285, 2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB I) Res-judicata.

19. The first question which arises for consideration is whether the impugned notice under Section 14T (6) of the 1955 Act was barred by the principle of res judicata. Sub-section (9) of Section 14T categorically provides that sub-sections (5) to (8) of the said Section shall be deemed to have always been inserted in the 1953 Act and that any officer specially empowered in this behalf under the 1953 Act or under the provisions of the 1955 Act may, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sections (5) to (8), reopen and decide afresh any proceeding, case or dispute in relation to determination of total land held by an intermediary or a raiyat or an under-raiyat at any point of time or may determine the quantum of land which such persons are entitled to retain and may also determine the extent of land which is to vest to the State and take possession of the same, in accordance with the provisions of Section 14SS of the 1955 Act.

20. More importantly, sub-Section (9) clearly stipulates that notwithstanding any judgment, decision or award of any court, Tribunal or authority to the contrary, the rule of res judicata shall not apply to such cases of reopening and fresh determination.

21. Sub-section (9) of Section 14T has not been held to be ultra vires, either in Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti3 (supra) or otherwise, till date. Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti & Ors.Vs State of West Bengal & Ors. reported at (1996) 2 CLJ 285, 2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB The question which is to be considered is whether the principle of res judicata, a doctrine entrenched in proceedings of a civil nature or quasi- civil nature can be negated by a statutory provision.

22. To answer the same, the court has to be conscious of the distinction between a challenge to an executive action and a statute promulgated by the legislature. Whereas, in the former case, the tests would be on a more lenient footing, permitting the court, under Article 226 of the Constitution, to assess whether the executive action is violative of any basic tenet of Indian law or principle of natural justice and/or a fundamental policy of Indian law, while testing the vires or effect of a statute, the anvil has to be on a much higher footing. The court, unlike the legislature, is not an elected body representing the aspirations of the polity. Whereas the legislature can take policy decisions as to what doctrines or legal principles may be adopted or negated in a piece of legislation, the High Courts, under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot declare the law but have to test the provisions of a law on the yardstick of constitutionality. Whereas the Supreme Court, under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, can pass orders which have the effect of the law of the land, such luxury is not available to a High Court.

23. In such backdrop, it cannot be said that a piece of legislation would be unconstitutional or ultra vires due to negation of a principle of law followed in civil cases by courts, that is, the principle of res judicata in the present instance.

2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB

24. The Legislature may, in its wisdom, curtail the operation of the principle of res judicata by enacting a law, just as it has recognized the doctrine in case of civil suits by introduction of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Merely by such enactment, it cannot be said that any Constitutional provision or cardinal principle of natural justice has been violated. Thus, we are of the considered view that by enacting sub- section (9) of section 14T, which was introduced by the amendment of 1981 with effect from March 24, 1986, the legislature was well within its competence to do away with the doctrine of res judicata in case of reopening and fresh determination under sub-sections (5) to (8) of section 14T of the 1925 Act, at least insofar as lateral operation of the same is concerned.

25. By "lateral operation" we mean it would operate between adjudications of different Revenue Officers, who are on the same stratum of administrative and quasi-judicial hierarchy. However, we would have some doubt as to how far a State legislation can do away with the doctrine of res judicata when it seeks to curtail the finality of a decree passed by a civil court of competent jurisdiction or any Constitutional Court, since in such event the vertical hierarchy of jurisdiction, binding effect and finality of judgments, as contemplated by the Constitution, would be hit. Also, such a provision would then be in direct conflict with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, a Central piece of legislation governing civil procedure. However, let such consideration 2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB remain a footnote for posterity, since the said question has not fallen for consideration directly before us in the present case.

26. Hence, the principle of res judicata is not applicable at all, insofar as the previous adjudication under Section 14T (3) by an earlier Revenue Officer in respect of the land held of the predecessor-in-interest of the writ petitioners is concerned.

27. That apart, the first adjudication was under Section 6 of the 1953 Act, which is on an entirely different footing than the 1955 Act. By virtue of sub-section (8) of section 14T of the 1955 Act, the provisions of sub- section (6) of the said Section has been given retrospective effect from May 5, 1953, co-extensive with the 1953 Act. Sub-section (9) further strengthens such position by stipulating that sub-section (6) shall be deemed to have always been inserted in the 1953 Act. The said sub- section specifically enumerates that any officer specially empowered on this behalf under the provisions of the 1953 Act or the 1955 Act may, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (6), reopen and decide afresh any proceeding, case or dispute in relation to determination of total land held by a raiyat or may determine the quantum of land which such raiyat is entered to retain and the portion which would vest in the State.

28. Even under Section 14T (3A), which was introduced by the 1978 Amendment to the 1955 Act, the Revenue Officer may, on of his own motion and after giving the raiyat an opportunity being heard, revise an order made under sub-section (3) and determine afresh the extent of 2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB land which is to vest in the State under Section 14S and take possession of such land.

29. With utmost respect, the ratio laid down in Anil Baran (supra)4 by the learned Single judge of this Court, being patently contrary to the provision of Section 14T of the 1955 Act, in particular sub-sections (6), (8) and (9) thereof, which were not considered by the learned Single Judge, is hereby held to be per incuriam.

30. In any event, the learned Single judge, in Anil Baran Nandi (supra), equated the reopening of a determination under Section 14T (3) by virtue of Section 14T (3A) to an appeal under Section 54 against the determination under Section 14T(3). Such a view, in our humble opinion, is patently contrary to the law. Sub-section (7) of Section 14T, also introduced by the Amendment Act of 1981 with effect from March 24, 1986, categorically provides for distinct and separate appeals under Sections 54 against orders made under sub-sections (3), (3A), (5) or (6) of the said Section. Thus, since a separate appeal has been provided against an order under sub-section (3A), thus permitting the opening of a new chapter, an order under sub-section (3A) itself cannot be equated with an appeal under Section 54 against an order under sub-section (3). Otherwise, an appeal against an order passed under Section 14T (3A) would be akin to a second appeal against an order under Section 14T (3). The very scheme of the statute would be defeated if such a view is taken, since, just as an adjudication under sub-section (3) is amenable to Anil Baran Nandi v. State of West Bengal and Ors., reported at (1992) CHN 32 2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB appeal under Section 54, a reopening of the same under Section 3A, being an independent proceeding, is also amenable to a separate appeal under Section 54.

31. Thus, the proceedings operate on parallel and different footings and an order under sub-section (3A) cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be treated on the same footing as an appeal under Section 54 against a sub-section (3) adjudication, thereby importing the limitation for an appeal under Section 54 against a Section 14T (3) order to a redetermination under Section 14T (3A), where the statute does not provide any limitation for the latter. As such, the very premise of the proposition laid down in Anil Baran Nandi (supra), with deepest respect, is contrary to the eco-system contemplated under Section 14T of the 1955 Act.

32. Coming to the judgment of Shri Shri Dayaleshwar Mahadeb Jew (supra)5, the said judgment was delivered on January 11, 1984, before the newly amended provisions of sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 14M were introduced with effect from March 24, 1986 by the 1981 Amendment. As on the date of the said judgement, Section 14M(5) provided that the lands own by a trust or endowment other than that of a public nature shall be deemed to be lands owned by the "beneficiary" under the trust or endowment and each such "beneficiary" shall be deemed to be a raiyat under the 1955 Act to the extent of the share of his beneficial Shri Shri Dayaleshwar Mahadeb Jew and others v. Junior Land Reforms Officer, Balrughat, reported at (1984) 1 CHN 104 2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB interest. The learned Single Judge held on the premise of such definition that where the deed of Arpannama absolutely vested the property in the deities, the deities became raiyats and were entitled to retain the land within the ceiling limit and, as such, the concept of beneficiary enunciated under the then sub-section (5) of Section 14M would not apply.

33. However, the said premise itself has been altered by the Amendment of 1981, which was published in the Calcutta Gazette on March 24, 1986, with retrospective effect from August 7, 1969. The newly amended sub- section (5) of Section 14M provides that the lands owned by a trust or endowment other than that of a public nature, shall be deemed to be lands owned by the "author" of the trust or endowment and such "author" shall be deemed to be a raiyat under the Act. The replacement of the word "beneficiary" by the expression "author" brought a sea change in the provision, invalidating the very basis of the judgment in Shri Shri Dayaleshwar Mahadeb Jew (supra)6. By virtue of sub-section (5), as newly amended, the land owned by a religious endowment of a private nature would be considered to be the land of the author of the endowment or trust, for the purpose of calculating ceiling limits and retention. Thus, the ratio laid down in the said judgment is also not applicable in the present context.

Shri Shri Dayaleshwar Mahadeb Jew and others v. Junior Land Reforms Officer, Balrughat, reported at (1984) 1 CHN 104 2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB

34. The writ petitioners also rely on Atis Chandra Sinha's case, in which the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of Section 6 (1) (i) of the 1953 Act. There is not a whisper in the said judgment that any of the provisions of the 1955 Act was either argued or adjudicated upon in the said judgment. Thus, proposition laid down there cannot be considered to be a binding precedent in the context of Sections 14M and 14T of the 1955 Act.

35. In such view of the matter, we hereby come to the conclusion that the impugned notice under Section 14T (6) of the 1955 Act, was not barred by res judicata.

ii) Whether the land held by a deity / idol by virtue of a private trust/religious endowment can be deemed to be the land owned by its author for the purpose of vesting.

36. Much has been argued by the writ petitioners on Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti7 (supra). However, the Division Bench, in the said judgment, stopped short of holding Section 14M(5), or Section 14T, sub-sections (5) to (9), of the 1955 Act, ultra vires.

37. In paragraph 189 of the said judgment, the Division Bench formed an opinion that once a trust or an idol, be it private or public, becomes a raiyat for the purpose of the 1955 Act, the question of divesting its interest and creating an interest in respect of the lands owned by it in the author of the trust cannot be sustained. The Division Bench, going Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti & Ors.Vs State of West Bengal & Ors. reported at (1996) 2 CLJ 285, 2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB beyond the provisions of the Act, carved out an exception to such proposition, to the effect that in a given case where a private trust has been created in order to avoid ceiling limit, the appropriate authority may become entitled to tear the veil, with a view to find out as to whether the trust-in-question is a genuine trust or not and only in the event of a finding that the trust-in-question is not a genuine trust but has been created for the purpose of evading the ceiling area, the Revenue Officer may hold that in truth and substance the author of the trust is the owner.

38. With due respect, the said proposition is patently contrary to sub- sections (5) to (9) of Section 14T as well as Section 14M, sub-sections (5) and (6). Since the said provisions were not declared ultra vires by the Division Bench in the said judgment, we have to go by the said provisions and treat the observations made therein not binding as a precedent.

39. The above view is bolstered by the observations in paragraph 135 of Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti8 (supra) itself. The Division Bench found therein that the principle of res judicata is founded on considerations of high public policy. While holding so, the Court considered examples where a decree passed in a civil suit or an order of the writ court could not be ignored by the Revenue Officer. Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti & Ors.Vs State of West Bengal & Ors. reported at (1996) 2 CLJ 285, 2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB

40. However, in the present case, we are not discussing a scenario where a civil court has passed a decree or a writ court has taken a decision which is sought to be reopened by the Revenue Officer. The principle of res judicata in the context of the present case is on a lateral footing, between an earlier finding under Section 14T (3) and a still-prior finding under Section 6 of the 1953 Act on the one hand and an inquiry under Section 14T (6) on the other. The concept of res judicata, in the sense as discussed in paragraph 135 of Paschimbanga Bhumijibi (supra), was hierarchically vertical; the decree of a Civil Court or an order of a Writ Court, passed by courts of superior jurisdiction, being binding on a Revenue Officer in quasi-judicial proceedings. As opposed thereto, in the present case, we are dealing with a "Revenue Officer vs. Revenue Officer"

situation. That apart, in its conclusion enumerated in paragraph 135 of the said report, the Division Bench clearly came to the conclusion that section 14T(6) of the 1955 Act has to be read down so as to confer jurisdiction upon the Revenue Officer only to the extent that question may be reopened only when it is necessary to give effect to the provisions of 1981 and 1986 Amendment Acts and not otherwise.(emphasis supplied).

41. Even if we go by the said proposition, the notice issued under Section 14T (6) was specifically for the purpose of giving effect to the 1981 Amendment Act, since sub-section (6) of Section 14T was itself inserted by the 1981 Amendment to the 1955 Act, notified on March 24, 1986. Even if we construe such notice to be a precursor of a fresh adjudication under section 14T(3A), we have to read the same in the context of sub-

2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB sections (7), (8) and (9) of Section 14T, all of which were inserted by the 1981 Amendment, with effect from March 24, 1986. Sub-section (7) provides parallel appeals from orders under sub-sections (3), (3A), (5) and (6), thus giving equal place of honour to all the said sub-sections, recognising them as adjudications independent of each other.

42. Again, sub-section (8) minces no words by introducing a non obstante clause with regard to anything contained in the 1953 Act or any other law for the time being in force, as well as any agreement, custom or usage or decree, judgment, decision or award of any court, Tribunal or authority, thus conferring on it the highest protection possible, while providing that the provisions of sub-sections (5), (6) and (7) shall operate with retrospective effect from May 5, 1953, co-extensively and contemporaneously with the 1953 Act.

43. Such position is further strengthened by sub-section (9), which is also a product of the 1981 Amendment of the 1955 Act, which speaks about sub-sections (5) to (8) of Section 14T being deemed to have always been inserted in the 1953 Act. Under sub-section (9), a Revenue Officer empowered under the 1953 as well as the 1955 Acts may reopen and decide afresh any proceeding, case or dispute in relation to determination of total land held by a raiyat vis-à-vis vesting and retention. The rule of res judicata, it is provided in sub-section (9), shall not apply to any such case of reopening and fresh determination.

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44. Thus, even going by the proposition laid down in paragraph 135 of Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti9 (supra), a notice can be issued by a Revenue Officer to the extent that prior adjudication/order/proceedings may be reopened to give effect to the provisions of the 1981 and 1986 Amendment Acts. That is precisely what has been done in the instant case.

45. Thus, the reliance of the petitioners on Paschimbanga Bhumijibi (supra) in such context is entirely misplaced.

46. As held above, the other judgments cited by the writ petitioners are not germane in the context of the present adjudication and as such, need not be discussed further. Thus, this issue is also decided against the writ petitioners. We hereby arrive at the finding that the land owned by a private trust/religious endowment in favour of a deity or idol can very well be treated to be the land owned by its author as a raiyat.

47. The entire scheme of Section 14M, between sub-sections (5) and (6) thereof, read with section 14T, sub-sections (5) to (9), lean in favour of such an interpretation. Whereas sub-section (6) of Section 14M recognizes a public trust or institution, exclusively for a charitable or religious purpose, to be a raiyat under the 1955 Act, entitled to retain lands, sub-section (5) distinguishes and carves out an exception for such a trust or endowment of a private nature, since the lands owned by such Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti & Ors.Vs State of West Bengal & Ors. reported at (1996) 2 CLJ 285, 2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB trusts would be deemed to be owned by the author/raiyat for the purpose of vesting and retention.

48. Even otherwise, the classification between private and public religious trusts/endowments cannot be said to be ex facie unreasonable. We say this because whereas in the case of a public religious endowment, there is an element of enjoyment of the usufructs of the trust by the public at large, thus opening up the benefits of the land owned by the trust to all and sundry, as opposed thereto, in case of a private trust or religious endowment, the deity is merely the name-lender, while, for all practical purposes, the usufructs of the property of the deity is enjoyed by the author of the trust or his family or chosen insiders. Hence, from a pragmatic perspective, although a private religious endowment in favour of an idol notionally vests the property in the idol, the benefits thereof are enjoyed entirely by the raiyat and his family who authored the trust, as opposed to a public religious endowment/trust.

49. We would be failing in our duty if we do not take note of the fact that even in Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti10 (supra), the Division Bench took note of the prior judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar and Ors., reported at 1956 SCC OnLine SC 12, wherein it was observed that it is only in an ideal sense that the idol is the owner of the endowed properties, as it cannot make Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti & Ors.Vs State of West Bengal & Ors. reported at (1996) 2 CLJ 285, 2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB itself use of them nor can enjoy or dispose of the same or even protect them. It was further held therein that an idol can have no beneficial interest in the endowment. However, the Division Bench, while taking note of the said judgment and reiterating the proposition that an idol is a perpetual minor, held that the terminology is not correct. Despite holding that the idol cannot enjoy the property itself or dispose of the same unless the persons managing the affairs think it fit to do so, the Division Bench, in Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti11 (supra), deviated and held that it does not mean that a body corporate or an idol would not be entitled to own the property.

50. With utmost respect, the comparison between a body corporate and an idol is a comparison between entities of completely different genres. A corporate entity is governed by specific corporate laws, be it company law or otherwise, and has its own framework and eco-system of asserting its power and authority as a juristic entity. It is unheard of that a company or a corporation has been equated by any Constitutional Court of India with a perpetual minor. Rather, a company not only holds property in its own name but can itself be a shareholder in other companies and assert its own rights in various ways.

Paschimbanga Bhumijibi Krishak Samiti & Ors.Vs State of West Bengal & Ors. reported at (1996) 2 CLJ 285, 2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB

51. An idol, on the other hand, does not have a legal and corporate presence, represented by a matrix whose coordinates are governed by specific laws and has checks and bounds in their operation.

52. An idol, apart from the faith and belief of its devotees, is an inanimate physical object, which does not have any legal authority to assert anything or protect itself or its property. Whereas a corporate body has its own legal checks and bounds to protect its property and has an active influence in the commercial world, an idol/deity is merely the focal point of the faith and belief of its believers and a mere façade for the activities of its Shebaits or persons in charge of it. Seen from such perspective, an idol is actually a "perpetual minor", which is an apt terminology in our humble opinion, unlike a corporate juristic entity.

53. Thus, we find that there is a reasonable basis of the classification drawn between a private religious trust or endowment and that of a public religious trust or endowment vis-a-vis the land held by them for the purpose of calculating the quantum of land for the purpose of vesting/ceiling limits and retention. Having said so, we do not find any reason to find fault with the legislative intent behind introducing sub- sections (5) and (6) of Section 14M and sub-sections (5) to (9) of Section 14T of the 1955 Act, and making such provisions co-extensive with the temporal span of the 1953 Act.

54. In view of the above observations, we find no illegality and/or infirmity in the impugned judgment of the Tribunal, whereby the notice dated April 24, 1995 under Section 14T(6) of the 1955 Act was upheld.

2025:CHC-AS:1639-DB

55. Accordingly, WPLRT No.362 of 2001 is dismissed on contest, thereby affirming the judgment dated February 27, 2001 passed by the Second Bench (in charge of the First Bench) of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal in TA No. 2023 of 2000, (LRTT) [previously CO No. 12726 (W) of 1995]. The impugned notice issued in connection with Suo Motu Case No. 6 of 1995, dated April 24, 1995, issued by the Revenue Officer attached to the office of the Sub-Divisional Land and Land Reforms Officer, Asansol, is hereby upheld.

56. The connected applications, bearing CAN 3 of 2016 (Old No: CAN 7771 of 2016), CAN 4 of 2018 (Old No: CAN 1146 of 2018) and CAN 5 of 2018 (Old No: CAN 1148 of 2018), are disposed of consequentially.

57. There will be no order as to costs.

58. Urgent certified server copies, if applied for, be issued to the parties upon compliance of due formalities.

(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.) I agree.

(Uday Kumar, J.)