Sethia Oil Industries Limited & Anr vs State Of West Bengal & Ors on 6 May, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Rai Chattopadhyay
W.P. No. 17846 (W) of 2012
&
W.P. No. 11513 (W) of 2019
Sethia Oil Industries Limited & Anr.
Vs.
State of West Bengal & Ors.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Jai Kr. Surana
: Mr. D. Surana
: Mr. Abhimonyu Roy
For the State : Mr. Amal Kr. Sen, ld. AGP
: Mr. Lal Mohan Basu
(...in WPA 17846 of 2012)
: Mr. Amal Kr. Sen, ld. AGP
: Mr. Suman Ghosh,
: Ms. Munmun Tewari,
(...in WPA 11513 of 2019)
For the respondent, RMC,Purba Bardhaman : Mr. Supriyo Chattapadhyay
(...in WPA 17846 of 2012 &
WPA 11513 of 2019)
For the respondent no. 3 : Ms. Sutapa Sanyal
: Mr. Debrup Bhattacharjee
: Mr. Pradip Kr. Tulsiyan
Judgment on : 05/05/2025
Rai Chattopadhyay, J. :-
(1) Two writ petitions being W.P. No. 17846(w) of 2012 and W.P. No. 11513(w) of 2019 are taken up together for disposal by dint of this common judgment, as the two are connected and deal with the same subject matter, which is as follows;
(2) The subject matter of challenge in W.P.No. 17846(w) of 2012 are the two notifications being (i) No. 429-M.W&C/9M-9/2000 dated January 29, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as No.429) and (ii) No. 2537-M.W.&C/1M-05/99(Pt.1) dated August 22, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as No.2537).
(3) By way of amendment of the said writ petition, the petitioner has further challenged the West Bengal Act XXVII of 2014 being the West Bengal Agricultural Produce (Regulation) (Amendment) Act, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act of 2014 or the 2014 Amendment Act) and the West Bengal Act XVI of 2017 being the West Bengal Agricultural Produce (Regulation) (Amendment) Act, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act of 2017 or the 2017 Amendment Act).
(4) The subject matter of challenge in W.P. No. 11513 (w) of 2019, is the assessment order dated June 30, 2016, issued by the Secretary, Purba Bardhaman Zila Regulated Marketing Committee/respondent no. 6 therein and the impugned order dated May 16, 2019, issued by the Director Agriculture (Marketing) and Ex-officio Additional Director of Agricultural (Marketing)/respondent No. 2. The writ petitioners have prayed for quashing of both of the said impugned orders.
(5) The question involved in these writ petitions is that if the amendments introduced to the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act 1972, bereft of any assent of the President of India and with that of the Governor of the State, is ultra vires the Constitution of India, or not. Also that, in that event, whether the subsequent notifications issued under the provisions of the said Amendment Acts should be termed as illegal and be set aside or not. The other question required to be determined is in that event whether the concerned respondents would be eligible to issue the impugned assessment orders as mentioned above and if the same would be liable to be set aside or not.
(6) Let the relevant facts of the case necessary for adjudication of the writ petitions, be narrated in a nutshell. The petitioners are engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of rice bran oil namely "Rice Gold" and de-oiled rice bran as its by-product. They do their business from the factory situated at district Burdwan, in the state of West Bengal.
(7) So far as the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act 1972, is concerned, rice oil or rice bran oil has not been a part of the same to come within its purview, before introduction of the Notification No. 429, by the Department of Agriculture, Government of West Bengal, on January 29, 2002. Notification No. 429 says that in exercise of power conferred by sub-section 1(a) of section 2 of the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 (West Bengal Act XXXV of 1972), the Governor includes the item "rice oil" in the schedule of the said Act of 1972. It has been mentioned that the inclusion as above was for the purpose of the market committees to raise fees under section 1 of the said Act.
(8) By issuance of the notification No. 2537, on August 22, 2008, the Governor in exercise of power conferred under section 3(3) of the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act 1972, has enforced the provisions of the said Act of 1972, in the Sadar and part of Durgapur sub-division, in the district Burdwan.
(9) The following amendment has been carried out vide the Amendment Act of 2014:
"2. In sub-section (1) of section 2 of the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act).-
(1) for clause (a), the following clause shall be substituted:
*(a) "agricultural produce" means any produce, whether processed or unprocessed of agriculture, horticulture, apiculture, pisciculture, sericulture, livestock and products of livestock, animal husbandry. fleeces (raw wool) and skins of animals, forest produce and any related and secondary product or by-product and combination of two or more than two of such produce as specified in the Schedule Provided that the State Government may, by notification, include in, or exclude from, any item of agricultural produce in the Schedule;"
(10) Thus, processed or unprocessed agricultural produce or by- products thereof has been introduced within the definition of agricultural produce, by dint of the said Amendment Act of 2014.
(11) 2017 Amendment Act introduces "All vegetable oils" in the schedule of the said Act, along with other oils including "Rice oil", as against the category "Oils", to be meant as the agricultural produce, under section 2(1)(a) of the said Act.
(12) On this background, the respondents issue the said two orders dated June 30, 2016 and May 16, 2019, against the petitioners, holding the petitioner company to be liable to pay the fees under the said Act (as amended) and assessing the fees payable by it.
(13) As stated earlier, the writ petitioners have challenged the vires of the said Amendment Acts of 2014 and 2017 and also of the notifications No. 429 and 2537 and challenged the legality and maintainability of the two orders dated June 30, 2016 and May 16, 2019, in these writ petitions.
(14) The petitioners are represented by Mr.Dutta, learned senior counsel, being assisted by Mr.Chakraborty, Mr. Surana and Mr.Roy learned advocates. Firstly, the petitioners have challenged the two Amendment Acts of 2014 and 2017 respectively, those being allegedly ultra vires of the Constitution of India. It is stated that the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act 1972 and the amendments thereof vide Amendment Acts of 1977 and 1981 respectively, were introduced with the previous sanction of the President of India. In case of the Amendment Acts of 2014 as well as that of 2017 respectively, the assent of the President of India has not been obtained but the same have been promulgated with consent of the Governor of the State. It is stated that according to Article 301 of the Part-XIII of the Constitution of India, trade, commerce and intercourse would be free through out the country, excepting subject to the other provisions of Part-XIII thereof. Article 302 empowers the Parliament to impose restrictions on freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse between States or within any part of the country as may be required in public interest. Likewise, Article 304(b) has empowered the State Legislatures to impose reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse, within the State as may be required in public interest. The Proviso to Article 304(b) states that no bill or amendment shall be introduced or moved in the State Legislature without the previous sanction of the President of India. On the basis of these provisions, it's the contention of the petitioners that sanction by the President of India has been mandated by the Constitution, for the State Legislature to impose reasonable restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse within the State. Thus, the State Legislature is incompetent to bring in any amendment as to the provisions of the Act of 1972, without the previous sanction of the President of India. It has been emphasised that so far as the Amendment Acts of 1977 and 1981 are concerned, there would not be any illegality in the same, those having been introduced with the assent of the President. The subsequent Amendment Acts of 2014 and 2017 having not been introduced through the similar process and with the assent of the Governor of the State only, would be ultra vires to the Proviso to Article 304(b) of the Constitution, which mandates that n7o amendment should be introduced or moved in the State Legislature without the previous sanction of the President. Hence, therefore introduction of processed or unprocessed agricultural produce or by-products thereof within the purview of the definition of agricultural produce and introduction of "Rice Oil" in the schedule of the said Act, has been challenged, being ultra vires the Constitution. Consequently, assessment of fees as per the provisions of the said Act (as amended) against the petitioners has also been challenged.
(15) Secondly, the petitioners say that the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act 1972 has been promulgated with the object to regulate buying and selling of the agricultural produce by establishing markets for agricultural produce in the State of West Bengal. The petitioners say that they are not in a business of buying and selling of the agricultural produce in market. That, the amendments to bring into the processed goods or the rice oil within the purview of the said Act, being ultra vires, the petitioner cannot be considered to be within the purview of the said Act and is liable for payment of any fees as prescribed thereunder. That, for the said reason provisions of the said Act of 1972 (as amended) cannot be made applicable in their case. That hence, the notices issued against the petitioner company, demanding fees in terms of the said amended Act, are also illegal.
(16) The petitioners have argued further that 'agricultural product' would mean a product of cultivation or rural industry cultivation of land. In this regard the petitioners have referred to a judgment of Privy Council reported in 1948 AC 210 (at pg. 214). They say that the rice bran oil, as produced by them is a factory produce and cannot be construed to be an 'agricultural produce' as defined in the said Act. They have elaborated the different stages through which the rice bran oil is produced from its raw form, which is paddy (and an 'agricultural produce', in terms of the said Act), are summarised as below:
1. Paddy (agricultural produce) is a produce of cultivation.
2. Paddy is reached to rice mill by farmers or traders.
3. Rice mill segregates paddy into husk, rice and bran.
4. Bran is sold to solvent extraction plant which extract oil from bran and produces crude rice bran oil and De-Oil Rice Bran (used as cattle feed).
5. Crude rice bran oil is sold to refineries like that of the petitioner.
6. While refining crude bran oil several saleable products are produced, namely (a) gums (b) spent earth (c) wax (d) fatty acid (e) refined rice bran oil.
Refined rice bran oil do not retain the character of agricultural produce.
(17) The writ petitioners have mentioned section 17 of the said Act of 1972, which has empowered the market committee, to levy fees on any agricultural produce purchased or sold in the market area. In this regard their first submission is that charging of any fees has to be quid pro quo and levied in lieu of a special benefit or privilege granted to and enjoyed by the assessee. The petitioners mention that the services to be availed by the assessee, have been provided in sections 12, 20, 36C, 36G of the Act of 1972 (as amended). They say, that none of the services as mentioned therein are being availed of or enjoyed by the petitioners. Thus, they say that they cannot be subjected to levy of fees under the said Act. In this regard the petitioners mention a judgment of this Court reported in AIR 1991 Cal 371 [Bethuadahari Regulated Market Committee vs Tapan Kumar Saha & Ors]. It is stated that in the said case, while interpreting section 17(1) of the Act of 1972 the Court finds that the market committee can levy fees and in turn the facilities as contemplated in section 20 thereof has to be provided. The Court has held that the fee is not a tax and part of a common burden but it has to be quid pro quo. In this regard the petitioners have further contended that the Proviso to section 17(1) of the said Act prohibits multiple levy of fees in relation to the same agricultural produce. They say that the raw material paddy, which is an 'agricultural produce', finally becomes a different product originated in the factory, that is the refined rice bran oil, after being processed through various stages. The raw material of the said final product, being an agricultural produce itself and thereafter being processed to become a different product, that is rice bran oil, cannot be twice levied with fees, under the provisions of the said Act as that would amount to multiple levy, which would not be sustainable in the eye of law.
(18) Finally, the petitioners have submitted that the definition of 'agricultural produce' as enumerated in section 2(1)(a) of the said Act, is a hard-and-fast definition to mean nothing excepting the meaning assigned to the expressions therein. The Legislature has used the word 'means' therein. In this regard the petitioners have relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1995 Supp (2) SCC 348 [P. Kasilingam vs P.S.G. Collage of Technology & Ors]. It is submitted that hence, inclusion of any expression incoherent with the illustrative expressions made in the said provision, would render those as nugatory and redundant, as the definition cannot be expanded beyond the scope of the words already promulgated thereunder.
(19) For all these reasons the petitioners say that the Amendment Acts and notifications as mentioned above may be declared ultra vires the Constitution and the order of assessment as mentioned above may be set aside being illegal.
(20) The respondent State is represented by Mr.Sen, learned AGP. As to the challenge of the petitioner regarding the said Amendments Acts of 2014 as well as 2017 being ultra vires, as discussed above, the State heavily relies on the interpretations and findings of the Constitutional Bench judgment of Jindal Stainless Limited & Another vs State of Haryana & Others reported in (2017) 12 SCC 1. Mr. Sen has stated that pursuant to the unamended as well as the amended provisions of the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act 1972, there has been a non-discriminatory imposition made upon the targeted group of persons. Therefore, according to the ratio decided by the 9 Judges Bench in Jindal Stainless Limited (supra), in which the Court has decided that only such taxes which are discriminatory in nature are prohibited by Article 304(a) and taxes simpliciter are not within the contemplation of Part-XIII of the Constitution, levy of a non-discriminatory tax would not constitute an infraction of Article 301. That, the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act 1972, having affected an imposition, non- discriminatory in nature, does not come within the purview of Article 301 and accordingly the 'Proviso' to Article 304(b) would not be applicable to the said Act. Also that, according to the ratio decided in the case of Jindal Stainless Limited (supra), both the enactments being the West Bengal Act XXVII of 2014 and the West Bengal Act XVI of 2017, whereby the amendments had been carried out to the said Principal Act of 1972 (previously amended) are valid pieces of legislation and thus intra vires to the Constitution of India though the assent of the President of India has not been obtained in either of the two Amendment Acts.
(21) He has said further that in view of the fact admitted by the petitioner as mentioned above and the amended definition of agricultural produce in Section 2(1)(a) of the 1972 Act (as amended) read with Section 2(1)(mb) of the said Act, "Rice Bran Oil" is an agricultural produce which is amenable to the charging Section of the West Bengal Agriculture Produce Marketing (Regulations) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as Marketing Regulations Act, 1972) for the purpose of imposition of fees under the said Act subject to inclusion of the same by way of issuance of a notification in terms of the proviso of Section 2(1) of the said Marketing Regulations Act, 1972. In this regard he has relied on a judgment of the Hon'ble Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Amit Trade Centre Private Limited. vs. State of West Bengal [in W.P. No. 17184 (w) of 2012, dated August 13, 2014]. He says that in the said judgment the issue as to whether the Rice Bran Oil is an agricultural produce or not for the purpose of imposition of fees under the said Marketing Regulations Act, 1972 is no more res integra. The following portion of the judgment has been relied on:-
"The only issue arises here for decision whether the Rice Bran comes within the ambit of agricultural produce as defined in Section 2(a) of the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972.
** ** ** Indisputedly, rice bran is an agricultural product and in the light of the observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court as above, the Rice bran oil, which is an industrial product obtained by processing of Rice Bran, of course come within the ambit of agricultural produce as defined in Section 2(a) of the said Act."
(22) In so far as the writ petitioner's contention about double taxation, that as per first Proviso to section 17 of the said West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972, double taxation is not permissible, the State submits that Rice Bran and Rice Bran Oil are two distinct and different agricultural produces. The respondents submit that first Proviso to Section 17 of the said Act contains a bar in respect of imposition of fees on same agricultural produce in the same market area, which means that the said Proviso does not stand in the way of imposition of fees on "Rice Bran Oil" even if it appears that such fees under the said Act has already been levied on "Rice Bran" in the same market area. Hence, according to the said respondent, in case of different market area, the said Proviso to Section 17 of the said Act is not applicable, i.e. there is no bar of imposition of fees under the said statute if the two products are different, and even on same product such fees can be imposed in different market area.
(23) The following judgments have been referred to by Mr.Sen, in support of the case of the respondent State.
(i) Municipal Council, Kota, Rajasthan vs. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd., Delhi & Ors. reported in (2001) 3 SCC 654;
(ii) Jain Bros. vs. Union of India reported in (1969) 3 SCC 311.
(24) The respondents have stated by referring to the judgment of Municipal Council Kota (Supra) that once the legislature is found to possess the required legislative competence to enact the law imposing tax limits, that competence cannot be judged further by the form or manner in which that power is exercised. The following portion has been relied on:
"16. Whenever a challenge is made to the levy of tax, its validity may have to be mainly determined with reference to the legislative competence or power to levy the same and in adjudging this issue the nature and character of the tax has to be inevitably determined at the threshold. It is equally axiomatic that once the legislature concerned has been held to possess the power to levy the tax, the motive with which the tax is imposed becomes immaterial and irrelevant and the fact that a wrong reason for exercising the power has also been given would not in any manner derogate from the validity of the tax. In Jullunder Rubber Goods Manufacturers' Assn. v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 644 : AIR 1970 SC 1589] this Court while dealing with a challenge to the levy of rubber cess under Section 12(2) of the Rubber Act, 1947 as amended in 1960 observed that the tax in the nature of excise duty does not cease to be one such merely because the stage of levy and collection has been as a matter of legislative policy shifted by actually providing for its levy and collection from the users of rubber, so long as the character of the duty as excise duty is not lost and the incidence of tax remained to be on the production or manufacture of goods. Likewise, once the legislature is found to possess the required legislative competence to enact the law imposing the tax, the limits of that competence cannot be judged further by the form or manner in which that power is exercised. In (Morris) Leventhal v. David Jones Ltd. [AIR 1930 PC 129] the question arose as to the power of the legislature to impose "bridge tax", when the power to legislate was really in respect of "tax on land". It was held therein as follows:
"The appellants' contention that though directly imposed by the legislature, the bridge tax is not a land tax, was supported by argument founded in particular on two manifest facts. The bridge tax does not extend to land generally throughout New South Wales, but to a limited area comprising the City of Sydney and certain specified shires, and the purpose of the tax is not that of providing the public revenue for the common purposes of the State but of providing funds for a particular scheme of betterment. No authority was vouched for the proposition that an impost laid by statute upon property within a defined area, or upon specified classes of property, or upon specified classes of persons, is not within the true significance of the term a tax. Nor so far as appears has it ever been successfully contended that revenue raised by statutory imposts for specific purposes is not taxation."
(emphasis supplied)
22. Though taxation of the same thing under different names is nonetheless "double taxation" in popular sense, the expertise exposition of the topic seems to also lean in favour of the Revenue, in that the legislature has been considered to possess the power to levy one or more tax or rates of tax on the same taxable event and since in these areas large latitude and wide discretion has always been allowed to the State to choose its own method or kind of tax or mode and purpose of levy and recovery, unless there is any prohibition in the Constitution or the very law enacted by the legislature itself prevents such a thing happening no infirmity can be said to vitiate such a levy. Wherever the taxes are imposed by different legislatures or authorities or where one of the two alone is a tax or where it is for altogether different purposes or when it is indirect rather than direct, there is no scope even for making any grievance of double taxation, at all. In the absence of any impediment specifically created in the Constitution of a country or the legislative enactment itself, the desirability or need otherwise to avoid such levies has been held to pertain to areas of political wisdom of policy making and adjusting of public finances of the State, and not for the law courts, though courts would unless there is clear and specific mandate of law in favour of such multiple levies more than once, in construing general statutory provisions lean in favour of an interpretation to avoid double taxation. So much are the principles or statements of law governing a challenge to any levy on the ground of double taxation."
(25) The Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jain Bros. (Supra) has been referred to on the following aspect :-
"19. There is no warrant or justification in law for the High Court proceeding on an assumption that permitting the levy even as "octroi" twice over would suffer the vice of double taxation and therefore bad in law, unmindful of the well- settled position of law in this regard, also. A Constitution Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Jain Bros. v. Union of India [(1969) 3 SCC 311 : AIR 1970 SC 778] in unmistakable terms declared the position to be as hereunder:
(SCC pp. 315-16, para 6) "6. It is not disputed that there can be double taxation if the legislature has distinctly enacted it. It is only when there are general words of taxation and they have to be interpreted they cannot be so interpreted as to tax the subject twice over to the same tax (vide Channell, J., in Stevens v. Durban-Roddepoort Gold Mining Co.
Ltd. [(1909) 5 TC 402 : 100 LT 481] ). The Constitution does not contain any prohibition against double taxation even if it be assumed that such a taxation is involved in the case of a firm and its partners after the amendment of Section 23(5) by the Act of 1956. Nor is there any other enactment which interdicts such taxation. It is true that Section 3 is the general charging section. Even if Section 23(5) provides for the machinery for collection and recovery of the tax, once the legislature has, in clear terms, indicated that the income of the firm can be taxed in accordance with the Finance Act of 1956 as also the income in the hands of the partners, the distinction between a charging and a machinery section is of no consequence. Both the sections have to be read together and construed harmoniously. It is significant that similar provisions have also been enacted in the Act of 1961. Sections 182 and 183 correspond substantially to Section 23(5) except that the old section did not have a provision similar to sub-
section (4) of Section 182. After 1956, therefore, so far as registered firms are concerned the tax payable by the firm itself has to be assessed and the share of each partner in the income of the firm has to be included in his total income and assessed to tax accordingly. If any double taxation is involved the legislature itself has, in express words, sanctioned it. It is not open to anyone thereafter to involve the general principles that the subject cannot be taxed twice over."
(26) Thus, the State respondent has argued that the Amendment Acts of 2014 and 2017 are well maintainable on the anvil of Constitutional validity thereof. Also, that the products of the petitioner company should be considered within the purview of the definitions as provided in the said Amendment Acts and that the plea of double taxation as emphasised by the writ petitioners, should also not be maintainable. Hence, it has sought for dismissal of the writ petitions and immediate compliance with the statutory provisions by the petitioners.
(27) Part XIII of the Constitution of India deals with the trade, commerce and intercourse within the territory of the country. Article 301 of the Constitution has provided for freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse within the country, subject to restrictions imposed in the following portion of the said Part-XIII, thereof. The Parliament has been empowered to impose by law, such restrictions, which should not generally be discriminatory unless it is necessary to do so for the purpose of dealing with a situation arising from scarcity of goods in any part or territory of the country [as per Articles 302, 303(1) and (2)].
(28) Power has been vested upon the Legislature of a State, to impose reasonable restrictions by promulgating law, under Article 304 of the Constitution to eradicate discrimination between goods imported from other States and the goods manufactured or produced within the said law making State or as may be required in the public interest [as per Article 304 (a) and (b)].
(29) In the instant writ petitions, the petitioners have challenged the vires of the State Amendment Acts 2014 and 2017, on the ground that those are violative of the Constitutional provision enshrined in the Proviso to Article 304(b) in so far as those amendments have been introduced in the principal legislation, that is the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972, with previous sanction of the Governor of the State and not the President of India, as mandated under the said Proviso to Article 304(b) of the Constitution.
(30) Since at the outset the petitioners have challenged the vires of the said Amendment Acts of 2014 and 2017 and termed those to be ultra vires, being introduced allegedly in contravention of the Proviso to section 304(b) of the Constitution of India, it is necessary that the Court examines the veracity of such challenge to the vires of those enactments at the first instance. The main issue looms large therefore in these writ petitions is as to the constitutionality of the Amendment Act 2014 and the Amendment Act 2017 respectively, as to whether these are Constitutionally valid being the Acts of the State Legislature imposing levy of fees on the petitioners, who are the producers and marketers of the refined rice bran oil, produced from the raw material 'paddy', though enacted without previous sanction of the President of India, where as in case of legislations to impose restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse by a State Legislature, as per Proviso to Article 304(b), previous sanction of the President of India has been laid down as mandatory. If the answer is to be that the said Amendment Acts as above cannot be validated on the anvil of the Proviso to Article 304(b) and hence are ultra vires the Constitution, it would become unnecessary to advert to the other aspects of the submissions made on either side.
(31) Legislative competence refers to the authority or power of a legislative body (like the Parliament or the State legislature) to make laws on specific subjects or areas. It essentially defines what a legislature is authorised to legislate on. This authority is often determined by the Constitution, which outlines which subjects fall under the jurisdiction of each legislative body.
(32) According to sub Article (3) of Article 246 of the Constitution of India, the legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution [State list]. Entry 46 of the State List, is regarding "Taxes on agricultural income". Entry 60 thereof is with regard to "Taxes on professions, trade, callings and employments". According to Article 246 (2) of the Constitution, the Legislature of any State also have the power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule, that is the Concurrent list. Entry 33(6) of the Concurrent list has provided for Trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of foodstuffs, including edible oil seeds and oils.
(33) Therefore, Entry 60 of the State list, being read with Entry 33 (6) of the Concurrent list helps to understand that trade, commerce, production, supply and distribution of foodstuffs including edible oil seeds and oil are/may be subject matter of levy by the State legislature.
(34) Entries in the legislative lists are to be construed by applying and in accordance with the doctrine of pith and substance. Briefly stated the doctrine means that when the question arises of determining whether a particular law relates to a particular subject mentioned in one list or another, the Court looks to the substance of the matter. When the substance of the matter is found to fall within one list, than the incidental encroachment by the law on the other list does not make it invalid. The doctrine is sometimes expressed in terms of ascertaining the true character of legislation and even the name given by the legislature in the short title to the legislation has been held to be immaterial. The classical example is the Privy Council judgment in Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee Vs. The Bank of Commerce Limited, Khulna, reported in AIR 1947 PC 60 holding that a State law dealing with money lending (which is a State subject) is not invalid merely because it incidentally affects promissory notes (Union list, Entry 46).
(35) It is well-settled that the various entries in the three lists of the Indian Constitution are not powers but fields of legislation. The power to legislate is given by Article 246 and other Articles of the Constitution. The three lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution are legislative heads or fields of legislation. These demarcate the area over which the appropriate legislatures can operate. From the scheme of entries in the three lists it is clear that taxing entries have been specifically enacted conferring power of taxation whereas the other entries pertain to the authority of the legislature to enact laws for the purpose of regulation.
(36) In this connection, it would be profitable to mention a Supreme Court judgment of Southern Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals Trichur and Others Vs. State of Kerala and Others reported in 1981 4 SCC 391. In the same, the Court was considering the aspect of legislative competence under Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution of India and has held that in determining whether an enactment is a legislation "with respect to" a given power, what is relevant is not a consequence of the enactment on the subject matter or whether it affects it, but whether in its pith and substance, it is a law upon the subject matter in question. Once it is found that in pith and substance the impugned Act is a law on a permitted field, any incidental encroachment on a forbidden field does not affect the competence of the legislature to enact the law.
(37) Another is the case of Premchand Jain and Another Vs. R.K. Chhabra reported in 1984 2 SCC 302. In the same, the subject "education including universities" though was earlier a State subject, by dint of 42nd amendment of the Constitution in 1976, the entry was omitted from the State list and included in the Concurrent list. University Grants Commission Act, 1956 was held to be covered under Entry 66 of the Union list that while legislating for a purpose germane to the subject covered by that Entry and establishing a University Grants Commission, Parliament considered it necessary, as a regulatory measure to prohibit unauthorized conferment of degrees and diplomas as also use of the word 'university' by institution which had not been either establish or incorporated by the subject legislation. The Court has held further that in doing so, the Parliament has not entrenched upon legislative power reserved for the State legislature. The Court has reiterated as per Harak Jain Vs. Union of India reported in 1969 2 SCC 166, the settled legal position that the entries incorporated in the lists covered by Schedule VII are not powers of legislation but 'fields of legislation' by referring to State of Bihar Vs. Kameswar reported in AIR 1952 SC 252 the Court has held there that such entries are mere legislative heads and are of an enabling character. Also that the language of the entries should be given the widest scope or amplitude.
(38) In the said judgment [Premchand Jain (supra)], the Court has held further with reference to earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Naveen Chandra Vs. CIT reported in AIR 1955 SC 58 that each general word in the Schedule as above has been asked to be extended to all ancillary or subsidiary matter which can fairly and reasonably be comprehended. It says with reference to Check Post Officer Vs. K.P. Abdullah Brothers reported in 1970 3 SCC 355 that an entry confers power upon the legislature to legislate for matters ancillary or incidental including provision for avoiding the law. It has been held further that as long as the legislation is within the permissible field in pith and substance, objection would not be entertained merely on the ground that while enacting legislation, provision has been made for a matter which though germane for the purpose for which competent legislation is made, it covers an aspect beyond it. The Court has held further that if an enactment substantially falls within the powers expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the legislature enacting it, it cannot held to be invalid merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters assigned to another legislature.
(39) In this context and keeping in mind the framework of the Constitution as discussed above, the scope of Chapter XIII of the Constitution may be found out. According to Article 301 of the Constitution, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free. But this freedom is not an absolute one and every imposition of duty does not tantamount to infringement of Article 301. The impugned provision when amounts to a restriction directly and immediately on the movement of trade or commerce, only comes within the bounds to be prohibited thereunder. Article 301 refers to non maintainability of laws which burdens, restricts or prevents the trade movements between and within states. Article 304, in its two sub-Articles (a) and (b) gives Constitutional sanction for reasonable restrictions on freedom of trade, commerce within a particular state, by way of legislation by the Sate Legislature. Article 304(a) when deals with legality and justifiability of such restriction on the basis of its nature being not discriminating, whereas provision under Article 304(b) allows imposition of reasonable restrictions by way of the law introduced by the State Legislature as may be required in public interest. Article 304 is an exception to Article 301 of the Constitution and need of taking resort to the exception will arise only if the 'reasonable restriction' is hit by Article 301 thereof. Only the levy which directly and immediately prohibits, restricts or interferes with free trade, commerce and intercourse, would amount to be hit by Article 301 of the Constitution and not otherwise. There should be a reasonable difference between prohibitory and regulatory measures by way of imposing reasonable restriction, when in case of the earlier such restriction may be held to be hit by Article 301 of the Constitution, whereas in the later case, any restriction would only be reasonable and thus permitted under Article 304(b) as well as Article 301 of the Constitution.
(40) It would be also beneficial to mention the other judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Video Electronics Private Limited Vs. State of Punjab reported in 1990 3 SCC 87 in which the Court has held that where the State law does not offend against Article 301 or Article 303, it need not be examined whether the conditions imposed by Article 304 are satisfied. The relevant portion thereof may be quoted for reliance as hereinbelow:-
"20. The question as we see is, how to harmonise the construction of the several provisions of the Constitution. It is true that if a particular provision being taxing provision or otherwise impedes directly or immediately the free flow of trade within the Union of India then it will be violative of Article 301 of the Constitution. It has further to be borne in mind that Article 301 enjoins that trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free. The first question, therefore, which one has to examine in this case is, whether the sales tax provisions (exemption etc.) in these cases directly and immediately restrict the free flow of trade and commerce within the meaning of Article 301 of the Constitution. We have examined the scheme of Article 301 of the Constitution read with Article 304 and the observations of this Court in Atiabari case [(1961) 1 SCR 809 : AIR 1961 SC 232] , as also the observations made by this Court in Automobile Transport, Rajasthan case [(1963) 1 SCR 491 : AIR 1962 SC 1406] . In our opinion, Part XIII of the Constitution cannot be read in isolation. It is part and parcel of a single constitutional instrument envisaging a federal scheme and containing general scheme conferring legislative powers in respect of the matters relating to List II of the Seventh Schedule on the States. It also confers plenary powers on States to raise revenue for its purposes and does not require that every legislation of the State must obtain assent of the President. Constitution of India is an organic document. It must be so construed that it lives and adapts itself to the exigencies of the situation, in a growing and evolving society, economically, politically and socially. The meaning of the expressions used there must, therefore, be so interpreted that it attempts to solve the present problem of distribution of power and rights of the different States in the Union of India, and anticipate the future contingencies that might arise in a developing organism. Constitution must be able to comprehend the present at the relevant time and anticipate the future which is natural and necessary corollary for a growing and living organism. That must be part of the constitutional adjudication. Hence, the economic development of States to bring these into equality with all other States and thereby develop the economic unity of India is one of the major commitments or goals of the constitutional aspirations of this land. For working of an orderly society economic equality of all the States is as much vital as economic unity."
(41) The Court relies on the other decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subhodaya Cheat Fund Private Limited Vs. Director of Cheats, Madras reported in 1991 supplementary to SCC 131 in which the Supreme Court has been pleased to held that where the original Act received the President's sanction under Article 304 (b) of the Constitution, no fresh sanction is required where the Amending Act, without imposing any additional restriction merely varied the form of restriction.
(42) The only conditions upon exercise of power under Article 304
(b) of the Constitution are that the restriction must be 'required in the public interest' and the restrictions so imposed are reasonable. Restrictions can be imposed on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse in the public interest the Supreme Court in the case of Khairabari Tea Company Limited Vs. State of Assam reported in AIR 1964 SC 925 as held while dealing with a challenge to the validity of statute that the Court has to consider whether the restrictions imposed by it are reasonable and are required in the public interest.
(43) Since it has been laid down by the Supreme Court that 'regulatory measures' are outside the purview of Article 301, so far apart from the power to impose restrictions conferred by Articles 302 and 304 (b), the Union or State legislature has the power to exercise legitimate control over the freedom of trade and commerce by means of regulatory measures, not amounting to restrictions. A distinction between a 'regulation' and a 'restriction' has been determined by the Supreme Court in the case of Automobile Transport Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1962 SC 1406, to include 'Licensing provisions with compensatory fees'. The term 'reasonable' means commensurate with the purpose for which the restriction that laid down and to the extent as is necessary for that purpose. It is a settled law that any restriction which does not impede the movement of goods but only facilitates their passage cannot be held to be unreasonable merely because they cause some inconvenience. What may be a restriction from the point of view of an individual may not be a restriction on inter- state or intra-state commerce viewed from the angle of the trade as a whole.
(44) Also, in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Hansa Corporation reported in 1980 Volume 4 SCC 697, the Supreme Court has held that though Article 304 (b) requires prior Presidential assent before the Bill is introduced in the State Legislature yet due to Article 255 of the Constitution, if prior consent is not obtained, the infirmity can be cured by subsequent assent of the President after the Bill has been passed by the legislature. Hence, absence of Presidential assent has been held to be not an incurable defect, so far as the imposition in substance is found to be reasonable. Reasonableness of the restriction would have to be judged in the light of the purpose for which the restriction is imposed, that is, 'as may be required in public interest'.
(45) Therefore, the petitioners must show that the restrictions are unreasonable and they are unduly hampered from carrying on their trade or business. To adjudicate if the challenge as to the Constitutional validity of the legislation would be maintainable, the substantial purpose of the legislation and if the same carries reasonableness in imposing invasion to the right of freedom of trade of the petitioner in public interest, by way of legislation to impose levy, are the concerns of the Court. In that case, only the reason that the legislation is bereft of Presidential assent, as per Proviso of Article 304(b), particularly when the original legislation has been published in due compliance with the said provision and with the assent of the President of India, should not come into way for the said legislation to be valid and intra vires the Constitution.
(46) In the case of Automobile Transport (supra), according to the majority opinion, the regulatory measures are excluded from the scope of Article 301, therefore, measures like the licensing of trade or business or its instrumentalities, would altogether come out of the purview of Article 304 (b) and the reasonableness of such regulatory measures could not be challenged under that provision.
In this case as in all Constitutional adjudications, the substance of the matter has to be looked into to find out whether there is any restriction imposed by way of the Amendments brought out in the Act of 1972 as an unreasonable restriction, in violation of the Constitutional mandate.
(47) The West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972, is a statute to provide for regulation for marketing agricultural produce in West Bengal. The object of the Act is to regulate buying and selling of agricultural produce, by establishing markets for agricultural produce in the State. Section 17 thereof has empowered the market committee for levy of fees, in the following words:
"17. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 or any other law relating to taxation of agricultural produce in force, the market committee shall levy fees on any agricultural produce in force, the market committee shall levy fees on any agricultural produce sold in the market area, at a rate which shall not be more than two rupees per one hundred rupees of the amount for which the agricultural produce is sold, whether for cash or for deferred payment or for other valuable consideration, irrespective of the fact that the buyer of the produce is the Central Government or the State Government or an agent [or undertaking] of either of them or a corporation constituted under any law for the time being in force:
Provided that no fee shall be levied in the same market area, more than once, in relation to the same agricultural produce irrespective of the number of transactions.
Explanation I.-For the purpose of this sub-section all agricultural produce taken out, or proposed to be taken out, of a market area shall, unless the contrary is proved. be presumed to have been sold within such area.
Explanation II.-In the determination of the amount of the fees payable [under this sub-section], any fraction of ten paise less than five paise shall be disregarded and any fraction of ten paise equal to or exceeding five paise shall be regarded as ten paise.
Explanation III.-For the purpose of this sub-section all agricultural produce stored in the cold storages within the market area shall, unIess the contrary is proved, be presumed to have been stored for the purpose of sale.
(2) The fees referred to in sub-section (1) shall be paid by the purchaser or the agricultural produce concerned in the following manner, namely:-
(i) when a licensed trader is the buyer of any agricultural produce, he shall pay the fees to the market committee in the prescribed manner within a week from the day of the transaction
(ii) when a Iicensed trader is the seller of any agricultural produce and the buyer is not licensed, the trader shall recover the fees from the buyer and deposit the same in the prescribed manner with the market committee within a week from the day of the transaction,
(iii) the market committee may authorise its officers or staff or any other person to realise the fees directly from the buyer."
(48) The said Act of 1972 was promulgated on October 31, 1972, with the sanction of the President of India and later on, has been subjected to amendments on various occasions, vide the Amendment Acts XXXIV of 1975, XII of 1977, XXVII of 1978, XXI of 1981 and recently vide the Amendments Act of 2014 and that of 2017 respectively.
(49) Vide the Amendment Act of 2014, amendment of section 2(1)(a) of the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 has been brought in. the amended provision has been extracted above. Let the old provision be quoted as herein bellow:
" 2. Definitions:-
(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) "agricultural produce" means any produce of agriculture, horticulture, pisciculture, sericulture, forestry or animal husbandry or and includes any related product specified in the Schedule to this Act;
Provided that the State Government may, by notification include any item of agricultural produce in the Schedule or exclude any such item from it;"
(50) Initially in the Schedule of the said Act, the de-oiled rice bran and the refined rice bran oil were not included as the agricultural produce, within the realm of its definition in the Act. Subsequently, by dint of the impugned notification No.425, said to have been published by the Governor of the State in exercise of the power conferred by section 2(1)(a) of the Act of 1972, an amendment was brought in to the Schedule of the Act, to include rice bran and rice oil within the purview of the said Act to be applied to all regulated market committee in the State for collection of fees in market areas under section 17(1) of the said Act. The writ petitioners have challenged the said notification too, in these writ petitions.
(51) Vide the West Bengal Act XVI of 2017, amendment was brought into section 2(1)(t) of the Act of 1972, in order to substitute the words therein "the business of purchasing and selling the agricultural produce", with the words, "the business of purchasing and selling the agricultural produce in such manner as may be prescribed". The Schedule to the principal Act was also substituted by the Schedule incorporated in the said Amendment Act, 2017.
(52) Reasonability of the action of the State Legislature to bring in changes by way of amendment may first be traced in the proviso to section 2(1)(a) of the Act of 1972 (as amended) which empowers the State, validates and justifies its action to include or exclude any item of agricultural produce in the Schedule of the Act. Even after omission of the words "in the Official Gazette" as were appearing therein, vide the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) (Amendment) Act 1978, such inclusion or exclusion by notification of an item from the Schedule of the Act by the State Government shall not be required to be published in the Official Gazette, to be valid. Inclusion of Rice Oil in the Schedule of the Act is coherent with the definition(amended) of 'agricultural produce' as appears in section 2(1)(a) of the Act, which has provided that the processed product and the related/ secondary product/ by product, is 'agricultural produce', as per the Act. The amendment of the Act as above is under challenge as ultra vires, being allegedly in violation of the Proviso to Article 304(b) of the Constitution, though such challenge is found not maintainable for the reason as enumerated by the Court in the case of Subhodaya Cheat Fund (supra), that once the Act has been promulgated with the Presidential sanction, no fresh sanction for amendment thereof may be necessary, particularly when no addition in restrictions is imposed, than the previous. In the instant case the provision of charging of the market fees has been there in the original Act of 1972 (section 17 thereof) and the same has remained unaltered, with the power granted to the State Government to add or exclude items in the Schedule thereof. These provisions are not challenged in this case but only the Amendment Acts of 2014 and 2017, which changes the definition of the 'agricultural produce' and adds an additional item in the Schedule. There appears no conflict between the provision of law as above and the amendments brought in by the Amendment Acts of 2014 and 2017. Hence such amendment brought in to the original Act, cannot be termed as unreasonable, so mush so to restrict the free flow of trade of the writ petitioner company. It may be a restriction or burden from the point of view of the petitioner itself but cannot be termed so on inter-state or intra-state commerce, viewed from the angle of the trade as a whole. These may be considered as the regulatory measures which may not be challenged under the law.
(53) Rice bran oil is the edible vegetable oil extracted from the hard outer layer of rice called bran. The vegetable oil has been a part of the Schedule of the Act. Hence, there is no apparent incoherence due to inclusion of the said item in the Schedule, with the other portions of the Statute. It is an agricultural produce derived from the bran of rice, a by product of the milling process. Its production and processing is no different from the other vegetable oils. Oil obtained from the oil-bearing product, which is an 'agricultural produce' according to the definition clause of the statute, by process of extraction by a solvent is the processed by-product and not the different product altogether. Due to the processing, it does not undertake a character of any synthetic product by losing its original, natural and organic character. The Rice Bran Oil being considered as an agricultural produce and a natural derivative from the rice crop or paddy, is also guided under the framework of the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI). This Court in the case of Amit Trade Centre (supra) has held in a similar way, as discussed above.
54) For the reasons as afore stated, the other challenge raised against the said Amendment Acts, that by dint of those the petitioners have been subjected to double taxation, does not appear to be a substantive and cogent one. The concept of double taxation has been deprecated by the Supreme Court in the case of Avinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in 1979 1 SCC 137 in the following words:
"A feeble plea that the tax is bad because of the vice of double taxation and is unreasonable because there are heavy prior levies was also voiced. Some of these contentions hardly merit consideration, but have been mentioned out of courtesy to counsel. The last one, for instance, deserves the least attention. There is nothing in Article 265 of the Constitution from which one can spin out the constitutional vice called double taxation. (Bad economics may be good law and vice versa). Dealing with a somewhat similar argument, the Bombay High Court gave short shrift to it in Western India Theatres [Cantonment Board Poona v. Western India Theatres Ltd., AIR 1954 Bom 261] . Some undeserving contentions die hard, rather survive after death. The only epitaph we may inscribe is : Rest in peace and don't be re-born ! If on the same subject-matter the legislature chooses to levy tax twice over there is no inherent invalidity in the fiscal adventure save where other prohibitions exist."
The other point raised in this case by the writ petitioners is that the market fees levied against it has to be quid pro quo, which is allegedly not in this case and hence cannot be maintained against the petitioners. Quid pro quo is a Latin term, meaning "something for something". It describes a situation when two parties mutually agree to exchange goods or services reciprocally, when one party's actions are conditional on another's. In the context of fees payable, quid pro quo refers to a principle where a fee is justified by the clear exchange of value between the payer and the recipient for a specific service rendered. It essentially means that a fee is a payment for a service received. The test of quid pro quo is not to be satisfied with close or proximate relationship in all cases. It is the settled law that the test would be satisfied if the fees, so levied and collected are shown to have been expended for the purpose for which it has been levied. Fees charged for licence is a regulatory fee, unlike fees for services rendered which is compensatory in nature. In terms of Article 110(b) and Article 199(2) of the Constitution, which are quoted bellow, fees for licences and the fees for services are expressions used indicating thereby that they are not the same;
'110. Definition of "Money Bill".--
** ** ** ** (2) A Bill shall not be deemed to be a Money Bill by reason only that it provides for the imposition of fines or other pecuniary penalties, or for the demand or payment of fees for licences or fees for services rendered, or by reason that it provides for the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax by any local authority or body for local purposes.' '199. Definition of "Money Bill".--
** ** ** ** (2) A Bill shall not be deemed to be a Money Bill by reason only that it provides for the imposition of fines or other pecuniary penalties, or for the demand or payment of fees for licences or fees for services rendered, or by reason that it provides for the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax by any local authority or body for local purposes.' (54) The purpose of the Act of 1972 is to regulate the marketing of agricultural produce and the market-place users are liable to pay the licence fees, as per the said statute. Hence, it is clear that the impugned licence fee is regulatory in character. Therefore, stricto sensu the element of quid pro quo does not apply in the case. The question to be considered is if there is a reasonable correlation between the levy of the licence fee and the purpose for which the provisions of the Act and the Rules have been enacted/framed. In the particular facts of this case the answer of the said question has to be in affirmative. Also, that the Court has no hesitation to concur with the submission of the respondent that the levy as impugned is not discriminatory in nature. Hence, levy of regulatory fees in this case should not be considered as vitiable being in contravention of the principle of quid pro quo. Similar proposition has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the judgment of A.P. Paper Mills Ltd. Etc. Etc vs Government Of A.P. And Anr [2000 (8) SCC 167].
(55) In the case of State of Tripura v. Sudhir Ranjan Nath [ (1997) 3 SCC 665] the Supreme Court has held that the distinction between compensatory fee and regulatory fee is well established by several decisions of this Court. Reference may be made to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Corpn. of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema 1965 AIR(SC) 1107 : 1965 (2) SCR 477). It has been held in the said decision that the expression 'licence fee' does not necessarily mean a fee in lieu of services and that in the case of regulatory fees, no quid pro quo need be established. The following observations may usefully be quoted : 'This contention is not really open to the respondent for Section 548 does not use the word "fee", it uses the words "licence fee" and those words do not necessarily mean a fee in return for services. In fact in our Constitution fee for licence and fee for services rendered are contemplated as different kinds of levy. The former is not intended to be a fee for services rendered'.
(56) The other case of the same Court may also be referred to that is Vam Organic Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U.P. [1997 (2) SCC 715], wherein the Court has held that there is a distinction between fees charged for licence i.e. regulatory fees and the fees for services rendered as compensatory fees. In the case of regulatory fee like the licence fee, existence of quid pro quo is not necessary although the fee imposed must not be, in the circumstances of the case, excessive.
(57) The Privy Council in George Walkem Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board [1939 AIR(PC) 36(PC)] has observed :
"If licences are granted, it appears to be no objection that fees should be charged in order either to defray the costs of administering the local regulation or to increase the general funds of the Province or for both purposes .... It cannot, as their Lordships think, be an objection to a licence plus a fee that it is directed both to the regulation of trade and to the provision of revenue. It would, therefore, appear that a provision for the imposition of a licence fee does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the fee must be only for services rendered."
(58) For all the reasons as discussed above, the Court finds that challenge as to the vires of the West Bengal Agricultural Produce (Regulation) (Amendment) Act, 2014 and West Bengal Agricultural Produce (Regulation) (Amendment) Act, 2017 and also to the notifications No. 429-M.W&C/9M-9/2000 dated January 29, 2002 and No. 2537-M.W.&C/1M-05/99(Pt.1) dated August 22, 2008, that those are ultra vires the Constitution, is not sustainable. The reasonableness of the impugned legislation challenged principally on the grounds of non-compliance with the Proviso to Article 304(b) of the Constitution or imposing double taxation upon the petitioners or that the levy being not in compliance with the principal of quid pro quo have not been substantiated in the instant case by the petitioners. The legality and propriety of the same as challenged in the instant writ petitions are found not to be maintainable. On the other hand it is found that the fees imposed is in the nature of regulatory levy, not challenged to be excessive in nature. Hence, being devoid of any merit the writ petitions No. W.P. 17846(w) of 2012 and W.P. 11513(w) of 2019 are dismissed. The petitioner company is held to be liable to duly pay the amount of market fees as per demand.
(59) Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities. Digitally signed by RAI RAI CHATTOPADHYAY CHATTOPADHYAY Date: 2025.05.06 13:24:36 +05'30' (Rai Chattopadhyay, J.)
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