I have studied the uploaded Memo of
Appeal. The principal defence emerging from the record is that the Respondent’s
transaction was pleaded by the Appellant as an investment/security
transaction, that the flat had already been sold, and that the District
Commission nevertheless directed delivery of possession and
execution/registration of conveyance.
For the Appellant, I would structure
the oral/written arguments around maintainability, nature of transaction,
impossibility of the relief, and error in granting specific performance without
properly determining the underlying contractual/property issues.
BRIEF
NOTES OF ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
I.
The impugned order proceeds on an erroneous appreciation of the nature of the
transaction
- The Learned District Commission failed to appreciate
the specific defence of the Appellant that the transaction between the
parties was not a conventional consumer transaction for rendering housing
service, but was substantially connected with investment of money,
the agreement having been treated by the Appellant as a security document.
- The Appellant had specifically pleaded that the money
received from the Respondent was liable to be refunded with prevailing
banking interest and that the Consumer Complaint was premature.
- Therefore, the primary question which required
determination was what was the true and substantive nature of the
transaction, rather than merely proceeding upon the nomenclature of
the Agreement.
- It is settled that the substance of the transaction and
the actual rights and obligations of the parties have to be examined. In Faqir
Chand Gulati v. Uppal Agencies Pvt. Ltd., the Supreme Court emphasized
that the nature and substance of an agreement, rather than merely its
description, determines its legal character.
II.
The Respondent was required to establish that he was a “consumer” and that
there was “deficiency in service”
- The jurisdiction of the Consumer Commission is
dependent upon the existence of a consumer dispute within the
meaning of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.
- Merely because an Agreement for Sale relating to a flat
exists, every dispute arising from such agreement does not automatically
become a consumer dispute.
- The Respondent was required to establish:
- that he hired/availed a service for consideration;
- that the Appellant was providing a service;
- that there was deficiency in such service; and
- that the relief claimed flowed from such deficiency.
- The Appellant's case is that the transaction was
essentially one involving investment/security and not a straightforward
consumer-service transaction. This issue required a proper finding based
upon the pleadings, evidence, payment records and surrounding circumstances.
- The Supreme Court in Faqir Chand Gulati v. Uppal
Agencies Pvt. Ltd., (2008) 10 SCC 345, explained that where a genuine
joint venture exists, the parties are co-adventurers and the relationship
is not that of consumer and service provider; the actual character of the
transaction has to be determined from its terms and substance.
III.
Mere execution of an Agreement for Sale does not dispense with proof of the
consumer-service relationship
- The Respondent's prayer was not confined to compensation
for an established deficiency in service. The principal relief granted was
a direction to hand over possession and execute and register a deed of
conveyance upon receipt of the balance consideration.
- The nature of the relief demonstrates that the real
controversy concerns enforcement of contractual rights relating to
immovable property.
- Where the dispute is fundamentally one of enforcement
of contractual obligations under an agreement for sale, the Commission
must carefully examine whether the ingredients of a consumer dispute are
actually made out.
- In Mangilal Soni v. T. Marappa, NCDRC held that
where the dispute is essentially non-performance by a vendor under an
agreement to sell, the appropriate remedy may lie before the competent
civil court for specific performance or other appropriate relief. The
principle has subsequently been followed in other consumer decisions.
However, this ground should be
argued cautiously, because there are Supreme Court
and Calcutta High Court authorities recognizing that consumer fora can, in
appropriate housing-service cases, direct execution of conveyance. Therefore,
the stronger formulation is that in the present case the Commission failed
to first establish the necessary consumer-service relationship and deficiency
in service before granting such relief.
IV.
The District Commission failed to properly consider the Appellant's specific
defence that the flat had already been sold
- A very material defence of the Appellant was that the
subject flat had already been sold and was no longer in his occupation or
possession. This was expressly pleaded in the appeal.
- Once such a plea was specifically raised, the Learned
District Commission ought to have considered:
(a) whether the Appellant continued to have title or
possession;
(b) whether the Appellant had legal capacity to convey the
property;
(c) whether any subsequent purchaser/third-party interest
existed;
(d) whether the subsequent purchaser was a necessary party; and
(e) whether the direction for conveyance could legally and
effectively be implemented.
- An adjudicatory order must be capable of lawful
implementation. A direction to convey an immovable property cannot be
sustained mechanically when the person against whom the direction is
issued asserts that he no longer owns or possesses the property.
- The Supreme Court in Fortune Infrastructure (Now
Known as Hicon Infrastructure) v. Trevor D'Lima, (2018) 5 SCC 442,
considered a situation where the property had been transferred to a third
party and emphasized the consequences flowing from the seller's
inability/unwillingness to transfer the property.
- The Appellant therefore submits that the Commission
ought to have examined the effect of the alleged subsequent sale before
directing possession and conveyance.
V.
The relief granted travels beyond a simple consumer deficiency claim
- The operative portion of the impugned order directs the
Appellant to:
- hand over possession of the “B” Schedule flat;
- execute and register the deed of conveyance;
- receive the balance consideration;
- pay Rs.30,000/- compensation; and
- pay Rs.8,000/- litigation costs.
- Thus, the principal relief is effectively enforcement
of the alleged contractual right to obtain the immovable property.
- The Commission could exercise such jurisdiction only
after properly determining that the agreement represented a
consumer-service arrangement and that the failure complained of
constituted deficiency in service.
- The impugned order, according to the Appellant, does
not adequately deal with the defence that the transaction was an
investment/security arrangement and that the flat had already been sold.
VI.
The complaint was premature and the Appellant's offer of refund was material
- The Appellant had pleaded that he was prepared to
refund the money received from the Respondent together with prevailing
banking interest.
- This aspect assumes considerable significance because
the Respondent's alleged entitlement to the particular flat depended upon
the continuing existence and enforceability of the contractual
arrangement.
- If the property had ceased to be available with the
Appellant, the Commission ought to have examined whether the appropriate
relief, if any, was refund with reasonable interest/compensation,
rather than directing conveyance of property which the Appellant claimed
he no longer possessed.
- The Supreme Court in Fortune Infrastructure v.
Trevor D'Lima recognized the importance of considering appropriate
monetary relief where transfer of the property itself cannot be effected.
VII.
The finding of the District Commission is not supported by adequate
consideration of the defence evidence
- The Appellant participated in the proceeding and filed
his written version, evidence on affidavit and other pleadings. The appeal
records that the Appellant specifically raised the above defences.
- The impugned order, however, required to deal with the
material defence of:
“investment/security transaction +
refund with interest + sale of flat + non-availability of possession.”
- A decision affecting valuable contractual and property
rights ought to contain findings on these material issues.
- The Appellant can therefore contend that the impugned
order suffers from non-consideration of material evidence and material
pleadings, resulting in miscarriage of justice.
VIII.
Important distinction regarding Sunil Kohli
- The Respondent may rely upon Sunil Kohli v. Purearth
Infrastructure Ltd., Civil Appeal Nos.9004-9005 of 2018, decided on 1
October 2019, where the Supreme Court held that purchase of a commercial
premises does not by itself exclude a person from being a consumer where
the premises are intended to be used personally for earning livelihood
through self-employment.
- The said decision does not automatically answer the
present case, because the Appellant's defence is not merely that the
property was intended for commercial use. The Appellant's case goes to the
very character of the transaction, namely that it was an
investment/security arrangement and not the conventional hiring/availing
of housing services.
- Accordingly, the Appellant should distinguish Sunil
Kohli on facts rather than attempting to contend that every purchaser
of a property is outside the Consumer Protection Act.
Judicial References — Most Useful for the Appellant
|
Sl. |
Judicial
reference |
Proposition
useful to Appellant |
|
1 |
Faqir Chand Gulati v. Uppal
Agencies Pvt. Ltd., (2008) 10 SCC 345 |
Nature/substance of transaction
determines whether relationship is consumer-service provider or genuine joint
venture/co-adventure. |
|
2 |
Fortune Infrastructure (Now Known
as Hicon Infrastructure) v. Trevor D'Lima,
(2018) 5 SCC 442 |
Consequences where seller/developer
transfers property to a third party; appropriate relief must be considered
where property cannot be transferred. |
|
3 |
Mangilal Soni v. T. Marappa, NCDRC, 25.03.2011 |
Pure non-performance of an
agreement to sell may require remedy before competent civil court; useful for
challenging a complaint that is essentially contractual. |
|
4 |
Sunil Kohli v. Purearth
Infrastructure Ltd., Civil Appeal Nos.
9004-9005/2018, decided 01.10.2019 |
Commercial purpose/self-employment
test; useful principally for distinguishing the Respondent's case depending
on evidence. |
|
5 |
Smt. Rita Das v. Mrs. Jayashri
Ghosh & Ors., Calcutta High Court, 14.12.2011 |
Important Calcutta authority
concerning agreement for sale, consumer jurisdiction and
execution/registration of conveyance. It should be distinguished rather than
ignored. |
A
particularly important caution
I would not make the
proposition “Consumer Commission has absolutely no jurisdiction to order
execution of a sale deed” the central ground. The Calcutta High Court has
taken a contrary view in appropriate circumstances in Rita Das, relying
upon Supreme Court authority.
The stronger appellate argument is:
Even assuming that a Consumer
Commission possesses jurisdiction in an appropriate housing transaction to
direct execution of conveyance, such jurisdiction could not properly be
exercised in the present case without first determining whether the Respondent
was a consumer, whether the transaction was genuinely a consumer-service
transaction, whether deficiency in service was established, and whether the
Appellant continued to have title/possession and legal capacity to convey the
subject flat.
That formulation avoids an overbroad
proposition and directly attacks the factual and legal foundation of the
particular impugned order.
Suggested
final prayer in argument
The Appellant may therefore submit
that the impugned order dated 01.12.2023 be set aside and CC/361/2021 be
dismissed; alternatively, if the State Commission finds that some
monetary liability is established, the relief may be appropriately moulded by
directing refund of the amount actually received with reasonable interest,
instead of compelling conveyance of a property which, according to the
Appellant's specific case, had already been sold. The appeal itself seeks
setting aside of the impugned order and dismissal of the complaint, with an
alternative prayer for stay.
If this is to be filed as the
Appellant's Brief Notes of Argument, I would recommend converting the above
into a formal 4–6 page “Brief Notes of Argument on behalf of the Appellant”
with numbered propositions, statutory provisions under the Consumer Protection
Act, 2019, and a separate “List of Judicial Authorities” with SCC/AIR citations.
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