WRITTEN STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE SUBSTITUTED DEFENDANT

 

IN THE COURT OF THE LEARNED 3RD CIVIL JUDGE (SENIOR DIVISION) AT ALIPORE

SOUTH 24 PARGANAS

 

TITLE SUIT NO. 107 OF 2024

 

IN THE MATTER OF;

DR. SUBRATA CHAKRABORTY

… Plaintiff

-Versus-

 

SRI SUBIR KUMAR  CHAKRABORTY & ORS.

… Defendants

 

WRITTEN STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE SUBSTITUTED DEFENDANT NOS. 1(a)(i) & 1(a)(ii), NAMELY SRI SOMNATH CHAKRABORTY AND SMT. RIYA CHAKBORTY

 

The substituted Defendant Nos. 1(a)(i) and 1(a)(ii), namely Sri Somnath Chakraborty and Smt. Riya Chakborty, most respectfully submit this Written Statement in answer to and in defence of the suit instituted by the plaintiff;

State as follows;

 

1.   That the instant suit as framed and presented by the plaintiff is wholly misconceived, untenable, devoid of merits and not maintainable either in law or on facts. The plaintiff has failed to disclose any valid, subsisting and enforceable right in respect of the suit property which could give rise to the reliefs claimed in the present suit.

 

2.   That the plaintiff has approached this Learned Court with an incorrect, distorted and incomplete narration of facts and has deliberately suppressed several material facts relating to the history of the suit property, the execution and subsequent revocation of the Family Settlement Deed, the revocation of the plaintiff's licence, the earlier eviction proceeding, the decree passed therein and the execution of the said decree.

 

 

 

3.   That the instant suit is further liable to be dismissed as the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff are self-contradictory and mutually inconsistent. The plaintiff seeks to establish a right on the basis of an old arrangement while simultaneously ignoring the subsequent registered revocation thereof and the legal and factual consequences flowing from the same.

 

4.   That the plaintiff has failed to disclose any proper cause of action for institution or continuation of the instant suit. The alleged cause of action pleaded by the plaintiff relates to events which took place several decades ago and which were followed by subsequent acts, correspondence, litigation, decree and execution proceedings.

 

5.   That the suit is barred by limitation. The plaintiff cannot, after an enormous and unexplained lapse of time, seek to reopen transactions and proceedings dating back to the years 1992, 1993, 1995 and 1997. The plaintiff has not disclosed any legally sustainable basis for excluding the period of delay or for treating an alleged stale claim as a fresh cause of action.

 

6.   That the plaintiff's claim is also hit by the principles of res judicata and/or constructive res judicata and/or the principles underlying finality of judicial proceedings, subject to the issues and matters actually and substantially adjudicated in the earlier proceedings concerning the suit property and the plaintiff's occupation thereof.

 

7.   That the plaintiff has deliberately omitted material facts relating to Title Suit No. 491 of 1995, the ex parte decree for eviction passed therein, and Title Execution No. 36 of 1995 whereby the decree was executed and possession of two rooms at the first floor of the suit premises was obtained through the process of Court.

 

8.   That the plaintiff has also failed to fairly disclose the subsequent institution of Title Suit No. 329 of 1997, which was filed before the Learned 1st Civil Judge (Junior Division), Alipore, and the plaint whereof was returned on the ground of want of jurisdiction.

 

9.   That the plaintiff, having failed to establish any continuing right, title or interest in the suit property and having suppressed the earlier litigation, is not entitled to obtain any equitable or discretionary relief from this Learned Court.

 

10.               That the suit has been instituted with an ulterior and mala fide motive and with an attempt to create a fresh cause of action out of matters which had occurred several decades earlier. The plaintiff has not approached this Learned Court with clean hands and is therefore disentitled to the reliefs claimed.

 

11.               That save and except matters which are specifically admitted herein or which are matters of record, each and every allegation, statement, averment, contention and submission contained in the plaint is denied and disputed.

 

12.               That the plaintiff is put to strict proof of each and every allegation made in the plaint and cannot obtain any decree merely upon the basis of assertions, allegations or inferences which are unsupported by legally admissible evidence.

 

13.               That the facts and circumstances relating to the suit property are materially different from the case sought to be projected by the plaintiff.

 

14.               That one Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty, since deceased, was the absolute owner of the suit property. With the object of maintaining peace, harmony and good relations amongst the family members, she executed and registered a Deed of Family Settlement dated 16.07.1992 in respect of the suit property.

 

15.               That the said Family Settlement Deed has to be considered in the context of the family relationship and the circumstances existing at the relevant point of time. The subsequent conduct of the plaintiff and the circumstances which thereafter arose materially altered the position and resulted in the subsequent revocation of the said arrangement.

 

16.               That the first floor of the suit premises had been constructed long prior to the present dispute and the construction was undertaken from the funds of Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty as well as the contribution of her husband, namely Sri Surendra Kumar Chakraborty.

 

17.               That the plaintiff did not contribute any amount towards construction of the said two-storied building. The allegation that the plaintiff had spent money towards construction of the second floor is false, incorrect and specifically denied.

 

18.               That even assuming, without admitting, that the plaintiff had at any point of time paid any amount to Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty, such payment was not made towards construction of the building and did not create, confer or vest in the plaintiff any independent right, title or interest in the suit property.

 

19.               That during the relevant period the plaintiff was residing at Dhanbad in connection with his employment and used to visit the suit premises occasionally during holidays and remain there for a few days.

 

20.               That the plaintiff's occupation of the suit premises was permissive in nature. The plaintiff was allowed to use and occupy the premises under the leave and licence of Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty and such permissive occupation never created any independent ownership or proprietary interest in favour of the plaintiff.

 

21.               That the plaintiff was never the absolute or exclusive owner of the suit property merely by reason of his occupation thereof. Physical occupation, particularly when permissive, cannot by itself create or establish title.

 

22.               That within a few months after execution of the Family Settlement Deed dated 16.07.1992, the relationship between the plaintiff and Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty deteriorated considerably.

 

23.               That the plaintiff and his wife, according to the defendants' case, started subjecting Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty to mental and physical torture and behaved with her in an abusive and disrespectful manner.

 

24.               That the plaintiff and his wife are alleged to have abused Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty with filthy and insulting language and to have assaulted her on several occasions.

 

 

25.               That as a consequence of the aforesaid conduct, Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty became completely disillusioned and disgusted with the plaintiff's conduct and was no longer willing to continue the arrangement which had been made for maintaining family harmony.

 

26.               That in the aforesaid circumstances, Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty exercised her rights and caused the Family Settlement Deed to be revoked and/or cancelled.

 

27.               That the plaintiff's challenge to the Deed of Revocation/Cancellation dated 21.12.1993 is wholly misconceived and proceeds upon an incorrect assumption that the Family Settlement Deed dated 16.07.1992, irrespective of its true legal character, had become irrevocable in all circumstances.

 

28.               That the true nature, character and legal effect of the document dated 16.07.1992 are required to be determined upon a proper construction of the recitals, operative clauses, surrounding circumstances, antecedent rights of the parties and the manner in which the parties acted thereunder.

 

29.               That the defendants state that a family settlement is essentially an arrangement intended to preserve family peace and harmony and to resolve or avoid disputes amongst family members. The Court is required to examine the substance of the transaction and not merely the nomenclature assigned to the document.

 

30.               That if, as is the case of the defendants, the document dated 16.07.1992 was executed in the backdrop of the family relationship and for maintaining peace and harmony amongst the family members, the same cannot be construed in isolation from the subsequent conduct of the parties and the circumstances which led to its revocation.

 

31.               That Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty was the absolute owner of the suit property and had entered into the family arrangement with the bona fide object of maintaining peace and cordiality amongst the members of the family.

 

32.               That subsequent to execution of the said arrangement, the relationship between Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty and the plaintiff and his wife deteriorated seriously and the plaintiff and his wife subjected her to grave mental and physical harassment, abuse and ill-treatment, as a result whereof the very circumstances and family relationship which had formed the basis of the arrangement materially changed.

 

33.               That in the aforesaid circumstances, Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty consciously and voluntarily decided to revoke and/or cancel the earlier arrangement and accordingly executed and registered the Deed of Revocation/Cancellation dated 21.12.1993.

 

34.               That the said Deed of Revocation/Cancellation dated 21.12.1993 was not a clandestine or informal act but was a registered instrument executed by Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty during her lifetime and while she was competent to deal with her property and her subsisting rights therein.

 

35.               That the plaintiff is put to strict proof of the allegation that the said Deed of Revocation/Cancellation was obtained by fraud, coercion, undue influence, misrepresentation or any other legally recognised vitiating circumstance.

 

36.               That a mere allegation that the Deed of Revocation/Cancellation was invalid does not render the said registered instrument void. The burden lies upon the plaintiff, who seeks to impeach the said registered instrument, to establish the specific legal and factual grounds upon which such cancellation is alleged to be void or voidable.

 

37.               That the defendants further state that the plaintiff has not pleaded or established any legally sustainable basis showing that the Deed of Revocation dated 21.12.1993 was executed without authority or that Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty had ceased to possess any legally recognisable interest or authority in respect of the suit property at the relevant time.

 

38.               That the defendants further state that the subsequent conduct of the parties furnishes important corroborative circumstances concerning the legal effect of the revocation. In particular, after the execution of the Deed of Revocation, Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty revoked the plaintiff's licence by letter dated 29.06.1995 through her Learned Advocate Sri Biswajit Roy.

 

39.               That thereafter, owing to the plaintiff's failure to vacate the premises, Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty instituted Title Suit No. 491 of 1995, in which, despite service of summons, the plaintiff did not appear and an ex parte decree for eviction was passed against him.

 

40.               That the said decree was thereafter executed through Title Execution No. 36 of 1995 and possession of two rooms at the first floor of the suit premises was obtained through the process of Court.

 

41.               That the aforesaid subsequent acts are wholly inconsistent with the plaintiff's present attempt to contend that the Family Settlement Deed dated 16.07.1992 continued to operate as an unconditional and irrevocable source of title in his favour.

 

42.               That the defendants therefore submit that the Deed of Revocation dated 21.12.1993 has to be considered together with the subsequent conduct of the parties, the revocation of licence, the institution of the eviction proceeding, the decree passed therein and the execution thereof.

 

43.               That in any event, the plaintiff cannot seek a declaration that the Deed of Revocation dated 21.12.1993 is void merely by making a bald allegation of invalidity without establishing the precise legal ground upon which such declaration is sought.

 

44.               That if the plaintiff relies upon the document dated 16.07.1992 as an instrument which itself created or transferred an absolute and irrevocable interest in the suit property, the plaintiff is required to establish the precise nature of the right allegedly created, the legal character of the instrument, the consideration or absence thereof, acceptance, possession, performance and all other facts necessary to sustain such alleged title.

 

45.               That the defendants specifically deny that the plaintiff acquired any absolute or indefeasible title which survived the subsequent registered revocation and the subsequent judicial proceedings concerning his occupation.

 

46.               That the defendants further submit that the plaintiff's claim is additionally weakened by his extraordinary delay and by his failure to challenge the alleged revocation at the relevant point of time, despite the subsequent revocation of his licence and the institution of the eviction proceeding in 1995.

 

47.               That the plaintiff's present challenge, raised after several decades and after the aforesaid subsequent proceedings, is liable to be rejected on the grounds of limitation, delay, acquiescence, suppression of material facts and absence of any subsisting cause of action, apart from the substantive merits of the challenge.

 

48.               That accordingly, the plaintiff is not entitled to a declaration that the Deed of Revocation/Cancellation dated 21.12.1993 is void, illegal, inoperative or not binding upon the parties.

 

49.               That after revocation of the Family Settlement, Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty further took steps for termination of the plaintiff's permissive occupation.

 

50.               That on 29.06.1995, Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty, through her Learned Advocate Sri Biswajit Roy, issued a letter to the plaintiff revoking the licence granted to him in respect of the premises.

 

51.               That upon revocation of the licence, the plaintiff had no continuing right to remain in occupation of the suit premises.

 

52.               That the plaintiff was therefore called upon to vacate and deliver possession, but instead of complying with the lawful demand, the plaintiff failed and neglected to vacate the premises.

 

53.               That owing to the plaintiff's failure to vacate the premises, Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty was constrained to institute Title Suit No. 491 of 1995 before the Learned 1st Civil Judge (Junior Division).

 

54.               That summons of the said suit was duly served upon the plaintiff, but despite service the plaintiff did not appear and contest the said proceeding.

 

55.               That consequently an ex parte decree for eviction was passed against the plaintiff.

 

56.               That the said decree was thereafter put into execution through Title Execution No. 36 of 1995.

 

57.               That pursuant to the said execution proceeding, possession of two rooms situated at the first floor of the suit premises was obtained through the process of the Learned Court.

 

58.               That Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty incurred substantial expenditure and was compelled to undertake prolonged litigation for obtaining possession from the plaintiff through due process of law.

 

59.               That the aforesaid decree and execution proceeding constitute material and relevant circumstances which the plaintiff was under an obligation to disclose fully and fairly in the present proceeding.

 

60.               That the plaintiff cannot suppress the previous eviction proceeding and execution thereof and thereafter seek to project himself before this Learned Court as though his occupation and alleged rights in the suit property had never previously been subjected to judicial proceedings.

 

61.               That after the aforesaid eviction proceeding, the plaintiff instituted another proceeding being Title Suit No. 329 of 1997 for permanent injunction before the Learned 1st Civil Judge (Junior Division), Alipore.

 

62.               That the plaint in the said proceeding was returned on the ground of want of jurisdiction.

 

63.               That the existence of the aforesaid proceeding further demonstrates that the dispute concerning the suit property and the plaintiff's alleged rights therein is not a recent dispute but has a long and continuous history.

 

64.               That despite the aforesaid history, the plaintiff has sought to revive the dispute after decades by challenging the Deed of Revocation/Cancellation dated 21.12.1993 and by seeking consequential reliefs in respect of the suit property.

 

65.               That the present suit therefore constitutes an attempt to reopen matters which have been the subject matter of earlier litigation and judicial process and is liable to be dismissed on the grounds stated herein.

 

66.               That with regard to paragraph no. 1 of the plaint, the statements contained therein are partly matters of record and, insofar as they are matters of fact or assertion, the same are denied. It is specifically denied that the plaintiff became the sole or exclusive beneficiary of the suit property or that he was in exclusive possession thereof by virtue of any alleged right.

 

67.               It is further denied that the plaintiff alone incurred expenditure towards construction of the second floor or any other portion of the building. The plaintiff is put to strict proof of the alleged expenditure and the source, purpose and legal effect thereof.

 

68.               That with regard to paragraph no. 2 of the plaint, the statements are denied in toto except those which are matters of record. It is specifically denied that the suit property was Trust property or that the relevant deed constituted a Trust Deed.

 

69.               It is further denied that Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty lacked authority to revoke the Family Settlement Deed or that the revocation was legally impermissible.

 

70.               That with regard to paragraph no. 3 of the plaint, the allegations are denied. It is denied that the plaintiff had no prior knowledge of the revocation/cancellation of the Family Settlement Deed. The plaintiff is put to strict proof of the allegation that information regarding the cancellation was communicated to him only on 10.07.1995.

 

71.               That with regard to paragraph no. 4 of the plaint, the allegations are denied in toto. It is specifically denied that Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty had not reserved or possessed the power or authority to revoke/cancel the Family Settlement Deed.

 

72.               It is further denied that the Deed of Revocation dated 21.12.1993 is invalid, inoperative, void or otherwise unenforceable.

 

73.               That with regard to paragraph nos. 5 and 6 of the plaint, the statements are denied in toto. It is denied that the plaintiff had any subsisting beneficial interest in the suit property after the revocation of the Family Settlement Deed.

 

74.               It is further denied that there was no justification or necessity for revocation of the Family Settlement Deed. The circumstances leading to the revocation have already been stated hereinabove.

 

75.               The allegations of fraud, fraudulent practice, receipt of money or issuance of any receipt in favour of the plaintiff are specifically denied and the plaintiff is put to strict proof thereof.

 

76.               That with regard to paragraph no. 7 of the plaint, the allegations are denied in toto. It is denied that the plaintiff spent any amount towards the property in such a manner as to acquire any right, title or interest therein.

 

77.               It is further denied that Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty was legally debarred from revoking the Family Settlement Deed or that the Deed of Revocation dated 21.12.1993 is invalid, inoperative or void.

 

78.               That with regard to paragraph no. 7A of the plaint, the statements are denied. It is specifically denied that after the death of the plaintiff's father on 14.10.2001 and the death of Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty on 08.04.2003, the plaintiff automatically became the absolute owner of the suit property.

 

79.               It is also denied that the present defendants have no right, title or interest in the suit property or that they are unauthorized occupants.

 

80.               It is further denied that the plaintiff acquired any automatic right to recover possession from the present defendants or to evict them merely on the basis of the allegations contained in the plaint.

 

81.               That with regard to paragraph no. 8 of the plaint, it is denied that any cause of action for the present suit arose on 21.12.1993, 10.07.1995 or on any other date as alleged by the plaintiff.

 

82.               The plaintiff is put to strict proof of the alleged cause of action, including the date on which the alleged right accrued, the date on which the plaintiff allegedly acquired knowledge, and the circumstances in which the present suit has been instituted after such an extraordinary lapse of time.

 

83.               That the plaintiff has failed to make a full and frank disclosure of all material facts relevant for adjudication of the present suit.

 

84.               In particular, the plaintiff has suppressed and/or failed to place the complete factual history relating to;

a. the original ownership of the suit property by Smt. Kiron Rekha Chakraborty;

b. the execution and registration of the Family Settlement Deed dated 16.07.1992;

c. the subsequent circumstances which resulted in its revocation;

d. the registered Deed of Revocation/Cancellation dated 21.12.1993;

e. the revocation of the plaintiff's licence on 29.06.1995;

f. Title Suit No. 491 of 1995;

g. the ex parte decree for eviction passed therein;

h. Title Execution No. 36 of 1995;

i. delivery of possession through the process of Court; and

j. subsequent Title Suit No. 329 of 1997.

 

85.               That suppression of such material facts is fatal to the plaintiff's claim, particularly when the plaintiff seeks discretionary and declaratory reliefs from this Learned Court.

 

86.               That a litigant seeking equitable and discretionary relief is required to approach the Court with utmost candour and clean hands. The plaintiff has failed to satisfy such requirement.

 

87.               That the plaintiff has failed to establish any subsisting legal right in the suit property.

 

88.               That the Family Settlement Deed dated 16.07.1992 cannot be considered in isolation from the registered Deed of Revocation/Cancellation dated 21.12.1993.

 

89.               That after the revocation and subsequent termination of the plaintiff's licence, the plaintiff cannot claim an independent right merely on the basis of his earlier permissive occupation.

 

90.               That the plaintiff's alleged expenditure, if any, does not by itself confer ownership or title upon him.

 

91.               That the plaintiff's allegation that he became absolute owner of the suit property after the death of his parents is legally and factually denied.

 

92.               That inheritance cannot be claimed in disregard of the legal status and rights existing in the property and the plaintiff cannot derive a better title merely from the death of the persons concerned when his alleged foundational right had itself been revoked and disputed.

 

93.               That the present suit is grossly delayed.

 

94.               That the principal documents and events relied upon by the plaintiff concern the years 1992 and 1993, while the plaintiff also refers to events of 1995 and thereafter.

 

95.               That the plaintiff has not disclosed any legally sufficient explanation for approaching the Court after such a prolonged period.

 

96.               That the plaintiff cannot, by describing an old grievance in a different manner or by seeking a declaration at a much later stage, circumvent the statutory bar of limitation.

 

97.               That the relief of declaration sought by the plaintiff is therefore liable to be rejected on the ground of limitation alone, apart from the other objections raised herein.

 

98.               That the plaint does not disclose a complete and subsisting cause of action against the present defendants.

 

99.               That the alleged cause of action is based upon historical events and documents which were known or ought to have been known to the plaintiff for decades.

 

100.            That no fresh cause of action can be manufactured merely because the plaintiff now seeks a declaration concerning the validity of an old document.

 

101.            That the plaintiff is therefore not entitled to maintain the present proceeding in its present form.

 

102.            That the earlier Title Suit No. 491 of 1995, the decree passed therein and Title Execution No. 36 of 1995 are highly material to the determination of the plaintiff's present claim.

 

103.            That the plaintiff cannot be permitted to circumvent the effect and consequences of previous judicial proceedings by simply changing the nature of the relief sought in the present proceeding.

 

104.            That the defendants reserve their right to rely upon the pleadings, orders, decree, execution records and other documents relating to the earlier proceedings at the appropriate stage of hearing.

 

105.            That the subsequent proceeding being Title Suit No. 329 of 1997 also demonstrates that the plaintiff had knowledge of and had already sought judicial intervention in relation to his alleged rights concerning the suit property.

 

106.            That the present proceeding, instituted decades thereafter, is therefore liable to be dismissed on the grounds of limitation, want of cause of action, suppression of material facts and the principles governing finality of litigation.

 

107.            That the plaintiff is not entitled to recover possession of the suit property from the present defendants.

 

108.            That the plaintiff has failed to establish any present title or superior right which would entitle him to seek eviction of the present defendants.

 

109.            That the defendants deny that they are trespassers or persons having no right, title or interest in the suit property.

 

110.            That the plaintiff cannot obtain a decree for possession merely by alleging that he became the absolute owner after the death of his parents.

 

111.            That the plaintiff is required to establish his own title and cannot succeed merely by attempting to point out alleged defects in the defendants' case.

 

112.            That the plaintiff is therefore not entitled to any declaration, recovery of possession, injunction or any other consequential relief as prayed for.

 

113.            That save and except what has been expressly admitted herein, all allegations, statements, averments, submissions and contentions contained in the plaint are denied.

 

114.            That no statement contained in the plaint shall be deemed to have been admitted merely because the same has not been dealt with in identical language or seriatim, and the plaintiff is put to strict proof of all matters not expressly admitted.

 

115.            That the defendants reserve the right to make further submissions and to place additional documents and evidence on record, if required, in accordance with law and subject to the leave of this Learned Court.

 

116.            That the defendants further reserve their right to amend, alter or supplement this Written Statement, if any subsequent fact, document or circumstance necessitates such amendment in accordance with law.

 

In the facts and circumstances stated hereinabove, it is most respectfully prayed that Your Honour may graciously be pleased to;

a) dismiss the instant Title Suit No. 107 of 2024 as being misconceived, not maintainable and devoid of merits;

 

b) hold that the plaintiff has failed to establish any subsisting right, title or interest in the suit property on the basis of the allegations made in the plaint;

 

c) hold that the plaintiff's claim is barred by limitation;

 

d) hold that the suit is barred by the principles of res judicata and/or constructive res judicata and/or the principles governing finality of judicial proceedings, insofar as applicable;

 

e) hold that the plaintiff has suppressed material facts relating to the Family Settlement Deed dated 16.07.1992, the Deed of Revocation/Cancellation dated 21.12.1993, the revocation of licence dated 29.06.1995, Title Suit No. 491 of 1995, the decree passed therein, Title Execution No. 36 of 1995 and the subsequent Title Suit No. 329 of 1997;

 

f) reject the plaintiff's claim for declaration that the Deed of Revocation/Cancellation dated 21.12.1993 is void, illegal, invalid or inoperative;

 

g) reject the plaintiff's claim for recovery of possession and/or eviction of the present defendants from the suit property;

 

h) dismiss all consequential reliefs claimed by the plaintiff;

 

i) award exemplary costs of the suit in favour of the present defendants and against the plaintiff;

 

j) pass such other or further order or orders as Your Honour may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice, equity and good conscience.

 

And for this act of kindness, the defendants as in duty bound shall ever pray.

 

VERIFICATION

 

I, Smt. Riya Chakborty, Defendant No. 1(a)(ii) in the instant suit, do hereby solemnly affirm and state that the statements contained in paragraphs 1 to 113 hereinabove are true and correct to my knowledge and belief, based upon the records available to me and information received and believed by me to be true, and that I have not knowingly suppressed any material fact.

Verified at Alipore, South 24 Parganas, West Bengal, on this ____ day of August, 2026.

 

 

 

 

Defendant No. 1(a)(ii)
Smt. Riya Chakborty

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

AFFIDAVIT

 

I, Smt. Riya Chakborty, daughter of ____________________, aged about ______ years, by faith Hindu, by occupation ____________________, residing at ____________________________________________, do hereby solemnly affirm and declare as follows;

 

1.   That I am the Defendant No. 1(a)(ii) in the instant suit and the Defendant No. 1(a)(i), namely Sri Somnath Chakraborty, is my brother.

 

2.   That I have been duly authorised by the Defendant No. 1(a)(i) to affirm this affidavit on behalf of the substituted Defendant Nos. 1(a)(i) and 1(a)(ii), and as such I am competent and duly authorised to swear and affirm this affidavit.

 

3.   That I am well acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the instant case and have personal knowledge of the matters stated herein and/or have derived knowledge thereof from the records of the case and the documents available to the defendants.

 

4.   That I have carefully read and understood the accompanying Written Statement filed on behalf of the substituted Defendant Nos. 1(a)(i) and 1(a)(ii).

 

5.   That the statements contained in the said Written Statement, insofar as they relate to facts within my knowledge, are true and correct to my knowledge and belief, and the legal submissions contained therein are based upon legal advice which I believe to be correct.

 

6.   That the statements made hereinabove are true to the best of my knowledge and belief and the rest are my respectful submissions before this Learned Court.

 

 

 

DEPONENT

Identified by me,

 

Advocate

 

N O T A R Y